The fundamental focus of maritime strategy centres on the control of human activity at sea. There is the effort to establish control for oneself or to deny it to an enemy and there is the effort to use the control that one has in order to achieve specific ends. The security of Sri Lanka derives from a combination of factors, including the maintenance of a highly competent naval force equipped with advanced technology and structured for unique geostrategic environment. Sri Lanka is now in the midst of a transition from a focus on internal security to an external security. The maritime strategy should be as much as it has to deal with the linkage between national strategic interests of the country. This may be the most appropriate time for Sri Lanka to re-appreciate our national interests and to derive National and Military objectives based on those interests.

1. A MARITIME
STRATEGY
FOR
SRI LANKA
Captain Akram Alavi, RWP, RSP, psc, MDS

2. ““Strategy is inescapably both politicalStrategy is inescapably both political
and military. Highly logical militaryand military. Highly logical military
strategy may be entirely impossible tostrategy may be entirely impossible to
execute because it violates the politicalexecute because it violates the political
constraints of the system within which itconstraints of the system within which it
has to operate”.has to operate”.
Norman FriedmanNorman Friedman
The US Maritime StrategyThe US Maritime Strategy

3. INTRODUCTION

4. • The foundations for maritime strategy in the 21st
century are laid on centuries of practice, but on
only a relatively short period of analysis and
theoretical examination.
• Today, we have a larger, theoretical
understanding that builds on these earlier ideas for
wartime maritime strategy.
• Our perspective has allowed us to go on to lay the
foundations of theory for peacetime strategies of
maritime power.
FOUNDATIONS FOR MARITIME
STRATEGY

5. FOCUS OF MARITIME STRATEGY
• The fundamental focus of maritime strategy
centers on the control of human activity at sea.
• There are two parts to this.
– the effort to establish control for oneself
or to deny it to an enemy.
– the effort to use the control that one has
in order to achieve specific ends.

6. SECURITY OF SRI LANKA
This derives from a combination of factors, including
the maintenance of a highly competent naval force
equipped with advanced technology and structured
for unique geostrategic environment. The formulation
of the defence policy or the doctrine should be
governed by the following prime factors:
• Political objectives of the country.
• Threats to the security of the country.
• Economic resources of the country.

7. We are now in amidst of a transition from
a focus on internal security to an external
security. We should equip the forces with
modern weapons and greater mobility,
and develop air and maritime capabilities
with modern platforms. The defence
relations with India and other Asian
countries will continue to be important,
both for sustaining self-reliant capability
for the defence of Sri Lanka, and
supporting for wider regional security.
SECURITY OF SRI LANKA

8. METHODOLOGY

9. HYPOTHESIS
Formulating a maritime strategy for
Sri Lanka is important in order to
safeguard her maritime interests
and integrity in the region.

10. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY
The immediate purpose of a maritime strategy is
to contest the control of the sea. The use of the
sea for movement is itself the core of maritime
strategy in its traditional sense. The most direct
method of doing this is to seek out the enemy’s
fighting forces and try to destroy them in some
single massive encounter or decisive battle. The
adoption of a maritime strategy has several
important advantages. It provides a theme for
tactical and technical development.

11. SEA POWER AND
STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
OF THE INDIAN OCEAN

12. •The Indian Ocean covering about twenty percent of
the world ocean areas has consistently occupied
position of pre-eminence unrivalled by the Pacific or
the Atlantic.
•The Ocean figured prominently not only in the lives
of people in the littoral countries, but also of the
people of distant lands.
•The geopolitical prominence of the Ocean was
intimately connected with the fabulous riches and
spices of the Indies. The importance of spices in the
distant past is probably surpassed only by the present
day prominence of oil.
THE INDIAN OCEAN

13. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF
THE INDIAN OCEAN
A region of utmost strategic importance to the East and
West, the Indian Ocean has become a focus of the new
cold war confrontation. The strategic importance of the
Indian Ocean has come to be recognized increasingly in
recent decades. This recognition has been accompanied
by growing militarization throughout the area, which has
included naval build up both by the littoral states and the
great powers. There are three aspects of the great power
interest in the region:
• the strategic location of the ocean basin,
• the existence of natural resources, especially oil
• local rivalries.

