weapon of mass destruction
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THE SUBJECT IS ABOUT WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION
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weapon of mass destruction
- 1. How Serious is the “WMD Terrorism” Threat?: Terrorist Motivations and Capabilities for Using Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons Gary Ackerman Director, WMD Terrorism Research Program Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies E-mail: gary.ackerman@miis.edu Jeffrey Bale Senior Research Associate, WMD Terrorism Research Program Center for Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies E-mail: jeffrey.bale@miis.edu September 28, 2005
- 3. Hype
- 4. Hype
- 5. Hype • Security condition upgrades • Government warnings How far we have come … from 1950s ‘Duck & Cover’ to 2003 ‘Duct tape & Cover your windows’
- 6. Hype or Threat? • Media want to inform us but inevitably sensationalize things. • After Sept 11, government officials don’t want to be accused of being complacent or not warning public, so tend to dwell on worst-case scenarios.
- 10. WMD Terrorism Da tabase
- 11. Incidents per Year Year Excluding Hoaxes Hoaxes Total 1999 53 76 129 2000 77 27 104 2001 68 239 307 2002 56 68 124 2003 54 41 95 2004 28 17 45 2005 37 32 69
- 12. The Empirical Record 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 CBRN Weapon Type Distribution (all incidents) biological chemical combination nuclear radiological unknown
- 13. The Empirical Record 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 CBRN Weapon Type Distribution (hoaxes / threats excluded) biological chemical combination nuclear radiological unknown
- 14. The Empirical Record 250 200 150 100 50 0 Weapon Type Distribution (Use only) biological chemical combination radiological unknown
- 15. The Empirical Record 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Incidents With > 5 Fatalities biological chemical
- 16. The Empirical Record: Casualties 21 1080 Casualties vs. Weapon Type 1506 6633 0 75 0 9000 8000 7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 biological chemical nuclear radiological Injuries Fatalities
- 17. Distribution by Event Type 7 15 20 177 146 2 42 26 55 15 13 145 151 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 Attempted Acquisition False Case Hoax / Prank / Threat Plot Only Possession Threat with Possession Use of Agent Distribution - Event Type 1975 - September 2000 (814 cases) Type 2: Criminally Motivated Type 1: Politically / Ideologically Motivated False case: Not Applicable
- 18. The Empirical Record: Geography Chemical Incident Distribution
- 19. Number of cases by Group Type all biological chemical combination nuclear radiological unknown Criminal Organization 10 2 % Left-wing 36 7 % Lone actor (s) 79 15 % N/A 7 1 % Nationalists / Separatists 100 18 % Religious (cults) 40 7 % Religious (fundamentalists) 54 10 % Right-wing 26 5 % Single-issue 33 6 % Unknown 157 29 % Total 542 100 %
- 20. Number of cases by Motive all biological chemical combination nuclear radiological unknown False Case 1 0 % To Act Because of an Ideology/Belief System 162 30 % To Act on a Personal/Professional Grudge 15 3 % To Establish Ethno-Nationalist Sovereignty 98 18 % To Express Abortion-Related Sentiment 39 7 % To Extort Money/Pure Financial Gain 41 8 % To Fulfill Individualized Objective 43 8 % To Protest Treatment of Animals 9 2 % To Support Other Single-Issue 25 5 % Unknown 110 20 % Total 543 100 %
- 21. Delivery Type for CBRN Attacks 0 50 100 150 Number of Attacks Delivery Type Water Supply Ventilation System Unknown Reaction Device N/A Mail/Letter/Package Jug/Jar/Canister Injection/Projectile Food/Drink Explosive Device Consumer Product Tampering Casual/Personal/Direct Contact Aerosol/Spray
- 23. Key Motivational Factors Relevant determinants of terrorist behavior: Factors Relating to the Nature of the Group Ideology, Organizational Structure, Organizational Dynamics, Organizational Lifecycle Status, Demographics, Resources, Operational Capabilities Factors External to the Group Historical Events, Relations w/ External Actors (media; other extremists; state apparatus; targeted audience; non-targeted audience; supporters), Security Environment, (Potential) Target Characteristics Factors Relating to Decision-Making General Planning Characteristics (risk thresholds; time horizons), Perceptual Filter, Operational Objectives
- 24. Who makes the Decisions? Decision to carry out attack X Individual terrorist Sub-group Organization Leadership All members (democracy) Committee Individual terrorist Individual terrorist Individual terrorist Committee Individual terrorist Individual terrorist Individual terrorist Individual terrorist Individual terrorist Sub-groups
- 26. Capabilities Main questions: – Do terrorists currently have the capability to engage in true WMD attacks? – Is the capability of terrorists with regard to WMD increasing? – If terrorists’ WMD capabilities are increasing, what is the rate of this change?
