Afghanistan: After the Election. Produced by the Afghan Center for Socio-economic and Opinion Research with D3 Systems and Langer Research Associates. Presented by Gregory H. Holyk at the annual meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, May 16, 2015, in Hollywood, Florida.

1. AFGHANISTAN:
AFTER THE ELECTION
Annual meeting of the
American Association for Public Opinion Research
Hollywood, Florida – May 16, 2015
Gary Langer and
Gregory Holyk
Matthew Warshaw
Jessica Beaird

2. Background
Pre- and post-election national surveys by the Afghan Center for
Socio-economic and Opinion Research (ACSOR-Surveys) as part of
its ongoing Afghan Futures series. Design and analysis by Langer
Research Associates and D3 Systems, Inc.
March 2014
Pre-election Poll
November 2014
Post-election Poll
April 2014
Afghanistan
Presidential
Election
June 2014
Runoff –
Ghani/Abdullah
September 2014
Ghani declared
winner; strikes
power-sharing
accord
w/Abdullah

3. Methodology
oNationwide random samples
o2,643 and 2,051 face-to-face interviews
oConducted in Dari and Pashto
oAfghan adults 18 and older
oMargin of sampling error
oMarch 10-18 and Nov. 4-12, 2014
 +/- 2.5 points for full samples
 +/- 4 points for pre-election survey’s sample of 1,190 likely voters

4. Pre-election results

5. 46%
45%
35%
32%
8%
11%
Afghan
Futures
survey
Final IEC
Results
Abdullah Ghani Rasul
Survey estimates closely matched the first-round outcome per the Afghan Independent
Election Commission, with 45/46 percent for Abdullah Abdullah, and 32/35 percent for
Ashraf Ghani.

6. Ethnic and regional divisions were by far the strongest individual
predictors of vote preferences.
Abdullah benefitted from higher Tajik
turnout in the North, and Hazaras in the
Central region and Kabul.
Ghani was broadly backed by ethnic
Pashtuns in the South, as well as Uzbeks.

7. 4%
13%
45%
38%Very easy
Somewhat easy
Somewhat difficult
Very difficult
Despite these divisions, a vast majority of Afghans said it would be very or somewhat
easy for them to accept someone from an ethnic group other than their own as
president.

8. 71%said they would
accept Abdullah as
the legitimate
leader of
Afghanistan.
76%said they would
accept Ghani as
the legitimate
leader of
Afghanistan.
82%were confident
the next
president
would unite the
country.

9. Post-Election Attitudes
Recap:
• Abdullah and Ghani advanced to a runoff
• Ghani prevailed; results were disputed
• Power-sharing deal emerged: Ghani as president, Abdullah
in the new position of chief executive

10. 44%
55%
Contrary to their expectations, fewer than
half of Afghans saw the election as fair
and transparent.
March 2014
November 2014
87%
Yet a vast majority approved of the
power-sharing agreement.

11. Even among those who saw the runoff as
fraudulent, 84 percent approved of the power-
sharing deal - indicating a willingness to tolerate
improvised measures in search of stability.

12. 78%accepted Abdullah
as the legitimate
president.
84%accepted Ghani
as the legitimate
chief executive.
76%were satisfied
with the
outcome.

13. 80%
Expressed
confidence that
a system of
freely electing
leaders can
work in
Afghanistan.

14. Still, fewer were very satisfied with the outcome or expressed high levels of confidence
in free elections.
14%
17%
6%
7%
50%
47%
29%
29%
Very/Somewhat unsatisfied Somewhat/Very satisfied
Not at all/Not so confident Somewhat/Very confident
Satisfactionwith
Election Outcome
Confidence in
Free Elections

15. Looking Forward

16. 48%
61%
64%
73%
2013 2014
Afghans shared a growing sense of optimism after the election. Compared with 2013,
more rated their overall living conditions positively and said Afghanistan was heading in
the right direction.

17. Compared with four years previous, Afghans were more likely to say they could afford fuel
and food and rated their ability to afford things and security from the Taliban positively.
47%
62%
44%
58%
39%
51%
31%
49%
2010 2014
Good security from Taliban
Good ability to afford things
Can afford food
Can afford fuel

18. 92%
4%
Current government Taliban
Nine in 10 Afghans continued to
prefer the current government over
the Taliban.
12%
53%
United States Taliban
Most continued to blame the Taliban
for Afghanistan's violence.

19. Despite broad opposition to the Taliban, 71 percent
of Afghans preferred a negotiated settlement vs.
continued fighting.
• Six in 10 expressed willingness for Taliban
members to join Afghan security forces if they lay
down their arms.
• As many, though, were unwilling to cede control
of some provinces to the Taliban in a peace deal.

20. Seventy-seven percent supported the presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Many
fewer, 46 percent, said they would like to see additional U.S. forces in the country, with
wide regional disparities.
52%
N
S
EW
62%
N
W E
S 27%
W
S
E
N

21. 39% 39% 37%
Jobs or other economic
opportunities
Supply of electricity Support for agriculture
Problems remain. Well fewer than half rated the following positively:

22. 73%
53%
2005 2014
In a discouraging result, the percentage of Afghans who see the cultivation of opium
poppy as "unacceptable in all cases" has declined sharply.

23. Support for women's rights was substantial in most cases, but far from universal, and
not always strong.
18%
12%
7%
5%
33%
24%
20%
17%
11%
6%
28%
34%
33%
36%
28%
25%
20%
31%
40%
42%
57%
67%
Women traveling unescorted non-locally
Women traveling unescorted locally
Women holding office
Women holding jobs
Girls' education
Women voting
Strongly oppose Somewhat oppose Somewhat support Strongly support

24. Generally, support for women’s rights was
highest among urban women, followed by urban
men, then by rural women, and sharply lower, in
most cases, among rural men.
Three-quarters of the country’s population lives in
rural areas.

25. In a result that’s challenging to Western
sensibilities, substantial numbers said they
would accept circumscribed women’s rights in
exchange for a settlement with the Taliban.
• Sixty-five percent would accept restrictions
on women leaving the home unescorted.
• Half or nearly half would accept bans on
women working, holding political office,
attending school and voting.
• Men and women expressed these views in
essentially equal numbers.

26. Afghans who said civil society organizations were active in their area were more likely
to believe CSOs make things better in their country, compared with those who were
unaware of CSOs operating locally.
43%
45%
45%
50%
51%
53%
56%
57%
61%
25%
30%
30%
38%
45%
31%
46%
52%
34%Reducing corruption
Expanding girls' education
Expanding boys' education
Improving access to health services
Expanding women's rights
Improving election participation
Providing job training
Expanding rights of the
handicapped
Supporting agriculture

27. Conclusions:
• Relief at the peaceful transition of power
presents an opportunity to build national
cohesion and democratic institutions.
• Brighter expectations are a positive, but a
risk if unfulfilled.
• War-weariness and economic deprivation
frame policy preferences.
• International development efforts can play
a continued critical role.

28. For more
information,
please contact:
8300 Greensboro Dr.
Suite 450
McLean, VA 22102
(703) 388-2450
www.d3systems.com
D3 Systems, Inc.
Matthew Warshaw
Managing Director
matthew.warshaw@acsor-
surveys.com
Thank you!
For more information:
Gary Langer
President
Langer Research Associates
New York, New York
info@langerresearch.com
Matthew Warshaw
Managing Director
ACSOR-Surveys
Afghanistan
matthew.warshaw@acsor-
surveys.com
Jessica Beaird
Assistant Research Analyst
D3 Systems, Inc.
McLean, VA
jessica.beaird@d3systems.com