Medical Device Threat Modeling with TemplatesPriyanka Aash
Modern medical devices contain many software components and are growing exponentially in complexity. Medical device engineering has typically struggled to threat model while the practice has become standard procedure for software systems. To help solve the problem for their engineers, GE Healthcare created a template that combines the software and medical device threat modeling specifics together.
Learning Objectives:
1: Understand the unique and common aspects of medical device technology.
2: See how to use a medical device threat model template.
3: Learn how the model presented may apply in any IoT environment.
(Source: RSA Conference USA 2018)
This document summarizes a presentation on the ISO 26262 approval of automotive software components. The presentation discusses ISO 26262 objectives for software, key characteristics of reusable software components, and the integration of qualified software components. It notes that ISO 26262 qualification of software components is possible if components have certain characteristics like modularity and provide documentation like a compliance matrix to guide integrators.
Get Answers to the most asked questions for ISO26262 compliant automotive Functional Safety consulting services. Check out the FAQs for Functional safety in automotive.
https://www.embitel.com/product-engineering-2/iso-26262functional-safety/
This document discusses considerations for reusing components in automotive systems designed according to ISO 26262 functional safety standards. It begins with an overview of ISO 26262 and its requirements for reusable components called Safety Elements Out of Context (SEooCs). Suppliers often deliver SEooCs to customers, with documentation like a safety manual describing proper deployment. For non-SEooC components, a Development Interface Agreement is required. While ISO 26262 does not directly address open source software, some argue it could be qualified for safety-critical use if specified, tested, and documented rigorously. In general, component reuse aims to increase quality and efficiency if managed carefully according to ISO 26262 processes.
SIA Journée d'étude : NORME ISO 26262 Sécurité fonctionnelle électronique automobile , 04-03-2018
Cédric Heller, DQI/DSEE, French Delegate of TC22/SC32/WG8
Automotive functional safety iso 26262 training bootcamp 2019Tonex
Tonex offers an Automotive Functional Safety ISO 26262 Training Bootcamp course to teach participants about ISO 26262. The course covers all aspects of ISO 26262 including functional safety management, hazard analysis, safety requirements, software and hardware development processes, auditing and more. It is intended for engineers, managers, suppliers and others in the automotive industry. The hands-on training aims to help participants understand and implement ISO 26262 in their work.
Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) is a classification scheme defined by ISO 26262 that assesses automotive safety risks. It considers the severity, exposure, and controllability of potential vehicle hazards to determine an ASIL rating of A, B, C, or D. An ASIL D hazard poses the highest safety risk, with the potential for fatal injuries in conditions that are difficult for the driver to control. The ASIL rating influences the safety integrity requirements placed on automotive components and systems.
Medical Device Threat Modeling with TemplatesPriyanka Aash
Modern medical devices contain many software components and are growing exponentially in complexity. Medical device engineering has typically struggled to threat model while the practice has become standard procedure for software systems. To help solve the problem for their engineers, GE Healthcare created a template that combines the software and medical device threat modeling specifics together.
Learning Objectives:
1: Understand the unique and common aspects of medical device technology.
2: See how to use a medical device threat model template.
3: Learn how the model presented may apply in any IoT environment.
(Source: RSA Conference USA 2018)
This document summarizes a presentation on the ISO 26262 approval of automotive software components. The presentation discusses ISO 26262 objectives for software, key characteristics of reusable software components, and the integration of qualified software components. It notes that ISO 26262 qualification of software components is possible if components have certain characteristics like modularity and provide documentation like a compliance matrix to guide integrators.
Get Answers to the most asked questions for ISO26262 compliant automotive Functional Safety consulting services. Check out the FAQs for Functional safety in automotive.
https://www.embitel.com/product-engineering-2/iso-26262functional-safety/
This document discusses considerations for reusing components in automotive systems designed according to ISO 26262 functional safety standards. It begins with an overview of ISO 26262 and its requirements for reusable components called Safety Elements Out of Context (SEooCs). Suppliers often deliver SEooCs to customers, with documentation like a safety manual describing proper deployment. For non-SEooC components, a Development Interface Agreement is required. While ISO 26262 does not directly address open source software, some argue it could be qualified for safety-critical use if specified, tested, and documented rigorously. In general, component reuse aims to increase quality and efficiency if managed carefully according to ISO 26262 processes.
SIA Journée d'étude : NORME ISO 26262 Sécurité fonctionnelle électronique automobile , 04-03-2018
Cédric Heller, DQI/DSEE, French Delegate of TC22/SC32/WG8
Automotive functional safety iso 26262 training bootcamp 2019Tonex
Tonex offers an Automotive Functional Safety ISO 26262 Training Bootcamp course to teach participants about ISO 26262. The course covers all aspects of ISO 26262 including functional safety management, hazard analysis, safety requirements, software and hardware development processes, auditing and more. It is intended for engineers, managers, suppliers and others in the automotive industry. The hands-on training aims to help participants understand and implement ISO 26262 in their work.
Automotive Safety Integrity Level (ASIL) is a classification scheme defined by ISO 26262 that assesses automotive safety risks. It considers the severity, exposure, and controllability of potential vehicle hazards to determine an ASIL rating of A, B, C, or D. An ASIL D hazard poses the highest safety risk, with the potential for fatal injuries in conditions that are difficult for the driver to control. The ASIL rating influences the safety integrity requirements placed on automotive components and systems.
Assurance-Level Driven Method for Integrating Security into SDLC ProcessSeungjoo Kim
Sooyoung Kang, Seungyeon Jeong, and Seungjoo Kim, "Assurance-Level Driven Method for Integrating Security into SDLC Process”, Proc. of The 18th CCUF Workshop 2020, The 18th Common Criteria Users Forum Workshop, Virtual (online) Conference, November 12, 2020.