14. THE SEA AS THE HIGHWAY
First railroads, then highways then aircraft
have all moved people much faster than
ships or riverboats, and due to the
competition of jet airliners, ocean
passenger ships have become very nearly
extinct over the past two decades.
However, goods still tend to travel by
water, because such transportation is so
much more efficient. The key issue is the
capacity of the alternative means of
transportation, in terms of tonnage
delivered continuously per unit time.

15. SEA POWER
Sea power is the ability of a nation to exploit the oceans to its
advantage. It consists not only the ability of exploiting the
oceans commercially, but the strength to protect this ability
from interference. Sea power is made up of following elements:
a. The strength of merchant fleet and the ship building
capacity to sustain them.
b. The availability of ports and naval bases in adequate
numbers and capacity with internal communications
serving them.
c. The industrial capacity to sustain national economy
through overseas trade.
d. The personnel to man the various instrument of sea
power.
e. The capacity to safeguard sea borne trade and other
maritime interest.
f. The maritime forces to enable a nation to impose its will
on an enemy in war, to influence others in peace and to
protect other elements of sea power.

16. GENERAL CONCEPTS
• Deterrence
Deterrence is a strategic idea in commonplace.
The idea is as old as strategy itself, by making
military operation, to convince a potential
opponent that military action will be unprofitable
for him.
• Sea Command and Sea Control
The reasons lie deep in the scale and nature of
world relationships at sea. It is therefore beyond
the bounds of possibility that at all times and in all
places any power could be in a position
comprehensively to impose its will on all goes on
at sea.

17. • Sea Use
‘The ability to use the sea’ is one definition of
maritime power. Sea use in normal conditions
can result in great economic gain, and great
advantages for the states. The economic uses of
the sea consist of trade and commerce on its
surface, and exploitation of resources in its
depth and subsoil.
• Sea Denial
Denial of the sea to one’s adversary has often
been regarded as to be opposite of sea control
for one’s own use.

18. THE MAHAN’S THEORY
The great naval strategist and theoretician
Admiral AT Mahan emphasized that the ‘principal
conditions affecting the sea power of nations’
were:
a. Geographical position.
b. Physical Conformation
c. Extent of Territory
d. Number of Population
e. National Character
f. Character of Government

19. THE ROLE AND TASK
OF THE NAVY

20. SPECIAL CHARACTER OF
NAVAL WARFARE
Naval warfare differs radically from land warfare.
The area encompassed by any naval operation
tends to be immense compared with that
covered by a land battle, because ships are so
mobile. The Naval forces have three key roles:
• Constabulary / regulatory role,
• Territorial defence role and
• Force projection at sea.
Navies of developed states normally perform
these roles too, but the third world context gives
them distinctive features. Third world navies are
often much more involved in regulatory duties
than are the navies of developed countries.

21. NAVY IN WAR
In wartime, fleet battles and blockade of war fleets
have been the two traditional means by which one
opponent has achieved control over another, preventing an
enemy from interfering in its own use of the sea. there are
many essential military uses of the sea for this purpose.
Among the most important wartime functions are:
a. Protecting and facilitating one's own and
allied merchant shipping and military supplies at sea.
b. Denying commercial shipping to an enemy.
c. Protecting the coast and offshore resources.
d. Acquiring advanced bases.
e. Moving and supporting troops.
f. Gaining and maintaining local air and sea
control in support of air and land operations.

22. NAVY IN PEACE
In peacetime, in operations short of open
warfare, and in the non-war functions of naval
power, many of which continue even during
wartime. Maritime strategy involves a wide
variety of other considerations. These may be
categorized under three headings:
- The military role.
- The policing role.
- The diplomatic and international role.

