This document summarizes a Supreme Court case from 1974 regarding the retroactive application of Republic Act 6126, also known as the Rental Law. The key points are: 1) The case involved a landlord who increased rental rates in January 1969, prior to the enactment of the Rental Law in June 1970. The tenant argued the law should apply retroactively to invalidate the rental increase. 2) The Supreme Court ruled the Rental Law was not intended to apply retroactively as it affects substantive rights. The language and legislative history of the law indicated it was meant to have only prospective application. 3) As the rental increase occurred over a year before the law took effect, it did not

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College of Law – Pitbol University
NOVEMBER 12, 2009
Espiritu vs Cipriano G.R. No. L-32743 February 15, 1974
Filed under: Statutory Construction — ryanmendez @ 2:36 pm
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-32743 February 15, 1974
PRIMITIVO ESPIRITU and LEONORA A. DE ESPIRITU, petitioners,
vs.
RICARDO CIPRIANO and THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, RIZAL, BRANCH XV,
respondents.
Concepcion, Victorino, Sanchez and Associates for petitioners.
Jose G. Ricardo for respondent Ricardo Cipriano.
ESGUERRA, J.:p
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners seek the review and nullification of two orders of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, the first, dated August 4, 1970 sustaining private
respondent Ricardo Cipriano’s motion to dismiss “on the authority of Republic Act 6126″, and the
second, dated October 16, 1970, denying the motion for reconsideration of the first order. The

2. question before Us involves the retroactive application of the provisions of Republic Act 6126,
otherwise known as the Rental Law.
The case originated as one for unlawful detainer instituted on May 30, 1969, by plaintiffs, now
petitioners, in the Municipal Court of Pasig, Rizal, against private respondent Ricardo Cipriano
for the latter’s alleged failure to pay rentals. An adverse judgment having been rendered against
said respondent, he appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal where the case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 338-M. In the said Court private respondent sought to amend his Answer filed
in the Municipal Court on the grounds that (1) for lack of time he was not able to disclose to his
former counsel all the material facts surrounding his case and, therefore, he was not able to fully
determine his defenses; and (2) that prior to the hearing of the case in the lower court he wanted to
cause the filing of an amended answer but was not able to do so for his alleged failure to contact
his counsel. The motion to file amended answer was denied by the Court. The parties eventually
submitted a stipulation of facts, the salient provisions of which read as follows:
1. The plaintiffs are the owners of the property in question, leased to the defendant since 1954;
2. The house of the defendant was built on the property with the knowledge and consent of the
plaintiff pursuant to an oral contract of lease;
3. Before 1969 the lease of the property was on year-to-year arrangement, rentals being then
payable at or before the end of the year;
4. The following are the rates of rentals:
(a) 1954 to 1957 P12.00 a year
(b) 1968 to 1959 P13.20 a year
(c) 1960 to 1961 P14.00 a year
(d) 1962 P16.00 a year
(e) 1963 to 1965 P24.70 a year
(f) 1967 to 1968 P48.00 a year
5. Effective January 1969 the lease was converted to a month-to-month basis and rental was
increased to P30.00 a month by the plaintiffs;
6. The defendant has remained in possession of the property up to the present;
7. Since January 1969 the defendant has not paid rental at the present monthly rate;
8. A formal notice to vacate, dated March 22, 1969, was sent by registered mail to, and received
by, defendant.

3. On July 7, 1970, Judge Vivencio Ruiz of the Court of First Instance of Rizal issued an order
giving private respondent herein seven days within which to file his motion to dismiss.
Subsequently, on July 13, 1970, respondent moved to dismiss petitioner’s complaint, invoking the
prohibitory provision of Republic Act 6126, entitled “An Act To Regulate Rentals of Dwelling
Units or of Land On Which Another’s Dwelling Is Located For One Year And Penalizing
Violations Thereof.
Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss but respondent Judge issued an order on August 4,
1970, which reads:
On the Authority of Republic Act 6126, this Court hereby sustains the Motion for Dismissal filed
by the defendant through counsel, dated July 13, 1970.
A motion for reconsideration of said order was likewise denied by respondent Judge. Hence this
petition.
Thrust upon Us, therefore, for resolution is the problem of whether Republic Act 6126 may be
held applicable the case at bar. For convenience We reproduce the pertinent provisions of law in
question:
Section 1. No lessor of a dwelling unit or of land on which another’s dwelling is located shall,
during the period of one year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon
between the lessor and the lessee prior to the approval of this Act when said rental does not
exceed three hundred pesos (P300.00) a month.
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved June 17, 1970.
It is the contention of respondent which was upheld by the trial court that the case at bar is
covered by the aforecited law. We rule otherwise. Established and undisputed is the fact that the
increase in the rental of the lot involved was effected in January, 1969, 1 while the law in question
took effect on June 17, 1970, or after a period of one year and a half after the increase in rentals
had been effected. Private respondent, however, puts forward the argument that there was no
perfected contract covering the increased rate of rentals and conversion thereof into monthly
payments of P30.00 effective January 1969, as he did not give his consent thereto. In his brief he
alleges:
Defendant (respondent) herein also begs to disagree with the contention of plaintiffs. We believe
and respectfully submit that there would be no impairment of obligation of contract if Republic
Act 6126 were to be applied to the present case. The alleged new contract of lease and subsequent
increase in the amount of rental were not effected as of January 1969 with respect to the
defendant. He did not accept the new rate of rental. The eloquent testimonies on record to show
that defendant never accepted the new rate of rental imposed upon him by the plaintiffs were the
pretrials on the case wherein defendant offered to accept the increase to the tone of 100%. Hence,
the new contract of lease increasing the rental had never been agreed upon by both the plaintiffs

4. and the defendant because the defendant never gave his consent to the new rate of rental. In effect,
therefore, the alleged new contract of lease was not a contract at all since it did not have the
consent of the other party, the defendant.
Private respondent’s contention is devoid of merit. There is nothing in the stipulation of facts to
show that his consent to the increase in rentals and change in the manner of payment was essential
to its validity. There was no more subsisting yearly contract of lease at a fixed amount. It had
already expired when the increase and conversion into monthly payments took effect in January,
1969. The lessor was free to fix a higher amount than that previously paid by the lessee (private
respondent herein) and if the latter did not agree to the increased amount, he could have vacated
the premises and thus rendered himself free from liability. Respondent Cipriano, therefore, cannot
invoke lack of consent on his part as basis for declaring the contract of lease ineffective.
Likewise the claim of private respondent that the act is remedial and may, therefore, be given
retroactive effect is untenable. A close study of the provisions discloses that far from being
remedial, the statute affects substantive rights and hence a strict and prospective construction
thereof is in order. Article 4 of the New Civil Code ordains that laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless the contrary is provided and that where the law is clear, Our duty is equally plain.
We must apply it to the facts as found. 2 The law being a “temporary measure designed to meet a
temporary situation”, 3 it had a limited period of operation as in fact it was so worded in clear and
unequivocal language that “No lessor of a dwelling unit or land … shall, during the period of one
year from March 31, 1970, increase the monthly rental agreed upon between the lessor and lessee
prior to the approval of this Act.” Hence the prohibition against the increase in rentals was
effective on March, 1970, up to March, 1971. Outside and beyond that period, the law did not, by
the express mandate of the Act itself, operate. The said law, did not, by its express terms, purport
to give a retroactive operation. It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that
“Expressium facit cessare tacitum” 4 and, therefore, no reasonable implication that the Legislature
ever intended to give the law in question a retroactive effect may be accorded to the same. A
perusal of the deliberations of Congress on House Bill 953 which became Republic Act No. 6126,
as recorded its Congressional Records of March 5, 1970 reveals the sponsors of the Rental Law
did not entertain for a moment that a retroactive operation would be given to this enactment. We
quote pertinent portions of the discussion:
Remarks of sponsor, Mr. Roces:
Mr. Roces — Mr. Speaker, the President is still observing the effect of the newly established
floating rate. In the meantime we feel that, in line with the policy that those who have less in life
should have more in law, apartment dwellers are entitled to protection. Therefore this bill
proposes that the rentals paid today will not be increased in the next 18 months.
and on pages 66 and 72 respectively of the same Congressional Record We likewise find the
following:
Mr. Gonzales — Will the gentleman from Manila interpret for us the phrase “during the period of
6 months preceding the approval of this Act” in Section 2? 5

5. Mr. Roces. — My interpretation is that the rent being paid during that period not before will be
the one considered.
Mr. Montano — … The term moratorium as utilized by the gentleman from Manila at the start of
his sponsorship was applied not in its legal acceptance but generally. For purposes of the bill, the
term is construed as suspension of increasing rents in the meantime that we have not yet
determined the real value of the currency … .
Respondent’s tenacious insistence On the retroactive operation of Republic Act 6126 represents a
last ditch effort on his part to hold on to the premises while at the same time escaping the
obligation to pay the increased rate. We can not countenance such a situation, for to permit the
same to obtain would be sanctioning a sheer absurdity and causing injustice to the petitioner
herein. Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive
laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is
equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to
affect pending proceedings, unless such intent in expressly declared or clearly and necessarily
implied from the language of the enactment, 6 Similarly, in the case of La Previsora Filipina,
Mutual Building and Loan Association v. Felix Ledda, 66 Phil. 573, 577, this Court said:
It is a principle generally recognized that civil laws have no retroactive effect unless it is
otherwise provided therein (Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Santos, G.R. No. 43861). Act No.
4118 does not state that its provisions shall have retroactive effect, wherefore, it follows, as it is
hereby declared, that it is not applicable to the contracts entered into by the parties, and, hence the
trial court erred in granting possession to the petitioner.
The petitioner contends that said law is applicable because when the property in question was sold
at public auction said law was already in force. This contention is in our opinion untenable. The
date which should be taken into account in order to determine the applicability of the law is the
date when the contracts were entered into by the parties and not the date of the public sale, … .
Under the circumstances of this case, We, therefore, rule that Republic Act 6126 is not applicable
to the case at bar. As the language of the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean
what it plainly says.
WHEREFORE, the assailed orders of August 4 and October 16, 1970, are hereby nullified and set
aside. The court a quo shall proceed with the prompt disposition of Civil Case No. 338-M (12285)
on the merits in accordance with Republic Act 6031 if applicable, otherwise under the prevailing
procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court.
Costs against respondent.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Stipulation of Facts, paragraph 5, March 3, 1970, 24 of Rollo.

6. 2 Cf. People v. Mapa, 20 SCRA 1164; Pacific Oxygen & Acetylene Co. v. CB, 22 SCRA 917;
Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Gracia, 30 SCRA 111.
3 Explanatory Note (RA 6126) H. No. 853 Congressional Record of the House, 1970 Vol. I, Part
I, March 5, 1970.
4 “That which is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.” (Sutherlands Statutory
Construction, Vol. 2. Section 4945 p. 412.)
5 “Section 2. It is unlawful for any owner, administrator, agent or any person, within a period of
18 months from the approval of this Act, to increase the rental of any building, part or unit thereof
for residential purposes, or to collect any amount in excess of the rental paid for such building,
part or unit thereof during the period of six months preceding the approval of this Act.” … .

7. EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18566 September 30, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF
ELIZABETH MIRA, GILBERT R. BREHM and
ESTER MIRA BREHM, petitioners-appellees, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-
appellant.
PAREDES, J.:chanrobles virtual law library
Finding that only legal issues are involved in
the instant case, the Court of Appeals certified the
same to this Court for disposition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Gilbert R. Brehm is an American citizen,
serving the U.S. Navy with temporary assignment
at Subic Bay. On October 9, 1958, he married Ester
Mira, a Filipino citizen, who had a daughter
Elizabeth, by another man, also of the American
Navy, who left the country in 1952, and never
heard from since then. After the marriage, the
couple established residence at Intramuros, Manila,
and the minor Elizabeth had always been under
their care and support of Brehm.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On January 28, 1959, the spouses filed a
Joint Petition with the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court for the adoption of the minor

8. Elizabeth, claiming that they have mutually given
their consent to the adoption, not only to promote
her best interest and well-being, but also to give
her a legitimate status. They prayed that after the
proper proceedings, judgment be entered, freeing
the child Elizabeth Mira from all legal obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to her
natural father, and be, for all legal intents and
purposes, the child of the petitioners, with all the
rights pertinent thereto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
An opposition to the petition with respect to
Gilbert Brehm was registered by the Republic of the
Philippines, it appearing that Brehm testified that
his residence in Philippines was merely temporary,
same being effective only for purposes of his tour of
duty with the Navy, thus disqualifying him from
making an adoption (Art. 335 [4], New Civil Code;
Sec. 2, Rule 100, Rules of Court), and that being a
non-resident alien, the Court has no jurisdiction
over him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
A reply to the opposition was presented by
petitioners. They claim that Art. 335 does not apply
in the case, reasoning out that it covers only
adoptions for the purpose establishing a
relationship of paternity and filiation, where none
existed, but not where the adopting parents are not
total strangers to said child; that there is already a
relation between the child and Brehm, created by

9. affinity that Art. 338 of the New Civil code,
expressly authorizes the adoption of a step-child by
a step-father, in which category petitioner Brehm
falls. Petitioners contend that the records show
their residence is Manila, for while Brehm works at
Subic, he always goes home to Manila, during
week-ends and manifested that he intends to reside
in the Philippines permanently, after his tour of
duty with the U.S. Naval Forces.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court
rendered judgment, the Pertinent portions of which
read -
... Since residence is principally a matter of
intention, the Court is of the opinion that
notwithstanding the nature of Petitioner Gilbert R.
Brehm's coming to the Philippines, his subsequent
acts, coupled with his declared intention of
permanently residing herein, have cured the legal
defect on the point of residence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Finally, we must consider the status of the
minor Elizabeth Mira whose welfare deserves
paramount consideration. Being a natural child of
the petitioning wife, it cannot be in conscience be
expected that when petitioners married, the mother
would reduce her responsibility and her affection
toward her child....chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

10. WHEREFORE, finding that the principal
allegations of the petitioners are true, it is hereby
adjudged that henceforth the minor Elizabeth is
freed from all obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to her natural father, and
is, to all legal intents and purposes, the child of the
petitioners Gilbert R. Brehm and Ester Mira Brehm,
said minor's surname being change from "Mira" to
"Mira Brehm".
The Solicitor General took exception from
the judgment, claiming that it was error for the
Court in adjudging the minor Elizabeth Mira the
adopted child of petitioner Gilbert R. Brehm. The
appeal, however, did not assail the right of
petitioner Ester Mira Brehm, the natural mother of
the minor, to adopt her.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
There is no question that petitioner Gilbert
R. Brehm is a non-resident alien. By his own
testimony, he supplied the conclusive proof of his
status here, and no amount of reasoning will
overcome the same. For this reason, he is not
qualified to adopt. On this very point, We have
recently declared:
The only issue in this appeal is whether, not
being permanent residents in the Philippines,
petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose. Article

11. 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Provides
that -chanrobles virtual law library
The following cannot adopt
x x x x x x x x xchanrobles virtual law library
(4) Non-resident aliens;
x x x x x x x x xchanrobles virtual law library
This legal provision is too clear to require
interpretation. No matter how much we may
sympathize with the plight of Baby Rose and with
the good intentions of petitioners herein, the law
leaves us no choice but to apply its explicit terms,
which unqualifiedly deny to petitioners the power to
adopt anybody in the Philippines (Ellis & Ellis v.
Republic, L-16922, Apr. 30, 1963).
Prior to the above decision, We have also
denied petitions to adopt by persons similarly
situated as petitioner Brehm. Thus, in the case of
Caraballo v. Republic, G.R. No. L-15080, April 25,
1962, giving some reason why non-resident aliens
are disqualified to adopt, We said -
... Looking after the welfare of a minor to be
adopted the law has surrounded him with
safeguards to achieve and insure such welfare. It
cannot be gain said that an adopted minor may be
removed from the country by the adopter, who is

12. not a resident of the Philippines, and placed beyond
the reach and protection of the country of his birth.
(See also S/Sgt. Katancik, v. Republic, G.R. No. L-
15472, June 20, 1962).
This notwithstanding, petitioners press the
argument that Brehm being now the step-father of
the minor, he is qualified to adopt, in view of the
provisions of par. 3, Art. 338, Civil Code, which
states -
The following may be adopted:
(1) The natural child by the natural fatherchanrobles virtual law library
(2) Other legitimate children, by the father or
motherchanrobles virtual law library
(3) A step-child, by the step-father or step-mother.
We should construe, however, Article 338 in
connection with article 335. Art. 335 clearly states
that "The following cannot adopt: ... (4). Non-
resident aliens". It is therefore, mandatory,
because it contains words of positive prohibition
and is couched in the negative terms importing that
the act required shall not be done otherwise than
designated (50 Am. Jur. 51). On the other hand,
Art. 338, Provides "the following may be adopted:
(3) a
step-child, by the step-father or step-mother",

13. which is merely directory, and which can only be
given operation if the same does not conflict with
the mandatory provisions of Art. 335. Moreover, as
heretofore been shown, it is article 335 that confers
jurisdiction to the court over the case, and before
Article; 338 may or can be availed of, such
jurisdiction must first be established. We ruled out
the adoption of a step-child by a step-father, when
the latter has a legitimate child of his own (Ball v.
Rep., 50 O.G. 145; and McGee v. Rep., L-5387,
April 29, 1959).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
IN VIEW HEREOF, the decision appealed
from, in so far as it affects the petitioner Gilbert R.
Brehm, is hereby reversed, and his Petition to
adopt the child EIizabeth Mira, denied. Without
costs.

14. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17915 January 31, 1967
TEODORO M. CASTRO, petitioner and appellant,
vs.
AMADO DEL ROSARIO as Commissioner of
Civil Service, DOMINADOR AYTONA as
Secretary of Finance,

15. MELECIO R. DOMINGO, as Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, and TOMAS C. TOLEDO,
respondents and appellants.
Ramon C. Aquino, Teodoro M. Castro, Leandro C.
Sevilla and Antonio M. Castro for petitioner and
appellant.
Emma Quisumbing-Fernando and E. M. Fernando
for respondent and appellant Toledo.
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and
Solicitor Ceferino S. Gaddi for respondents and
appellants Secretary of Finance, et al.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
This is a proceeding in quo warranto, certiorari and
mandamus originally filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. The controverted position is
that of Assistant Regional Revenue Director II,
Manila, which became vacant on August 24, 1959,
upon the promotion of its occupant, Alfredo
Jimenez. Respondent Tomas C. Toledo was
appointed in his place, and it is this appointment
that is being questioned by petitioner Teodoro M.
Castro in this proceeding. The court a quo
annulled Toledo's appointment, but did not grant
Castro's prayer that respondent officials be
ordered to appoint him.

16. Toledo's appointment by the Secretary of Finance,
upon recommendation of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, was made on November 24,
1959, effective as of October 1, 1959. When he
was appointed Toledo's position was that of Chief
Revenue Inspector, or Chief Revenue Examiner,
stationed in Manila. The appointment was
protested by Castro in a letter he wrote the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue on January 19,
1960, wherein he alleged that in accordance with
the provisions of Section 23 of Republic Act No.
2260, otherwise known as the Civil Service Act of
1959, he was the one who should have been
considered for the position. Copy of the letter-
protest was furnished the Secretary of Finance.
On February 8, 1960 the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, in a first indorsement, informed Castro
that "the position of Assistant Revenue Regional
Director II, R-53, at P6,000.00 adjusted to
P6,597.60 per annum, is for Regional District No.
3, Manila, and the appointment thereto had to be
issued to the person actually performing the
functions of the position," namely, respondent
Toledo, who was then acting as Assistant
Revenue Regional Officer II, Manila.

17. On March 8, 1960 Castro appealed to the
Commissioner of Civil Service, who indorsed the
matter to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
with a request for a statement of the comparative
qualifications of Toledo and Castro. After setting
forth the qualifications as requested, the
Commissioner explained that the next two
Assistant Revenue Regional Directors in line for
the protested position, as reported for purposes of
Administrative Order No. 171, were Teodoro
Lucero, Assistant Revenue Regional Director I
(Regional District No. 4), with a salary of P6,900
per annum; and Lauro Abraham, Assistant
Revenue Regional Director I (Regional District No.
6), with a salary of P6,000 per annum, but that
since the protested position was for Regional
District No. 3, Manila, where Toledo was next in
rank, and since he was actually performing the
functions of the controverted office, there was no
need to make a comparison between his
qualifications and those of Castro.
On July 1, 1960 the Commissioner of Civil Service
rendered his decision dismissing Castro's protest
on the ground that the contested position belonged
properly to Regional District No. 3, where Toledo
was the next ranking employee, while Castro was

18. in Regional District No. 5, San Pablo City. Hence,
Castro filed the present petition asking that
Toledo's appointment be annulled and that he be
declared entitled to the position. As already stated,
the trial court rejected Castro's claim, but at the
same time annulled Toledo's appointment — this
last on the ground that his previous appointment
as Chief Revenue Examiner was illegal.
Both sides appealed from the decision.
Respondents claim that the lower court should not
have nullified Toledo's appointment. They contend
(1) that the question as to the legality of his
previous appointment as Chief Revenue Examiner
was neither raised in the pleadings nor proven at
the trial with the consent of the parties; (2) that
petitioner was precluded by laches from
questioning said appointment; and (3) that the
same was not contrary to the Revised
Administrative Code.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that the lower
court should have ordered respondents
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Secretary
of Finance to appoint him to the controverted
position because (1) he was senior in rank to
Toledo and was the competent and qualified

19. employee next in line for the position; and (2) the
eight other Assistant Revenue Regional Directors I
had waived their rights to the position.
Castro entered the government service in 1931 as
a messenger in the Bureau of Forestry. He
became a clerk in the Bureau of Internal Revenue
on February 1, 1937. Then he became
successively law clerk, income tax examiner, Chief
of Tax Audit Branch and eventually, on July 1,
1957, Assistant Revenue Regional Director I.
On the other hand , Toledo first worked in the
Metropolitan Water District on July 16, 1948. He
became employed in the Bureau of Internal
Revenue on December 4, 1952, when he was
appointed distillery agent. At the time he left the
Bureau on January 15, 1958 his position was that
of income tax examiner with a salary of P3,300 per
annum. On said date he became a Technical
Assistant to the Executive Secretary of the
President of the Philippines at P7,200 per annum.
On July 1, 1958, when he returned to the Bureau
he was appointed Chief Revenue Inspector (a new
position created under the Appropriation Act of
1958-1959, which look effect on July 1, 1958) at
P6,787 per annum.