Most industrial safety-critical systems are developed and validated following safety standards. However even though all safety standards address similar concerns with similar objectives, they are also domain-specific standards. The presentation results from the activity of a working group (formerly CG2E, now part of the recently set-up Embedded France) gathering industrial safety experts from aeronautics, automotive, industrial automation, nuclear, railway and space. The lecture will combine a presentation focused on one industry specific standard (the recent ISO 26262 for automotive), and complementary perspective in comparison with the standards in the other five mentioned domains. After the presentation of the history and position and the various regulation regimes, we will highlight some more technical topics e.g., integrated or external safety systems, fault prevention vs. fault tolerance, objectives vs. means prescription, probabilistic vs. deterministic arguments and the notion of criticality, integrity or assurance levels.
Security in CI/CD Pipelines: Tips for DevOps EngineersDevOps.com
While DevOps is becoming a new norm for most of the companies, security is typically still behind. The new architectures create a number of new process considerations and technical issues. In this practical talk, we will present an overview of the practical issues that go into making security a part of DevOps processes. Will cover incorporating security into existing CI/CD pipelines and tools DevOps professionals need to know to implement the automation and adhere to secure coding practices.
Join Stepan Ilyin, Chief Product Officer at Wallarm for an engaging conversation where you’ll learn:
Methodologies and tooling for dynamic and static security testing
Composite and OSS license analysis benefits
Secrets and analysis and secrets management approaches in distributed applications
Security automation and integration in CI/CD
Apps, APIs and workloads protection in cloud-native K8s enabled environments
How to Apply Functional Safety to Autosar ECU'sRenesas America
Here's a walkthrough on how you can apply functional safety to Autostar ECU's. These functional safety features apply to ISO26262, AUTOSAR, and MICROSAR. We map out safety requirements, monitoring approaches, and a couple different interface scenarios. Finally we will finish up with E2E protection.
The document discusses AUTOSAR software components (SWCs), which are pieces of code that carry out applications or parts of applications. There are several types of SWCs, including application SWCs, sensor/actuator SWCs, parameter SWCs, and others. SWCs contain elements like ports, internal behavior, and runnables. Runnables are attached to operating system tasks. The document provides examples of how SWCs interact through interfaces like sender-receiver and client-server interfaces. It also discusses how SWCs map to ECUs and contain runnable entities that execute in tasks.
ISO26262-6 Software development process (Ver 3.0)Hongseok Lee
ISO26262-6 Software Development Process in the automotive domain. Planning(Coding Guideline. MISRA guideline), Requirement, Design, Safety Analysis, Testing
Compliance with medical standards iec 62304, iso 14971, iec 60601, fda title ...Intland Software GmbH
Check out our latest webinar to learn more about complying with IEC 62304, ISO 14971, IEC 60601, and relevant FDA regulations (for instance, Title 21 CFR Part 11 about electronic signatures). In this webinar, we discussed the requirements set forth by these standards. We also showed our Intland's Medical IEC 62304 Template to leverage codeBeamer ALM's advanced capabilities and to facilitate compliance with these regulations.
Functional hazard analysis is the first step in the process of ensuring functional safety. For safety-critical product developers, this step is fundamental as it helps identify and assess the potential hazardous situations that could lead to accidents. A systematic and structured approach to hazards analysis is crucial to identify Safety Goals and their related ASILs as an input for the development of safety related products.
Watch video recording: https://intland.com/on-demand-webinar/hazard-analysis-and-functional-safety-compliance/
ISO/PAS 21448 (SOTIF) in the Development of ADAS and Autonomous VehiclesIntland Software GmbH
As the innovation of emergency intervention, ADAS (Advanced Driver Assistance Systems), and self-driving technologies progresses, the automotive industry is already formulating ways to ensure the safety of these solutions in our vehicles. ISO/PAS 21448:2019 (SOTIF) is the first universal standard addressing the safety of the intended functionalities in our vehicles.
Our webinar helps you get familiar with the concept of “Safety of the Intended Functionality” (SOTIF) and the relationship between ISO 26262:2018 and ISO/PAS 21448:2019. This webinar helps you understand how to design and configure codebeamer to address SOTIF requirements. Learn configuration tips & tricks and to gain early access to our SOTIF-ready workspace free of charge!
Watch the webinar's recording and access the workspace at https://intland.com/webinar-recording/iso-pas-21448-sotif-in-the-development-of-adas-and-autonomous-vehicles-webinar-recording/
The document provides guidelines for developing safety cases to demonstrate that automotive systems are acceptably safe to operate. It discusses key concepts like argument layers and evidence tables that structure the safety argument. The guidelines are intended to help with ISO 26262 compliance by providing a common framework for explicit safety arguments, which lay out the rationale for safety requirements and evidence that the requirements are complete and implemented correctly. This approach aids communication, consistency, and third-party assessment of a system's safety.
AUTOSAR (AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture) is an open standard for automotive software architecture and interfaces supported by automotive manufacturers, suppliers, and tool providers. The goal is to make automotive ECU software reusable between vehicles and manufacturers by standardizing interfaces. This will improve quality, reduce costs by enabling software reuse, and make modifications and updates more flexible. AUTOSAR defines a layered architecture with standardized application and basic software layers separated from hardware-dependent layers to achieve reusability independent of ECU or microcontroller hardware.
What is the NIST Cybersecurity Framework?
Why YOU should care?
How would I apply it?
Would you drive BLINDFOLDED?
A false sense of security?
Without a Security Framework…
Why Cyber Security Framework?
How would I measure my effectiveness?
BSIMM: Bringing Science to Software SecurityCigital
There is an old management adage that says “You can’t manage what you don’t measure.” The Building Security in Maturity Model (BSIMM) applies scientific principles to the field of software security to effectively measure security activities across industries and business units. The BSIMM enables experts like you to discover what exists in the application security universe, how those things work today, how they worked in the past and how they are likely to work in the future.