23. a. Ensuring stability in trade and commerce and such
economic activity, which are largely dependent on safe
sea passage.
b. Safeguarding a coastline of over 679 NMs and a sea
area over 8 times the landmass.
c. Protecting the entry and exit of over 4 million
containers annually brought by ships, arriving or transiting
via the Ports of Colombo, Galle and Trincomalee.
d. Protecting the entry of approximately 350 shiploads of
food, raw material and consumer items for the nation’s use
and transhipment every month.
e. Protecting International Sea Lines of Communications
(SLOCs) located along the Southern and Eastern coasts
of the Island.
f. Safeguarding the Traffic Separation Zone at Dondra
Head, one of the busiest in the world.
ROLE AND TASK OF THE NAVY

24. g. The protection and exploitation of the following
natural resources in the sea area of control, which
greatly add to the state’s economic gains:
(1) The maritime fishing industry with emphasis
on deep sea fishing and living / renewable
resources.
(2) The non-living / non-renewable resources.
h. Maintaining safe communications of local shipping
within the EEZ, against terrorism, sea piracy, gun
running, drug trafficking, smuggling and illicit immigration
and emigration.
i. Protecting the environment and installations such as
harbours, offshore rigs and structures and submarine
cables.
j. Sri Lanka being a littoral state can claim the sea
area beyond the EEZ for the sovereign right of mineral
deposits and certain Biological resources.

25. SRI LANKAS EEZ AND
SAFEGUARDING ITS
RESOURCES

26. The world economy will depend increasingly on
the vast and largely untapped wealth of the
oceans. Since the Third United Nations
Conference on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) of
1982, some nations have declared Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZ) around their coastlines,
within which the country has sovereign rights
for exploration, exploitation and management of
natural resources.
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

27. Sri Lanka being an
Island nation, our
lives have been
linked with the
sea. The area of
the Island is
around 64,850 sq.
kms. The Coastal
area around the
country is about
1600 kms. With an
EEZ of 200 NMs
extending towards
the ocean, and the
ocean area
encompassing to
the jurisdiction of
Sri Lanka is about
8 times the area of
the land mass.

28. There is a possibility exist for Sri Lanka to
acquire an additional sea area which
would be 30 times the area of land mass
of Sri Lanka. However it is the duty of Sri
Lanka to provide the reference points after
conducting surveys. Consequently, the
initial investigations began in 1999 and a
'desktop study' was compiled with the
seismic information in the Bay of Bengal
Sedimentary Fan.
THE EXTENDED EEZ

29. The potential continental shelf extension (blue areas)

30. EEZ
ADDITIONAL
EEZ
AREA
NOT DRAWN TO SCALE
SUBMEREED
MOUND
MARINE
RIDGE
MARINE
RIDGE
INCUBA

31. LIVING AND NON-LIVING
RESOURCES
The wealth and resources within this vast area are
enormous. Their exploration and exploitation will make Sri
Lanka one of the richest countries in Asia. The resources
are broadly:
a. Ocean bed minerals.
b. Petroleum, gas and shale.
c. Potential for energy generation (OTEC as well
as the emerging ocean current technology).
d. Fishery resources.
e. Rights resources including possible levies on
international shipping moving through this zone.

32. • It is important to access and manage these
resources carefully after surveying them,
mapping them out and formulating short,
medium and long term plans for their:
exploration, development, conservation and
surveillance.
• Today we have new methodologies of science
and technology using the full range of the
electro-magnetic spectrum for making the basic
survey measurements, using different remote
sensing techniques. This will determine the
both living and non-living resources.
• The task of exploration and exploitation of the
living and non-living resources of the sea
should include measures for prevention of
other countries from exploitation of our
resources. Thus it would also require maritime
surveillance.

33. MARITIME SURVEILLANCE
• Maritime Surveillance refers to the systematic
observation and monitoring of an area to detect
and deter violators of specific offences or rules.
• The effectiveness of it depends on three paramount
capabilities viz. detection, identification and near
real time transmission for analysis and the
effectiveness of enforcement depends on the ability
to inspect and apprehend offenders.
• The most efficient and cost effective platform for
the surveillance of this large seaboard is a Long
Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft (LRMPA) with night
operation capability and state of the art surveillance
equipment outfit.

