Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is al Qaeda’s Yemen-based affiliate and has become the most operational al Qaeda node. The organization seeks to attack the United States and maintains the capability to conduct terrorist attacks. Understanding AQAP’s leadership will help define the challenge the U.S. faces, and underpin strategies to defeat the threat that AQAP poses to the United States and its allies.
For more, please see: www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/zimmerman-aqap-leaders-and-networks-september-27-2012.
It englights the era of Iraq under the leadership of Saddam hussein untill he was executed. I have analysed Saddam's tenure including Iran-Iraq war, both Gulf wars and Substance of Anarchy embedled in Iraq while scrutinizes his policies and Baa'th agenda.
It englights the era of Iraq under the leadership of Saddam hussein untill he was executed. I have analysed Saddam's tenure including Iran-Iraq war, both Gulf wars and Substance of Anarchy embedled in Iraq while scrutinizes his policies and Baa'th agenda.
Explains background information on the volatile country of Syria, including conflicts within the Muslim groups and with Muslims and other religions in the country.
The Arab Spring is a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests (both non-violent and violent), riots, and civil wars in the Arab world that began on 18 December 2010 and spread throughout the countries of the Arab League and surroundings.
Source: Looking Glass Publications
By Linda Lavender, Writer / Robin Barnett, Editor
Understanding the past proxies is relevant to the recent unrest in the Middle East, which is often mischaracterized as a purely sectarian conflict. While clearly there is a sectarian component to ongoing unrest in the region, the conflicts, both latent and manifest within Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen are often reported as a struggle between opposing religious sects - Sunnis and Shiites. However, according to F. Gregory Gause of the Brookings Institution, the best way to understand regional politics and the current unrest in the Middle East is through a Cold War framework between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Iran where the central issue is that of regional hegemony.
I was fascinated by the Arab Spring phenomenon (2011-2014) which reveals how complex the social-political situation in MENA (Middle East and North Africa) had been. Many of my countrymen don't understand the realities there, instead believing conspiracy theories which simplified things to merely "US/Israel/Zionist vs Islam/muslims".
This presentation is my attempt to summarize the history and geopolitical complexities and to debunk some conspiracy theories related to Arab Spring.My sources are multiple articles in CNN, TIME, Al-Jazeera, Al-Monitor, Stratfor, Foreign Policy, among others.
I closed this ever expanding presentation in the beginning of 2014 since it became obvious that the revolution season was over and multiple failures manifested in many countries.
Armed groups, the 'Sudan Liberation Army' (SLA) and 'Justice and Equality Movement' (JEM), began the war. Reasons are cited as lack of economic development which demands a greater share of country’s resources and exclusion from the political administration of Khartoum.
Attacks on towns, government establishments and civilians in Darfur resulted in the deaths of hundreds of policemen and civilians and the breakdown of law and order in Darfur. An area where inhabitants depend on natural resources the severe impact of the continuing climatic changes and droughts on accessibility to land and water has a detrimental effect on the livelihood in Darfur as well as the rest of Sudan.
This slide deck presents some of the insights gleaned from a data set in Ntrepid Corporation’s Timestream application that is an open-source collection of reported ISIS-linked activity in Yemen. The full case study is available: http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/exploring-isis-yemen-zimmerman-july-24-2015.
The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is attempting to expand its footprint in Yemen. ISIS declared an Islamic Caliphate on June 29, 2014, under the leadership of the new Caliph, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. The return of the Caliphate under Baghdadi placed an obligation on all Muslims to pledge allegiance to him, according to ISIS. Al Qaeda broadly dismisses the legitimacy of the Caliphate under ISIS, and ISIS and al Qaeda are now in competition for the leadership of the global jihadist movement.
Al Qaeda’s Yemen-based affiliate, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), dominates the jihadist fight in the country and it remains the greatest direct threat to the United States from the al Qaeda network. AQAP leadership reaffirmed its allegiance to al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri in November 2014, publicly rejecting the legitimacy of the Islamic Caliphate. The 2015 collapse of the central Yemeni state created opportunities for AQAP to exploit, and the group is expanding its presence in Yemen.
The initial reaction to ISIS in Yemen was muted, but the group has begun to make inroads as the conflict there protracts. ISIS began claiming regular attacks in Yemen as of March 2015 and now operates in at least eight Yemeni governorates.