ISO Automotive,SAE 21434 Training, Road Vehicles Cybersecurity EngineeringBryan Len
ISO Automotive,SAE 21434 Training, Road Vehicles Cybersecurity Engineering.
Sign up for course.
https://www.tonex.com/training-courses/iso-sae-21434-training-road-vehicles-cybersecurity-engineering-training-workshop/
An integrative solution towards SOTIF and AV safetyBernhard Kaiser
Slide set from this year's SOTIF conference in Austin, Texas, Oct 1 and 2, 2019. Shows intermediate pragmatic ideas on how to handle SOTIF in combination with ISO 26262 safety, and how to integrate SOTIF analysis with simulation and driving verification. Terminology may still change as ISO 21448 is evolving.
Standard IEC 62443, Series of standards that define procedures for
implementing electronically secure Industrial Automation and Control
Systems (IACS). *Equivalence to ISO 27001 and NIST Cybersecurity Framework.
Naveen Kumar N G has over 4.5 years of experience in automotive ECU development, verification, and validation. He has strong experience in firmware development, diagnostics implementation, hardware-in-the-loop testing, and working with automotive communication protocols and microcontrollers. Some of his project experience includes firmware development for HVAC systems, driver monitoring systems, and infotainment systems. He has expertise in tools like Vector CANoe, DSpace, Renesas CubeSuite, and debugging tools.
Presentation for March 2017 webcast by NIST.
www.nist.gov/cyberframework
Webcast video: https://www.nist.gov/news-events/events/2017/03/cybersecurity-framework-virtual-events
This presentation introduces the audience to the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (“The Framework”). It provides a brief history about why and how the Framework was developed, and an understanding of each of the three primary Framework components (the Core, Implementation Tiers, and Profiles). It covers potential benefits of Framework, and how the Framework can be used. It highlights industry resources, progress in Roadmap areas, and future direction of the Framework program.
Secure Your Medical Devices From the Ground Up ICS
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has recently released new guidance on cybersecurity for medical devices. This presentation will provide an overview of this guidance and review what is required for 510(k) submissions. We will also discuss the upcoming European Union (EU) cybersecurity regulations and how they compare to the FDA guidance.
This webinar with ICS and partner RTI, the largest software framework company for autonomous systems, will focus on threat modeling and cybersecurity risk assessments in light of the new guidance, and how these activities impact design requirements for medical devices. You will learn common pitfalls and mistakes to avoid when establishing organizational best practices in cybersecurity.
We will also discuss the challenges to securing data in motion for connected medical devices and describe how a data-centric software framework based on open standards, addresses the design requirements for highly reliable, scalable and secure systems.
Attendees will gain an understanding of the current regulatory expectations, best practices for cybersecurity risk assessments, and standards-based solutions for secure data connectivity.
This document describes a threat analysis tool called cp/TARA that was originally developed under a Japanese government research project on automotive cybersecurity. cp/TARA provides a common platform to integrate various threat analysis methods and risk assessment criteria using models. It supports threat analysis and risk assessment based on attack trees. cp/TARA models security features using extended SysML diagrams and can identify assets, attack surfaces, threats and derive security requirements to analyze threats in an automotive system.
Assurance-Level Driven Method for Integrating Security into SDLC ProcessSeungjoo Kim
Sooyoung Kang, Seungyeon Jeong, and Seungjoo Kim, "Assurance-Level Driven Method for Integrating Security into SDLC Process”, Proc. of The 18th CCUF Workshop 2020, The 18th Common Criteria Users Forum Workshop, Virtual (online) Conference, November 12, 2020.
Most industrial safety-critical systems are developed and validated following safety standards. However even though all safety standards address similar concerns with similar objectives, they are also domain-specific standards. The presentation results from the activity of a working group (formerly CG2E, now part of the recently set-up Embedded France) gathering industrial safety experts from aeronautics, automotive, industrial automation, nuclear, railway and space. The lecture will combine a presentation focused on one industry specific standard (the recent ISO 26262 for automotive), and complementary perspective in comparison with the standards in the other five mentioned domains. After the presentation of the history and position and the various regulation regimes, we will highlight some more technical topics e.g., integrated or external safety systems, fault prevention vs. fault tolerance, objectives vs. means prescription, probabilistic vs. deterministic arguments and the notion of criticality, integrity or assurance levels.
Security in CI/CD Pipelines: Tips for DevOps EngineersDevOps.com
While DevOps is becoming a new norm for most of the companies, security is typically still behind. The new architectures create a number of new process considerations and technical issues. In this practical talk, we will present an overview of the practical issues that go into making security a part of DevOps processes. Will cover incorporating security into existing CI/CD pipelines and tools DevOps professionals need to know to implement the automation and adhere to secure coding practices.
Join Stepan Ilyin, Chief Product Officer at Wallarm for an engaging conversation where you’ll learn:
Methodologies and tooling for dynamic and static security testing
Composite and OSS license analysis benefits
Secrets and analysis and secrets management approaches in distributed applications
Security automation and integration in CI/CD
Apps, APIs and workloads protection in cloud-native K8s enabled environments
How to Apply Functional Safety to Autosar ECU'sRenesas America
Here's a walkthrough on how you can apply functional safety to Autostar ECU's. These functional safety features apply to ISO26262, AUTOSAR, and MICROSAR. We map out safety requirements, monitoring approaches, and a couple different interface scenarios. Finally we will finish up with E2E protection.
The document discusses AUTOSAR software components (SWCs), which are pieces of code that carry out applications or parts of applications. There are several types of SWCs, including application SWCs, sensor/actuator SWCs, parameter SWCs, and others. SWCs contain elements like ports, internal behavior, and runnables. Runnables are attached to operating system tasks. The document provides examples of how SWCs interact through interfaces like sender-receiver and client-server interfaces. It also discusses how SWCs map to ECUs and contain runnable entities that execute in tasks.
