Interactive Powerpoint_How to Master effective communication
Ā
Academic Dishonesty A Zero Tolerance Professor And Student Registration Choices
1. ACADEMIC DISHONESTY: A Zero Tolerance
Professor and Student Registration Choices
Elliott S. Levy*,
ā and Carter C. Rakovski**
................................................................................................
................................................................................................
College and university faculty and administrators are responsible for constructing
academic honesty policies and communicating them to students. This is often
attempted through institutional honesty policies and university-wide honor codes.
While these approaches have been widely researched, less attention has been
given to the role of individual faculty members. That role is examined in this study
by addressing student reactions to professors based on their academic honesty
policies. In addition to demographic information, data were gathered about student
attitudes and beliefs concerning academic dishonesty and their decision to enroll
in or avoid a course being taught by a professor with zero tolerance for academic
dishonesty. The findings regarding different instructorsā approaches toward
academic dishonesty indicate that an intolerant policy will keep dishonest
students away, but at a priceāit will also detract many honest students.
................................................................................................
................................................................................................
KEY WORDS: academic dishonesty; honor codes; cheating.
INTRODUCTION
Academic institutions would like to attract honest students as well as
foster a culture of honesty and ethical conduct among current students.
Some institutions attempt to accomplish this through promotion of aca-
demic honor codes and various rituals and pledges from students upon
admission or arrival on campus. Other universities and colleges rely on
individual faculty members to relate the academic honor policies of the
institution through their syllabi and individual instruction. While some
studies support the deterrent eļ¬ect of campus-wide honor codes on
*Department of Accountancy, Bentley College, Waltham, MA, USA.
**Academic Technology Center, Bentley College, Waltham, MA, USA.
Address correspondence to: Elliott S. Levy, Department of Accountancy, Bentley College,
175 Forest Street, Waltham, MA 02452, USA. E-mail: elevy@bentley.edu
735
0361-0365 ā 06 ā 0900-0735 ā 0 2006 Springer Science+Business Media, Inc.
Research in Higher Education, Vol. 47, No. 6, September 2006 ( 2006)
DOI: 10.1007/s11162-006-9013-8
2. academic dishonesty, the eļ¬ect of individual faculty taking strong posi-
tions against student dishonesty is not well established.
In this paper, we give an overview of the ļ¬ndings of previous research
regarding prevention of and solutions to academic dishonesty. Then we
report results from a survey we administered at a business college. The
purpose of the survey was to determine how students would react to a
professor who has zero tolerance for academic dishonesty. In addition,
survey questions were directed at student attitudes regarding penalties
that should be imposed for various dishonest acts, which dishonest acts
are most severe, and how frequently students engage in academic
dishonesty. We test the validity of our survey by comparing our ļ¬ndings
to that of other researchers and then report new ļ¬ndings in regard to
studentsā reactions to a āāzero toleranceāā professor.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Much has been written about academic dishonesty in higher educa-
tion. Researchers have looked at diļ¬erent types of dishonest acts, demo-
graphics such as gender and income, schools with or without honor
codes, diļ¬ering majors and type and size of school. Seminal studies in-
clude William Bowersā studies in the 1960s and Donald McCabeās work
in the 1990s. In general, the research shows that cheating in higher
education is rampant. It is caused by many factors including student
perceptions about faculty and their dishonest behaviors, the use of tech-
nology, and evolving cultural norms. It is also deterred by many factors
including honor codes and faculty behavior.
The problem of academic dishonesty does not begin in college. A sur-
vey by the Josephson Institute of Ethics found that 74% of the 12,000
high school students polled had cheated on a test at least once in the
past year. The same survey also indicated that students are more likely
than in the past to lie to parents and teachers and even to steal (Taylor,
2003). More than 35% of high and middle school students agreed with
the statement āāI would be willing to cheat on a test if it would help me
get into collegeāā (Gomez, 2001).
At the college level, students of business are among the most dishon-
est (Bowers, 1964; Caruana, Ramaseshan, and Ewing, 2000; Clement,
2001; McCabe, 1997; Smyth and Davis, 2004). At 87%, business
students provided the highest cheating rate when compared with engi-
neering, science and humanities students (Caruana et al., 2000). The
majority of studies show that business majors, regardless of gender,
have lower ethical values than peers in other majors (Harris, 1989).
Wood, Longenecker, McKinney, and Moore (1988) posit that the
736 LEVY AND RAKOVSKI
3. college student of today is not the 1960s idealist, and he characterizes
business students as āācareerist.āā Egoism has replaced idealism for many
college students and the majority of business students cannot reason
beyond Kohlbergās stage fourālaw and order (Wood et al., 1988).
Callahan (2004) connects increased cheating to shifting values and
priorities, especially among young people. The mid-1970s shift toward
materialism replaced the idealism of the 1960s (Callahan, 2004).