WHAT: It is a global militant Islamist and takfiri organisation.
FOUNDER: Abdullah Yusuf Azzam
Osama bin Laden
LOCATED: Peshawar, Pakistan
WHEN: August 1988 and late 1989
Explains background information on the volatile country of Syria, including conflicts within the Muslim groups and with Muslims and other religions in the country.
The Arab Spring is a revolutionary wave of demonstrations and protests (both non-violent and violent), riots, and civil wars in the Arab world that began on 18 December 2010 and spread throughout the countries of the Arab League and surroundings.
Source: Looking Glass Publications
By Linda Lavender, Writer / Robin Barnett, Editor
Understanding the past proxies is relevant to the recent unrest in the Middle East, which is often mischaracterized as a purely sectarian conflict. While clearly there is a sectarian component to ongoing unrest in the region, the conflicts, both latent and manifest within Lebanon, Iraq, Syria and Yemen are often reported as a struggle between opposing religious sects - Sunnis and Shiites. However, according to F. Gregory Gause of the Brookings Institution, the best way to understand regional politics and the current unrest in the Middle East is through a Cold War framework between Saudi Arabia and the Republic of Iran where the central issue is that of regional hegemony.
I was fascinated by the Arab Spring phenomenon (2011-2014) which reveals how complex the social-political situation in MENA (Middle East and North Africa) had been. Many of my countrymen don't understand the realities there, instead believing conspiracy theories which simplified things to merely "US/Israel/Zionist vs Islam/muslims".
This presentation is my attempt to summarize the history and geopolitical complexities and to debunk some conspiracy theories related to Arab Spring.My sources are multiple articles in CNN, TIME, Al-Jazeera, Al-Monitor, Stratfor, Foreign Policy, among others.
I closed this ever expanding presentation in the beginning of 2014 since it became obvious that the revolution season was over and multiple failures manifested in many countries.
Armed groups, the 'Sudan Liberation Army' (SLA) and 'Justice and Equality Movement' (JEM), began the war. Reasons are cited as lack of economic development which demands a greater share of country’s resources and exclusion from the political administration of Khartoum.
Attacks on towns, government establishments and civilians in Darfur resulted in the deaths of hundreds of policemen and civilians and the breakdown of law and order in Darfur. An area where inhabitants depend on natural resources the severe impact of the continuing climatic changes and droughts on accessibility to land and water has a detrimental effect on the livelihood in Darfur as well as the rest of Sudan.
This slide deck presents some of the insights gleaned from a data set in Ntrepid Corporation’s Timestream application that is an open-source collection of reported ISIS-linked activity in Yemen. The full case study is available: http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/exploring-isis-yemen-zimmerman-july-24-2015.
The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is attempting to expand its footprint in Yemen. ISIS declared an Islamic Caliphate on June 29, 2014, under the leadership of the new Caliph, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. The return of the Caliphate under Baghdadi placed an obligation on all Muslims to pledge allegiance to him, according to ISIS. Al Qaeda broadly dismisses the legitimacy of the Caliphate under ISIS, and ISIS and al Qaeda are now in competition for the leadership of the global jihadist movement.
Al Qaeda’s Yemen-based affiliate, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), dominates the jihadist fight in the country and it remains the greatest direct threat to the United States from the al Qaeda network. AQAP leadership reaffirmed its allegiance to al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri in November 2014, publicly rejecting the legitimacy of the Islamic Caliphate. The 2015 collapse of the central Yemeni state created opportunities for AQAP to exploit, and the group is expanding its presence in Yemen.
The initial reaction to ISIS in Yemen was muted, but the group has begun to make inroads as the conflict there protracts. ISIS began claiming regular attacks in Yemen as of March 2015 and now operates in at least eight Yemeni governorates.
WHAT: It is a global militant Islamist and takfiri organisation.
FOUNDER: Abdullah Yusuf Azzam
Osama bin Laden
LOCATED: Peshawar, Pakistan
WHEN: August 1988 and late 1989
AQIS Al Qaeda in Indian Sub Continent announced by Ayman al Zawahiri operates through affiliates and has no foot print per se of the parent organisation. In the Bangladesh-India-Myanmar corridor the AQIS has a number of old and new groups operating supported by the base organisation Af Pak region. Here is a preview
Degrading al Qaeda leadership is central to American counterterrorism strategy, but the leaders today are not the same as they were in 2001. Al Qaeda leaders are no longer necessarily connected by formal networks and many operate outside of any formal affiliation to the al Qaeda network. Such a development makes it insufficient to rely solely on group membership or public identification to isolate the al Qaeda leadership group.