20. This case is principally a special civil action in quo
warranto. A quo warranto proceeding is one to
determine the right to the use or exercise of a
franchise or office and to oust the holder from its
enjoyment, if his claim is not well founded, or if he
has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.1
The
action may be commenced for the Government by
the Solicitor General or by a fiscal;2
or a person
claiming to be entitled to a public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another
may bring an action in his own name.3
Where a
private person files the action, he must prove that
he is entitled to the controverted position,
otherwise respondent has a right to the
undisturbed possession of his office.4
Castro claims the position by virtue of Section 23,
paragraph 3, Republic Act 2260, which provides:
Whenever a vacancy occurs in any
competitive or classified position in the
government or in any government-owned
or controlled corporation or entity, the
officer or employee next in rank who is
competent and qualified to hold the
position and who possesses an
appropriate civil service eligibility shall be

21. promoted thereto: Provided, That should
there be two or more persons under equal
circumstances, seniority shall be given
preference: And provided, however, That
should there be any special reason or
reasons why such officer or employee
should not be promoted, such special
reason or reasons shall be stated in writing
by the appointing official and the officer or
employee concerned shall be informed
thereof and be given opportunity to be
heard by the Commissioner of Civil
Service, whose decision in such case shall
be final. If the vacancy is not filled by
promotion as provided herein, then the
same shall be filled by transfer of present
employees in the government service, by
reinstatement, by reemployment of
persons separated through reduction in
force, or by certification from appropriate
registers of eligibles in accordance with
rules promulgated in pursuance of this Act.
It appears that for internal revenue tax purposes
the Philippines is divided into ten regional districts,
with Manila as District No. 3. Each district has a
Revenue Regional Director and an Assistant

22. Revenue Regional Director. The Revenue
Regional Director for the Manila District outranks
the nine other Revenue Regional Directors, while
the Assistant Revenue Regional Director for
Manila outranks the nine other Assistant Revenue
Regional Directors. These nine Assistant Revenue
Regional Directors therefore usually aspire to be
promoted either to the position of Revenue
Regional Director or to that of Assistant Revenue
Regional Director for Manila.
At the time the controverted petition became
vacant Toledo was occupying the position of Chief
Revenue Inspector, (or Examiner) while the
positions of Assistant Revenue Regional Director
outside the Manila District were occupied by the
following:
Name Salary
1. Teodoro
Lucero . . . . . . . . . . . . .
P6900
2. Lauro D.
Abraham . . . . . . . . . . .
6000
3. Ricardo A. Rivera . . . . . . . . .
. . .
6000
4. Gaspar L. Angeles . . . . . . . . 5100

23. . . .
5. Jaime
Araneta . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6000
6. Policronio Blanco . . . . . . . . .
. . .
6000
7. Francisco Tantuico . . . . . . . .
. .
6266.40
8. Pedro D.
Uy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6000
9. Teodoro M. Castro . . . . . . . .
. . .
6000
According to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, the next two in line for the position in
question were Lucero and Abraham. Obviously the
position of Chief Revenue Inspector (Examiner)
was considered to be of the same rank as the
position of Assistant Revenue Regional Director
for regions other than Manila. And Toledo, who
was then Chief Revenue Inspector (Examiner),
was chosen because in the opinion of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue he was already
in the region where the vacancy occurred and
therefore was more familiar with the work there,
and both his salary range and efficiency rating5

24. were higher than Castro's aside from the fact that
he was already performing the functions of the
office.
Even on the assumption that Castro possessed,
as he claims, better qualifications and a higher
efficiency rating than Toledo, it would avail him
nothing because he has failed to prove that his
position was the one next in rank to the vacant
office. He was not even the most senior among the
different Assistant Revenue Regional Directors
outside the Manila District. However, he insists
that the eight other Assistant Revenue Regional
Directors waived their rights to the position by their
failure to complain against Toledo's appointment.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known
right. The silence of the eight other Assistant
Revenue Regional Directors does not amount to a
waiver on their part. Waiver must be predicated on
more concrete grounds. The evidence must be
sufficient and clear to warrant a finding that the
intent to waive is unmistakable.
Castro himself, when he testified, could not
categorically state that the eight others were not
interested in the position.6
Not having shown either
seniority in rank among the nine Assistant

25. Revenue Regional Directors outside the Manila
District or waiver on the part of those who were
senior to him Castro has failed to establish a clear
right to the office which would entitle him to oust
respondent Toledo.
Upon the other hand, the supposed illegality of
Toledo's appointment as Chief Revenue Officer of
the Manila District cannot be a ground for the
annulment of his appointment to the controverted
position.7
The legality of that earlier appointment
may not be questioned except in a quo warranto
proceeding brought by the proper person at the
proper time. To be sure, as heretofore stated this
is principally such a proceeding, but only insofar
as the position of Assistant Revenue Regional
District II is concerned. It is true there is an
allegation in Castro's petition that the earlier
appointment of Toledo as Chief Revenue officer
was illegal.8
But Castro does not claim to be
entitled to that other position and consequently the
legality of Toledo's appointment thereto is not
properly in issue. Besides, even if Castro were the
proper party to raise that issue, he did so beyond
the time limit prescribed by law.9
Toledo was
appointed to said position on July 1, 1958. Castro
had one year from that date to assail the legality of

26. the appointment. The petition here was filed only
on August 6, 1960, or beyond the one-year period.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is
modified by eliminating therefrom that portion
annulling respondent Toledo's appointment to the
position in dispute, and is affirmed in other
respects. Costs against petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala,
Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.

27. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25245 December 11, 1967
FRANKLIN BAKER COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
MAURICIO ALILLANA and WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents.
Paulino Manongdo for petitioner.
Paciano C. Villavieja and M.E. Lanzona, Jr. for
respondents.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

28. Franklin Baker Co. of the Philippines, a domestic
corporation engaged in producing copra, on July
19, 1947 took Mauricio Alillana into employment,
as truck loader. In 1956 he was assigned as
washer. Four months later, he became shell
collector therein, performing duties of this nature:
To pick up unshelled coconuts from a moving
conveyor; place them in a "caritilla" and hand them
to the shellers; four times during the 8-hour work,
he and some assistants had to personally rotate
the pulley to keep the conveyor running when it
gets stuck up by coconut shells.
On April 21, 1958, Alillana suffered from pains at
the ribs he was found with bronchitis and went on
leave. On May 9, 1958, however, he was allowed
by the company to resume his work.
Starting May 31, 1958, he from time to time
complained of cough, with chest and back pains,
for which he was treated. Referred for physical
and X-ray examinations, on July 6, 1958, his
condition was found to be as follows: "Far
advanced pulmonary tuberculosis at the left lung,
associated with bronchitis." The next day, on July
7, 1958, he retired from the company. Franklin
Baker Co. paid him P188.16 under its non-

29. occupational sickness and disability benefit plan
for the period from July 7, 1958 to October 29,
1958; and P669.12 as retirements benefits.
Alillana subsequently filed a claim for disability
compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. On February 28, 1963, the
Regional Office hearing officer awarded disability
benefits. Franklin Baker Co. elevated the case to
the Workmen's Compensation Commission.
The Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, on
October 11, 1963, affirmed the award, slightly
reducing the amount to P3,015.06. Section 14 was
applied, on temporary total disability, i.e., 60% of
his average weekly wage of P27.01, times the
maximum of 208 weeks less a brief period when
he had "odd-lot" or sporadic employment.
On July 25, 1964, Franklin Baker Co. paid said
award of P3,015.06. Satisfaction thereof was
acknowledge by Alillana in writing (Annex "C" to
Petition).
Thereafter, on August 10, 1964, alleging
continuing disability from his ailment, Alillana filed
a motion in the same case for additional
compensation. The Workmen's Compensation

30. Commission, on September 16, 1964, ordered a
physical examination of Alillana. And on
September 7, 1965, after said physical
examination by one of the Commission's doctors,
finding Alillana still suffering from temporary total
disability due to his ailment, the Workmen's
Compensation Commission issued an order for
additional compensation of P984.94, thus raising
the total award to the then statutory maximum of
P4,000.
Franklin Baker Co. moved for reconsideration. On
October 13, 1965, the Workmen's Compensation
Commission en banc denied the motion, stating
that the period of disability can be extended
beyond 208 weeks under Sec. 18 of the Act.
Hence, this petition was filed by the Franklin Baker
Co., to raise on appeal from the Workmen's
Compensation Commission's orders the issue:
Does the Workmen's Compensation Commission
have power under Sec. 18 to extend the period of
disability under Sec. 14 of the Act?
Section 14 provides:
Sec. 14. Total disability. — In case the
injury or sickness causes total disability for

31. labor, the employer, during such disability
but exclusive of the first three days shall
pay to the injured employee a weekly
compensation equivalent to sixty per
centum of his average weekly wages; but
not more than thirty-five pesos nor less
than ten pesos per week, except in the
case provided for in the next following
paragraph. Such weekly payments shall in
no case continue after disability has
ceased, nor shall they extend over more
than two hundred and eight weeks, nor
shall the aggregate sum paid as
compensation exceed in any case four
thousand pesos. But no award of
permanent disability shall take effect until
after two weeks have elapsed from the
date of injury.
In Avecilla Building Corporation vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, L-10668, September
26, 1957, this Court already ruled that said
maximum period of 208 weeks can be extended
under Section 18, as amended by Republic Act
772:

32. Speaking of this right of the Workmen's
Compensation Commissioner to reopen a
case already decided by him, it is an
innovation introduced by Rep. Act 772,
particularly, Sec. 13 thereof, amending
Section 18 (last par.) of the original
Workmen's Compensation Law, namely,
Act 3428. Before amendment, the last
paragraph of Section 18 read thus:
"The total compensation prescribed in
this and the next preceding section and
the total compensation prescribed in
sections fourteen and fifteen of this Act
shall, together, not exceed the sum of
three thousand pesos."
As amended, the said last paragraph now
reads as follows:
"The total compensation prescribed in
this and the next preceding section and
the total compensation prescribed in
sections fourteen and fifteen of this
Act, shall, together, not exceed the
sum of four thousand pesos: Provided,
however, that after the payment has
been made for the period specified by

33. the Act in each case, the Workmen's
Compensation Commissioner may
from time to time cause the
examination of the condition of the
disabled laborer, with a view to
extending, if necessary, the period of
compensation which shall not,
however, exceed the said amount of
four thousand pesos."
One change introduced is the increase
from P3,000 to P4,000 of the total
compensation provided in the original
provision. The more important change,
however, is that contained in the proviso,
which is the last part of the paragraph. This
legal provision empowering Workmen's
Compensation Boards or Commissioners
to reopen a case is contained in the
Workmen's Compensation Acts of many of
the States of the American union, including
the Territory of Hawaii.1awphil.net The reason for this
legal provision is explained by Arthur
Larson in his authoritative work entitled.
The Law of Workmen's Compensation,
Vol. 2, as page 330, as follows:

34. "In almost all states, some kind of
provision is made for reopening and
modifying awards. This provision is a
recognition of the obvious fact that, no
matter how competent a commission's
diagnosis of claimant's condition and
earning prospects at the time of
hearing may be, that condition may
later change markedly for the worse, or
may improve, or may even clear up
altogether. Under the typical award in
the form of periodic payments during a
specified maximum period or during
disability, the objectives of the
legislation are best accomplished if the
commission can increase, decrease,
revive or terminate payments to
correspond to claimant's changed
condition. Theoretically, then,
commissions ought to exercise
perpetual and unlimited jurisdiction to
reopen cases as often as necessary to
make benefits meet current conditions.
But the administrative problem lies in
the necessity of preserving the full
case records of all claimants that have

35. ever received any kind of award,
against the possibility of a future
reopening.1awphil.net Moreover, any attempt to
reopen a case based on an injury ten
or fifteen years old must necessarily
encounter awkward problems of proof,
because of the long delay and the
difficulty of determining the relationship
between some ancient injury and a
present aggravated disability. Another
argument is that insurance carriers
would never know that kind of future
liabilities they might incur, and would
have difficulty in computing appropriate
reserves."
It will be noticed, however, that while in the
several states of the union, the reopening
is intended for the benefit of both employer
and employee in the sense that, in case of
aggravation or deterioration of the disability
of the employee, the period of
compensation should be extended up to a
certain limit, or in case the condition of the
employee improves or the disability
disappears altogether, the period of
compensation is shortened or

36. compensation stopped, our law, under
Section 18, is a little one-sided and is all
for the benefit of the employee, for the
reason that as may be gathered from the
proviso, the Commissioner may from time
to time cause examination of the condition
of the disabled laborer, with a view to
extending, if necessary, the period of
compensation. In this respect there is room
for improvement of the law as to make it
more equitable to both parties, labor and
management. Furthermore, while in the
several states of the American Union, the
time within which the Commissioner or
Board may reopen a case is limited
anywhere from one year to several years,
our law contained in the proviso in
question, sets no time limit. The
disadvantage of making this period within
which the case may be reopened, too long,
or as in our law, with no limit at all, is
touched upon by Larson in the latter part of
his commentary, as above-reproduced,
namely, that in case such a period is too
long, there may be difficulty in completing
and preserving the record of the injury, or

37. determining the relationship, if any,
between the aggravation or deterioration of
the employee's disability and some ancient
injury, to say nothing of the fact that
insurance companies which are interested
in similar cases, by having insured
employees of companies against injuries,
may find difficulty in adjusting their
finances, such as putting up reserve funds
to take care of future liabilities.
But there is no question that under Section
18 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
as amended, the Commissioner was
authorized to reopen the case of Carpeso
and to direct that the compensation to him
by petitioner be increased or continued.
The claim of petitioner that it had not been
given an opportunity to traverse the claim
that Carpeso's condition had deteriorated,
is not supported by the record.1awphil.net
Clearly, therefore, the Workmen's Compensation
Commission did not incur in any error in extending
to cover beyond 208 weeks the period of Alillana's
disability compensation, up to a total of not more
than P4,000.

38. Alillana's having signed a satisfaction receipt can
not result in waiver; the law does not consider as
valid any agreement to receive less compensation
than what the worker is entitled to recover under
the Act (Sec. 29).
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission are hereby
affirmed. No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando,
JJ., concur

39. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24022 March 3, 1965
ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE, Y. FELICIANO, ET AL., respondents.
Jose C. Zulueta and Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn
Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400
metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the
recommendation of the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of
1964.
On December 27, 1964, the President submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration and on
December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the President
designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the
importation pursuant to which Chairman Jose Y. Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said
importation and set the bidding for February 1, 1965.
Considering that said importation is contrary to Republic Act 3452 which prohibits the government
from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same, the Iloilo Palay
and Corn Planters Association, Inc., together with Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as taxpayer,
filed the instant petition before this Court seeking to restrain Jose Y. Feliciano, in his capacity as
Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, from conducting the bid
scheduled on the date abovementioned, and from doing any other act that may result in the
contemplated importation until further orders of this Court. For reasons that do not clearly appear, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Auditor General were made co-respondents.
Pending decision on the merits, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
which, in due course, this Court granted upon petitioners' filing a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.
This bond having been filed, the writ was issued on February 10, 1965.

40. Respondents, in their answer do not dispute the essential allegations of the petition though they
adduced reasons which justify the importation sought to be made. They anchor the validity of the
importation on the provisions of Republic Act 2207 which, in their opinion, still stand.
It is petitioners' contention that the importation in question being undertaken by the government even
if there is a certification by the National Economic Council that there is a shortage in the local supply
of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, is illegal because the same is prohibited
by Republic Act 3452 which, in its Section 10, provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left
to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that the Rice and Corn
Administration, or any other government agency, is prohibited from doing so.
It is true that the section above adverted to leaves the importation of rice and corn exclusively to
private parties thereby prohibiting from doing so the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency, but from this it does not follow that at present there is no law which permits the
government to undertake the importation of rice into the Philippines. And this we say because, in our
opinion, the provision of Republic Act 2207 on the matter still stands. We refer to Section 2 of said Act
wherein, among other things, it provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the
local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified by the
National Economic Council, the President of the Philippines may authorize such importation thru any
government agency that he may designate. Here there is no dispute that the National Economic
Council has certified that there is such shortage present which, because of its gravity, constitutes a
national emergency, and acting in pursuance thereof the President lost no time in authorizing, after
consulting his cabinet, the General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration to immediately
undertake the needed importation in order to stave off the impending emergency. We find, therefore,
no plausible reason why the disputed importation should be prevented as petitioners now desire.
The contention that Republic Act 2207 has already been repealed by Republic Act 3452 is untenable
in the light of the divergent provisions obtaining in said two laws. Admittedly, Section 16 of Republic
Act 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides: "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." The question may now be asked:
what is the nature of this repealing clause ? It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it
fails to identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed [ Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, (1943) Vol. 1, p. 467]. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon
the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. Such being the case,
the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied
repeals apply ex proprio vigore. Indeed, the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws so that,
if a repeal is intended, the proper step is to so express it [Continental Insurance Co. v. Simpson, 8 F
(2d) 439; Weber v. Bailey, 151 Ore. 2188, 51 P (2d) 832; State v. Jackson, 120 W. Va. 521, 199 S.E.
876]. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any
existing law (Crawford, Construction of Statute, 1940 ed., p. 631), unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no such
inconsistency.
To begin with, the two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicable
to different circumstances. Thus, the total banning of importation under normal conditions as provided
for in Republic Act 2207 is one step to achieve the rice and corn sufficiency program of the
Administration. The philosophy behind the banning is that any importation of rice during a period of
sufficiency or even of a minor shortage will unduly compete with the local producers and depress the
local price which may discourage them from raising said crop. On the other hand, a price support
program and a partial ban of rice importation as embodied in Republic Act 3452 is another step
adopted to attend the sufficiency program. While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate

41. objective, their methods of approach are different; one is by a total ban of rice importation and the
other by a partial ban, the same being applicable only to the government during normal period.
There is another area where the two laws find a common point of reconciliation: the normalcy of the
time underlying both laws. Thus, with respect to the matter of importation Republic Act 2207 covers
three different situations: (1) when the local produce of rice is sufficient to supply local consumption;
(2) when the local produce falls short of the supply but the shortage is not enough to constitute a
national emergency; and (3) when the shortage, on the local supply of rice is of such gravity as to
constitute a national emergency. Under the first two situations, no importation is allowed whether by
the government or by the private sector. However, in the case of the third situation, the law authorizes
importation, by the government.
Republic Act 3452, on the other hand, deals only with situations 1 and 2, but not with. Nowhere in
said law can we discern that it covers importation where the shortage in the local supply is of such
gravity as to constitute a national emergency. In short, Republic Act 3452 only authorizes importation
during normal times, but when there is a shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a
national emergency, we have to turn to Republic Act 2207. These two laws therefore, are not
inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.
Our view that Republic Act 3452 merely contemplates importation during normal times is bolstered by
a consideration of the discussion that took place in Congress of House Bill No. 11511 which was
presented in answer to the request of the Chief Executive that he be given a standby power to import
rice in the Philippines. On this matter, we quote the following views of Senators Padilla and
Almendras:
SENATOR PADILLA: But under Republic Act No. 3452 them is a proviso in Sec. 10
thereof "that the Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency is hereby
prohibited from importing rice and corn."
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: That is under normal conditions.
SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided further", it says, "that the importation of rice, and corn
is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding tax." So therefore, the
position of the Committee as expressed by the distinguished sponsor, is that Sec. 10
of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under normal conditions.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: "Yes". (Senate Debate, June 16, 1964).
Much stress is laid on the content of Section 12 of Republic Act 3452 which gives to the President
authority to declare a rice and corn emergency any time he deems necessary in the public interest
and, during the emergency, to conduct raids, seizure and confiscation of rice and corn hoarded in any
private warehouse or bodega subject to constitutional limitations, to support the claim that said Act
also bans importation on the part of the government even in case of an emergency. The contention is
predicated on a misinterpretation of the import and meaning of said provision. Note that the section
refers to an emergency where there is an artificial shortage because of the apparent hoarding
undertaken by certain unscrupulous dealers or businessmen, and not to an actual serious shortage of
the commodity because, if the latter exists, there is really nothing to raid, seize or confiscate, because
the situation creates a real national emergency. Congress by no means could have intended under
such a situation to deprive the government of its right to import to stave off hunger and starvation.
Congress knows that such remedy is worthless as there is no rice to be found in the Philippines.
Seizure of rice is only of value in fighting hoarding and profiteering, but such remedy cannot produce
the rice needed to solve the emergency. If there is really insufficient rice stocked in the private

