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Dmitry Sklyarov
Senior Analyst @ Department for Advanced Developments
Positive Technologies
Positive Hack Days IV, May 21-22, 2014
How it looks (approximately ;)
Explore textual marks on Modem
Front side:
• “4G” logo
• operator’s logo
Under the cover (access to SIM and SD cards):
• operator’s internal model number
• IMEI
• serial number
Hmm, what the actual manufacturer name and
model number?
Back side:
• nothing
Explore packaging
Manufacturer name (ZTE) printed on the box and in booklet
ZTE MF823 4G Modem Specification
• LTE-FDD:
800/900/1800/2600MHz;
• UMTS: 900/2100MHz;
• LTE-FDD: DL/UL
100/50Mbps (Category3)
• DC-HSPA+: DL/UL
42/5.76Mbps
• Size: 90 x 28.4 x 13mm
• OS: Win7, Windows XP,Vista,
Win8, Mac OS
ZTE MF823 4G Modem re-Branding
MegaFon (Russia)
O2(Germany)
Is there Modem anymore?
After plugging into PC running Windows 7:
• CWID USB SCSI CD-ROM USB Device
• ZTE MMC Storage USB Device (MicroSD Card Reader)
After performing “Eject CD Drive”:
• CD-ROM (sometimes they come back!)
• MicroSD Card Reader
• Remote NDIS* based Internet Sharing Device
*NDIS == Network Driver Interface Specification
No drivers required! (at least on Windows 7 ;)
Remote NDIS adapter properties
> ipconfig
Windows IP Configuration
Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection:
Connection-specific DNS Suffix . :
IPv4 Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.182
Subnet Mask . . . . . . . . . . . : 255.255.255.0
Default Gateway . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.1
How to speak with MF823?
Results of ports scan for 192.168.0.1
HTTP server on 192.168.0.1
NB: Some brand-customized firmware contains web-interface
that relies on “GoForm” handlers
GET /index.html HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
HTTP/1.1 404 Site or Page Not Found
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
HTTP/1.0 302 Redirect
Server: GoAhead-Webs/2.5.0
Location: http://192.168.0.1/index.html
HTTP server Handlers
Defined UrlHandlers:
/goform
/cgi-bin
/mmc2
/api/xmlclient/post
/client/backup
/api/nvramul.cgi
Defined GoForm handlers:
/goform/goform_get_cmd_process
/goform/goform_set_cmd_process
/goform/goform_process
/goform/formTest
Getting diagnostics info
http://192.168.0.1/goform/
goform_get_cmd_process?
cmd=device_diagnostics
Returns:
productName softwareVersion modemVersion
routerVersion webUiVersion hardwareVersion
serialNumber simSerialNumber simMsisdn
deviceImei simImsi simStatus
sdCardAvailable sdCardTotalMemory sdCardUsedMemory
currentConnectedUsers maxConnectedUsers timeSinceStartup
Switching to Download (FACTORY) mode
http://192.168.0.1/goform/goform_process?
goformId=MODE_SWITCH&switchCmd=FACTORY
New devices appears:
• ZTE Diagnostics Interface (COMX)
• ZTE NMEA Device (COMY)
• ZTE Proprietary USB Modem
NB: Send AT+ZCDRUN=F to COM-port associated with
“ZTE NMEA Device” to return from Download mode
telnetd on 192.168.0.1
OpenEmbedded Linux 9615-cdp
msm 20130729 9615-cdp
9615-cdp login: root
Password: zte9x15
root@9615-cdp:~# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
root is good!
Full-featured ARM-based Linux
• busybox apps (e.g. nc and netstat)
• iptables
• tcpdump
• gdbserver
CD image at /usr/zte_web/ZTEMODEM.ISO
HTTP server root at /usr/zte_web/web/*
• auto_apn
• copy
• zte_log
What is actually under your control?
What is actually under your control?
What are the treats?
controls all
external traffic
log all
internet activity replicate all
internet activity
WiFi-enabled?
access to
local WiFi
GPS-enabled?
store/report
GPS location
under remote
management
access to
local network
My favorite Modem ;)
That’s all…
Thanks for your patience ;)
Dmitry Sklyarov
DSklyarov@ptsecurity.ru
Senior Analyst @ Department for Advanced Developments
Positive Technologies
4G modem – best present ever!

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4G modem – best present ever!