For more information, please visit http://www.criticalthreats.org/al-qaeda/hagen-aqim-leaders-and-networks-march-27-2014
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) operates cells in Libya that may support external attack networks in Europe. The U.S. conducted airstrikes on ISIS training camps southwest of Sirte city on January 19 that targeted operatives planning attacks in Europe. These operatives may be connected to the ISIS-linked militant who attacked a Christmas market in Berlin on December 19, 2016. The U.S. strikes disrupted ISIS’s efforts to re-establish combat capabilities after the loss of its former stronghold in Sirte in late 2016. Airstrikes alone cannot defeat ISIS in Libya, however. Libyan factions are focused on protecting their interests in the country’s civil war. The resulting security vacuum allows Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to operate throughout the country. ISIS will continue to use Libya as a support zone for external operations as long as the civil war continues.
2. Al Qaeda affiliates are developing more lethal explosive attack capabilities in Mali. Al Murabitoun, an affiliate of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), conducted a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack on a military base in Gao city, central Mali, on January 18. The attack, which killed more than 70 people, signals a step-change in al Murabitoun’s bomb-making capabilities. AQIM is attempting to undermine UN-backed peace accords in northern Mali. The January 18 attack targeted a joint base established under the peace accords in an effort to spark conflict between rival factions. AQIM seeks to co-opt local movements that share its short-term goals, including the desire to expel Western influence from the region.
3. The Saudi-led coalition renewed efforts to seize territory from the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an effort to reset political negotiations. Hadi government forces, backed by coalition air support, seized Mokha port and attacked two al Houthi-Saleh bases in Taiz governorate on January 23 and 24. These operations aim to disrupt al Houthi-Saleh supply lines into Taiz city and pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction to accept terms that favor the Hadi government and its supporters. The coalition is prioritizing the fight against the al Houthi-Saleh faction in Taiz over operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in southern Yemen. AQAP is seizing the opportunity to resurge in its historic safe havens.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The death of the “Blind Sheikh,” Omar Abdul Rahman, may inspire retaliatory attacks against U.S. targets. Abdul Rahman, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, died of natural causes in prison in North Carolina on February 18. Al Qaeda’s General Command called for revenge attacks on Americans and U.S. interests and accused the U.S. of killing Abdul Rahman by withholding his medication in prison. The joint statement from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) eulogizing Abdul Rahman and calling for revenge attacks indicates the continued close coordination between the two affiliates. Al Shabaab released a separate statement. Al Qaeda’s al Nafeer bulletin released Abdul Rahman’s will, in which he accused the U.S. of poisoning and abusing him.
2. Al Shabaab increased its operational tempo in Mogadishu in an effort to disrupt Somalia’s new administration. Al Shabaab militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) in a crowded market in Mogadishu on February 19, killing dozens of people. A senior al Shabaab official threatened a “vicious war” against the new government on February 19. Al Shabaab is also conducting an assassination campaign targeting government officials and elders who supported the electoral process. Former president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud ceremonially transferred power to new President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo on February 16 in a ceremony that al Shabaab attempted to disrupt with mortar fire.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may exploit famine conditions in the Lake Chad Basin to increase recruitment and build a local support base. This faction, also known as ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya (West Africa Province), seeks to attack Western targets throughout West Africa. It has built ties to local populations that allow it to access supplies and deliver aid in the midst of widespread food insecurity. A rival Boko Haram faction led by Abubakr Shekau has alienated the local population may lose militants to the better-resourced ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya, which will in turn expand the scope and scale of its operations against regional states.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. U.S. administration officials have signaled that the U.S. may take a more aggressive stance against the al Houthis in Yemen to counter Iranian influence. An aggressive position against the al Houthi movement, which is not an Iranian proxy, would further isolate the al Houthis and drive them further into Iran’s orbit. U.S. intervention against the al Houthis would strengthen the Saudi-led coalition and its preferred government in Yemen, led by internationally recognized President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. The Hadi government has struggled to gain legitimacy even in territory in southern Yemen under its control. Former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the al Houthis’ current partner, possesses significant political capital, military capabilities, and public support.