ISO26262-6 Software development process (Ver 3.0)Hongseok Lee
ISO26262-6 Software Development Process in the automotive domain. Planning(Coding Guideline. MISRA guideline), Requirement, Design, Safety Analysis, Testing
Compliance with medical standards iec 62304, iso 14971, iec 60601, fda title ...Intland Software GmbH
Check out our latest webinar to learn more about complying with IEC 62304, ISO 14971, IEC 60601, and relevant FDA regulations (for instance, Title 21 CFR Part 11 about electronic signatures). In this webinar, we discussed the requirements set forth by these standards. We also showed our Intland's Medical IEC 62304 Template to leverage codeBeamer ALM's advanced capabilities and to facilitate compliance with these regulations.
Functional hazard analysis is the first step in the process of ensuring functional safety. For safety-critical product developers, this step is fundamental as it helps identify and assess the potential hazardous situations that could lead to accidents. A systematic and structured approach to hazards analysis is crucial to identify Safety Goals and their related ASILs as an input for the development of safety related products.
Watch video recording: https://intland.com/on-demand-webinar/hazard-analysis-and-functional-safety-compliance/
ISO/PAS 21448 (SOTIF) in the Development of ADAS and Autonomous VehiclesIntland Software GmbH
As the innovation of emergency intervention, ADAS (Advanced Driver Assistance Systems), and self-driving technologies progresses, the automotive industry is already formulating ways to ensure the safety of these solutions in our vehicles. ISO/PAS 21448:2019 (SOTIF) is the first universal standard addressing the safety of the intended functionalities in our vehicles.
Our webinar helps you get familiar with the concept of “Safety of the Intended Functionality” (SOTIF) and the relationship between ISO 26262:2018 and ISO/PAS 21448:2019. This webinar helps you understand how to design and configure codebeamer to address SOTIF requirements. Learn configuration tips & tricks and to gain early access to our SOTIF-ready workspace free of charge!
Watch the webinar's recording and access the workspace at https://intland.com/webinar-recording/iso-pas-21448-sotif-in-the-development-of-adas-and-autonomous-vehicles-webinar-recording/
The document provides guidelines for developing safety cases to demonstrate that automotive systems are acceptably safe to operate. It discusses key concepts like argument layers and evidence tables that structure the safety argument. The guidelines are intended to help with ISO 26262 compliance by providing a common framework for explicit safety arguments, which lay out the rationale for safety requirements and evidence that the requirements are complete and implemented correctly. This approach aids communication, consistency, and third-party assessment of a system's safety.
AUTOSAR (AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture) is an open standard for automotive software architecture and interfaces supported by automotive manufacturers, suppliers, and tool providers. The goal is to make automotive ECU software reusable between vehicles and manufacturers by standardizing interfaces. This will improve quality, reduce costs by enabling software reuse, and make modifications and updates more flexible. AUTOSAR defines a layered architecture with standardized application and basic software layers separated from hardware-dependent layers to achieve reusability independent of ECU or microcontroller hardware.
What is the NIST Cybersecurity Framework?
Why YOU should care?
How would I apply it?
Would you drive BLINDFOLDED?
A false sense of security?
Without a Security Framework…
Why Cyber Security Framework?
How would I measure my effectiveness?
BSIMM: Bringing Science to Software SecurityCigital
There is an old management adage that says “You can’t manage what you don’t measure.” The Building Security in Maturity Model (BSIMM) applies scientific principles to the field of software security to effectively measure security activities across industries and business units. The BSIMM enables experts like you to discover what exists in the application security universe, how those things work today, how they worked in the past and how they are likely to work in the future.
ISO Automotive,SAE 21434 Training, Road Vehicles Cybersecurity EngineeringBryan Len
ISO Automotive,SAE 21434 Training, Road Vehicles Cybersecurity Engineering.
Sign up for course.
https://www.tonex.com/training-courses/iso-sae-21434-training-road-vehicles-cybersecurity-engineering-training-workshop/
An integrative solution towards SOTIF and AV safetyBernhard Kaiser
Slide set from this year's SOTIF conference in Austin, Texas, Oct 1 and 2, 2019. Shows intermediate pragmatic ideas on how to handle SOTIF in combination with ISO 26262 safety, and how to integrate SOTIF analysis with simulation and driving verification. Terminology may still change as ISO 21448 is evolving.
Standard IEC 62443, Series of standards that define procedures for
implementing electronically secure Industrial Automation and Control
Systems (IACS). *Equivalence to ISO 27001 and NIST Cybersecurity Framework.
Naveen Kumar N G has over 4.5 years of experience in automotive ECU development, verification, and validation. He has strong experience in firmware development, diagnostics implementation, hardware-in-the-loop testing, and working with automotive communication protocols and microcontrollers. Some of his project experience includes firmware development for HVAC systems, driver monitoring systems, and infotainment systems. He has expertise in tools like Vector CANoe, DSpace, Renesas CubeSuite, and debugging tools.
Presentation for March 2017 webcast by NIST.
www.nist.gov/cyberframework
Webcast video: https://www.nist.gov/news-events/events/2017/03/cybersecurity-framework-virtual-events
This presentation introduces the audience to the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (“The Framework”). It provides a brief history about why and how the Framework was developed, and an understanding of each of the three primary Framework components (the Core, Implementation Tiers, and Profiles). It covers potential benefits of Framework, and how the Framework can be used. It highlights industry resources, progress in Roadmap areas, and future direction of the Framework program.