Engineering students report higher rates of academic dishonesty than
students in most other disciplines. McCabe (1997) reported that engi-
neering students, who were second to business majors in self-reported
cheating, admitted to a higher cheating rate than natural science and
social science majors. McCabe (1997) also found that natural science
majors generally report cheating levels comparable to social science
students. A study by Harding et al. found that 79% of respondents to a
survey of engineering students indicated that they cheated at least once
per term in high school. Although that study did not collect data
regarding behavior in college, a previous study by those authors esti-
mated that 96% of engineering students had cheated at least once while
in college (Harding, Carpenter, Finelli, and Passow, 2004).
Several studies conclude that cheating is less common at institutions
with strong academic honor codes (Bowers, 1964; Brooks, Cunnigham,
Hinson, Brown, and Weaver, 1981; Canning, 1956; McCabe and
Trevino, 1993, 2002). One study reported that 54% of the students on
honor-code campuses admitted to one or more incidents of serious
cheating compared to 71% on campuses with no code (McCabe,
Trevino, and Butterļ¬eld, 2001a, b). At private schools with an honor
code, 6% of students admitted to repetitive cheating versus 17% at
campuses with no code (McCabe and Pavela, 2000).
Many students who cheat blame faculty for their transgressions, espe-
cially professors who fail to respond to what students consider obvious
incidents of cheating that occur in their courses (McCabe and Trevino,
2002). Students who perceive that their peers cheat and are not penal-
ized cheat more (Bowers, 1964; McCabe and Trevino, 1993, 1997).
Some students complain that their professors are cheating them by
spending more time consulting and publishing than teaching or prepar-
ing for classes (Fishbein, 1993).
There is evidence to support these studentsā claims. Engle and Smith
(1990) found that a minority of faculty were plagiarizing research, falsi-
fying research data, and accepting sex for grades. However, a sizeable
number of faculty cancel oļ¬ce hours excessively, utilize outdated lecture
notes and allow students to grade non-objective exams (Rezaee, Elmore,
and Szendi, 2001). Milem et al. (2000) reported statistically signiļ¬cant
ZERO TOLERANCE PROFESSOR 737
4. increases from 1972 to 1992 in time spent engaged in research at all
institutions, and teaching and preparing for teaching at all institutional
types except for research universities. They also reported statistically sig-
niļ¬cant decreases in the amount of time faculty spent advising and
counseling students. This is a troubling ļ¬nding considering the impor-
tance of faculty contact with students in informal settings (Milem, Ber-
ger, and Dey, 2000). If professors are playing a role in causing
dishonest student behavior, this highlights an opportunity to curb
dishonest student behavior through the actions of individual faculty.
Attempts at Prevention
Notwithstanding outside inļ¬uences, cheating is strongly dependent on
what occurs in the classroom and the biggest factor is the instructor.
Lower levels of cheating have been observed when students believe that
cheaters will be caught. And, if students perceive that cheating is likely
to be reported, they are also likely to believe that cheaters will be
caught and punished (McCabe et al., 2001a, b). Clement (2001) found
peer disapproval to be the least eļ¬ective deterrent and fear of punish-
ment and embarrassment to be the strongest deterrents. Maximizing the
risk of being caught, setting high expectations that students wonāt cheat,
and giving an automatic F for the course for plagiarizing works are
common tactics, and worked for one English professor (Mahon, 2002).
Academic honor codes can be thought of as preventative measures.
Some level of obligation, in most traditional honor codes, is put on stu-
dents to report incidents of cheating they may observe among their
peers; yet, such clauses are infrequently enforced (McCabe and Trevino,
2002). In comparison to schools with no honor codes, schools with
modiļ¬ed honor codes experience lower levels of cheating. Generally,
modiļ¬ed codes do not require students to report others (McCabe and
Pavela, 2000).
The structure of honor codes varies across universities. At Washing-
ton and Lee University, prospective students are informed of their
expected obligations under the honor code as part of the admissions
process. The Universityās admissions literature states that if applicants
cannot abide by the provisions of the campus code, Washington and
Lee is probably not the right school for them (McCabe and Trevino,
2002). At Princeton, incoming freshmen read the honor code and write
an essay promising to uphold it (Gomez, 2001). At Vanderbilt Univer-
sity, each student signs a class banner indicating a personal commitment
to the Vanderbilt code (McCabe and Trevino, 2002).
738 LEVY AND RAKOVSKI
5. Dishonesty: Degree, Frequency, and Penalties
Several studies have addressed the degree of dishonesty of various
acts from plagiarism and copying from anotherās exam to collaborating
on homework and inappropriately using a tutor. Exam-related dishon-
esty and plagiarism are considered the most serious dishonest acts.
Out-of-class work including collaborating on homework and not
contributing to a group project are considered less serious dishonest acts
(Ashworth, Bannister, and Thorne, 1997; Franklyn-Stokes and
Newstead, 1995; Pincus and Schmelkin, 2003; Sims, 1995). As one might
expect, the behaviors students consider less serious are also the ones in
which they are more frequently engaged (Kidwell, Wozniak, and Laurel,
2003). In one study, the ļ¬ve most frequently reported behaviors were
also considered the ļ¬ve least serious behaviors (Nuss, 1984). Whitley
(1998) summarized 107 studies of cheating. He found that although an
average of 70% of students cheat, only 43%, on average, cheat on
exams; and 47%, on average, plagiarize. Another study determined that
students would more likely help someone cheat (seen as passive and less
serious) than to cheat themselves (more active and more serious)
(Whitley and Kost, 1999).