2. Al Shabaab may be expanding terrain under its control, using the sanctuary that it retained in south-central Somalia to support operations. Predicted food shortages may make conditions more permissive for al Shabaab. Somalia is suffering from a severe drought that may cause widespread hunger on par with the 2010-2011 famine, which killed more than 250,000 people. The Somali government is ill-prepared to address a crisis of this magnitude. An insufficient aid response from the government would allow al Shabaab to position itself as a legitimate source of relief and governance. External factors, including the likely expulsion of Somali refugees from Kenya before Kenyan general elections, may exacerbate the crisis in Somalia.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) may be facilitating the growth of a Salafi-jihadi insurgency within the Fulani ethnic group across borders in the Sahel region. The Macina Liberation Front (MLF), an ethnically Fulani AQIM-associated group, is challenging the state in central Mali by forcing secular schools to remain closed in Mopti region. Ansar al Islam, a related Salafi-jihadi Fulani group, is pursuing a similar campaign in Burkina Faso. A Fulani insurgency is also challenging the Nigerian state, though Salafi-jihadi organizations have not yet infiltrated this movement. AQIM and other Salafi-jihadi groups may use ties into the Fulani community to expand their area of operations in the Sahel. AQIM has tapped into Tuareg networks to advance its objectives in West Africa in the past.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Somali parliamentarians elected Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo as the president of Somalia on February 8. President Farmajo must now form a government to address a host of challenges. These challenges include pervasive corruption and an impending food crisis, caused by a region-wide drought. Widespread hunger will tax resources throughout East Africa and may reduce the ability of Somali forces and regional partners to sustain pressure on al Shabaab. Al Shabaab overran two Somali military camps and ambushed a Somali convoy in south-central Somalia on February 12, demonstrating tactical sophistication that will test the new administration.
2. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may escalate operations targeting southern Saudi Arabia. Cross-border attacks by al Houthi-Saleh forces killed approximately twelve Saudi Border Guards in a nine-day period. These casualties far exceed the average rate of deaths reported by Saudi Arabia since the beginning of the Saudi-led coalition campaign in Yemen in March 2015. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may pursue escalation in the border region as a counter to a Saudi-led coalition-backed campaign on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, which threatens the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s access to the Red Sea. Al Houthi movement leader Abdul Malik al Houthi claimed, likely falsely, to possess ballistic missiles capable of striking Riyadh during a televised address on February 10. The al Houthi movement’s aggressive position toward Saudi Arabia reflects a long-standing conflict over the Saudi-Yemeni border, not necessarily growing ties between the al Houthi movement and Iran. A major faction of the al Houthi movement opposes Iranian control, and the group is not an Iranian proxy.
3. Armed groups set conditions that may cause conflict to escalate in central and western Libya. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar dropped out of long-awaited talks with the head of Libya’s UN-backed unity government on February 14, signaling his intent to prioritize a military solution. Anti-Islamist forces under Haftar’s command intensified a campaign against Islamist militants in contested central Libya. More powerful Islamist factions may rally to support these militants, increasing the likelihood that Libya’s most powerful factions will resume active hostilities for control of the country’s oil-rich center. Hardline Islamist militias in Tripoli formed a new coalition to contest control of Libya’s capital and undermine the UN-backed government. An outbreak of fighting in either Tripoli or central Libya would undermine the country’s fragile economic recovery and reduce pressure on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Houthi-Saleh forces conducted a small-boat suicide attack on a Saudi warship in the Red Sea, marking the use of a new asymmetric tactic. Al Houthi-Saleh militants attacked a Saudi frigate near al Hudaydah port in the Red Sea on January 30. The attack may have been intended for a U.S. vessel, according to U.S. defense officials. The al Houthi-Saleh faction last threatened U.S. freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, a critical shipping lane, in October 2016, when militants fired missiles at the USS Mason. The use of suicide boats may indicate that al Houthi-Saleh missile capabilities are limited due to U.S. retaliatory actions following USS Mason attacks. Alternately, the suicide boat attack may be intended to generate an American or Saudi response against local traffickers and fisherman, which would increase popular backlash against the Saudi-led coalition campaign in western Yemen. Iranian support for the January 30 attack is possible but not confirmed.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA)’s battle for Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, is culminating. The LNA is ascendant in eastern and central Libya, lowering the likelihood that LNA commander Field Marshall Haftar will participate in a negotiated settlement to end Libya’s civil war. It is bolstered by control of critical oil infrastructure and alleged Russian military support. The LNA will now prioritize the fight for Derna city, which is controlled by an Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia. The LNA’s military expansion drives moderate Islamist groups to cooperate with or support extremist actors, including Salafi-jihadi groups linked to al Qaeda.