Secure Your Medical Devices From the Ground Up ICS
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has recently released new guidance on cybersecurity for medical devices. This presentation will provide an overview of this guidance and review what is required for 510(k) submissions. We will also discuss the upcoming European Union (EU) cybersecurity regulations and how they compare to the FDA guidance.
This webinar with ICS and partner RTI, the largest software framework company for autonomous systems, will focus on threat modeling and cybersecurity risk assessments in light of the new guidance, and how these activities impact design requirements for medical devices. You will learn common pitfalls and mistakes to avoid when establishing organizational best practices in cybersecurity.
We will also discuss the challenges to securing data in motion for connected medical devices and describe how a data-centric software framework based on open standards, addresses the design requirements for highly reliable, scalable and secure systems.
Attendees will gain an understanding of the current regulatory expectations, best practices for cybersecurity risk assessments, and standards-based solutions for secure data connectivity.
This document describes a threat analysis tool called cp/TARA that was originally developed under a Japanese government research project on automotive cybersecurity. cp/TARA provides a common platform to integrate various threat analysis methods and risk assessment criteria using models. It supports threat analysis and risk assessment based on attack trees. cp/TARA models security features using extended SysML diagrams and can identify assets, attack surfaces, threats and derive security requirements to analyze threats in an automotive system.
This document provides an overview of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and Industrial Control Systems (ICS), including fundamentals, evolution over time, vulnerabilities, security frameworks, good practices, and resources. It defines SCADA/ICS, describes how they have become more interconnected, lists vulnerabilities like outdated systems and remote access, outlines security standards like NIST and NERC, recommends practices like segmentation and patching, and provides example frameworks and resources.
The document discusses approaches to building secure web applications, including establishing software security processes and maturity levels. It covers security activities like threat modeling, defining security requirements, secure coding standards, security testing, and metrics. Business cases for software security focus on reducing costs of vulnerabilities, threats to web apps, and root causes being application vulnerabilities and design flaws.
Slide Griffin - Practical Attacks and MitigationsEnergySec
Over the past few years, penetration testing has gotten easier. What used to take a week of scanning, analysis, and exploit research now happens in one day on average in a common IT environment. The efficiency of compromise has increased based on several factors including increased knowledge sharing, more robust computing, and automated exploitation tools. OT environments are often utilizing the same operating systems and are prone to many of the same attacks. The main differences are the presence of custom protocols, embedded systems, and lack of formal security programs to address the gaps created by two-way data communication networks.
This talk will show the most common attacks which our team currently uses to gain access and control over the networks and systems we test. More importantly, we will discuss the “top 10” things an organization can do to mitigate, remediate, and have active visibility into critical systems.
The module explains that a Security Operations Center (SOC) uses people, processes, and technologies to defend against cyber threats. SOCs assign roles across multiple tiers, with tier 1 analysts monitoring alerts and tier 3 experts conducting in-depth investigations. A SOC relies on security information and event management (SIEM) systems to collect and analyze data, while security orchestration, automation and response (SOAR) helps automate workflows. Key performance indicators like mean time to detect threats are used to measure a SOC's effectiveness. The module also discusses qualifications and experience needed for a career in cybersecurity operations.
Kernel Memory Protection by an Insertable Hypervisor which has VM Introspec...Kuniyasu Suzaki
IWSEC2014(The 9th International Workshop on Security 弘前) で"Kernel Memory Protection by an Insertable Hypervisor which has VM Introspection and Stealth Breakpoints"
Research talk I gave at Semiconductor Research Corporation workshop in September 2017. Here I set research goals to create a new type of security technology to protect autonomous systems.
Advance security in cloud computing for military weaponsIRJET Journal
This document proposes a system to securely transmit military weapon launch codes through cloud storage using multiple security techniques. The system uses steganography to hide launch codes in image captchas. Visual cryptography is then used to split the captcha images into shares distributed to authorized users. Each share undergoes image encryption and watermarking before being sent via email. To obtain the launch code, users decrypt their shares, verify the watermarks through de-watermarking, and use visual cryptography to reconstruct the original captcha and extract the hidden launch code text. The proposed multi-layered approach aims to securely transmit sensitive military information through cloud storage.
The document provides an overview of key security engineering activities that should be integrated into the software development lifecycle (SDLC). It discusses securing each phase of development through threat modeling, secure coding practices like code reviews, and security testing. The goal is to build security into applications from the start to help prevent vulnerabilities and deliver more robust products.
DTS Solution - Building a SOC (Security Operations Center)Shah Sheikh
This document discusses building a cyber security operations center (CSOC). It covers the need for a CSOC, its core components including security information and event management (SIEM), and integrating components like monitoring, alerting, and reporting. Key aspects that are important for a successful CSOC are people, processes, and technology. The roles and skills required for people in the CSOC and training needs are outlined. Developing standardized processes, procedures and workflows that align with frameworks like ISO are also discussed.
The document discusses trustworthy systems and trusted AI. It provides background on the Singapore Cybersecurity Consortium and its vision of trustworthy systems. It then summarizes ongoing work, including capabilities for security testing, formal verification of systems, and research on defending against Spectre attacks and fuzz testing. It also discusses model training and robustness, fuzzing for deep neural networks, and research on self-healing systems through specification inference and genetic programming.
The presentation focuses on the responsibilities, practices, processes, tools, and techniques that systematically increase security in the software development lifecycle (SSDLC). Software should be provisioned uniformly declarative regardless of whether software artifacts are produced in-house or purchased. This is the foundation for effective quality and security standardization, which are key facilitators of reliability engineering.
Enterprise Security Architecture for Cyber SecurityThe Open Group SA
Cyber Security is one of the major challenges facing organisations within all industries. This presentation will examine the integration of an Enterprise Architecture approach with an Enterprise Security Architecture approach (TOGAF and SABSA) and propose a generic framework.
Download this presentation at http://opengroup.co.za/presentations
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) hosted the 3rd Open Security Controls Assessment Language (OSCAL) Workshop on March 1-2, 2022.
