An Improvisational Model of Change Management The Case of G.docx

An Improvisational Model of Change
Management: The Case of Groupware
Technologies
Wanda J. Orlikowski and J. Debra Hofman
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sloan School of Management
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge
MA 02142-1347
Sloan Management Review, January 1997
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
Abstract
Introduction
An Improvisational Model for Managing Change
Case Example: Zeta
Summary of Zeta Case
Enabling Conditions
Aligning Key Change Dimensions

Dedicating Resources for Ongoing Support
Conclusions
Footnotes
References
Figures
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank the editor and reviewers for their
helpful comments on an earlier version
of this manuscript. We gratefully appreciate the research
support of MIT's Center for
Coordination Science and Center for Information Systems
Research.
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An Improvisational Model of Change Management:The Case of
Groupware Technologies
Abstract
In this paper, we present an alternative way of thinking about
technological change in
organizations. This alternative approach is motivated by a
recognition that traditional models for
managing technological change - in which the major steps of the
change are defined in advance
and the organization then strives to implement these changes as
planned in a specified period of
time - are not particularly useful given the more turbulent,
flexible, and uncertain organizational
situations that many companies face today. Traditional models
are also not particularly useful for
helping the implementation of technologies such as groupware
whose unprecedented, open-
ended, and context-specific nature make it difficult to predefine
the exact changes to be realized
and to predict their likely organizational impact.
We suggest an alternative model of managing technological
change, one that reflects the
dynamic and variable nature of contemporary organizations and
technologies, and which
accommodates iterative experimentation, use, and learning over
time. We label such a model of
managing technological change "improvisational," and suggest
that it may enable organizations
to take advantage of the evolving capabilities, emerging
practices, and unanticipated outcomes
that accompany use of new technologies in contemporary
organizations.

Introduction
In the preface to her discussion of technology design, Suchman
(1987: vii) refers to two different
approaches to open sea navigation -- the European and the
Trukese:
The European navigator begins with a plan -- a course -- which
he has charted according to
certain universal principles, and he carries out his voyage by
relating his every move to that plan.
His effort throughout his voyage is directed to remaining "on
course." If unexpected events
occur, he must first alter the plan, then respond accordingly.
The Trukese navigator begins with
an objective rather than a plan. He sets off toward the objective
and responds to conditions as
they arise in an ad hoc fashion. He utilizes information provided
by the wind, the waves, the tide
and current, the fauna, the stars, the clouds, the sound of the
water on the side of the boat, and he
steers accordingly. His effort is directed to doing whatever is
necessary to reach the objective.
(Berreman 1966, p.347)
Like Suchman, we too find this contrast in approaches
instructive, and will use it here to
motivate our discussion of managing technological change. In
particular, we suggest that how
people think about managing change in organizations most often
resembles the European
approach to navigation. That is, they believe they need to start
with a plan for the change, charted

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according to certain general organizational principles, and that
they need to relate their actions to
that plan, ensuring throughout that the change remains on
course.
However, when we examine how change actually occurs in
practice, we find that it much more
closely resembles the voyage of the Trukese. That is, people
end up responding to conditions as
they arise, often in an ad hoc fashion, doing whatever is
necessary to implement change. In a
manner similar to Argyris and Schon's (1978) contrast between
espoused theories and theories-
in-use, we suggest that there is a discrepancy between how
people think about technological
change and how they do it. Moreover, we suggest that this
discrepancy significantly contributes
to the difficulties and challenges that contemporary
organizations face as they attempt to
introduce and effectively implement technology-based change.
Traditional ways of thinking about technological change have
their roots in Lewin's (1952) three-
stage change model of "unfreezing," "change," and "refreezing"
(Kwon and Zmud, 1987).
According to this model, the organization prepares for change,
implements the change, and then
strives to regain stability as soon as possible. Such a model,
which treats change as an event to be
managed during a specified period (Pettigrew, 1985), may have
been appropriate for
organizations that were relatively stable, bounded, and whose
functionality was sufficiently fixed