Some studies have addressed penalties for dishonest behavior. Nuss
(1984) surveyed faculty regarding penalties for academic dishonesty. If a
faculty member determined that a student had cheated, 39% of survey
respondents would report the dishonesty to appropriate authorities,
34% would lower the grade, and 26% would give a warning. She also
found that the response would depend on the severity of the oļ¬ense.
Whitley and Kost (1999) presented cheating scenarios to students and
found that students view students who assist others less negatively than
they view the cheater.
Contribution of Present Study
The current study will start by addressing the following issues that
have been explored by previous studies: student attitudes toward the
severity of acts of academic dishonesty, the punishments students feel
are appropriate, and the frequency in which they engage in these dis-
honest acts. We then compare our results to earlier ļ¬ndings to test the
validity of our survey instrument. Finally, we explore the reactions of
students toward an instructorās zero tolerance policies regarding aca-
demic dishonesty. To our knowledge, no previous research study con-
nects studentsā attitudes and behaviors to their reactions to a speciļ¬c
instructorās policies.
ZERO TOLERANCE PROFESSOR 739
6. We presented students with a hypothetical situation, namely a profes-
sor who will not tolerate academic dishonesty. Survey questions were
asked to determine if such a zero tolerance policy would aļ¬ect studentsā
registration choices. In light of previous research concerning the impact
of honor codes and the perceived role of faculty, we hypothesized that a
professorās high expectations regarding honest academic behavior would
attract honest students and deter dishonest students.
METHODOLOGY
Survey Instrument
A survey was administered by email invitation to all students at a
northeastern business college after a pilot test. Students were oļ¬ered
anonymity using the Perseus software, which allows students to respond
anonymously through a secure website (http://www.perseus.com/). Con-
sidering a recent study that found a modest improvement in response
rates when lottery incentives were used (Porter and Whitcomb 2003), we
oļ¬ered $100 gift certiļ¬cates to the college bookstore to ļ¬ve randomly
selected respondents. Survey invitations were sent by email to the entire
student email list, consisting of 5317 students, including undergraduates,
graduate students, part-time, and full-time students. A total of 1269
responses were received, representing a 24% response rate. The survey
addressed penalties for academic dishonesty, degree of dishonesty of
diļ¬erent acts, dishonest behavior of students, and studentsā reactions to
diļ¬erent professors. Demographic data were gathered regarding gender,
full-time or part-time status, year in school, domestic or international,
age, and GPA.
Zero Tolerance Professor
As part of the survey, questions were asked about how students
would react to a professor based on her or his statements at the start of
a course regarding academic dishonesty (Appendix A). Two scenarios
were presented. The ļ¬rst professor takes the Collegeās academic honesty
policies seriously and in the past has ļ¬led dishonesty reports and has
penalized students (the āāOtherāā professor). The second professor has
zero tolerance for academic dishonesty and will give an F course grade
for any dishonest act (the āāZeroāā professor).
Three questions with the same choices were asked for each of the
scenarios. The questions asked how respondents thought honest
students, dishonest students and they themselves would react to these
740 LEVY AND RAKOVSKI
7. two professors. The choices were to go out of the way to register, try to
register, be indiļ¬erent, try to avoid, or avoid at all costs. Comparisons
were made of responses to the zero tolerance professor (scenario 2) and
the other professor (scenario 1).
Analysis Plan
Sample means were calculated for each act on each of the three scale-
sāpenalty, level of dishonesty, and frequency of behavior. Factor anal-
ysis was used to group similar responses to questions about severity of
cheating behaviors in order to make a scale by which to classify stu-
dents according to cheating behavior. We tabulated the responses
regarding the zero tolerance professor according to the respondentsā
reaction to the other professor and according to their cheating behavior.
A logistic regression model was calculated to examine the characteristics
of those students likely to avoid a class when faced with a zero toler-
ance policy. The SPSS statistical package was used to analyze the data
(http://www.spss.com).
RESULTS
Sample Characteristics
Very few inconsistencies were found in the data. The responses were
checked for errors using two extreme itemsāstealing an exam and cor-
rectly referencing information copied from the internet. Seven responses
were deemed unusable because the answer was the same for all of the 15
items under questions 1 (penalty), 2 (level of dishonesty) and 3
(frequency). It was not plausible for someone to sincerely respond with
the same number for these varied questions. Another 7 responses were
deleted due to missing values, leaving a sample size of 1255.
The sample was representative of the college population except that
there were more female respondents in the sample and accounting
majors were overrepresented (Table 1). Also, there were fewer respon-
dents with GPAs of 2.2 or less. The higher response rate of accounting
majors may have been related to the fact that the email announcing the
survey came from an accounting professor.
Penalties
Our ļ¬ndings (Table 2) were consistent with previous research.