If you didn't have the chance to attend this virtual event, we have good news for you.
Our own, Max Aulakh, CEO at Ignyte Assurance Platform™, talked about OSCAL-based automation solutions, starting with the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (#fedramp) Program Management Office’s (PMO) efforts to digitalize authorization packages submitted in #OSCAL.
How can a successful SOC2-compliant ISMS be built without power, money and a...Vsevolod Shabad
The document discusses building an information security management system (ISMS) compliant with SOC2 for a Kubernetes software company with limited resources. It outlines using threat modeling to identify key assets like Docker images, and developing initial security documents around principles, policies for vulnerabilities and releases. Challenges include prioritizing many vulnerabilities, demonstrating due care with transparency and commitments to customers. Building security is a long-term effort.
Comparative study of Cyber Security Assessment ToolsIRJET Journal
This document provides a comparative study of cyber security assessment tools. It begins with an introduction that outlines how organizations face constant cyber threats and the need for routine cyber security audits. It then discusses best practices for cyber security audits, including performing security assessments, having incident response plans, prioritizing risks, integrating security into monitoring, and automating threat detection. The document also outlines the classification of security audit tools and provides examples like network mapping tools, perimeter security tools, and vulnerability scanning tools. It provides details on specific network mapping tools and their features.
EV Charging at MFH Properties by Whitaker JamiesonForth
Whitaker Jamieson, Senior Specialist at Forth, gave this presentation at the Forth Addressing The Challenges of Charging at Multi-Family Housing webinar on June 11, 2024.
Expanding Access to Affordable At-Home EV Charging by Vanessa WarheitForth
Vanessa Warheit, Co-Founder of EV Charging for All, gave this presentation at the Forth Addressing The Challenges of Charging at Multi-Family Housing webinar on June 11, 2024.
Charging and Fueling Infrastructure Grant: Round 2 by Brandt HertensteinForth
Brandt Hertenstein, Program Manager of the Electrification Coalition gave this presentation at the Forth and Electrification Coalition CFI Grant Program - Overview and Technical Assistance webinar on June 12, 2024.
Charging Fueling & Infrastructure (CFI) Program by Kevin MillerForth
Kevin Miller, Senior Advisor, Business Models of the Joint Office of Energy and Transportation gave this presentation at the Forth and Electrification Coalition CFI Grant Program - Overview and Technical Assistance webinar on June 12, 2024.
Implementing ELDs or Electronic Logging Devices is slowly but surely becoming the norm in fleet management. Why? Well, integrating ELDs and associated connected vehicle solutions like fleet tracking devices lets businesses and their in-house fleet managers reap several benefits. Check out the post below to learn more.
Welcome to ASP Cranes, your trusted partner for crane solutions in Raipur, Chhattisgarh! With years of experience and a commitment to excellence, we offer a comprehensive range of crane services tailored to meet your lifting and material handling needs.
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Charging Fueling & Infrastructure (CFI) Program Resources by Cat PleinForth
Cat Plein, Development & Communications Director of Forth, gave this presentation at the Forth and Electrification Coalition CFI Grant Program - Overview and Technical Assistance webinar on June 12, 2024.
Understanding Catalytic Converter Theft:
What is a Catalytic Converter?: Learn about the function of catalytic converters in vehicles and why they are targeted by thieves.
Why are They Stolen?: Discover the valuable metals inside catalytic converters (such as platinum, palladium, and rhodium) that make them attractive to criminals.
Steps to Prevent Catalytic Converter Theft:
Parking Strategies: Tips on where and how to park your vehicle to reduce the risk of theft, such as parking in well-lit areas or secure garages.
Protective Devices: Overview of various anti-theft devices available, including catalytic converter locks, shields, and alarms.
Etching and Marking: The benefits of etching your vehicle’s VIN on the catalytic converter or using a catalytic converter marking kit to make it traceable and less appealing to thieves.
Surveillance and Monitoring: Recommendations for using security cameras and motion-sensor lights to deter thieves.
Statistics and Insights:
Theft Rates by Borough: Analysis of data to determine which borough in NYC experiences the highest rate of catalytic converter thefts.
Recent Trends: Current trends and patterns in catalytic converter thefts to help you stay aware of emerging hotspots and tactics used by thieves.
Benefits of This Presentation:
Awareness: Increase your awareness about catalytic converter theft and its impact on vehicle owners.
Practical Tips: Gain actionable insights and tips to effectively prevent catalytic converter theft.
Local Insights: Understand the specific risks in different NYC boroughs, helping you take targeted preventive measures.
This presentation aims to equip you with the knowledge and tools needed to protect your vehicle from catalytic converter theft, ensuring you are prepared and proactive in safeguarding your property.
1. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
THREAT ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK FOR SAFETY ARCHITECTURES IN
SCDL
KENJI TAGUCHI (CAV), RYO KURACHI (NAGOYA UNI), KIYOSHI SASAKI
(MARELLI), NOBUHIKO NAKAMURA (VECTOR), KAZUKI TOMONAGA
(MITUBISHI ELECTRIC), SHUHEI YAMASHITA (DNV)
18 SEP 2020
2. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
Background
• Cybersecurity threats have become a reality for safety critical systems
such as automobiles, railways and avionics, witnessing cybersecurity
incidents and POC reports from white hackers.
• Threat analysis for safety critical systems needs to assess an effect
caused by threats against safety.
• How to integrate the system development lifecycle for functional safety
and cybersecurity has not been well established yet.
3. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
Main Challenges
• Proposal for Security threat analysis framework at the concept phase in
ISO 26262
‒ This assume that
Identification of essential ingredients on threat analysis and their
adaptation to the security threat analysis framework.