34. PROTECTION OF THE RESOURCES
• The needs of offshore control are radically
different from those of land-based policing. Prior
setting up an offshore control organization, a
detailed assessment must be carried out of the
assets within the EEZ and of the risks, which
have to be guarded against.
• There may be mineral resources, hydrothermal
vents, deep cur-rents, historic wrecks and other
unknown features worth exploiting.
• The protection of resources needs similar
careful analysis. The organization needed to
control an EEZ and especially the equipment
used to exercise control depends critically on the
geographical and hydrographical nature of the
area.

35. PROPOSED MARITIME
STRATEGY FOR SRI LANKA

36. • The Sri Lanka Navy should continuously seek to
maintain a naval strategy to achieve its
designated role as required by the State.
• Article 2 (4) of the United Nation’s Charter which
clearly prohibits the use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of
any State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations.
• Sri Lanka’s history has shown that the following
factors could be considered in formulating naval
strategies.
A MARITIME STRATEGY FOR
SRI LANKA

37. a. The danger that could come across the sea, from
beyond territorial limits.
b. As the coast can be considered the island’s frontier,
coastal surveillance should be undertaken.
c. The maintaining of strategic alliances with neighbouring
countries, but with caution that mutual relations are not
strained which could lead to conflict.
d. The landing of sea borne troops to be employed in
internal conflicts.
e. The landing on unfamiliar foreign shores when
necessary, only after careful study and planning.
f. The protection of Trade and Commerce with the use of
sea power.
g. The containment of enemy incursions by sea or his
escape from land.
h. The effective denial of safety and logistics to enemy
shipping.
i. Not displaying ‘expansionist’ ambitions but yet not being
intimidated.

38. The immediate purpose of maritime
strategy is to contest the control of the sea
at least to some degree. Whilst preparing
the naval fleet to face any asymmetric
threat like the threat posed by LTTE, we
must prepare to maintain surveillance and
carry out various tasks in the EEZ and
around our coast. Some of the areas
suggested for this process are as follows:
IMMEDIATE PURPOSE OF
MARITIME STRATEGY

39. a. Enhance SLN Fleet to carry out various tasks
within EEZ with more endurance and range of
operation whilst improving the inshore security.
b. Formulation of a Coast Guard Force with
integrated Deep Water System.
c. Assist the agencies that are carrying out
research and development in the ocean around
Sri Lanka.
d. Protect and safeguard sea lines of
communication within the area of jurisdiction.
e. Improve the weapon outfit and sensors of SLN
fighting ships and craft with enhanced ranges
and fire control systems.
f. Improve maritime surveillance capability in
liaison with the SLAF and Indian navy.

40. g. Obtaining assistance from India in joint patrols.
h. Maintain an Auxiliary / amphibious / sealift
capability to a desired degree.
i. Improve defences and development of ports.
j. Improve Intelligence gathering mechanism by
obtaining assistance from foreign countries and
satellites along with other high tech sensors.
k. To develop a tactical picture around our country
combining all sensors such as ships, aircraft,
satellites, fishing vessels, merchant ships, shore
based radar stations.
l. Modify training methods and contents based on
lessons learnt and to be in par with the latest
development in science and technology.

41. m. A proper analysis should be carried out by a
high level team after each battle or an incident to
find out the lapses and to improve own fighting
efficiency. A record has to be maintained and
their observation, findings, recommendations
has to be brought to the notice of the relevant
personnel concerned.
n. Adopting of Maritime Confidence building
measures such as sharing general information
on doctrine, policies, and force structures.
o. As far as the sea warfare is concerned, Army,
Navy and Air force strategies have to merge and
should bring a closer affiliation, which should
reflect in a joint approach to maritime strategy.