Respondents indicated that the most severe penalties should be given
ZERO TOLERANCE PROFESSOR 741
8. for acts involving cheating on exams (theft, copying with or without
another studentās knowledge, and using a crib sheetābehaviors 15, 3, 2,
and 1, respectively) and cheating on papers or projects (submitting
anotherās work, copying anotherās work, and knowingly allowing some-
one to submit oneās workābehaviors 8, 4, and 9, respectively). The
least severe penalties were for passive acts (giving help, allowing another
to copy homework, allowing another to use a paper or project not
knowing that it would be submitted, and allowing another to copy from
an examābehaviors 14, 7, 10, and 6, respectively), not citing internet
TABLE 1. Comparison of Sample and Population
Population
N=5648a
Sample
N=1255b
Male Female Male Female
Full-time undergraduates 58% 42% 39% 61%
Part-time undergraduates 50% 50% 38% 62%
Graduate Students 56% 44% 47% 53%
Enrollment Population Sample
Full-time undergraduates 3834 (68%) 896 (73%)
Part-time undergraduates 491 (9%) 65 (5%)
Graduate Students 1323 (23%) 274 (22%)
Geographic Distribution
Undergraduate Students N=4325 N=961c
Domestic 92% 91%
International 8% 9%
Graduate Students N=1323 N=274
Domestic 84% 81%
International 16% 19%
Major for Undergraduates
Accountancy 10% 16%
Computer Information Systems 8% 6%
Economics--Finance 7% 8%
Finance 14% 16%
Management 13% 10%
Marketing 13% 15%
Other 17% 20%
Undecided 19% 10%
a
Source: College Oļ¬ce of Public Aļ¬airs, 2002--2003 data.
b
27 respondents did not give information regarding either gender or enrollment.
c
20 respondents did not give information regarding either domestic/international or class.
742 LEVY AND RAKOVSKI
9. sources (behavior 11), copying homework (behavior 5), and receiving
help on graded material (behavior 13).
Degree of Dishonesty
The responses were similar to the responses regarding penalty
(Table 2). The highest degree of dishonesty was attached to stealing an
exam, submitting anotherās paper, copying an exam with or without the
other studentās knowledge, copying a paper or project, allowing some-
one to submit oneās work, using a crib sheet, and allowing another to
copy an exam. The lowest level of dishonesty was giving and receiving
help on graded material, copying and allowing someone to copy home-
work, copying from the internet without giving the source, and allowing
use of oneās paper not knowing that it would be submitted by another
student.
Behavior
The lowest means were reported for stealing an exam, submitting
anotherās paper, knowingly allowing another student to use oneās paper,
copying an exam with or without the other studentās knowledge, copy-
ing a paper, and using a crib sheet (behaviors 15, 8, 9, 2, 3, 4, and 1,
respectively). The highest means, which indicate the acts in which stu-
dents engage most frequently, were reported for allowing another to
copy homework, copying homework, giving help on graded work,
receiving help on graded work, and copying from the internet and not
indicating the source (behaviors 7, 5, 14, 13, and 11, respectively). This
was consistent with prior work in this area.
Student Self-Reported Honesty
Respondents were asked to indicate their self-perception as well as the
perception of others regarding their level of honesty. Most students con-
sider themselves to be very honest (57%) or honest (42%). Actually,
more think that others consider them to be very honest (62%). Very few
consider themselves (1%) or are considered by others (1%) to be dis-
honest or very dishonest. Because so few students classiļ¬ed themselves
as anything but honest, we classiļ¬ed respondents into categories of hon-
esty based on their self-reported behaviors. We chose factor analysis as
a method to determine which acts were the most severe and used only
those acts to determine the honesty score.
ZERO TOLERANCE PROFESSOR 743
11. Creation of Categories of Dishonest Respondents
Factor analysis was performed to determine which acts were the most
dishonest based on the severity of the acts. Respondents were then put
into categories of dishonesty based on the most severe dishonest acts.
See Sims (1993) for a similar approach that assigned a āāseverity weightāā
to statements chosen by subjects. Eight out of the 15 acts were part of
the factor that indicated the most serious acts of dishonesty. The other
acts loaded on the less serious factor. Each factor was well deļ¬ned with
Cronbachās alpha equal to .91 and .85 for the ļ¬rst and second factors,
respectively. The most dishonest items were using a crib sheet, copying
an exam with the other studentās knowledge, copying an exam without
the other studentās knowledge, copying a term paper or project, allow-
ing someone to copy an exam, submitting someone elseās term paper or
course project as his or her own, allowing use of a paper or project
knowing it would be submitted, and stealing exam material.
We then used the respondentsā answers to their frequency of engaging
in these 8 acts to classify them into categories of dishonesty. Initially,
we totaled the scores (1--5) of each respondent on the 8 items to create
an index ranging from 8 to 40. However, this approach would lose data
from those respondents who did not mark a response for 1 or more of
the 8 items. In order to preserve the respondentās data on the other
items and therefore minimize loss of data due to missing responses, we
decided to take the average response to the 8 items. This index, called
the dishonesty score, ranges from 1 to 5. Next, we categorized respon-
dents into one of 5 groups based on their dishonesty score. We used 5
groups in order to identify the top 10% of cheatersāthe hardcore
cheaters. This resulted in groups with unequal numbers, because 57% of
the sample scored a 1 (never commit) for all 8 of the most severe acts.