Analysis on security threats against safety concepts (safety goals,
functional safety requirements within abstract safety architecture).
Analysis on effects of security threats against safety
mechanism/architecture.
Protection against safety goal violation
Analysis on protection against security threats by safety
mechanism/architecture.
4. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
• Jeep Cherokee was remotely hacked by C. Miller and C. Valasek
‒ Black Hat 2015, Remote Exploitation of an Unaltered Passenger Vehicle, 2015
• Attack vectors
‒ Remote attack
No direct injection of CAN messages on the CAN Bus.
Remote access via Infotainment device
‒ Spoof CAN messages
Enforce an ECU into diagnostic mode and spoof the control messages from it.
• Safety mechanism against security threat!
‒ An ECU can only be put under diagnostic mode at a low speed.
‒ A safety mechanism somehow defends an ECU from this attack vector.
Jeep Cherokee Hack
Tesla Model S Hack
• Hack on Tesla Model S was remotely hacked by Tencent
‒ Black Hat 2016, Free-Fall: Hacking Tesla From Wireless to CAN Bus
• Attack vectors
‒ Remote attack
via Infotainment system
Used vulnerabilities commonly found in IT
‒ Spoof CAN messages
Spoof control messages to ECUs
• Defended by safety mechanism!
‒ Some ECUs do not respond under driving mode
5. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
Safety Mechanisms Against Security Threats
Safety mechanism against hazard
hazard
Safety mechanism
Security threat causes hazard
hazardthreat
Jeep/Tesla Hack
hazardthreat
Safety mechanism
6. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
Assumed Process
• Several ways to integrate processes for the system development (for system function), safety
development (for safety mechanisms) and security development (for security mechanism).
• The process we assumed in this paper is basically the safety-first process, where safety
architecture has been already modelled in SCDL.
1) Simultaneous development
2) Trade-off development
Trade-off
3) Our process
ISO 26262
7. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
SCDL (Safety Concept Description Language)
• ISO 26262 requires the safety concept, which is “specification of the functional safety requirements, with
associated information, their allocation to architectural elements, and their interaction necessary to achieve
the safety goals”.
• The SCDL aims to provide the intuitive semi-formal notation with the rigorous background (meta-model)
for the safety concept which faithfully and precisely follows ISO 26262.
• The language specification has been developed by the SCN-SG (Safety Concept Nation Study Group) formed
by engineers from OEMs, suppliers, tool vendors, etc.
• International standardization of the SCDL is under way at ASAM (Association for Standardization of
Automation and Measuring Systems).
• Some OEMs and suppliers have been using the SCDL for the development of safety concepts in ISO 26262.
‒ SCN-SG members from more than 100 companies and organizations
‒ First version of specification documents 650 downloads for far (2020 Feb)
• Current status
‒ SCDL specification
English version v. 1.4, 2018
Japanese version v. 1.5, 2020
• Currently available toos.
‒ Add-in tool on Enterprise Architect (Sparx Systems)
‒ Safilia (Gaio Tech)
‒ Astah System Safety (Change vision)
8. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
Basic Symbols of SCDL
• Requirement notation
‒ Functionalities, roles, and behaviors
‒ Weighting (assigned ASIL)
[Requirements]
[Interaction]
Example
• Element notation
‒ Systems, sub-systems, components,
units, modules, etc
‒ Weighting (assigned ASIL)
[Elements]
• Interaction notation
‒ Relationship between requirements
such as information, signals,
messages, etc.
[System boundary interaction]
• System boundary interaction notation
‒ Relationship between requirements
and interactions from/to the outside
of the system/item
Remark: These figures are copyrighted by SCN-SG presentation slides.
9. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
Some Auxiliary Notations Unique to SCDL
[Requirement group]
• A collection of requirements within
a certain grouping
[Pairing]
• Linking constraints to paring
between requirements groups
• Coexistence of requirements with
different ASIL (no interference assumed)
• the independence requirement in “Pairing”
with constraints (no interference assumed)
Remark: These figures are copyrighted by SCN-SG presentation slides.
10. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
Case Study
• This is a very simplified system of “Parking Assist System” which consists of several elements with
requirements and interactions among them.
‒ Parking Assist System (ITEM-1) = Smartphone (EL-1) + Vehicle (EL-2)
‒ Vehicle (EL-2) = Gateway (EL-3) + Parking Assist ECU (EL-4) + Control System (EL-5) + Locator ECU (EL-6) + Environment
Recognition (EL-7)
Non-functional safety requirement
Main Functionality (Intended Functionality)
Safety Mechanism
11. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
Criteria on threat analysis
1. Where does an attack come from? => Attack surface
2. What should be protected from an attack? => Asset
‒ Assets are classified into functional assets and information assets
3. What boundary should be protected from an attack? => Trust boundary
4. How does an attack reach the target? => Attack path/Attack scenario
5. What kind of attacks are possible? => Attack identification
6. How many attacks are necessary? => Multiple attacks
1. Attack surface => Interactions and system boundary interactions
2. Asset => Requirements for functional assets and interactions for information assets
3. Trust boundary => Boundary of an element
4. Attack path => Any path comprising requirements and interactions
5. Attack identification => Typical attack categories such as STRIDE
6. Multiple attacks => Combination of attacks on attack surfaces and/or assets
Interpretation of those modeling elements for threats in SCDL
Remark: No explicit model element for data in SCDL
12. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
Security Analysis: Trust Boundary and Attack Surface
• The trust boundary of this system can be regarded as Vehicle itself, e.g., EL-2.
• Any interactions between this boundary and outside can be regarded as an entry point of potential
attacks (Attack surfaces).
‒ Map Data (System boundary interaction)
‒ Positioning Information (System boundary interaction)
‒ Sensor Input (System boundary interaction)
‒ On/NOGO (Interaction)
Attack Surfaces Trust boundary
13. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
Security Analysis: Assets
• Assets are classified under functional and information assets.