3. Al Shabaab has momentum against the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is regaining territory in the Lower Shabelle region. Al Shabaab conducted a multi-phase attack to drive security forces out of Afgoi, a strategic location less than 20 miles away from Mogadishu, between January 19 and 24. Al Shabaab also continued a pattern of mass-casualty attacks targeting AMISOM bases. Militants conducted a high-casualty attack involving multiple vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) on a Kenyan base at Kolbio town near the Kenyan-Somali border on January 27. The Kolbio attack may signal the start of a campaign to raise the cost of Kenya’s involvement in Somalia in advance of Kenyan elections.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri called for jihadists to prioritize the fight against the United States and its allies and rejected the ideology of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in a 14-minute audio message released on January 5. He reiterated major themes from al Qaeda’s strategic doctrine, including the group’s position as a defender of oppressed Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to rebut ISIS and reinforce al Qaeda’s role as the vanguard of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
2. The Saudi-led coalition is supporting an offensive intended to capture key sites in Yemen’s Taiz governorate and increase military pressure on al Houthi-Saleh forces. Internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government launched “Operation Golden Spear” on January 7 in an effort to drive al Houthi-Saleh forces away from the strategic Bab al Mandeb Strait. The coalition-backed forces likely intend to pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction militarily in an effort to expedite a politically negotiated settlement. They also seek to secure the Bab al Mandab Strait by removing the al Houthi-Saleh presence from southwestern Yemen. A cessation of hostilities is unlikely to hold while local conflicts remain unresolved, however.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, are taking advantage of heightened civil conflict in Libya to reset conditions and prepare for attacks. Libyan actors, including U.S. partners, are dedicating limited security resources to political objectives at the expense of counterterrorism operations. ISIS and al Qaeda-linked militants broke out of besieged neighborhoods in Benghazi, raising the risk of attacks on military targets and oil infrastructure throughout Libya. ISIS militants are also gathering in western Libya, where the group is preparing for future operations to disrupt the Libyan state. Al Qaeda-linked militants have also signaled preparations for attacks in the near term.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The U.S. may expand its military operations in Somalia to increase pressure on al Shabaab, which has resurged and is set to make additional gains in 2017. The Pentagon recommended the deployment of additional U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to cooperate with Somali forces for counter-al Shabaab operations. The Pentagon also called for reduced restrictions on U.S. airstrikes targeting al Shabaab. Al Shabaab is attempting to delegitimize the Somali Federal Government (SFG), led by newly elected President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, by degrading security in Mogadishu and taking control of towns where counterterrorism forces do not operate. Al Shabaab may also exploit widespread famine that could further challenge the SFG.
2. Russia is attempting to rally U.S. support for its preferred strongman in Libya as part of a broader strategy to push back against the influence of the U.S. and NATO. Moscow’s support for Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar strengthens its ties to Cairo, the LNA’s main backer. Russia is actively working to draw Egypt away from the U.S. sphere of influence. Russia also seeks to leverage its support for Haftar to secure military basing on the Mediterranean, expanding on the strategy it has pursued successfully in Syria. Moscow has also positioned itself as a broker between Libya’s rival factions and will host talks in the coming days. Finally, Russia is pursuing economic interests in Libya, including a large oil deal signed in February 2017.
3. Al Qaeda senior leaders are under increased pressure from U.S. targeting. They relocated to Syria beginning in 2013 to operate from the sanctuary enjoyed by al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, and to provide strategic guidance for the global network and for the Syrian war. A U.S. airstrike killed the deputy leader of al Qaeda, Abu al Khayr al Masri, in Idlib Province, Syria, on February 26. Al Qaeda operates alongside Syrian opposition groups within the group, the Tahrir al Sham Assembly. It is actively consolidating the Syrian armed opposition under its leadership.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
31052024_First India Newspaper Jaipur.pdfFIRST INDIA
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Find Latest India News and Breaking News these days from India on Politics, Business, Entertainment, Technology, Sports, Lifestyle and Coronavirus News in India and the world over that you can't miss. For real time update Visit our social media handle. Read First India NewsPaper in your morning replace. Visit First India.