Therefore, we have 57% in group 1, and 8--15% in each of the remain-
ing 4 groups (see Appendix B).
Zero Tolerance Professor
Most students think that honest students will be indiļ¬erent in select-
ing both the zero tolerance professor and the other professor (Table 3a).
A total of 813 respondents (65.6%) answered the question about what
they thought honest students would do for each of the two professors
by selecting āāBe indiļ¬erent in selecting this professorās class.āā However,
132 (10.6%) respondents who thought that honest students would be
indiļ¬erent when selecting the other professor changed their response to
indicate that honest students would avoid or avoid at all costs the zero
ZERO TOLERANCE PROFESSOR 745
12. tolerance professor. This ļ¬nding suggests that a professor may lose
about 10% of honest students by taking a zero tolerance stand.
Most students think dishonest students will try to avoid both profes-
sors (Table 3b). A total of 901 respondents (72.8%) indicated that dis-
honest students would avoid or avoid at all costs the other professor,
while 986 (79.7%) indicated that dishonest students would avoid or
avoid at all costs the zero tolerance professor. Another 271 (30%) of
those who indicated that dishonest students would avoid the other pro-
fessor changed their answer to avoid at all costs when indicating what
dishonest students would do regarding the zero tolerance professor.
These results suggest that a professor who takes a zero tolerance posi-
tion about academic dishonesty will discourage most dishonest students
from registering for his or her class. In fact, many dishonest students
will avoid the class at all costs.
When asked to indicate what they would do rather than what they
thought honest or dishonest students would do, most respondents were
TABLE 3. How (a) HONEST Students, (b) DISHONEST Students, (c) YOU
Would React to Both Professors
Reaction to Other
Reaction to Zero
Totals
Register Indiļ¬erent Avoid
(a) HONEST
Register 120 34 10 164
Indiļ¬erent 78 813 122 1013
Avoid 6 22 34 62
Totals 204 869 166 1,239
(b) DISHONEST
Register 13 7 18 38
Indiļ¬erent 7 169 122 298
Avoid 7 48 846 901
Totals 27 224 986 1,237
(c) YOU
Register 103 43 11 157
Indiļ¬erent 39 805 152 996
Avoid 6 28 49 83
Totals 148 876 212 1,236
Note: The ļ¬ve choices to the survey questions about registering for the professorās class were
combined into 3 options. Register=Go out of your/their way to register for this professorās
class and Try to register for this professorās class. Indiļ¬erent=Be indiļ¬erent in selecting this
professorās class. Avoid=Try to avoid this professorās class and Avoid this professorās class at
all costs.
746 LEVY AND RAKOVSKI
13. unaļ¬ected by the professorās comments (Table 3c). Most responded that
they would be indiļ¬erent to each of the two professors (N=805, 65.1%).
In addition, 152 (15.3%) of those who were indiļ¬erent about registering
for the other professor would avoid the zero tolerance professor or avoid
the zero tolerance professor at all costs. Eleven (7.0%) of those who
would have registered for the other professor would avoid the zero pro-
fessor or avoid the zero professor at all costs. In summary, 13% of all
respondents (163 students) will try to avoid the zero tolerance professorās
class because of the attitude expressed toward academic dishonesty when
compared to the attitude expressed by the other professor.
We ļ¬t a logistic regression model to further examine the characteristics
of the āālost students,āā i.e., students who would either be indiļ¬erent or
register for the other professorās class, but would avoid the zero tolerance
professorās class. The 163 lost students were more likely to be young and
dishonest, compared to the rest of the sample (Table 4). The youngest
group was over four times more likely than the oldest group to be lost by
the zero tolerance policy (OR=4.33). Even controlling for age, the most
dishonest students were nearly three times more likely to leave than the
most honest students (OR=2.75). There were no signiļ¬cant diļ¬erences
by gender or between domestic and international students.
Analysis about what respondents themselves would do indicates that
46 honest students (category 1) will avoid the zero tolerance professor
TABLE 4. Likelihood of Leaving Due to Zero Tolerance Policy: Logistic
Regression Model, Coeļ¬cients, and Odds Ratio (N=1255)
Coeļ¬cient Standard Error Odds Ratio
Gender (Male=1) 1.22
Agea
17--19 1.47 0.48*** 4.33
20--22 1.30 0.48*** 3.68
23--25 0.63 0.59 1.87
26--30 0.51 0.59 1.66
Dishonesty Categoryb
2 0.42 0.25* 1.52
3 0.67 0.29** 1.95
4 0.93 0.27*** 2.54
5 1.01 0.26*** 2.75
Constant )3.51 0.47 0.03
a
Reference category is age equal to or greater than 31.
b
Reference category is the most honest category (category=1).
