1. Sazan M. Mandalawi
How accurate is it to describe the PKK as a
narcoterrorist organization?
Module:Drugs and Narcoterrorism
Module Convenor: Dr. Sue Pryce
Sazan M. Mandalawi
Autumn 2011

2. Sazan M. Mandalawi
Turkey as well as many other countries refer to the Kurdistan Workers Party (or
PartiyaKarkeren Kurdistan, widely known as PKK) as a narcoterrorist organization, while the
organisation perceives itself as a freedom fighter. On both extreme ends of the spectrum, the
prevalent issue of the PKK in Turkey has become an on-going violent conflict of over 27
years. This essay argues it is not always accurate to describe the PKK as a narcoterrorist
organisation. The paper first delineates the key terms of both terrorist and Narcoterrorism. In
general, the essaypositions two different groups of scholars with opposing views of their
explanation to what the term narcoterrorism is, this in return affect the degree to which it is
accurate to classify the PKK as a narcoterrorist organisation. Secondly, a contextual
background to the Kurds in turkey and the formation of the PKK is given. Thirdly, the paper
will then illustrate how through trafficking, tax, extortions, production, cultivation and money
laundering, the PKK can be well classified into a narcoterrorist organisation. This will be
followed by
framework; here it will be argued that PKK can be classified as a crime group and a
narcoterrorist. The sixth section will challenge the mainstream literature and argue due to
political motivates the PKK it is inaccurate to classify the PKK as a narcoterrorist group, it
will accomplish this by studying closely the Frustration-Aggression theory of Miller et. al.
(140), and before concluding the essay will briefly highlight the way Turkey uses the terms
such as Narcoterrorism as a propaganda to wage its violence.
Narcoterrorism is a term that is contested among the scholars in the field. In order to
understand it, it is crucial that a clear understanding of terrorism is grasped first. A number of
scholars (Victoroff, 2005; Badey 1998, Laquer 1999 in Victoroff, 2005, and Crenshaw, 2000)
as well as the FBI and US state department all make two common points regarding terrorism
despite all the differences. Firstly, it includes group using violence often against non-
combatants. The second point is that the ultimate goal is challenging the state or the
behaviour of a certain 'audience'. Pontara (1979, in Ferracuti, 1982: 130) defines a terrorist act
as "any action carried out as part of a method of political struggle, aimed at influencing, or
conquering or defending the State power." This implies methods that include violence to the
extent of death often against innocent people and non-combatants. The underlying difference
in defining the boundaries of narcoterrorism can be classified into two different groups, one
group of scholars like Napoleoni (2003, 229), Martin (2006) and Simon (in Schmid, 2005)
claim that terror tactics are used by the traffickers and drug lords to protect their illegal
business.A group of authors like Ehrenfeld (1990 in Shanty, 2001), Petrakis (2001, in
Schmid, 2005), Sawant (2002, in Schmid, 2005) as well as the DEA state that the term refers
to drug trafficking to advance the aims of the terrorist group. These authors further highlight
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3. Sazan M. Mandalawi
that the revenue is used for terrorist activities. This is not to say that the later refuse the
former, although this is brief guideline. In order to understand the issue of narcoterrorism in
Turkey, one must first understand and analyze the context and background in which the PKK
emerged in.
Not all definitions accept the view that the PKK is a narcoterrorist or not. Hence, to know the
extent to which is it accurate to describe the organisation this way the paper focuses on two
different interpretations of the termPetrakis (2001, cited in Schmid, 2005) maintains that
narcoterrorism is when insurgent groups or terrorists take part in trafficking drugs. In her
definition she provide three different groups to narcoterrorism, the first of which, and the
most relevant to this paper, states that narcoterrorists use narcotics to advance their political
ends. This explanation of the term also coincides with that of the Drugs Enforcement
Administration (DEA) who categorise narcoterrorist as individuals or groups that directly or
indirectly take part in either of the cultivation, transport, distribution of illicit substances. On
the other side of the argument, if one is to analyse Simon's(Simon, cited in Schmid, 2005)
definition of narcoterrorism, he makes it clear that while terrorist methods are used such as
threats, assassinations and bombings the underlying motivations for narcoterrorism differ.
Simon argues that ideological or nationalist goals are not apparent in narcoterrorism.
Moreover, there is not an underlying ethnic-religious or separatist causes to the violence,
(ibid). The author further claims that quest for money allows drug lords to use violence
against sides that attempt to halt their activities. Therefore, from this perspective it can be
claimed that categorizing the PKK as a narcoterrorist organization is unconvincing.