42. The ocean area around Sri Lanka lies within
some of the major international shipping routes
across the Indian Ocean. It is the responsibility
of the SLN to maintain an effective surveillance
of this vast ocean area in respect of following:
– Maintaining Freedom of Navigation in sea
lines of communications.
– Prevent maritime pollution.
– Prevent poaching and smuggling.
– Prevent sea piracy.
– Protection of agencies exploiting ocean
resources.
– Ensure maritime safety.
– Salvage and search and rescue.
– Assistance in maritime research.

43. VIABLE FLEET FOR THE
SRI LANKA NAVY
At sea, a naval force that is even slightly inferior
will usually be defeated decisively by and inflict
little damage on superior enemy. The ideal fleet
for Sri Lanka navy could be a composition of
flowing squadrons of ships and craft:
– Offshore Surveillance Squadron.
– Fast attack Craft Squadron.
– Auxiliary Squadron.
– Inshore Patrol Craft Squadron.

44. OFFSHORE SURVEILLANCE SQUADRON
• In modern naval combat, effective scouting is the key to
effective weapon delivery. The needs of offshore control
are radically different from those of land based policing.
This may not be as simple as it sounds. The agencies
and authorities involved in offshore activities would be
undertaken, to assess the facilities already available,
such as means of command and control, surveillance,
communica­tions and data handling. On the equipment
side additional ships and air­craft may be needed for law
and order enforcement. The patrol vessels with tactical
data links can be used to transmit data through a shore­
based gateway or ground entry terminal, to the database
of, the integrated radar system. Navy’s requirement on
corvettes as the high point in the many forums.

45. FAST ATTACK CRAFT SQUADRON
• Naval warfare centres on the process of attrition. Attrition
comes from the successful delivery of firepower.18 In
recent past FAC were mainly responsible for most of the
enemy craft destruction and they will remain as
vanguard of the Navy. It has been experienced that
weapon outfit of FAC were incapable to cause
destruction to the enemy. The weapon out fit has to be
continuously tested and the capabilities and shortcoming
to be observed by team of experts. History shows us
naval battles are hard fought and destructive, but high
morale and courage in combat always depend on
superior machines. Therefore SLN should in possession
of well­fitted FAC for outwitting or outfighting a
unequalled enemy..

46. AUXILIARY SQUADRON
• Although Sri Lanka has extensive road network, sea
transportation remained as cheapest means of
transportation of cargo for various destinations.
Amphibious capabilities of Sri Lanka navy will remain as
an important element of the fleet when transporting
troops and equipment. Sri Lanka being an Island nation
amphibious element of our fleet should remain strong
and capable to react to urgent requirement of army even
without major amphibious operation. The auxiliary
squadron may remain as the workhorse of the navy.
During the latter part of 1980s the SLN was able to
acquire amphibious capability and carry out successful
amphibious operations since then.

47. INSHORE PATROL CRAFT SQUADRON
• Owing to continuous harbour security and
inshore patrol requirements, demands for
Inshore patrol craft will remain unchanged.
Recently Sri Lanka Navy has started a
new project to built Inshore Patrol Craft
(IPC) locally. The local builders should be
encouraged to build IPC with lesser length
and with high speed. The weapon outfit for
the IPC needs to be reviewed considering
the threat perception of the enemy.

48. CONCLUSION

49. The Sri Lanka Navy should be structured to maintain a
favourable maritime situation and carrying out all the
tasks entrusted to her in an effective manner. In this
process the Navy requires various platforms, weapons
and sensors from various sources from time to time.
The recommended platforms are Frigates, Offshore
patrol vessels, Maritime patrol aircraft, minesweepers
and Corvettes to carryout effective maritime operations
in Sri Lanka. Now that the long drawn separatist war is
over the Sri Lanka Navy can play even a greater role in
maritime operations. The Sri Lanka Navy of tomorrow
will therefore need to have a dual role, protection of
her shores and seas. Navy’s future platforms, sensors
and training will be catered for keeping the duel role of
the future in mind.

50. Thank You