- 27. Capabilities Broad Trends – Terrorist capabilities in general are increasing – Societal changes can increase vulnerabilities and facilitate terrorist capabilities
- 28. Capabilities • Organizational Capabilities • Logistical Resources • Financial Resources • Knowledge/Skill Acquisition • Materials and Technology Acquisition – C,B,R, and N differ • Initial Production of Agent – C,B,R, and N differ • Weaponization of Agent – C,B,R, and N differ
- 29. Desiderata • Insiders • State sponsorship • Attacks on Facilities
- 30. Radiological Biological Nuclear Conventional Explosives Chemical Probability (based on capability considerations only) Consequence CBRN Terrorism Risk Plane RISK = Probability x Consequence
- 32. Terrorists and Technology • Traditionally, terrorists have tended in their use of weapons and tactics to be both: – Conservative • “Path of least resistance” – terrorists generally seek to use the easiest, cheapest, tried-and-true methods – Imitative • Terrorists often utilize the successful tactics and weapons types of other groups (albeit with some localization, e.g. Mao to Carlos Marighella) • Why? – Most groups have limited resources and there are costs associated with identifying, researching and implementing new technologies, in terms of time, finances, personnel etc. – There are also often uncertainties about the reliability of any new technology in terms of achieving desired effects. – Soft targets vulnerable to traditional weapons are plentiful.
- 33. Terrorists and Technology • BUT, there are exceptions to the above (may be becoming more common) where terrorists will seek new technologies: A. Specific ideological orientation towards innovating technologically • Examples: Aum Shinrikyo sending operatives to explore the documents of Nikola Tesla in hopes of building an earthquake generating machine; in some groups ideology may drive members to push the technological envelope, such as in a conceivably violent version of the Raelian cult (who pursue human cloning and worship extraterrestrials). A. Existing methods insufficient to achieve aims • For example, when current weapons do not (or are perceived to not) result in enough casualties, publicity, or psychological impact. • New means are needed to circumvent protective measures. A. Perceived competition • Perceive the need to ‘stand out from the crowd’ and remain relevant. A. Group has very high level of resources • Allows opportunity to engage in long-term development and explore different tools (two examples: Aum and Al Qa’ida). A. Costs associated with adopting new technology are lowered • For example, the electronic privacy movement has enabled groups with very little resources, such as radical environmental extremists, to use the latest encryption and steganographic tools. • Advent of commercial biotech “kits” and commercial modified PCR. • Group recruiting members with advanced technical capabilities.
- 34. The Future: More CBRN? E. If costs associated with adopting new technology are lowered… No. of casualties per $1 cost* 1000 5 Tipping Point Year 2000 2015
- 35. Hype or Threat?
- 36. Bad News … • Terrorism trends are ominous • Significant increase in number of incidents • Al Qa`ida – sustained enemy • Other groups: cults, militias, lone actors? More threat assessment is necessary
- 37. Bad News … September 11 – confirmed that terrorists will seek to inflict mass casualties Anthrax attacks – showed that the capability to get the agents is there (almost) Theoretically, a single person could now be capable of causing 1,000’s of casualties and willing to do so.
- 38. But Some Good News • Very few incidents involving warfare agents • More difficult to cause mass casualties with WMD than often assumed – difference between AGENTS and WEAPONS!