After the carving up of the Ottoman Empire Kurds were promised independence by the treaty
of Serves. However, in 1923 Ataturk rejected the treaty and used military means to crush
Kurdish uprisings in the 1920s and 1930s (Brown 1995). Turkey sought to create a united,
strong, Turkish state that later lead to the suppression of the Kurds that live in the country
(Kutschera, 1994 and Muftuler-Bac, 1998) it was viewed that Kurdish autonomy would be a
threat to the Turkish state (Karacan, 2002: 19 and Gunter, 2000: 849). Today Turkey is home
to the largest Kurdish population in the world (Yavuz, 2009: 171). Kurds, deprived from the
rights of wearing traditional clothing, speaking their mother tongue and practising their
culture (Bruinessen, 1984, 8) began to seek for their rights. Approximately one fifth of
Turkey's population, 12 million Kurds, are not recognized as a separate minority group in the
country (Muftuler-Bac, 1998: 250). Turkey's eastern provinces where the majority of the
Kurds are is less developed and poorer than other areas of the country, certain scholars argue
that this was a purposeful strategy used in Turkish policy to prevent development among the
Kurds as it would revive their nationalist sentiments (Bruinessen, 1984: 6). Most often Kurds
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4. Sazan M. Mandalawi
were referred to as "mountains Turks" (Brown, 1995) or "Backwards People" (Bruinessen,
1984: 6) this circumstance encouraged for extremism to emerge, which consequently lead to
the formation of the PKK in 1978, headed by Abdulla Ocalan.
Initially the PKK aimed to work for independence for the Kurds in Turkey, nevertheless this
evolved over the years and by the 1990s the PKK was seeking for cultural and political rights
of the Kurds in Turkey (Gunter, 2000: 853). In 1984, the PKK resorted to violence to begin
pressuring the Turkish government, since then there has been a battle between both the PKK
and Turkish soldiers (the actions of the PKK will be closely examined in the following
section). In May 2002, the PKK was pronounced as a terrorist organization by the European
Union, and in 2004 it made its way into the United States foreign terrorists list (Roth and
Sever, 2009: 902).
The writing of Pek and Ekici (2007) provide a descriptive outline of a report that analyzed
narcoterrorist cases in Turkey by a project initiated in 2003, run by the Anti Smuggling and
Organized crime (KOM). The study provides proof that the PKK had taken part in five
different categories, taxing and extortion, cultivation and production, trafficking, street
delivery and money laundering of money through MED TV, the first Kurdish television
station (ibid). Heroin is transported via the Balkan route to its export venue in Europe, the
link between Afghanistan and European countries goes through Turkey (Ekici, nd: 2) this is
where the role of the PKK is dominant. It is widely known that the organisation has placed
illegal checkpoints and offering traffickers to pass their drugs, the PKK gained much revenue
through tax, threats, blackmailing and even abduction (ibid), it also uses the Balkan route to
smuggle Heroin using its strategic location in connecting to Europe. The PKK has also
smuggled arms, and provided it to other Kurdish groups (Cinar, 2010: 2009). As for extortion,
the PKK forces businessmen, especially those abroad, to pay the organisation money that is in
return used to fund terrorist activities (Cinar, 2010: 9). One can argue here, that despite the
fact that this clearly reflects both DIA's and Petrakis' (2001 cited in Schmid, 2005) idea of
narcoterrorism as it this section proved that both directly and indirectly the PKK is involved
in drug trafficking, in which it uses its revenue to fund terrorist activities. Aside from playing
a major role in trafficking drugs, the PKK later developed to take part in the making of the
drug.
The PKK demands farmers in the bordering villages under their control to cultivate cannabis.
To further prove this point, in 1993 to 1997 show that hashish was seized in shelters that
belonged to the PKK. In 1994, a group of people were arrested with 2 kilos of hashish, and
120, 000 roots of cannabis they confessed to cultivating more than 250 to 300 hectares with
other PKK members (Ekici, nd: 4). the organisation also possessed heroin labs in the
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5. Sazan M. Mandalawi
mountains, which reflects that it is involved in the entire process form the making to selling in
the European market. Even in the selling process, through linkages with families and
members of the organisation they have been able to reach the streets of Europe. In total it is
estimated that in the 1990s the annual income of the PKK coming from criminal activities
reached 86 million US dollars (Roth and Sever, 2007: 906). In relation to money laundering
Pek and Ekici(2007) state through the initiation of the TV channel PKK was able to launder
money. In contrast to the authors' perspective, Ryan (1999) in an article for the BBC writes
there is no proof to show this relation, even though MED TV was searched on many
occasions. Counterarguments (ibid) from the Kurdish side suggest that this was Turkey's
strategic tactic to close the television station, as it shed light into the Kurdish issue and
pointed out the oppression of Turkey against its Kurdish minority which was neglected by
other media outlets.