42. warehouses and bodegas such confiscatory step cannot remedy an actual emergency, in which case
we have to turn to Republic Act 2207.
The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of its
policy to promote a rice and corn program. And if this can be done, as we have shown, it is the duty of
this Court to adopt such interpretation that would give effect to both laws. Conversely, in order to
effect a repeal by implication, the litter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the
prior existing law [United States v. Greathouse,. 166 U.S. 601, 41 L. Ed., 1130; In re Phoenix Hotel
Co., 13 F. Supp. 229; Hammond v. McDonald, 32 Cal. App. 187, 89 P (2d) 407; Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, supra, p. 462]. The old and the new laws must be absolutely incompatible (Compañia
General de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8). A mere difference in the terms and
provisions of the statutes is not sufficient to create a repugnancy between them. There must be such
a positive repugnancy between the provisions of the old and the new statutes that they cannot be
made to reconcile and stand together (Crawford, Construction of Statute, supra, p. 631). The clearest
case possible must first be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn [Nagano v.
McGrath, 187 F (2d) 759]. Inconsistency is never presumed.
Republic Act 3848 entitled "An Act Providing for the Importation of Rice During the Calendar Year
Nineteen Hundred Sixty-Four in the Event of Shortage in Local Supply" cannot be given any nullifying
value, as it is pretended, simply because Section 6 thereof provides that "except as provided in this
Act, no other agency or instrumentality of the Government shall be allowed to purchase rice from
abroad." The reason is that it is a mere temporary law effective only for a specific year. As its title
reads, it is merely an authority to import rice during the year 1964. The same, therefore, is now
functus officio at least on the matter of importation.
Neither can petitioners successfully pretend that as Section 4 thereof provides that pending
prosecutions for any violation of Republic Acts 2207 and 3452 shall in no way be affected by said Act
3848 the implication is that the aforesaid Acts have already been repealed. That provision is merely a
safeguard placed therein in order that the prosecutions already undertaken may not be defeated with
the enactment of Republic Act 3848 because the latter provides for penal provisions which call for
lesser penalty. The intention is to except them from the rule that penal statutes can be given
retroactive effect if favorable to the accused.
To further bolster our view that Republic Act 2207 has not been impliedly repealed by Republic Act
3452, we wish to briefly quote hereunder the views expressed by some senators during the
discussion of House Bill 11511 already mentioned above. It should be here repeated that said bill was
presented to accede to the request of the President for a stand-by power to import in case of
emergency in view of the uncertainty of the law, but that during the discussion thereof it was strongly
asserted and apparently upheld that such request for authority was not necessary because Republic
Act 2207 was still in force. It is probably for this reason that said bill, after having been approved by
the Senate, was killed in the conference committee that considered it. These views, while not binding,
are of persuasive authority and throw light on the issue relative to the effectivity of Republic Act 2207.
SENATOR LIWAG: ... Now Mr. Chairman, is it the sense of the Committee that in the
case of emergency, in case of an impending shortage, we can import rice under the
provisions of R.A. No. 2207?
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is what we mean, your Honor, in this paragraph
(c), Section 2, page 2, that when we say "under the provisions of existing law," we are
referring to R.A. No. 2207.
x x x x x x x x x

43. SENATOR PADILLA: I notice, Mr. Senator, that Section 2 paragraph (c) of the
amendment by substitution reads:
Importation of rice and/or corn should be resorted to only in cases of extreme and
under the provisions of existing law.
I suppose that the existing laws referred to are Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic
Act No. 3452. Does this section in the proposed bill by substitution recognize the
continued existence of the pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic
Act No. 3452 on rice importation ?
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is the reason, Your Honor, why we struck out the
stand-by power on the part of the President to import rice.
x x x x x x x x x
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: The position of your Committee, Your Honor, because of
the existing law — that is, Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 — that is
the reason your Committee eliminated that stand-by power of the President to import
rice. Because you know, Your Honor, what is the use of that stand-by power,
inasmuch as under Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 the President
can designate any government agency to import rice?
SENATOR PADILLA: Well, it is good to make that clear because in the decision of the
Supreme Court, as I said, there was no clear-cut holding as to the possible co-
existence or implied repeal between these two Acts.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, Your Honor, but the gentleman from Nueva Ecija,
Senator Liwag, informed me that Republic Act No. 2207 has never been repealed.
SENATOR PADILLA: Well, I also concur with that view, but we want to make that
clear ... .
SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided, further," it says, "That the importation of rice and corn
is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes." So, therefore, the
position of the Committee, as expressed by the distinguished sponsor is that Sec. 10
of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under normal conditions.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.
SENATOR PADILLA: So, both provisions of law are in existence.
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.
SENATOR PADILLA: One is not repealed by the other.
x x x x x x x x x
SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there are two views already expressed on
whether Republic Act No. 2207 has been repealed by Republic Act No. 3452. One
view sustains the theory that there has been a repeal of Republic Act No. 2207 by

44. Republic Act No. 3452 insofar as rice importation is concerned. The other view is that
there is no repeal. The Supreme Court does not state clearly which side prevails. I
take the view that the two laws can be reconciled ... .
Now, Mr. President, reading those two provisions together, I maintain that they are not
totally repugnant to each other, that it is possible for them to stand together except on
certain points: First, is importation in case of a national emergency certified by the
National Economic Council permissible? By reading the two provisos together I would
say yes because there is nothing in the proviso contained in Republic Act No. 3452
which would be inconsistent with importation during a shortage amounting to a
national emergency.
Another circumstance that strengthens our view is that when said House Bill No. 11511 was finally
approved by the Senate, it carried a clause which expressly repeals, among others, Republic Act No.
2207 (Section 14), but which bill, as already said, was later killed in the conference committee. This
attitude clearly reveals that Congress preferred to fall back on Republic Act 2207 with regard to future
importations.
Anent the point raised relative to the lack of necessary appropriation to finance the importation in
question, suffice it to state that under Republic Act 663 the National Rice and Corn Corporation is
authorized to borrow, raise and secure the money that may be necessary to carry out its objectives.
We refer to Section 3 (e) of said Act which empowers said corporation to secure money and to
encumber any property it has as a guaranty, and Republic Act No. 3452, which creates the Rice and
Corn Administration, transferred its functions and powers to the latter, including the power to borrow
money under Section 3(e). This provision gives the RCA enough power with which to finance the
importation in question.
WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby
dissolved. Costs against petitioners.
Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:
It is regrettable that in their effort to uphold the Government's power to import rice, under Section 2 of
Republic Act 2207, the majority opinion seems to have overlooked that the repeal of statutes is
primarily a matter of legislative intention; and that on its face, Republic Act No. 3452 was plainly
intended to supersede the prior law, Republic Act No. 2207.
The specific issue, in brief, is whether the extraordinary emergency power to import rice and corn,
granted to the President by Section 2 of Republic Act 2207, may still be considered as subsisting at
present, notwithstanding the terms of Section 10 of the subsequent Republic Act No. 3452.
For convenience, we present in parallel columns the specific provisions of the respective acts:
REP. ACT NO. 2207 REP. ACT NO. 3452

45. (1959) (1962)
SEC. 2. Prohibition. It shall be
unlawful for any person, association,
corporation or government agency to
import rice and corn into any point in
the Philippines: Provided, however,
That should there be an existing or
imminent shortage in the local
supply of the abovementioned
commodities of such gravity as to
constitute a national emergency,
upon certification to this effect by the
National Economic Council, based
on the studies of the Office of
Statistical Coordination of said body,
the President of the Philippines may
authorize the importation of the
commodities, through any
government agency that he may
designate in such quantities as the
National Economic Council may
determine necessary to cover the
shortage, subject to the taxes, duties
and/or special charges as now
provided by law: Provided, further,
That contracts for such importation
shall be only on straightsales basis,
and awarded only after a public
bidding, with sealed bids. (Emphasis
supplied)
SEC. 10. ... Provided, that the Rice
and Corn Administration or any
other government agency is hereby
prohibited from importing rice and
corn: Provided, further, That the
importation of rice and corn is left to
private parties upon payment of the
corresponding taxes. (Emphasis
Supplied)
It is apparent at first sight that the two provisions contradict each other. First, in policy; because under
Republic Act No. 2207, the general rule is that no person or entity, public or private, shall import rice
and corn; while under the later Act, Republic Act No. 3452, the importation of rice and corn is left to
private parties, with no restriction other than the payment of tax. Second, in procedure; under
Republic Act 2207, the President, in case of emergency, may import rice and corn in quantities
certified by the National Economic Council as necessary, through any government agency that he
may designate; while by Act 3452 any government agency is prohibited from importing rice and corn,
said prohibition being express, absolute, total, and unconditional. Not only this, but violation of the
prohibition is sanctioned by a P10,000 fine and imprisonment for not more than 5 years (sec. 15, Act
3452).
We cannot see how the majority opinion can contend that the presidential power to make importations
of rice and corn still subsists, in view of the unqualified terms of Republic Act 3452. If any government
agency is prohibited from importing rice and corn by the later law, and the violation of the prohibition
is penalized by fine and imprisonment, in what manner can the President make the importation? He
cannot do so directly, since Act 2207 specifically requires that it be done "through any government
agency". How, then, may he import?

46. It is unnecessary to resort to legal gymnastics in order to realize why this must be so. Suffice it to note
that the Administration's power to import rice in certified emergencies under Act 2207 was but a mere
corollary to the total ban on rice and corn imports under that Act, and the existence of such
exceptional import power necessarily depended on the continuation of that total prohibition.1äwphï1.ñët
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2207 clearly shows how intimate was this dependence between the
emergency importing authority granted to the government and the maintenance of the normal non-
import policy.
SEC. 2. Prohibition: It shall be unlawful for any person, association, corporation or
government agency to import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines, provided,
however, that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local supply of
the above-mentioned commodities, of such gravity as to constitute a national
emergency, upon certification to this effect by the National Economic Council, based
on the studies of the Office of Statistical Coordination of said body, the President of
the Philippines may authorize the importation of these commodities, through any
government agency that he may designate, in such quantities as the National
Economic Council may determine necessary to cover the shortage, subject to taxes,
duties and/or special charges as now provided by law; provided, further, that contracts
for such importation shall be only on straight sales basis, and awarded only after a
public bidding, with sealed bids. (Emphasis supplied)
So closely linked were the policy and the emergency import power that the latter was not even set
apart in a section. Therefore, repeal of the absolute ban on imports, prescribed in the opening portion
of the section quoted, necessarily entails the disappearance of the emergency power to import rice
and corn established by the later part of the same legal provision. Where the basic rule disappears,
the exception thereto must necessarily cease to operate, since the exception becomes automatically
functus officio for lack of basis.
The total banning of cereal imports logically, under Act 2207, meant that whenever the domestic crop
became insufficient to satisfy the demand for rice and corn, the latter had to be brought from outside
to fill the gap; and the legislature decided (in Act 2207) that it should be done through governmental
agencies. But under Republic Act 3452, the total prohibition to import disappeared, and private parties
were authorized to bring in the cereals at any time; hence, the exceptional importing power of the
Government lost all reason for its existence, because the private imports allowed by Act 3452 were
contemplated and intended to make up for the difference between demand and supply, without
necessity of government intervention. In truth, the expression in Section 10 of Act 3452 —
SEC. 10. ... Provided, That the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government
agency is hereby prohibited from importing rice and corn; Provided, further, That the
importation of rice and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the
corresponding taxes. (Emphasis supplied)
can only mean that the Administration must desist from importing, and leave to private parties the task
of bringing such cereals from without in order to make up for whatever shortages in production should
occur.
That only private parties, and not the government, can import the cereals finds confirmation in the
legislative journals. In the Congressional Record, No. 48, March 30, 1962, page 1360, containing the
transcript of the Senate debates on the bill that later became Republic Act No. 3452, the following
appears:

47. CUENCO AMENDMENT
Mr. CUENCO. Mr. Speaker, on page 3, line 16, change the period (.) to colon and add
the following: PROVIDED, THAT THE RICE AND CORN ADMINISTRATION OR ANY
OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY IS HEREBY PROHIBITED FROM IMPORTING
RICE AND CORN: PROVIDED, FURTHER, THAT THE IMPORTATION OF RICE
AND CORN IS LEFT TO PRIVATE PARTIES UPON PAYMENT OF THE
CORRESPONDING TAXES.
Mr. OCAMPO. Suppose there is a calamity, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. CUENCO. Leave that to private parties.
Mr. OCAMPO. Accepted, Mr. Speaker.
The SPEAKER. Is there any objection? (After a pause). The chair does not hear any.
The amendment is approved. (Congressional Record, No. 48, March 30, 1962, p.
1360)
The Senate Journal, No. 59, May 8, 1962, also contains the following illuminating remarks:
SENATOR LEDESMA: So it is on the understanding then, Your Honor, that we could
proceed with the discussion.
Your Honor, House Bill No. 339, as I have already stated, specifically provides that
appointment of personnel should be in accordance with the Civil Service Law as well
as with the WAPCO. It seems to me that this provision is very laudable and very, very
reasonable. The second important feature in this proposed measure is that it prohibits
importation by the government. I think this should be clarified in the sense that, at the
same time, it allows importation by private parties but with the payment of the
corresponding duties. Or rather, under House Bill No. 339, the general policy which is
being set in the proposed measure is that the government should not resort to
importation but that importation of the cereal is open at all times to any citizen of this
country so long as he pays the corresponding duties and other taxes which are
imposed by our government. (Senate Journal, No. 59, May 8, 1962)
It is thus clear that if section 16 of Republic Act 3452 providing that —
All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly",.
intended to refer to any preceding statute at all, it must have referred to Republic Act No. 2207.
Hence, the Presidential power to import no longer exists.
In arguing in favor of the Government's power to import even now, the majority opinion avers that
Republic Act No. 3452 is designed to apply only to normal times and conditions. This is plainly
absurd, for in normal times, when production equals consumption, no importation need be authorized,
for none will be required.
The majority opinion stresses that Republic Act 3452 does not repeal Act 2207 in express terms.
Granting arguendo that this were true, despite the express prohibition of government imports in

48. section 10 of the later Act, yet it does not elucidate why the legislature found it necessary, or
expedient, to enact an entirely different law, instead of merely providing for the amendment of the
prior statute (R.A. 2207). If both laws were designed to attain the same end, rice and corn sufficiency
for our country, and only a change of method was intended, why enact two statutes not only
unconnected with each other, but actually contradictory?
That the two laws are inconsistent with each other cannot be gainsaid. Under Act 2207, no person or
entity, public or private, could import rice or corn, since under Section 2 thereof "it shall be unlawful for
any person, association, corporation or government entity to import rice and corn"; while under Act
3452, on the contrary, "importation of rice and corn is left to private parties" (sec. 10) at any time, with
no other restriction than the payment of taxes. How can it be said that the two laws, with so
diametrically opposite philosophies, were intended to co-exist?
Because the two laws covering the same field are plainly incompatible with each other (since private
importation of rice and corn cannot, at the same time, be unlawful under Act 2207 and lawful under
Act 3452), it is inescapable to conclude that the later statute (3452) is, and must have been, intended
to revise, supersede, and replace the former law (Act 2207).The established rule in this jurisdiction in
such a case is that —
While as a general rule, implied repeal of a former statute by a later one is not
favored, yet if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly
intended as a substitute it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act (Posadas
vs. National City Bank of New York, 296 U.S. 497, 80 Law Ed. 351) (quoted and
applied in In re Guzman, 73 Phil. 52).
pines adopted the American doctrine that in such a revision of the law, whatever is excluded is
discarded and repealed (In re Guzman supra, at pp. 52-53).1
It has been held that "where the legislature frames a new statute upon a certain
subject-matter, and the legislative intention appears from the latter statute to be to
frame a new scheme in relation to such subject-matter and make a revision of the
whole subject, that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail, and that
whatever is excluded is discarded". (People v. Thornton, 186 Ill. 162, 173, 75 N.E.
841.)
And an author says: "So where there are two statutes on the same subject, passed at
different dates, and it is plain from the frame-work and substance of the last that it was
intended to cover the whole subject, and to be a complete and perfect system or
provision in itself, the last must be held to be a legislative declaration that whatever is
embraced in it shall prevail and whatever is excluded is discarded and repealed."
Or, as more tersely put in Madison vs. Southern Wisconsin R. Co., 10 A. L. R. 910, at page 915:
6. A subsequent statute, evidently intended as a substitute for one revised, operates
as a repeal of the latter without any express words to that effect; and so any distinct
provision of the old law, not incorporated into the later one, is to be, deemed to have
been intentionally annulled. Smith, Stat. Constr. sec. 784; Bartlett v. King, 12 Mass.
537, 7 Am. Dec. 99:
This rule, expressly adopted by this very Supreme Court, utterly destroys the contention of the
majority opinion that because the Government's power under Republic Act 2207, to make imports of
rice and corn in case of certified emergency, is nowhere expressly repealed by Republic Act 3452,

49. such power must be still deemed to exist. No such power can now exist for the reason that the Act
conferring it was totally and unconditionally superseded and repealed by Act 3452. The contradictory
philosophies of both Acts testify to that effect.
The majority also avers that Republic Act No. 3452 does not contemplate situations where the
shortage in local supply is of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency. It also asserts that
Act 3452 refers only to artificial shortages through hoarding, and does not cover natural shortages
where the rice and corn crops do not suffice to meet the demands of consumption. Unfortunately, the
opposite of these assertions is precisely true. Thus,
Section 1 of Act 3452 provides: The Government shall engage in the purchase of
these basic foods from tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the
Philippines ... and whenever circumstances brought about by any cause, natural or
artificial, should so require, (the Government) shall sell and dispose of these
commodities to the consumers ... .
Section 3 of Act 3452 — With a view to regulating the level of supply of rice and corn
throughout the country, the Administration is authorized to accumulate stocks as a
national reserve in such quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet any
contingencies. ...
Section 12, Act 3452 — "The President of the Philippines is hereby authorized to
declare a rice and corn emergency any time he deems necessary in the public
interest. During the emergency period, the Rice and Corn Administration, upon the
direction of the President, shall, subject to constitutional limitation, conduct raids,
seizures, and confiscation of rice and con hoarded in any private warehouse or
bodega: Provided, That the Rice and Corn Administration shall pay such confiscated
rice and corn at the prevailing consumer's price of the Rice and Corn Administration.
(Emphasis supplied)
Certainly the words used by the statute, "any cause, natural or artificial", "any contingencies", "rice
and corn emergency" are broad enough to cover all contingencies, natural deficiency due to
insufficient production, as well as artificial shortages due to hoarding. The terms employed exempt the
legislature from the accusation that it still has left some emergency unprovided for. What it did deny
the Government was the power to import rice and corn whenever it so chooses; instead, the law
expressly prescribed "that the Rice and Corp. Administration or any government agency is hereby
prohibited from importing rice and corn" (sec. 10, R.A. 3452), a command that, as previously
observed, squarely contradicts and vacates that permission to import previously granted under
Republic Act 2207. The Government, therefore, may not now bring in rice and corn from abroad,
unless special legislative authorization is first obtained, as was done for 1964 by Republic Act No.
3848.
The very fact that the Administration went to and obtained from the Legislature permission to import
300,000 metric tons of rice during the calendar year 1964 (Rep. Act No. 3848), and made use of that
permission, is the best proof that the Executive felt that its former power under Republic Act No. 2207
no longer existed after the passage of Republic Act No. 3452. Such action places the Administration
in estoppel to assert the contrary. Why should it seek authority to make importation during 1964 if it
still possessed that granted by Republic Act 2207?
Note that, in consenting the Government's importing 300,000 tons of rice in 1964, the Legislature
once more re-affirmed the prohibition of further government imports in section 6 of the enabling law,
Republic Act No. 3848:

50. SEC. 6 — Except as provided in this Act, no other agency or instrumentality of the
Government shall be allowed to purchase rice from abroad." (Emphasis supplied)
which is a virtual repetition of the restraint imposed by Republic Act 3452. In addition, the law
imposed the further condition that the importation be made only upon two-thirds vote of the National
Economic Council, where Republic Act 2207 specified no particular majority.
The main opinion seeks to minimize the effect of these reiterated prohibitions by claiming that said
section 6 was intended to operate only for 1964. If that had been the intention, then section 6 was
absolutely unnecessary because the authority given by Act 3848 was a limitation in itself, as it only
permitted the importation of 300,000 metric tons for the calendar year 1964. Under such a grant, any
excess beyond the quantity fixed, and any import after 1964, were automatically forbidden. The
enactment of section 6 of Act 3848, therefore, was an actual reassertion of the policy of outlawing
Government imports, as declared in Republic Act 3452. If anything, it meant that to import rice now,
the Executive must first obtain an enabling law.
Moreover, the financing by the Government of its foreign purchase of rice would violate the
Constitutional restraint against paying money out of the Treasury, "except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law" (Art. VI, sec. 23, par. 3), and no law making such appropriation has been
enacted. Under the Revised Administrative Code, sections 606 and 607, no contract involving the
expenditure of public funds can be made without previous appropriation therefor, duly certified by the
Auditor General. Nor can these inhibitions be evaded by the ruse of causing a Government agency to
borrow the funds required for the purpose, considering that any and all government agencies are flatly
forbidden to import rice (Republic Act 3452, sec. 10), and the borrowing of funds to finance
importation is essential for the execution thereof.
Finally, we see no point in the quotations from statements made in the Senate during the
deliberations on House Bill No. 11511. That bill never became law, and is not before the Court. The
statements quoted are not binding, this Court having the exclusive prerogative of construing the
legislative enactments.
The effect in the majority decision is, after the Legislature had expressly prohibited government
agencies to import rice and corn, and after the lawmaking body refused to pass the bill (House Bill No.
11511) granting the Executive a stand-by authority to import, a decision of this Court now reverses
this clear policy of the Legislature, and hands the Executive a blanket power to do what the laws have
expressly forbidden.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.

51. EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24022 March 3, 1965
ILOILO PALAY AND CORN PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL. Petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE, Y.
FELICIANO, ET AL., Respondents.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:chanrobles virtual law library
On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn
Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400
metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the
recommendation of the National Economic Council as embodied in its Resolution No. 70, series of
1964.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On December 27, 1964, the President submitted said letter to his cabinet for consideration and on
December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the President
designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the
importation pursuant to which Chairman Jose Y. Feliciano announced an invitation to bid for said
importation and set the bidding for February 1, 1965.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Considering that said importation is contrary to Republic Act 3452 which prohibits the government from
importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same, the Iloilo Palay and
Corn Planters Association, Inc., together with Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as taxpayer, filed the
instant petition before this Court seeking to restrain Jose Y. Feliciano, in his capacity as Chairman and
General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, from conducting the bid scheduled on the date
abovementioned, and from doing any other act that may result in the contemplated importation until

52. further orders of this Court. For reasons that do not clearly appear, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and
the Auditor General were made co-respondents.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Pending decision on the merits, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction,
which, in due course, this Court granted upon petitioners' filing a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.
This bond having been filed, the writ was issued on February 10, 1965.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Respondents, in their answer do not dispute the essential allegations of the petition though they
adduced reasons which justify the importation sought to be made. They anchor the validity of the
importation on the provisions of Republic Act 2207 which, in their opinion, still stand.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is petitioners' contention that the importation in question being undertaken by the government even
if there is a certification by the National Economic Council that there is a shortage in the local supply of
rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, is illegal because the same is prohibited by
Republic Act 3452 which, in its Section 10, provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to
private parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that the Rice and Corn
Administration, or any other government agency, is prohibited from doing so.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is true that the section above adverted to leaves the importation of rice and corn exclusively to
private parties thereby prohibiting from doing so the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency, but from this it does not follow that at present there is no law which permits the
government to undertake the importation of rice into the Philippines. And this we say because, in our
opinion, the provision of Republic Act 2207 on the matter still stands. We refer to Section 2 of said Act
wherein, among other things, it provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the
local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, and this is certified by the
National Economic Council, the President of the Philippines may authorize such importation thru any
government agency that he may designate. Here there is no dispute that the National Economic Council
has certified that there is such shortage present which, because of its gravity, constitutes a national
emergency, and acting in pursuance thereof the President lost no time in authorizing, after consulting
his cabinet, the General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration to immediately undertake the
needed importation in order to stave off the impending emergency. We find, therefore, no plausible
reason why the disputed importation should be prevented as petitioners now desire.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The contention that Republic Act 2207 has already been repealed by Republic Act 3452 is untenable in
the light of the divergent provisions obtaining in said two laws. Admittedly, Section 16 of Republic Act
3452 contains a repealing clause which provides: "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." The question may now be asked:
what is the nature of this repealing clause ? It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it
fails to identify or designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed [ Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, (1943) Vol. 1, p. 467]. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon
the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. Such being the case,
the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied
repeals apply ex proprio vigore. Indeed, the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws so that, if
a repeal is intended, the proper step is to so express it [Continental Insurance Co. v. Simpson, 8 F (2d)
439; Weber v. Bailey, 151 Ore. 2188, 51 P (2d) 832; State v. Jackson, 120 W. Va. 521, 199 S.E. 876].
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law
(Crawford, Construction of Statute, 1940 ed., p. 631), unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no such inconsistency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
To begin with, the two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different methods applicable to
different circumstances. Thus, the total banning of importation under normal conditions as provided for
in Republic Act 2207 is one step to achieve the rice and corn sufficiency program of the Administration.
The philosophy behind the banning is that any importation of rice during a period of sufficiency or even
of a minor shortage will unduly compete with the local producers and depress the local price which may
discourage them from raising said crop. On the other hand, a price support program and a partial ban
of rice importation as embodied in Republic Act 3452 is another step adopted to attend the sufficiency
program. While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of

53. approach are different; one is by a total ban of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the
same being applicable only to the government during normal period.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
There is another area where the two laws find a common point of reconciliation: the normalcy of the
time underlying both laws. Thus, with respect to the matter of importation Republic Act 2207 covers
three different situations: (1) when the local produce of rice is sufficient to supply local consumption;
(2) when the local produce falls short of the supply but the shortage is not enough to constitute a
national emergency; and (3) when the shortage, on the local supply of rice is of such gravity as to
constitute a national emergency. Under the first two situations, no importation is allowed whether by
the government or by the private sector. However, in the case of the third situation, the law authorizes
importation, by the government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Republic Act 3452, on the other hand, deals only with situations 1 and 2, but not with. Nowhere in said
law can we discern that it covers importation where the shortage in the local supply is of such gravity
as to constitute a national emergency. In short, Republic Act 3452 only authorizes importation during
normal times, but when there is a shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a national
emergency, we have to turn to Republic Act 2207. These two laws therefore, are not inconsistent and
so implied repeal does not ensue.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Our view that Republic Act 3452 merely contemplates importation during normal times is bolstered by a
consideration of the discussion that took place in Congress of House Bill No. 11511 which was
presented in answer to the request of the Chief Executive that he be given a standby power to import
rice in the Philippines. On this matter, we quote the following views of Senators Padilla and Almendras:
SENATOR PADILLA: But under Republic Act No. 3452 them is a proviso in Sec. 10 thereof "that the Rice
and Corn Administration or any government agency is hereby prohibited from importing rice and corn."chanrobles virtual law library
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: That is under normal conditions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided further", it says, "that the importation of rice, and corn is left to private
parties upon payment of the corresponding tax." So therefore, the position of the Committee as
expressed by the distinguished sponsor, is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under
normal conditions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: "Yes". (Senate Debate, June 16, 1964).
Much stress is laid on the content of Section 12 of Republic Act 3452 which gives to the President
authority to declare a rice and corn emergency any time he deems necessary in the public interest and,
during the emergency, to conduct raids, seizure and confiscation of rice and corn hoarded in any
private warehouse or bodega subject to constitutional limitations, to support the claim that said Act also
bans importation on the part of the government even in case of an emergency. The contention is
predicated on a misinterpretation of the import and meaning of said provision. Note that the section
refers to an emergency where there is an artificial shortage because of the apparent hoarding
undertaken by certain unscrupulous dealers or businessmen, and not to an actual serious shortage of
the commodity because, if the latter exists, there is really nothing to raid, seize or confiscate, because
the situation creates a real national emergency. Congress by no means could have intended under such
a situation to deprive the government of its right to import to stave off hunger and starvation. Congress
knows that such remedy is worthless as there is no rice to be found in the Philippines. Seizure of rice is
only of value in fighting hoarding and profiteering, but such remedy cannot produce the rice needed to
solve the emergency. If there is really insufficient rice stocked in the private warehouses and bodegas
such confiscatory step cannot remedy an actual emergency, in which case we have to turn to Republic
Act 2207.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The two laws can therefore be construed as harmonious parts of the legislative expression of its policy
to promote a rice and corn program. And if this can be done, as we have shown, it is the duty of this
Court to adopt such interpretation that would give effect to both laws. Conversely, in order to effect a

54. repeal by implication, the litter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the prior
existing law [United States v. Greathouse,. 166 U.S. 601, 41 L. Ed., 1130; In re Phoenix Hotel Co., 13
F. Supp. 229; Hammond v. McDonald, 32 Cal. App. 187, 89 P (2d) 407; Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, supra, p. 462]. The old and the new laws must be absolutely incompatible (Compa�ia
General de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8). A mere difference in the terms and provisions
of the statutes is not sufficient to create a repugnancy between them. There must be such a positive
repugnancy between the provisions of the old and the new statutes that they cannot be made to
reconcile and stand together (Crawford, Construction of Statute, supra, p. 631). The clearest case
possible must first be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn [Nagano v. McGrath,
187 F (2d) 759]. Inconsistency is never presumed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Republic Act 3848 entitled "An Act Providing for the Importation of Rice During the Calendar Year
Nineteen Hundred Sixty-Four in the Event of Shortage in Local Supply" cannot be given any nullifying
value, as it is pretended, simply because Section 6 thereof provides that "except as provided in this Act,
no other agency or instrumentality of the Government shall be allowed to purchase rice from abroad."
The reason is that it is a mere temporary law effective only for a specific year. As its title reads, it is
merely an authority to import rice during the year 1964. The same, therefore, is now functus officio at
least on the matter of importation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Neither can petitioners successfully pretend that as Section 4 thereof provides that pending
prosecutions for any violation of Republic Acts 2207 and 3452 shall in no way be affected by said Act
3848 the implication is that the aforesaid Acts have already been repealed. That provision is merely a
safeguard placed therein in order that the prosecutions already undertaken may not be defeated with
the enactment of Republic Act 3848 because the latter provides for penal provisions which call for
lesser penalty. The intention is to except them from the rule that penal statutes can be given
retroactive effect if favorable to the accused.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
To further bolster our view that Republic Act 2207 has not been impliedly repealed by Republic Act
3452, we wish to briefly quote hereunder the views expressed by some senators during the discussion
of House Bill 11511 already mentioned above. It should be here repeated that said bill was presented to
accede to the request of the President for a stand-by power to import in case of emergency in view of
the uncertainty of the law, but that during the discussion thereof it was strongly asserted and
apparently upheld that such request for authority was not necessary because Republic Act 2207 was
still in force. It is probably for this reason that said bill, after having been approved by the Senate, was
killed in the conference committee that considered it. These views, while not binding, are of persuasive
authority and throw light on the issue relative to the effectivity of Republic Act 2207.
SENATOR LIWAG: ... Now Mr. Chairman, is it the sense of the Committee that in the case of
emergency, in case of an impending shortage, we can import rice under the provisions of R.A. No.
2207?chanrobles virtual law library
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is what we mean, your Honor, in this paragraph (c), Section 2, page
2, that when we say "under the provisions of existing law," we are referring to R.A. No. 2207.
x x x x x x x x xchanrobles virtual law library
SENATOR PADILLA: I notice, Mr. Senator, that Section 2 paragraph (c) of the amendment by
substitution reads:chanrobles virtual law library
Importation of rice and/or corn should be resorted to only in cases of extreme and under the provisions
of existing law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
I suppose that the existing laws referred to are Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452. Does
this section in the proposed bill by substitution recognize the continued existence of the pertinent
provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 and Republic Act No. 3452 on rice importation ?chanrobles virtual law library

55. SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, that is the reason, Your Honor, why we struck out the stand-by power on
the part of the President to import rice.
x x x x x x x x xchanrobles virtual law library
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: The position of your Committee, Your Honor, because of the existing law - that
is, Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 - that is the reason your Committee eliminated
that stand-by power of the President to import rice. Because you know, Your Honor, what is the use of
that stand-by power, inasmuch as under Republic Act No. 3452 and Republic Act No. 2207 the
President can designate any government agency to import rice?chanrobles virtual law library
SENATOR PADILLA: Well, it is good to make that clear because in the decision of the Supreme Court, as
I said, there was no clear-cut holding as to the possible co-existence or implied repeal between these
two Acts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes, Your Honor, but the gentleman from Nueva Ecija, Senator Liwag, informed
me that Republic Act No. 2207 has never been repealed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SENATOR PADILLA: Well, I also concur with that view, but we want to make that clear ... .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SENATOR PADILLA: "Provided, further," it says, "That the importation of rice and corn is left to private
parties upon payment of the corresponding taxes." So, therefore, the position of the Committee, as
expressed by the distinguished sponsor is that Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 is applicable under
normal conditions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SENATOR PADILLA: So, both provisions of law are in existence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SENATOR ALMENDRAS: Yes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SENATOR PADILLA: One is not repealed by the other.
x x x x x x x x xchanrobles virtual law library
SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there are two views already expressed on whether Republic Act
No. 2207 has been repealed by Republic Act No. 3452. One view sustains the theory that there has
been a repeal of Republic Act No. 2207 by Republic Act No. 3452 insofar as rice importation is
concerned. The other view is that there is no repeal. The Supreme Court does not state clearly which
side prevails. I take the view that the two laws can be reconciled ... .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Now, Mr. President, reading those two provisions together, I maintain that they are not totally
repugnant to each other, that it is possible for them to stand together except on certain points: First, is
importation in case of a national emergency certified by the National Economic Council permissible? By
reading the two provisos together I would say yes because there is nothing in the proviso contained in
Republic Act No. 3452 which would be inconsistent with importation during a shortage amounting to a
national emergency.
Another circumstance that strengthens our view is that when said House Bill No. 11511 was finally
approved by the Senate, it carried a clause which expressly repeals, among others, Republic Act No.
2207 (Section 14), but which bill, as already said, was later killed in the conference committee. This
attitude clearly reveals that Congress preferred to fall back on Republic Act 2207 with regard to future
importations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