* p0.1; **p0.05; ***p0.01.
ZERO TOLERANCE PROFESSOR 747
14. and would not avoid the other professor (Fig. 1). This is an increase
from 43 students (6.0% of category 1 students) to 89 students (12.6% of
category 1 students). However, 26 of the most dishonest students (cate-
gory 5) will avoid the zero tolerance professor. This is an increase from
12 (10.7% of category 5 students) to 38 students (33.9%). In summary,
by adopting a zero tolerance policy, the professor may discourage about
one-third of the most dishonest students from taking his or her class.
CONCLUSIONS
Our ļ¬ndings are consistent with much of the published research on
academic dishonesty, thereby adding to our conļ¬dence concerning the
validity of our survey results (see Ashworth et al., 1997; Franklin-Stokes
and Newstead, 1995; Nuss, 1984; Pincus and Schmelkin, 2003; Sims,
1995; Whitley and Kost, 1999). There was little disagreement among
students about the act that was the most severe and deserved the stiļ¬est
penaltyāstole exam material (item 15). This item has both characteris-
tics that students recognize as cheatingāan in-class exam and an active
act. The acts that are least recognized are those that are passive (e.g.,
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
1
Dishonesty Score
Avoid Other Professor
Avoid zero tolerance professor
Honest Dishonest
5
4
3
2
FIG. 1. Avoiding zero tolerance professor and other professor.
748 LEVY AND RAKOVSKI
15. allowed to copy) and involve out of class activities, such as homework.
However, the standard deviations were higher around the passive acts,
suggesting disagreement about these acts.
Further, the three questions regarding penalty, severity and frequency
of the 15 behaviors corresponded to each other in a manner that was
expected by the literature. Stern and Havlicek (1986) found a negative
correlation (r=).40) between the deļ¬nition of a behavior as academic
misconduct and the proportion of students who admitted to engaging in
that behavior. Kidwell, Wozniak and Laurel (2003) also concluded that
students committed the more serious acts less frequently. In the present
study, students indicated that more serious oļ¬enses should be punished
more severely, that they engage less in the more serious dishonest
behaviors and that they should be penalized least severely for the acts in
which they do engage.
The corroboration of our ļ¬ndings by previous studies gives us conļ¬-
dence in the credibility of our unique ļ¬ndings regarding an individual
professorās stance toward academic dishonesty. Most students were not
fazed by either professorās statements and responded with indiļ¬erence
to both professors. However, among those who would consciously ļ¬ee
(i.e., changed from indiļ¬erence or registering for the other, standard
professor to avoiding the zero tolerance professor) were more dishonest
students, even after controlling for age.
The main objective of this research was to determine if the zero toler-
ance policy would discourage dishonest students from registering for a
particular professorās class and encourage honest students to register.
The ļ¬ndings regarding dishonest students were not surprising. A profes-
sor who adopts a zero tolerance policy toward academic dishonesty and
communicates that policy to students can expect to have more students
trying to avoid his or her class than would a more typical professor.
However, honest students will also avoid this professor.
That some honest students would avoid a zero tolerance professor
was contrary to our hypothesis that honest students would be drawn to
such a professor. While we could not explore the causes of this avoid-
ance in a systematic way, open-ended comments that students were
invited to write may shed some light on this phenomenon. Several
survey respondents indicated that a professor who has zero tolerance
toward academic dishonesty may also be inļ¬exible about other areas of
the teacher-student relationship. It is also possible that honest students
are concerned that a āāharmlessāā act might be interpreted by the zero
tolerance professor as dishonest. Thus, even honest students who
presumably prefer to be in an honest academic environment may try to
ZERO TOLERANCE PROFESSOR 749
16. avoid taking a class with a professor who has strong, inļ¬exible attitudes
toward dishonest academic behavior.
Implications
Many professors have experienced academic dishonesty in their clas-
ses. How to deal with dishonest behavior and dishonest students can be
a very diļ¬cult issue for faculty. One can comment on academic dishon-
esty in the course syllabus, actively proctor exams, give diļ¬erent exams
and paper assignments each semester, give multiple versions of the same
exam in a class, and take action against students who violate the trust.
When these actions do not quell the behavior, what is a professor to
do? It is all too easy to turn oneās back on academic dishonesty. After
all, there is very little beneļ¬t associated with having to confront
students, process paperwork, appear in front of honesty committees,
respond to parents, and deal with supportive or unsupportive adminis-
trators. From a practical perspective, it is simply easier to ignore or
tolerate students violating the expectation of honest behavior.
Most academics seek careers in higher education to make a diļ¬erence,
to teach, to help others learn. Undergraduate and graduate education
prepared faculty to work with students and to do research. They have
mastered their disciplines and may have had some classes on how to
teach and some experience actually teaching. What they have not been
prepared for is students violating their trust. Having a student sit across
from a professor and lie to him or her is enough to make one recon-
sider college teaching as a career choice.
Should faculty members who joined the academy to have a positive
impact on students simply turn their backs on academic dishonesty?