The aforementioned information demonstrates the extent to which the organisation is
involved in the trafficking, taxing, extortion, cultivation, production and trafficking of drugs.
Hence, very accurate to conclude that the PKK is a narcoterrorist organisation, nonetheless, as
the second group of scholars (Napoleoni, 2003; Martin, 2006; Simon, cited in Schmid, 2005)
would argue this is not narcoterrorism, as the revenue of the drugs is used for terrorist
activities that have an underlying political agenda to it, as the following sections will show, it
is not merely about protecting an illicit drug business.
While studying the PKK and narcoterrorism it is critical to closely examine criminal groups.
Makarenko's (2003) framework exemplifies how it is possible to classify the organisation as
both an organised criminal group and a narcoterrorist. Roth and Sever (2007: 903)
defineorganised crime as "continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from
illegal activities: is continuing existence is maintained through the use of force, threats,
monopoly control.."In Makarenko's Crime Terror Continuum model there is a point of
convergence; it is at this point that where an organisation can share both criminal and terrorist
features. Through Makarenko's illustration of the convergence thesis, one can place the PKK
within its features. She argues that in this case "criminal and terrorist organisations could
converge into a single entity that initially displays characteristics of both groups
simultaneously," (Makarenko, 2004 135). In the same theory there are two separate features.
The first of which is when a criminal group withholds political driving force and secondly,
terrorist groups who use their "political rhetoric" (ibid) to undertake their criminal activities.
Hence, like Makarenko's argument they diverge from their initial aims. On the contrary,
opposing this view to a degree is Ekici (nd) who clearly claims that this may not always be
the case as crime groups are driven by business ends while terrorist organisations have
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6. Sazan M. Mandalawi
political aims. Due to this difference in long term aims he argues that convergence and
cooperation is difficult.
As pointed out by Bjornehed (2004) Makarenko's crime-terror continuum model also
illustrates the "changing in motivation" he gives the example of JumaNamangani of
Uzbekistan's Islamic Movement, here the writer emphasizes how a change of leadership can
also divert the underlying motives of the organisation. In the case of the PKK one can argue
this is also true to a large degree, after the capture of PKK leader, Ocalan, self-interest seems
to have dominated, it can be said that certain individuals hide their illicit activities under the
umbrella of the PKK. It can also be argued here that the PKK is both a crime group and a
narcoterrorist where it funds its activities through narcotic trafficking.
Analyzing the writings of Kutschera(1994), Bruinessen (1984), Muftuler-Bac (1998), and
Brown (1995) it is apparentthe underlying aim of the organisation is a political motive where
the PKK demands rights and autonomy. Vast majority of the literature that discusses the issue
of the PKK and its involvement in narcoterrorism often overlooks critical phases of recent
history that has greatly influenced this ongoing issue. The PKK in Turkey emerged at the
background of the repression caused against the Kurds in 1967 there were tens of thousands
of demonstrators, showing Kurds becoming active in claiming for their rights (Kutschera,
1994: 12) before the establishment of the PKK. Lack of development in Kurdish cities in
Turkey (Markus, 1994 and Marcus, 1990), as well as continuous human right violations
(Brown, 1995; Muftuler, 1998: 245) are two of the many examples that reflect racism and
repression on behalf of the Turkish state on the Kurds. There is widely reached consensus
among scholars (Muftuler-Bac, 1998: 252; Rumford, 2001; Keyman and Duzgit; Keyman and
Duzgit, 2007: 82) that one of the confrontations of Turkey's entrance to the European Union
is its human rights violations and suppression of its Kurdish minority. Gunter (2004) argues
that the rejection of having a "moderate Kurdish opposition" encouraged the rise of
extremism like the PKK.