to allow for detailed specification. Today however, given more
turbulent, flexible, and uncertain
organizational and environmental conditions, such a model is
becoming less appropriate; hence,
the discrepancy.
This discrepancy is particularly pronounced when the
technology being implemented is open-
ended and customizable, as in the case of the new information
technologies that have come to be
known as groupware.[1] Groupware technologies provide
electronic networks that support
communication, coordination, and collaboration through
facilities such as information exchange,
shared repositories, discussion forums, and messaging. Such
technologies are typically designed
with an open architecture that is adaptable by end users,
allowing them to customize existing
features and create new applications (DeJean and DeJean, 1991;
Malone et al., 1992). Rather
than automating a predefined sequence of operations and
transactions, these technologies tend to
be general-purpose tools which are used in different ways
across various organizational activities
and contexts. Organizations need the experience of using
groupware technologies in particular
ways and in particular contexts to better understand how they
may be most useful in practice. In
such a technological context, the traditional change model is
thus particularly discrepant.
The discrepancy is also evident when organizations are using
information technologies to
attempt unprecedented and complex changes such as global
integration or distributed knowledge
management. A primary example of this is the current attempt

by many companies to redefine
and integrate global value chain activities which were
previously managed independently. While
there is typically some understanding up front of the magnitude
of such a change, the depth and
complexity of the interactions among these activities is only
fully understood as the changes are
implemented. For many organizations, such initiatives represent
a new ball game, not only
because they haven't played the game before but because most
of the rules are still evolving. In a
world with uncertain rules, the traditional model for devising
and executing a game plan is very
difficult to enact. And as recent strategy research has suggested
(Mintzberg, 1994; McGrath and
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McMillan, 1995), planning in such circumstances is more
effective as an ongoing endeavor,
reflecting the changing and unfolding environments with which
organizations interact.
In many situations, therefore, predefining the technological
changes to be implemented and
accurately predicting their organizational impact is not feasible.
Hence, the models of planned

change that often inform implementation of new technologies
are less than effective. We suggest
that what would be more appropriate is a way of thinking about
change that reflects the
unprecedented, uncertain, open-ended, complex, and flexible
nature of the technologies and
organizational initiatives involved. Such a model would enable
organizations to systematically
absorb, respond to, and even leverage unexpected events,
evolving technological capabilities,
emerging practices, and unanticipated outcomes. Such a model
for managing change would
accommodate -- indeed, encourage -- ongoing and iterative
experimentation, use, and learning.
Such a model sees change management more as an ongoing
improvisation than a staged event. In
this paper, we propose such an alternative model. After
presenting the model, we describe a case
study of groupware implementation in a customer support
organization to illustrate the value of
this alternative model in practice. We conclude by discussing
the conditions under which such an
improvisational model may be a powerful way of managing the
implementation and use of
advanced technologies.
An Improvisational Model for Managing Change
The improvisational model for managing technological change
is based on research we have
done into the implementation and use of open-ended
information technologies. The model rests
on two major assumptions which differentiate it from traditional
models of change: first, that the
changes associated with technology implementations constitute
an ongoing process rather than

an event with an end point after which the organization can
expect to return to a reasonably
steady state; and second, that the various technological and
organizational changes made during
the ongoing process cannot, by definition, all be anticipated
ahead of time.
Given these assumptions, our improvisational change model
recognizes three different types of
change: anticipated, emergent, and opportunity-based. These
change types are elaborations on
Mintzberg's (1987) distinction between deliberate and emergent
strategies. Here, we distinguish
between anticipated changes -- changes that are planned ahead
of time and occur as intended --
and emergent changes -- changes that arise spontaneously out of
local innovation and which are
not originally anticipated or intended. An example of an
anticipated change would be the
implementation of electronic mail software which accomplishes
its intended aim to facilitate
increased and quicker communication among organizational
members. An example of an
emergent change would be the use of the electronic mail
network as an informal grapevine
disseminating rumors throughout an organization. This use of e-
mail is typically not planned or
anticipated when the network is implemented, but often emerges
tacitly over time in particular
organizational contexts.
We further differentiate these two types of changes from
opportunity-based changes -- changes
that are not anticipated ahead of time but are introduced
purposefully and intentionally during the
change process in response to an unexpected opportunity, event,