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In a May 9, 2024 paper, Juri Opitz from the University of Zurich, along with Shira Wein and Nathan Schneider form Georgetown University, discussed the importance of linguistic expertise in natural language processing (NLP) in an era dominated by large language models (LLMs).
The authors explained that while machine translation (MT) previously relied heavily on linguists, the landscape has shifted. “Linguistics is no longer front and center in the way we build NLP systems,” they said. With the emergence of LLMs, which can generate fluent text without the need for specialized modules to handle grammar or semantic coherence, the need for linguistic expertise in NLP is being questioned.
हम आग्रह करते हैं कि जो भी सत्ता में आए, वह संविधान का पालन करे, उसकी रक्षा करे और उसे बनाए रखे।" प्रस्ताव में कुल तीन प्रमुख हस्तक्षेप और उनके तंत्र भी प्रस्तुत किए गए। पहला हस्तक्षेप स्वतंत्र मीडिया को प्रोत्साहित करके, वास्तविकता पर आधारित काउंटर नैरेटिव का निर्माण करके और सत्तारूढ़ सरकार द्वारा नियोजित मनोवैज्ञानिक हेरफेर की रणनीति का मुकाबला करके लोगों द्वारा निर्धारित कथा को बनाए रखना और उस पर कार्यकरना था।
role of women and girls in various terror groupssadiakorobi2
Women have three distinct types of involvement: direct involvement in terrorist acts; enabling of others to commit such acts; and facilitating the disengagement of others from violent or extremist groups.
‘वोटर्स विल मस्ट प्रीवेल’ (मतदाताओं को जीतना होगा) अभियान द्वारा जारी हेल्पलाइन नंबर, 4 जून को सुबह 7 बजे से दोपहर 12 बजे तक मतगणना प्रक्रिया में कहीं भी किसी भी तरह के उल्लंघन की रिपोर्ट करने के लिए खुला रहेगा।
2024 is the point of certainty. Forecast of UIF experts
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula: Leaders and their Networks
1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula:
Leaders and their Networks
Prepared by Katherine Zimmerman
Critical Threats Project Analyst
Gulf of Aden Team Lead
September 27, 2012
Brendan Zegers contributed research to this slide deck.
2. U.S. Policy: Degrading Terrorist Leadership
“Despite Anwar al-Aulaqi’s death, [AQAP] maintains the intent and capability to conduct
anti-U.S. attacks with little to no warning.”
– National Counterterrorism Center Director Matthew G. Olsen, September 19, 2012
• American counterterrorism strategy aims to deny terrorist groups space to
operate, disrupt attempted attacks, and degrade the organization’s
leadership.
• Despite the targeted killings of Awlaki and other AQAP leaders, however, U.S.
strategy in Yemen is achieving only partial and reversible success.
– U.S. strategy in Yemen relies on direct action against AQAP leaders and
supporting local Yemeni security forces to clear and hold safe-havens.
– AQAP has exhibited a depth of leadership and resilience to leaders’ deaths. The
founding leadership also remains intact.
• Targeted killings will weaken AQAP in the short term, but new leaders will
continue to emerge as long as AQAP has a sanctuary in Yemen.
• American strategy in Yemen is not on track to achieve lasting success against
the al Qaeda franchise there. 2
3. What is al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula?
• Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is al Qaeda’s affiliate in
Yemen that formed as a merger between the Yemeni and Saudi
branches in January 2009.
• Previously al Qaeda had separate Saudi and Yemeni branches.
– Saudi Arabia pursued aggressive counter-terrorism actions and effectively
denied al Qaeda operating space within the Kingdom in the mid-2000s.
– Yemen absorbed many of the Saudi al Qaeda operatives, who crossed the
Yemeni-Saudi border and connected with al Qaeda’s Yemeni branch.
– Al Qaeda’s Yemen branch, which had been weakened between 2002 and
2006, resurged after 23 operatives escaped from prison in February 2006 and
benefited from the introduction of Saudi members.