56. Anent the point raised relative to the lack of necessary appropriation to finance the importation in
question, suffice it to state that under Republic Act 663 the National Rice and Corn Corporation is
authorized to borrow, raise and secure the money that may be necessary to carry out its objectives. We
refer to Section 3 (e) of said Act which empowers said corporation to secure money and to encumber
any property it has as a guaranty, and Republic Act No. 3452, which creates the Rice and Corn
Administration, transferred its functions and powers to the latter, including the power to borrow money
under Section 3(e). This provision gives the RCA enough power with which to finance the importation in
question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby
dissolved. Costs against petitioners.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25619 June 30, 1970
DOMINGO B. TEOXON, petitioner-appellant, vs. MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF
ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, respondents-
appellees.
FERNANDO, J.:
The pivotal question raised by petitioner, a veteran who suffered from permanent physical
disability, in this appeal from a lower court decision dismissing his suit for mandamus, is its
failure to accord primacy to statutory provisions fixing the amount of pension to which he was
entitled. 1
Instead, it sustained the plea of respondent officials, members of the board of
Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration, relying on the administrative rules
issued by them presumably in pursuance of their duty to enforce the Veterans' Bill of Rights. We
have to resolve, then, whether or not there has been a failure to apply the doctrine to which this
Court has been committed that if it can be shown that there is repugnancy between the statute and
the rules issued in pursuance thereof, the former prevails. Unfortunately, as will be hereafter
shown, the lower court did not see it that way. It found nothing objectionable in respondents
following a contrary norm and thus disregarding petitioner's legal right for which mandamus is the
proper remedy. We cannot lend our approval then to such conclusion especially so in the light of
our decision barely two months ago, Begosa v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration,
2
where we categorically held that a veteran suffering from permanent disability is not to be denied
what has been granted him specifically by legislative enactment, which certainly is superior to any
regulation that may be promulgated by the Philippine Veterans Administration, presumably in the
implementation thereof. We reverse.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner, on April 23, 1965, filed his suit for mandamus before the Court of First Instance of
Manila alleging that he filed his claim for disability pension under the Veterans' Bill of Rights,
Republic Act No. 65, for having been permanently incapacitated from work and that he was first
awarded only P25.00 monthly, thereafter increased to P50.00 a month contrary to the terms of the
basic law as thereafter amended. 3
His claim, therefore, was for a pension effective May 10, 1955

57. at the rate of P50.00 a month up to June 21, 1957 and at the rate of P100.00 a month, plus P10.00
a month, for each of his unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from June 22, 1957 up to
June 30, 1963; and the difference of P50.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month for each of his four
unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from July 1, 1963. He would likewise seek for
the payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. 4
The answer for
respondents filed on May 25, 1965, while admitting, with qualification, the facts as alleged in the
petition, would rely primarily in its special and affirmative defenses, on petitioner not having
exhausted its administrative remedies and his suit being in effect one against the government,
which cannot prosper without its consent. 5
In the stipulation of facts dated Oct. 13, 1965, it was
expressly agreed: "That the petitioner sustained physical injuries in line of duty as a former
member of a recognized guerilla organization which participated actively in the resistance
movement against the enemy, and as a result of which petitioner suffered a permanent, physical
disability." 6
Mention was likewise made in the aforesaid stipulation of facts that while petitioner
would rely on what is set forth in the Veterans' Bill of Rights, as amended, respondents in turn
would limit the amount of pension received by him in accordance with the rules and regulations
promulgated by them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the decision now on appeal, promulgated on Dec. 4, 1965, the lower court, in dismissing the
petition, expressed its conformity with the contention of respondents. Thus: "Upon examination of
the issues involved in this case, the Court believes that a case for mandamus will not lie. The
respondent Board has authority under the Pension law to process applications for pension, using
as guide the rules and regulations that it adopted under the law and their decisions, unless shown
clearly to be in error or against the law or against the general policy of the Board, should be
maintained." 7 The lower court went even further in its recognition of the binding force to be
given the administrative rules and regulations promulgated by respondents. Thus: "As mentioned
above, under the provisions of the Veterans Law as subsequently amended, the Board is
authorized to promulgate regulations to carry into effect the provisions of the law. In accordance
with said law, the Board has promulgated rules and regulations which are considered in the
approval of the claims for pension. The court sees no reason why the case of petitioner should be
considered as an exception. There is no question that his disability is not complete, and, therefore,
he cannot be entitled to complete disability allowance. That the decision of the Board is based on
its regulations is also, according to the Court, justified because that is how the Board functions." 8
Hence, this appeal, which, as noted at the outset, calls for an affirmative response. Petitioner's
contention that his right as conferred by law takes precedence to what the administrative rules and
regulations of respondents provide is indisputable. So our decisions have indicated with unfailing
uniformity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
1. The recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of the statute, necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative
enactment, may be found in the early case of United States v. Barrias 9 decided in 1908. Then
came, in a 1914 decision, United States v. Tupasi Molina, 10
a delineation of the scope of such
competence. Thus: "Of course the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be
extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions

58. of the law, they are valid." In 1936, in People v. Santos, 11
this Court expressed its disapproval of
an administrative order that would amount to an excess of the regulatory power vested in an
administrative official. We reaffirmed such a doctrine in a 1951 decision, where we again made
clear that where an administrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of
the Act, "the mandate of the Act must prevail and must be followed." 12
Justice Barrera, speaking
for the Court in Victorias Milling Company, Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 13
citing Parker,
14
as well as Davis 15
did tersely sum up the matter thus: "A rule is binding on the courts so long as
the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory granted
by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its
innate wisdom .... On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely
advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means."chanrobles virtual law library
It cannot be otherwise as the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in whom all
executive power resides, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 16
No lesser
administrative executive office or agency then can, contrary to the express language of the
Constitution, assert for itself a more extensive prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to observe the
constitutional mandate. There must be strict compliance with the legislative enactment. Its terms
must be followed. The statute requires adherence to, not departure from, its provisions. No
deviation is allowable. In the terse language of the present Chief Justice, an administrative agency
"cannot amend an act of Congress." 17
Respondents can be sustained, therefore, only if it could be
shown that the rules and regulations promulgated by them were in accordance with what the
Veterans' Bill of Rights provides.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We examine, then, the original act approved in 1946 18
and its later amendments. The Veterans'
Bill of Rights, as it read when enacted in 1946, insofar as pertinent, provides: "The persons
mentioned in sections one and two hereof, who are permanently incapacitated from work owing to
sickness, disease, or injuries sustained in line of duty, shall be given a life pension of fifty pesos a
month unless they are actually receiving a similar pension from other government funds, and shall
receive, in addition, the necessary hospitalization and medical care." The act took effect upon its
approval, on Oct. 18 of that year. Then, in 1955, came the first amendment in these words; "[Sec.]
9; The persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof who permanent incapacitated from work
owing to sickness, disease, or injuries sustained in line of duty, shall be given a life pension of
fifty pesos a month, and ten pesos a month for each of his unmarried minor children below
eighteen years of age, unless they are actually receiving a similar pension from other government
funds, and shall receive, in addition, the necessary hospitalization and medical care." 19
The present
Section 9, as again amended in 1957, reads as follows: "The persons mentioned in sections one
and two hereof who are permanently incapacitated from work owing sickness, disease, or injuries
sustained in line of duty, shall be given a life pension of one hundred pesos a month, and ten pesos
a month for each of his unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age, unless they are
actually receiving a similar pension from other Government funds, and shall receive, in addition,
the necessary hospitalization and medical care." 20
chanrobles virtual law library
To the extent, therefore, that petitioner would base his suit on the legal rights thus conferred on
him by the above statutory provisions, he is entitled to a favorable judgment. That is what was
decided in Begosa v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, referred to by us earlier in

59. the opinion as decisive of a controversy of this nature. We do so again. Hence, a reversal of the
appealed decision is indicated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
2. The affirmative defenses as to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as well as a
proceeding of this character being a suit against the State were considered and rejected in the
aforesaid Begosa decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the decision of December 4, 1965 of the lower court is reversed, and another one
entered granting this petition for mandamus. Respondents are ordered to pay petitioner a pension
effective as of May 10, 1955 at the rate of P50.00 a month up to June 21, 1957 and at the rate of
P100.00 a month, plus P10.00 a month for each of his unmarried minor children below 18 years of
age from June 22, 1957 up to June 30, 1963; and the difference of P50.00 a month plus P10.00 a
month for each of his four unmarried minor children below 18 years of age from July 1, 1963 until
the statutory rate has been satisfied. Thereafter petitioner is entitled to the amount of P100.00 a
month plus P10.00 a month for each of his four unmarried minor children below eighteen years of
age, in accordance with law. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro and Teehankee, JJ.,
concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Barredo and Villamor, JJ., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees, vs. JOSE JABINAL Y
CARMEN, Defendant-Appellant.
ANTONIO, J.:
Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in
Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm
and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year
and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises
in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v.
Mapa.1
chanrobles virtual law library

60. The complaint filed against the accused reads:
That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion,
Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver
Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first
securing the necessary permit or license to possess the same.
At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which
trial was accordingly held.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however,
claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an
appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as
Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly
carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. His
appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:
Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an effective
agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and order in the province of
Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal
cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby
appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to take effect immediately, or
as soon as you have qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties shall be those
generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and order in this
province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be clearly understood
that any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered sufficient ground for the automatic
cancellation of your appointment and immediate separation from the service. In accordance with
the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have
the right to bear a firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the
performance of your duties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by taking your
oath of office and filing the original thereof with us.
Very truly yours,chanrobles virtual law library
(Sgd.) FELICIANO LEVISTE
Provincial Governor
FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:chanrobles virtual law library

61. Kind: - ROHM-Revolverchanrobles virtual law library
Make: - Germanchanrobles virtual law library
SN: - 64chanrobles virtual law library
Cal:- .22
On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of
Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities,
wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might affect the peace
and order condition in Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily
authorized to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while
in the performance of his duties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments
as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the
prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs.
Macarandang2
and People vs. Lucero.3
The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the
evidence of record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by
the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with
authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the
accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a
firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of
Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court
considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero, supra, and
People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction
against the accused because it was shown that at the time he was found to possess a certain
firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial
Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of
crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that
while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit,
nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms; and
Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and
detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to
a member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero,
We held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm
to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander
to effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in
Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the
following ground:

62. The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any
person to ... possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any
instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of
firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative
Code.) The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to
officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine
Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial
governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors,
and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."
(Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.)chanrobles virtual law library
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not
exempt. ... .
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in
1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on
the matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero
(1958). Our decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The
sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in
Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the
Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he
accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the
laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The
interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that
law originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" - the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine
laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the
land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should
be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and
acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal
laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance
of society.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent
and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine
enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his
possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must

63. be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done
was held not to be punishable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with
costs de oficio.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Fernando, J., took no part.