Most would agree that eļ¬ort should be made to prevent, detect and
correct problems associated with students cheating. With the advent of
paper mills and access to information on the internet, detection tools
such as āāTurnitināā have become a popular topic. With the use of
camera cell phones to share exam answers, prevention eļ¬orts such as
prohibiting any technology during an exam have also received attention.
A renewed emphasis on ethics in college curricula is an attempt at cor-
recting the problem, but can we teach our students not to cheat when
there are so many role models and societal pressures that encourage and
reward cheating?
Being a zero tolerance professor is an attempt at preventing academic
dishonesty. An exasperated professor who sees students committing the
same dishonest acts semester after semester in his or her class may con-
sider adopting a zero tolerance policyāone violation and the student
750 LEVY AND RAKOVSKI
17. gets a grade of F in the course. If the professor follows through on the
threat and word gets out, one would expect dishonest students to avoid
this professor at all costs. Students who do enroll in the zero tolerance
professorās class will likely think twice before engaging in dishonest acts.
This policy may help to manage the class by freeing up the professor
from focusing time and energy on other prevention and detection activi-
ties, as well as by creating a more level playing ļ¬eld for all students.
Many an honest student complains about the advantage dishonest stu-
dents have when they cheat. Perhaps this policy can serve not only as a
deterrent but also as a way of teaching the importance of being honest
and of developing trust.
Additional research into how students react to faculty attitudes could
help instructors and universities reduce the incidence of academic dis-
honesty. This paper explored reactions to a zero tolerance professor.
However, we did not address questions such as whether students would
avoid or be attracted to a professor who does not take meaningful
action against dishonest students. We confronted respondents with a
āābaselineāā professor who upholds the academic honesty policy of the
school and a āāzero toleranceāā professor who would be the most likely
to send a strong message against academic dishonesty. An area yet to
be researched is the eļ¬ect of a zero tolerance policy on student thinking
and behavior beyond course choice. In other words, for the students
who remained in the course, would their behaviors be diļ¬erent because
of the zero tolerance stance of the instructor? Future research should
explore whether our ļ¬ndings about student reaction to a zero tolerance
policy for one course would hold true for an entire institution.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The research was supported by a Department of Accountancy Summer
Research Grant. The authors thank the student survey respondents and
Maria Skaletsky, who assisted with data analysis. The authors also thank
David Schwarzkopf for his insights in designing the survey instrument.
APPENDIX A: SURVEY INSTRUMENT QUESTIONS REGARDING
PROFESSORāS POLICY
Other Professor
Assume a professor is known for making the following statement the
ļ¬rst day of class: I take the Collegeās policy on academic honesty seri-
ously in this class. That policy is available in the Student Handbook
ZERO TOLERANCE PROFESSOR 751
18. and on the Collegeās website. I urge you to read it and to come to me if
you have any questions about it. If you have any doubts about whether
what you are doing in class or on an assignment may be seen as a viola-
tion of this policy, please see me before you take any action that may
get you in trouble. I think you should be aware that in the past I have
ļ¬led reports of academic dishonesty for students in my classes, with
penalties ranging from getting a zero on an assignment to getting an F
in the course.
Zero Tolerance Professor
Assume a professor is known for making the following statement the
ļ¬rst day of class: In order to protect honest students, I will not tolerate
any academic dishonesty in this class. Anybody caught cheating will re-
ceive an F in the course. Cheating includes the following: using illicit
aids during an exam; copying from another studentās exam, term paper,
course project, or homework; allowing another student to copy from
your exam, term paper, course project, or homework; submitting some-
one elseās term paper or course project as your own; allowing someone
to use your term paper or course project; copying something from the
internet and not indicating the source; receiving or giving help on a gra-
ded assignment or project (other than group work) that goes beyond
what the instructor allows; stealing examination material.
Responses: Go out of your way to register for this professorās class;
Try to register for this professorās class; Be indiļ¬erent in selecting this
professorās class; Try to avoid this professorās class; Avoid this profes-
sorās class at all costs.
APPENDIX B
Respondents were classiļ¬ed from most honest (category 1) to most
dishonest (category 5) as follows:
Dishonesty
Category
Average Score
on the 8 Most
Serious Acts
(Range: 1--5)
Percentage of
Respondents (%)
1 1 57
2 1.125 15
3 1.14--1.25 8
4 1.28--1.57 10
5 1.625 and above 9
752 LEVY AND RAKOVSKI
19. REFERENCES
Ashworth, P., Bannister, P., and Thorne, P. (1997). Guilty in whose eyes? University studentsā
perceptions of cheating and plagiarism in academic work and assessment. Studies in Higher
Education 22(2): 187--203.
Bowers, W. J. (1964). Student Dishonesty and its Control in College, Bureau of Applied Social
Research, Columbia University, New York.
Brooks, C. M., Cunnigham, R., Hinson, N., Brown, S., and Weaver, B. (1981). Student
attitudes toward a medical school honor code. Journal of Medical Education 56(8): 669--671.
Callahan, D. (2004). The Cheating Culture: Why More Americans Are Doing Wrong to Get
Ahead, Harcourt, Inc., Orlando, FL.