• AQAP has since become al Qaeda’s most operational node and has
attempted to carry out at least three terrorist attacks on the United
States.
3
4. Emergence of AQAP in Yemen
AQAP leadership announced the Featured:
group’s formation in a January
2009 video. al Malahem
Media Foundation
The leadership was identified as:
Produced by AQAP’s media arm Nasser al Wahayshi
- Commander: Nasser al Wahayshi
- Deputy Commander: Said al Shihri
- Military Commander: Qasim al Raymi
- Field Commander: Mohammed al Awfi*
Said al Shihri
The leadership draws on key
figures from al Qaeda’s affiliates
in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
Qasim al Raymi
All four featured leaders had
previously been in American or We Start from Here…
Yemeni custody. and in al Aqsa We Meet
January 12, 2009
* Mohammed al Awfi turned himself in to Mohammed al Awfi
authorities the following month.
4
5. Notable AQAP Leaders and Former Leaders
Saudis and Yemenis make up the leading AQAP figures; nearly all key figures had been detained.
Nasser al Wahayshi Said al Shihri Anwar al Awlaki
Leader / Emir Deputy Leader External Operations
Yemeni Saudi Inspirational Cleric
Escaped from prison GTMO #372 Yemeni-American
Qasim al Raymi Uthman al Ghamdi Fahd al Quso
Military Commander Commander Operational Member
Yemeni Saudi Yemeni
Escaped from prison GTMO #184 Escaped from prison
Ibrahim al Asiri Ibrahim al Rubaish Nayef al Qahtani
Explosives Expert Spiritual Leader Media Official
Saudi Saudi Saudi
Jailed in Saudi Arabia GTMO #192
Adil al Abab Mohammed al Awfi Mohammed al Umdah
Shari’a Official Field Commander Commander
Yemeni Saudi Yemeni
GTMO #333 Escaped from prison
5
Deceased Surrendered Wanted
6. AQAP Leadership’s Shared Histories
• AQAP’s founding leaders were operational before January 2009.
• There are clear points of convergence in the leaders’ histories:
– Nearly all of AQAP’s Saudi leadership was once incarcerated in Guantanamo Bay.
The individuals were transferred from Guantanamo to Saudi Arabia for a
rehabilitation program, and from there, resumed terrorist activities. The Saudis
who joined AQAP are collectively called the “Saudi Eleven.”
– Nearly all of AQAP’s Yemeni leadership was once incarcerated in a Yemeni
political security prison. Of those who had been imprisoned, the majority
participated in a February 2006 prison break. A handful of others either escaped
or gained release prior to 2006.
• Many of AQAP’s founding leaders traveled to the Afghanistan-Pakistan
region in 2001 to fight. It is likely that relationships formed during
their time there persist.
6
7. AQAP Leadership in al Qaeda in Yemen
• Yemen had made progress against al Qaeda in the immediate
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and invasion of Afghanistan; however, a
February 3, 2006 prison break – allegedly facilitated by an insider –
freed operatives who would rise to the head of Yemen’s al Qaeda
branch, and then AQAP.
23 al Qaeda operatives escaped from a Yemeni Political Security Prison in Sana’a
Deceased Surrendered† Wanted
Wahayshi: Named leader of al Qaeda’s
* Yemen branch, and is now emir of AQAP.
*
Raymi: Coordinated terrorist attacks in
* Yemen, such as July 2007 car bomb that
killed eight tourists. Now he is AQAP’s
military commander.
Badawi: Coordinated USS Cole bombing
and remains at large.
7
† Operatives denounced militancy. Those marked by a * are believed to be incarcerated.
8. AQAP’s “Saudi Eleven”
• At least 120 Saudi Guantanamo Deceased
Bay detainees were transferred Surrendered
Wanted
to Saudi Arabia between May
14, 2003 and June 12, 2009.
• Eleven of these individuals
appeared on a February 2009
most-wanted list released by
Saudi Arabia, indicating their
return to terrorist activities.
• All eleven had fled to Yemen
and joined AQAP; two Former Saudi Guantanamo Detainees in AQAP
appeared in AQAP’s January 2009 leadership video.
• One of the transfers of Guantanamo detainees to Saudi Arabia occurred on
November 9, 2007. Five of the 14 transferred detainees are members of the
“Saudi Eleven.” They are: Said al Shihri, Yussef al Shihri, Mohammed al
Awfi, Turki Asiri, and Murtada Magram. 8
9. Osama bin Laden and AQAP Leaders
• AQAP’s leadership members and Osama bin Laden had developed
trust through shared experiences or associates.