- 39. BBUUTT The threat must be countered before this becomes easier to accomplish
- 40. The Bottom Line • Threat of CBRN terrorism is real, but often distorted by hype. • Remain mindful of more boring (but deadly threats): terrorism using conventional weapons is still likely to be prominent. • ‘Don’t Panic’: Terrorists want us to panic – that’s why it’s called TERRORism.
- 41. The End
Editor's Notes
- Panel 1: Role of Chemical Weapons in Terrorist Planning for Attacks in US Panel Chair: Brad Roberts Panelist: Brian Jackson, Gary Ackerman What role do chemical weapons play in terrorist calculations relative to other WMD weapons? Is the role that chemical weapons play in terrorist calculations likely to change over the next five years? Why has there been no significant CW attack on the US homeland? How likely are terrorists to use CW in the United States? Which terrorists? >1) theory of various reasons why terrorists might want to use CW over >other weapons types. >2) some historical stats on CW terrorism >3) brief discussion of some interesting recent attacks >4) brief look at CW terrorism in the framework of disruptive vs. >sustaining technology
- Homeland security advisory system – Oscillatinf up and down In Feb, George Tenet, CIA director remarked before the Senate Intel committee that chatter "points to plots that could include the use of a radiological dispersion device as well as poisons and chemicals," After U.S. Fire Administrator David Paulison described a list of useful items in event of a chemical or biological attack, stores in the greater Washington, D.C. area reported a surge in sales of plastic sheeting, duct tape, and other emergency items.
- Overall Incidents decreased dramatically, mainly due to drop in number of hoaxes.
- Before we can analyze the relative threat and response requirements between different types of CBRN, need to look at empirical record. Use the database for some quick descriptive statistics – won’t go into too much detail, but pretty dramatic results nonetheless. First – we look at both Type I: Politically motivated and Type II’s criminally motivated (although only look at larger scale criminal incidents or with high-end agents – not wives knocking off the old man with cyanide or people holding up convenience stores with claims of aids filled syringes) For our purposes – the same … won’t distinguish between them. Even 500 more anthrax hoaxes that have not included.
- We drill outbreaks a lot, make good movies and scary that can take on a life of their own (perception potential for infinite spread) but historical record does not necessarily agree with this.
- Strategy vs tactics – obfuscating terms when dealing with terrorism
- When we talk about motivation, we have to make sure we understand WHOSE motivation we’re talking about, how this is made up and how this affects decision to act. Decision to carry out a specific attack (can be generalized to any decision on the part of the group) In this example, we’ll look at decision to use chemical weapons within Israel as an example. [something we here at CNS know a little about] First look at who makes the decision (can be completely different from who carries it out, but this doesn’t concern us so much here) Who has the authority to make the decision? IMPORTANT: All of this must be viewed in a dynamic context – as situation changes, external environment, internal dynamics change… authority and structures within groups can change. In case of Middle East – cannot think of any group operating as a ‘democracy’. Orange is special case of committee consisting of one – i.e. absolute leader. Also cannot think of any group whose leadership is made up of subgroups in any formal sense – perhaps individual representatives of various factions, but these can be treated as individuals. So basically: who makes decisions – an individual member of terrorist organization - A subgroup of a terr org eg. A militant faction or cell with operational independence The group leadership Who actually makes it depends on structure of the group in question eg. Big difference in structure between Al Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo
- In terms of likelihood: lower end chem.-attacks (lots of other dangers from RDDs to bioattacks) but even these could havedevastating psychosocial consequences. the most likely potential WMD terrorist scenario would be the carrying out of a crude CW attack or a "dirty bomb" detonation by an Islamist terrorist cell linked to al-Qa`ida or some other operationally sophisticated Islamist group (such as the principal Egyptian and Algerian terrorist organizations). The next most likely scenario would be the carrying out of a crude chemical agent attack by small autonomous cells or disgruntled individuals associated loosely with the right-wing Christian Patriot (i.e., the "militia") movement here in the US
- Fortunately, reality is not so bleak
- Time span … 5 years? Ten? 50? But sooner or later, terrorists will get there.
- In the words of Douglas Adams – Don’t Panic - if you panic they win.