The Frustration-Aggression (FA) theory (Miller et al. 1940, 338) verifies that the occurrence
of aggression assumes the existence of frustration. The authors make it clear when frustration
exists then there is a resort to aggression. PKK was formed as a result of the frustration that
existed as the Kurds were deprived of practicing their basic rights and consequently there was
a resort to aggressive violent behaviour. Apposing this view is Victoroff (2005) who sets to
provide a rather logical claim asserting there are millions of people in the world who live
under extreme frustration but have not resorted to violent behaviour. Then again, one can
argue since its establishment in 1978 the PKK did not launch insurgent attacks until August of
1984, where the state would refuse to recognize the rights of the minority group (Muftuler-
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Bac, 1998). Gunter states that peaceful democratic attempts in protest such policy lead people
to prison or more severe consequences. Hence, as Gunter argues Turkey, itself, "sowed the
seeds of Ocalan's movement" (ibid). It can be maintained that if minority rights were given to
Kurds of Turkey then the PKK would have not resorted to violence, which then progressed
into involvement in both terrorist and narcoterrorist activities with ideological and political
bases.
The FA theory reflects the actions of the PKK and the Kurds of Turkey. Relying on Simon's
(in Schmid, 2005) mention of narcoterrorism, it is clear here, the PKK's terrorist actions were
not to preserve the drug money or industry, but rather to defend their ideological and
nationalist goals. In this circumstance it is not entirely productive to compare the terrorist
activities of Colombia by Escobar to that of the PKK, as the underlying causes and ends were
entirely different. Where the former undertook terrorist activities to maintain its interests in
Narcotic revenue the later uses the drugs money attained to fund its terrorist activities against
the state to gain its political and social rights. For this reason, it is largely inaccurate to
describe the organization as a narcoterrorist.
For Turkey to classify the PKK a terrorist or narcoterrorist, it places it in a situation where it
legitimizes the use of violence against the organisation. Certain scholars like Napoleoni
(2003) and Wardlaw (1987) have argued that the concept of narcoterrorism is used as
propaganda means for governments to influence public debates and receive sustain their
policies and legitimize their actions. One can argue that this is true in the context of the PKK
and Turkey where the use of the word narcoterrorism (and terrorism) has widely been
politicizes. For example, recently Al-Jazeera television (2011) reported on Turkish banks and
financial institutions refusing to share information or statements with Reuters international
news agency because it does not refer to the PKK as a terrorist organization, but rather a rebel
group. Often classifying PKK as terrorist or narcoterrorist has served the interest of Turkey as
it legitimises its attacks against the group. Muftuler-Bac (1998, 247) makes the argument that
the Turkish military defends any threats to Kemalism, anything seen as a menace is defeated
with violence. These arguments suggest labelling the PKK as narcoterrorism is a tactic used
by Turkey to continue its suppression; Turkey has continuously used military means to fight
the organisation (Kutschera, 1994: 14).
It can be stated that for a solution to end such a war, negotiations is key, Turkey needs to
demilitarize the issue and look at it though a human rights perspective. A weakness of this
paper is that one can only assume that the PKK are using drug trafficking to fund greater
political cause. When this cause is met and their demands for recognition and detainment of
rights are fulfilled, only then, if the violence, terrorist activities and drug activities continue
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8. Sazan M. Mandalawi
one can accurately argue the organisation is a narcoterrorist that is using terrorism to cover up
its illicit drug business. While studying the PKK and narcoterrorism it is critical to study
criminal groups, although, this was beyond the limitations of this paper. It did cover the
matter through Makarenko's framework, though it would be interesting to look into what
other scholars in the field argue. Future in depth study is necessary to look at the grey and thin
line of classification of the PKK as a narcoterrorist organization or a transnational organized
crime group. One can also make the point that there are terrorist individuals who are only
interested in making profit but use "political rhetoric" to cover their "pure" criminal activities
The focus of the essay was narrowed to two opposing views of the extent to which the
organisation can be classified as a narcoterrorist. Hence, it can be concluded thatviolence was
the only means to pursue the objectives of the PKK as they were not given room to do this
peacefully and democratically, expression of identity was depicted through terror. This was
showed in this paper through the use of the FA theory, where one can argue resort to violence
and narcotics by the PKK is arguable legitimized as a response to the repression on behalf of
Turkey. By definition of Simon it was depicted that when isolated from all angles the resort to
violence came through as a fight for survival, and narcotics trafficking and production
appeared as a legitimate source of revenue.
On the other hand, as mentioned the majority of scholars state that involvement in narcotics
classifies the organization as narcoterrorist as there is substantial evidence that the
organization uses the drug money to fund its terrorist organization. Looking briefly into
st and a
criminal organisation.
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9. Sazan M. Mandalawi
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