• AQAP leadership relationships developed with bin Laden:
– Nasser al Wahayshi had previously served as bin Laden’s personal secretary.
– Mohammed al Umdah was purported to have been a body guard for bin Laden.
– Ibrahim al Rubaish fought in Tora Bora when bin Laden was known to be there.
– Qasim al Raymi claims to have met bin Laden while training at al Farouq camp.
• This personal capital is extremely important to al Qaeda’s network.
– AQAP leader Nasser al Wahayshi asked bin Laden whether Anwar al Awlaki, who
did not personally know the al Qaeda leader, should be given AQAP’s lead role.
– Bin Laden’s response revealed the value he placed on personally knowing an
individual and on the individual’s displayed commitment to the cause.
– Bin Laden wrote regarding Awlaki’s credentials: “We here *in Pakistan+ become
reassured of the people when they go to the line and get examined there.”
[Declassified letter dated August 27, 2010] 9
10. Revelations from the Abbottabad Raid
Declassified letters from West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center
• The private communications provide insights into the relationship al Qaeda
and AQAP, as well as the personal relationship between the two leaderships.
• Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Atiyah Abd al Rahman, were in contact
with AQAP’s top leadership, including: leader Nasser al Wahayshi, deputy
leader Said al Shihri, military commander Qasim al Raymi, and senior leader
Anwar al Awlaki.
• Communications between Wahayshi and the al Qaeda leadership lend
insight into the al Qaeda leadership’s opinion of the Yemeni government as a
U.S. counter-terrorism partner.
• Wahayshi writes: “If you want Sana'a, today is the day.”
– Bin Laden's apparent reluctance to - Was this written just before the beginning of AQAP’s
support the overthrow of Ali territorial offensive in Yemen?
• Bin Laden (possibly written by Atiyah) responds: “We do
Abdullah Saleh suggests that the not see escalation as necessary at this point because we
much-trumpeted counter-terrorism are in the preparation stage; therefore, it is not in our
interest to rush in bringing down the regime.”
partnership between Saleh and the - Did bin Laden’s death affect AQAP’s decision to wage
U.S. was less effective than many an insurgency?
in Washington believed. 10
11. Yemen: AQAP’s Safe Haven
• AQAP’s leadership has operated out of established safe havens in Yemen,
where the group finds sanctuary.
• Historical safe havens in Yemen have existed in the country’s eastern areas.
• These safe havens provide a physical destination for prospective militants.
– Take the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab as an example.
– Deeply religious, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab originally followed a Nigerian
cleric, Sheikh Gumi, who died in 1992. Abdulmutallab later became completely
committed to Anwar al Awlaki’s teachings.
– He went to Yemen to find Awlaki in August 2009.
• The safe havens also allow time and space for recruits to be vetted
before being accepted into AQAP.
– Abdulmutallab expressed his desire to be a suicide bomber for AQAP.
– Awlaki texted Abdulmutallab, initiating a conversation that resulted in a promise
that Awlaki would find a way for Abdulmutallab to be involved in jihad.
11
12. Operational Freedom in Safe Havens
Spent 3 Left Awlaki Received Awlaki Asiri Attempted
days with and met training gave provided to carry out
Awlaki Asiri with AQAP instructions the bomb attack on
Flight 253
• AQAP operatives are able to personally introduce recruits to other
operatives, creating a network of trust.
‒ Awlaki hosted Abdulmutallab for three days in Yemen.
‒ From there, Abdulmutallab was introduced to Ibrahim al Asiri, who discussed
with him would become the December 25, 2009 attack.
• AQAP also runs terrorist training camps in its safe havens in Yemen.
‒ Awlaki approved of Asiri’s plan.
‒ Abdulmutallab then received training at a one of AQAP’s camps.
• The freedom of movement afforded operatives in safe havens
facilitates preparations for a terrorist attack.
‒ After training, Abdulmutallab received instructions from Awlaki to detonate
the bomb, given to him by Asiri, over the United States.
‒ Abdulmutallab then left to carry out the attack. 12
13. For more on AQAP and Yemen, visit
www.criticalthreats.org/yemen