  • 1.
  • 2. Dmitry Sklyarov Senior Analyst @ Department for Advanced Developments Positive Technologies Positive Hack Days IV, May 21-22, 2014
  • 3. How it looks (approximately ;)
  • 4. Explore textual marks on Modem Front side: • “4G” logo • operator’s logo Under the cover (access to SIM and SD cards): • operator’s internal model number • IMEI • serial number Hmm, what the actual manufacturer name and model number? Back side: • nothing
  • 5. Explore packaging Manufacturer name (ZTE) printed on the box and in booklet
  • 6. ZTE MF823 4G Modem Specification • LTE-FDD: 800/900/1800/2600MHz; • UMTS: 900/2100MHz; • LTE-FDD: DL/UL 100/50Mbps (Category3) • DC-HSPA+: DL/UL 42/5.76Mbps • Size: 90 x 28.4 x 13mm • OS: Win7, Windows XP,Vista, Win8, Mac OS
  • 7. ZTE MF823 4G Modem re-Branding MegaFon (Russia) O2(Germany)
  • 8. Is there Modem anymore? After plugging into PC running Windows 7: • CWID USB SCSI CD-ROM USB Device • ZTE MMC Storage USB Device (MicroSD Card Reader) After performing “Eject CD Drive”: • CD-ROM (sometimes they come back!) • MicroSD Card Reader • Remote NDIS* based Internet Sharing Device *NDIS == Network Driver Interface Specification No drivers required! (at least on Windows 7 ;)
  • 9. Remote NDIS adapter properties > ipconfig Windows IP Configuration Ethernet adapter Local Area Connection: Connection-specific DNS Suffix . : IPv4 Address. . . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.182 Subnet Mask . . . . . . . . . . . : 255.255.255.0 Default Gateway . . . . . . . . . : 192.168.0.1
  • 10. How to speak with MF823? Results of ports scan for 192.168.0.1
  • 11. HTTP server on 192.168.0.1 NB: Some brand-customized firmware contains web-interface that relies on “GoForm” handlers GET /index.html HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.0.1 HTTP/1.1 404 Site or Page Not Found GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.0.1 HTTP/1.0 302 Redirect Server: GoAhead-Webs/2.5.0 Location: http://192.168.0.1/index.html
  • 12. HTTP server Handlers Defined UrlHandlers: /goform /cgi-bin /mmc2 /api/xmlclient/post /client/backup /api/nvramul.cgi Defined GoForm handlers: /goform/goform_get_cmd_process /goform/goform_set_cmd_process /goform/goform_process /goform/formTest
  • 13. Getting diagnostics info http://192.168.0.1/goform/ goform_get_cmd_process? cmd=device_diagnostics Returns: productName softwareVersion modemVersion routerVersion webUiVersion hardwareVersion serialNumber simSerialNumber simMsisdn deviceImei simImsi simStatus sdCardAvailable sdCardTotalMemory sdCardUsedMemory currentConnectedUsers maxConnectedUsers timeSinceStartup
  • 14. Switching to Download (FACTORY) mode http://192.168.0.1/goform/goform_process? goformId=MODE_SWITCH&switchCmd=FACTORY New devices appears: • ZTE Diagnostics Interface (COMX) • ZTE NMEA Device (COMY) • ZTE Proprietary USB Modem NB: Send AT+ZCDRUN=F to COM-port associated with “ZTE NMEA Device” to return from Download mode
  • 15. telnetd on 192.168.0.1 OpenEmbedded Linux 9615-cdp msm 20130729 9615-cdp 9615-cdp login: root Password: zte9x15 root@9615-cdp:~# id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
  • 16. root is good! Full-featured ARM-based Linux • busybox apps (e.g. nc and netstat) • iptables • tcpdump • gdbserver CD image at /usr/zte_web/ZTEMODEM.ISO HTTP server root at /usr/zte_web/web/* • auto_apn • copy • zte_log
  • 17. What is actually under your control?
  • 18. What is actually under your control?
  • 19. What are the treats? controls all external traffic log all internet activity replicate all internet activity WiFi-enabled? access to local WiFi GPS-enabled? store/report GPS location under remote management access to local network
  • 21. That’s all… Thanks for your patience ;) Dmitry Sklyarov DSklyarov@ptsecurity.ru Senior Analyst @ Department for Advanced Developments Positive Technologies