or breakdown. For example, as
companies gain experience with the World Wide Web, they are
finding opportunities to apply
and leverage its capabilities in ways that were not anticipated or
planned before the introduction
of the Web. Both anticipated and opportunity-based changes
involve deliberate action, in
contrast to emergent changes which arise spontaneously and
usually tacitly out of people's
practices with the technology over time (Orlikowski, 1996).
These three types of change build on each other over time in an
iterative fashion (see Figure 1).
While there is no predefined sequence in which the different
types of change occur, the
deployment of new technology often entails an initial
anticipated organizational change
associated with the installation of the new hardware/software.
Over time, however, use of the
new technology will typically involve a series of opportunity-
based, emergent, and further
anticipated changes, the order of which cannot be determined in
advance because the changes
interact with each other in response to outcomes, events, and
conditions arising through
experimentation and use.
One way of thinking about this model of change is to consider,
as an analogy, a jazz band. While
members of a jazz band, unlike members of a symphony

orchestra, do not decide in advance
exactly what notes each is going to play, they do decide ahead
of time what musical composition
will form the basis of their performance. Once the performance
begins, each player is free to
explore and innovate, departing from the original composition.
Yet, the performance works
because all members are playing within the same rhythmic
structure and have a shared
understanding of the rules of this musical genre. What they are
doing is improvising -- enacting
an ongoing series of local innovations which embellish the
original structure, respond to
spontaneous departures and unexpected opportunities, and
iterate and build on each other over
time. Using our earlier terminology, the jazz musicians are
engaging in anticipated, opportunity-
based, and emergent action during the course of their
performance to create an effective and
creative response to local conditions.
Similarly, an improvisational model for managing technological
change in organizations is not a
predefined program of change charted by management ahead of
time. Rather, it recognizes that
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technological change is an iterative series of different changes,
many unpredictable at the start,
that evolve out of practical experience with the new
technologies. Using such a model to manage
change requires a set of processes and mechanisms to recognize
the different types of change as

they occur and to respond effectively to them. The illustrative
case presented below suggests that
where an organization is open to the capabilities offered by a
new technological platform and
willing to embrace an improvisational change model, innovative
organizational changes can be
achieved.
Case Example: Zeta
Zeta is one of the Top 50 software companies in the US, with
$100 million in revenues and about
1000 employees. It produces and sells a range of powerful
software products providing
capabilities such as decision support, executive information,
and marketing analysis. Zeta is
headquartered in the Midwest, with sales and client service field
offices throughout the world.
Specialists in the Customer Service Department (CSD) at Zeta
provide technical support via
telephone to clients, consultants, value-added resellers, Zeta
client service representatives in the
field, and other Zeta employees who use the products. This
technical support can be quite
complex. Specialists typically devote several hours of research
to each problem, often searching
through reference material, attempting to replicate the problem,
and/or reviewing program source
code. Some incidents require interaction with members of other
departments such as quality
assurance, documentation, and product development. The CSD
employs approximately fifty
specialists and is headed by a director and two managers.
In 1992, the CSD purchased the Lotus Notes groupware

technology within which they developed
a new Incident Tracking Support System (ITSS) to help them
log customer calls and keep a
history of progress towards resolving the customers' problems.
Following a successful pilot of
the new system, the CSD decided to commit to the Notes
platform and to deploy ITSS
throughout its department. The acquisition of new technology to
facilitate customer call tracking
was motivated by a number of factors. The existing tracking
system was a home-grown system
which had been developed when the department was much
smaller and Zeta's product portfolio
much narrower. The system was not real-time, entry of calls was
haphazard, information
accuracy was a concern, and performance was slow and
unreliable. It provided little assistance
for reusing prior solutions and no support for the management
of resources in the department.
The volume and complexity of calls to the CSD had increased in
recent years due to the
introduction of new products, the expanded sophistication of
existing products, and the extended
range of operating platforms supported. Such shifts had made
replacement of the tracking system
a priority, as CSD managers were particularly concerned that
the home-grown system provided
no ability to track calls, query the status of particular calls,
apprehend the workload, balance
resources, identify issues and problems before they became
crises, and obtain up-to-date and
accurate documentation on work in progress and work
completed. In addition, calls would
occasionally be lost, as the slips of paper on which they were
recorded would get mislaid or
inadvertently thrown away.

