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Mobile Security and 2FA
The reality from the trenches…
Ollie Whitehouse, Associate Director, NCC Group
Before we begin…
• NCC = iSEC Partners in the USA
• FTSE listed ~99 million GBP revenue
• Independent security experts
• Working in hardware, software
and higher level business functions
• Trusted advisor to many
• ~ 250 technical security consultants
• ~ 80 business security consultants
Agenda for the 15 minute positioning..
•Mobile Security
•Reality and Elephants
•Future Enablers
•Authentication and mobile
•2FA – what it looks like today
•Voice biometrics and its Role
Mobile Security – Security threats
• Hardware
• Platform
• Android, iOS, Windows etc.
• Vendor Customisation
• Undermining platform security
• Apps
• Poorly designed / implemented
• User activity
• Hygiene with regards to apps / jail breaking
Mobile Security – Challenges
• Mobile vendor fragmentation
• Vendor spend on security
• 18 to 24 month device life cycles
• Carrier certification of updates
• User awareness / education
• User experience for security patches
• Carrier / user desire for security patches
Mobile Security – Future
Mobile Security – Future
• The security arms race is starting..
• BlackBerry, Samsung,
SEAndroid (Generic),
Apple and Windows
• Platform features
• TrustZone
• Virtualisation / HyperVisors
• Software security
• Improving rapidly..
Mobile 2FA – Concerns
• Satisfying ‘Something you have’
• SMS latency
• The ‘NYE’ problem
• The ‘malware’ issue
• For seeded / on-line
• Jail breaking
• For seeded / on-line
• Connectivity
• For on-line
Mobile 2FA – Drivers for mobile 2FA
Mobile 2FA – What we’re seeing
Mobile 2FA – Satisfying the concerns
• Today
• Jail break detection
• Device unique IDs
• Device lockdown
• Dual persona devices
• Tomorrow
• TrustZone and friends
Mobile 2FA – Result (one solution seen)
Circuit Switch and Voice for Last Chance Fall-back
Mobile 2FA – Tomorrow?

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2013 04-04 --ncc_group_-_voice_biometrics_conference_-_mobile_security

  • 1. Mobile Security and 2FA The reality from the trenches… Ollie Whitehouse, Associate Director, NCC Group
  • 2. Before we begin… • NCC = iSEC Partners in the USA • FTSE listed ~99 million GBP revenue • Independent security experts • Working in hardware, software and higher level business functions • Trusted advisor to many • ~ 250 technical security consultants • ~ 80 business security consultants
  • 3. Agenda for the 15 minute positioning.. •Mobile Security •Reality and Elephants •Future Enablers •Authentication and mobile •2FA – what it looks like today •Voice biometrics and its Role
  • 4. Mobile Security – Security threats • Hardware • Platform • Android, iOS, Windows etc. • Vendor Customisation • Undermining platform security • Apps • Poorly designed / implemented • User activity • Hygiene with regards to apps / jail breaking
  • 5. Mobile Security – Challenges • Mobile vendor fragmentation • Vendor spend on security • 18 to 24 month device life cycles • Carrier certification of updates • User awareness / education • User experience for security patches • Carrier / user desire for security patches
  • 7. Mobile Security – Future • The security arms race is starting.. • BlackBerry, Samsung, SEAndroid (Generic), Apple and Windows • Platform features • TrustZone • Virtualisation / HyperVisors • Software security • Improving rapidly..
  • 8. Mobile 2FA – Concerns • Satisfying ‘Something you have’ • SMS latency • The ‘NYE’ problem • The ‘malware’ issue • For seeded / on-line • Jail breaking • For seeded / on-line • Connectivity • For on-line
  • 9. Mobile 2FA – Drivers for mobile 2FA
  • 10. Mobile 2FA – What we’re seeing
  • 11. Mobile 2FA – Satisfying the concerns • Today • Jail break detection • Device unique IDs • Device lockdown • Dual persona devices • Tomorrow • TrustZone and friends
  • 12. Mobile 2FA – Result (one solution seen) Circuit Switch and Voice for Last Chance Fall-back
  • 13. Mobile 2FA – Tomorrow?