[Information assets]
[Functional assets]
[Identified attack surfaces]
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Identified potential attacks by STRIDE : Attack Surfaces
• STRIDE is a collection of typical threats, i.e., Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation,
Information disclosure, Denial of Services and Elevation of privilege used in SDL
(Secure Development Lifecycle) by Microsoft.
• STRIDE is applied to identified attack surfaces and assets
Spoofing Positioning Information (e.g., GSP spoofing)
Typical examples:
Tampering Map data (e.g., tampering coordinates)
Information disclosure of GO/NOGO commands (e.g., eavesdropping the command GO/NOGO)
Denial of Service of Sensor Input (e.g., Disturbance against ultrasonic sensor)
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Identified potential attacks by STRIDE: Assets
Tampering Command Checking (e.g., change its functionality)
Typical examples:
Denial of Service of Control value generation (e.g., delay the function)
Escalation of privilege against Monitor (e.g., Override the function)
16. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
Safety Goal and Safety Goal violation
• Safety Goal
‒ The item does not generate unintended control values (actuation) against user intention.
‒ The safety goal violation could be judged by the outer-most output, in this case Control
values (actuation)
User intention Control values (actuation)
17. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
Attack Scenario #1
Attack starting with “Spoofing User operation” could be prevented by “FR-6:
Judgement”.
1: Spoof User operation
2: GO/NOGO is transferred
3: Pre command is transferred
FR-6 judges whether the
parking place is appropriate
using Map Data and
Location Data.
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Attack Scenario #2
Multiple attacks with “Spoofing User operation” and “Tampering Map Data” could be
prevented by “FSR-3: Control Value Generation” with “Environment Recognition Data”.
1-1: Spoof User operation
1-2: GO/NOGO is transferred
1-3: Pre command is transferred
FSR-3 senses the
surrounding environment
from Sensor Input and might
detect some obstacles.
2-1:Tamper Map Data
2-2:Map Data is transferred 2-3: GO/NOGO is transffered
19. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
Attack Scenario #3
Multiple attacks with “Spoofing User operation”, “Tampering Map Data” and “Spoof
Sensor Input” could not be prevented by any safety mechanism and causes the safety
goal violation.
1-1: Spoof User operation
1-2: GO/NOGO is transferred
1-3: Pre command is transferred
2-1:Tamper Map Data
2-2:Map Data is transferred
2-3: GO/NOGO is transferred
3-1:Spoof Sensor Input
3-2: Environment Recognition Data is transferred
The rest of interactions are all transferred.
Unintended control
value/actuation is generated
20. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
Related Work
• Only limited to Architecture Description Language (AD) with security extension
related to automotive systems.
• EAST-ADL
‒ Developed under ITEA EAST-EEA
‒ Integration of AUTOSAR
‒ SAM (Security Abstraction Model) for a meta-model for security properties.
‒ No specific threat analysis technique for safety architecture nor any relationship between
safety and security.
• AADL
‒ Developed by SAE and CMU/SEI
‒ Error Mode Annex for error models and Security Annex for security model
‒ Security Annex is based on MILS architecture and applied to avionics
‒ No work on safety and security interactions.
• SysML
‒ cp/TARA is an integrated threat analysis tool
‒ Security extensions of SysML block definition diagrams (assets, attack surfaces, etc) and
requirements diagrams (functional security req. following SAE J3061).
‒ No work on safety and security interactions.
21. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
Concluding Remarks and Future Directions
• We proposed the security threat analysis framework for SCDL, which can
help identify potential threats against safety concepts modelled in SCDL.
‒ Effects by security threats against safety architecture/mechanism can be
analyzed.
‒ This framework provides TARA (Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment) at the
concept phase in ISO 26262.
RA part has not been achieved yet.
• Future directions include the followings:
‒ Feedback loop to functional safety activities after threat analysis is carried out
(including feasibility study on cybersecurity concept in SCDL).
‒ Possible yet effective integration of functional safety (ISO 26262) and
security processes (ISO/SAE 21434).
‒ Further adaptation of this framework towards activities to follow (e.g., system
level) in ISO 26262.
22. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
Thank you for your attention!
Acknowledgements to all members of SCDL Security SWG, particularly Mr. T.
Muramatsu and F. Kohno for the discussion on the issues addressed in this
paper.
23. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
Basic Concept Related to Safety
• Safety related concepts such as hazard, accident, risk, failure have different definitions and
understanding in industries and countries.
• Definitions (from ISO 26262)
‒ Hazard
potential source of harm caused by malfunctioning behaviour of the item
‒ Safety mechanism
technical solution implemented by E/E functions or elements, or by other technologies,
to detect faults or control failures in order to achieve or maintain a safe state.
Remark: Safety mechanism includes simple monitor-arbitration logic to more complex
fault tolerant/redundancy mechanisms
hazard
Safety mechanism
Examples of hazard:
1) Overheat of battery charging device causes its explosion and/or make burns.
2) ECU produces unintended assist torque.
The following simplified figure is used to represent safety mechanism against hazard.
24. copyright@2020 CAV Technologies Co., Ltd. all rights reserved.
Threat and Hazard: How Do They Interact Each Other?
• There is no clear and definitive definition on how
threat and hazard are related each other.
• Definitions (from J3061)
‒ Threat
A circumstance or event with the potential to
cause harm, where harm may be with
respect to financial, reputation, privacy,
safety, or operational.
• We take that a hazard may be caused by threat as a
working assumption.
Hazard: Overheat of battery charging device causes its explosion and/or makes burns.
Threat (action): Malware causes malfunction of battery charging device.
Hazard: ECU produces unintended assist torque.
Threat (action): Control message is spoofed.
hazardthreat
That a threat causes a hazard relationship