Canning, R. (1956). Does an honor system reduce classroom cheating? An experimental answer.
Journal of Experimental Education 24: 291--296.
Caruana, A., Ramaseshan, B., and Ewing, M. T. (2000). The eļ¬ect of anomie on academic
dishonesty among university students. The International Journal of Educational Management
14(1): 23--29.
Clement, M. J. (2001). Academic dishonesty: To be or not to be? Journal of Criminal Justice
Education 12(2): 253--270.
Engle, T. J., and Smith, J. L. (1990). The ethical standards of accounting academics. Issues in
Accounting Education 5(1): 7--29.
Fishbein, L. (1993). We can curb college cheating. The Chronicle of Higher Education 40(15):
A52.
Franklin-Stokes, A., and Newstead, S. E. (1995). Undergraduate cheating: Who does what and
why? Studies in Higher Education 20(2): 159--172.
Gomez, D. S. (2001). Putting the shame back in student cheating. The Virginia Journal of
Education 94: 6--10.
Harding, T. S., Carpenter, D. D., Finelli, C. J., and Passow, H. J. (2004). Does academic
dishonesty relate to unethical behavior in professional practice? An exploratory study.
Science and Engineering Ethics 10(2): 311--324.
Harris, J. R. (1989). Ethical values and decision processes of male and female business students.
Journal of Education for Business 64(5): 234--238.
Kidwell, L. A., Wozniak, K., and Laurel, J. P. (2003). Student reports and faculty perceptions
of academic dishonesty. Teaching Business Ethics 7(3): 205--214.
Mahon, R. L. (2002). Got plagiarism? Try the guillotine. Community College Week 15(9): 4--5.
McCabe, D. L. (1997). Classroom cheating among natural science and engineering majors.
Science and Engineering Ethics 3(4): 433--445.
McCabe, D. L., and Pavela, G. (2000). Some good news about academic integrity. Change
32(5): 32--38.
McCabe, D. L., and Trevino, L. K. (1993). Academic dishonesty: Honor codes and other
contextual inļ¬uences. Journal of Higher Education 64(5): 522--538.
McCabe, D. L., and Trevino, L. K. (1997). Individual and contextual inļ¬uences on academic
dishonesty: A multi-campus investigation. Research in Higher Education 38(3): 379--396.
McCabe, D. L., and Trevino, L. K. (2002). Honesty and honor codes. Academe 88(1): 37--41.
McCabe, D. L., Trevino, L. K., and Butterļ¬eld, K. D. (2001a). Cheating in academic
institutions: A decade of research. Ethics Behavior 11(3): 219--232.
McCabe, D. L., Trevino, L. K., and Butterļ¬eld, K. D. (2001b). Dishonesty in academic
environments. Journal of Higher Education 72(1): 29--45.
Milem, J. F., Berger, J. B., and Dey, E. L. (2000). Faculty time allocation: A study of change
over twenty years. Journal of Higher Education 71(4): 454--475.
ZERO TOLERANCE PROFESSOR 753
20. Nuss, E. M. (1984). Academic integrity: Comparing faculty and student attitudes. Improving
College and University Teaching 32(3): 140--144.
Pincus, H. S., and Schmelkin, L. P. (2003). Faculty perceptions of academic dishonesty: A
multidimensional scaling analysis. Journal of Higher Education 74(2): 196--209.
Porter, S., and Whitcomb, W. (2003). The impact of lottery incentives on student survey
response rates. Research in Higher Education 44(4): 389--407.
Rezaee, Z., Elmore, R. C., and Szendi, J. Z. (2001). Ethical behavior in higher educational
institutions: The role of the code of conduct. Journal of Business Ethics 30(2): 171--183.
Sims, R. L. (1993). The relationship between academic dishonesty and unethical business
practices. Journal of Education for Business 68(4): 207--211.
Sims, R. L. (1995). The severity of academic dishonesty: A comparison of faculty and student
views. Psychology in the Schools 32(3): 233--238.
Smyth, M. L., and Davis, J. R. (2004). Perceptions of dishonesty among 2-year college students:
Academic versus business situations. Journal of Business Ethics 51(1): 63--73.
Stern, E. B., and Havlicek, L. (1986). Academic misconduct: Results of faculty and
undergraduate student surveys. Journal of Allied Health 15(2): 129--142.
Taylor, K. R. (2003). Cheater, cheater. Principal Leadership 3(8): 74--77.
Whitley, B. E. (1998). Factors associated with cheating among college students: A review.
Research in Higher Education 39(3): 235--274.
Whitley, B. E., and Kost, C. R. (1999). College studentsā perceptions of peers who cheat.
Journal of Applied Social Psychology 29(8): 1732--1760.
Wood, J. A., Longenecker, J. G., McKinney, J. A., and Moore, C. W. (1988). Ethical attitudes
of students and business professionals: A study of moral reasoning. Journal of Business Ethics
7(4): 249--257.
Received June 22, 2005
754 LEVY AND RAKOVSKI