The initial introduction of the new ITSS system was
accompanied by anticipated changes in the
nature of both the specialists' and managers' work. In contrast to
the previous system, which had
been designed to only capture a brief description of the problem
and its final resolution, ITSS
was designed to allow specialists to document every step they
took in their process of resolving a
particular incident. That is, it was designed to enable the
capture of a full incident history. As
specialists began to use ITSS this way, the focus of their work
shifted from primarily research--
solving problems--to both research and documentation--solving
problems and documenting work
in progress.
The ITSS database quickly began to grow as each specialist
documented his/her resolution
process in detail. While documenting calls took time, it also
saved time by providing a rich
database of information which could be searched for potential
resolutions. Moreover, this new
database of rich information served as an unexpected and
informal learning mechanism by
providing the specialists with exposure to a wide range of
problems and solutions. As one
specialist noted: "If it is quiet, I will check on my fellow
colleagues to see what ... kind of calls
they get, so I might learn something from them. ... just in case
something might ring a bell when
someone else calls." At the same time, however, using the ITSS
database as a sole source of

information did pose some risk, since there were no guarantees
as to the accuracy of the
information. To minimize this risk, the specialists tacitly
developed a set of informal quality
indicators to help them distinguish between reliable and
unreliable data. For example, resolutions
that were comprehensively documented, documented by certain
individuals, or verified by the
customer were considered more reliable sources of information.
In addition to these changes in specialists' work, use of the new
system by the CSD managers
improved their ability to control the department's resources.
Specialists' use of ITSS to document
calls provided managers with detailed workload information,
which was used to justify increased
headcount and adjust work schedules and shift assignments on a
dynamic and as-needed basis.
ITSS also supplied managers with more accurate information on
specialists' work process, for
example, the particular steps followed to research and resolve a
problem, the areas in which
specialists sought advice or were stalled, and the quality of
their resolutions. As managers began
to rely on the ITSS data to evaluate specialists' performance,
they expanded the criteria they used
to do this evaluation. For example, quality of work-in-progress
documentation was included as
an explicit evaluation criterion and documentation skills became
a factor in the hiring process.
As the CSD gained experience with and better understood the
capabilities of the groupware
technology, the managers opportunistically introduced a change
in the structure of the
department to further leverage these capabilities. This change

had not been planned prior to the
implementation of ITSS, but the growing reliance on ITSS and
an appreciation of the capabilities
of the groupware technology created an opportunity for the CSD
to redistribute call loads. In
particular, "first line" and "second line" support levels were
established, with junior specialists
being assigned to the first line, and senior specialists to the
second line. Partnerships were
created between the less experienced, junior specialists and the
more experienced, senior
specialists. Front line specialists now took all incoming calls,
resolved as many of these as they
could, and then electronically transferred calls to their second
line partners when they were
overloaded or had calls which were especially difficult. In
addition to handling calls transferred
to them, senior specialists were expected to proactively monitor
their front line partners' progress
on calls and to provide assistance as needed.
While this partnership idea was conceptually sound, it regularly
broke down in practice. Junior
specialists were often reluctant to hand off calls, fearing that
such transfers would reflect poorly
on their competence or that they would be overloading their
more senior partners. Senior
specialists, in turn, were usually too busy resolving complex
incidents to spend much time
monitoring their junior partners' call status or progress. In
response to this unanticipated
breakdown in the partnership idea, CSD managers introduced
another opportunity-based
structural change. They created a new role, that of an

intermediary, which was filled by a senior
specialist whose job it was to mediate between the first and
second lines, regularly monitoring
junior specialists' call loads and work in progress, and
dynamically reassigning calls as
appropriate. The new intermediary role served as a buffer
between the junior and senior
specialists, facilitating the transfer of calls and relieving senior
specialists of the responsibility to
constantly monitor their front line partners. With these
structural changes, ITSS in effect
changed the prior undifferentiated and fixed division of labor
within the department to a dynamic
distribution of work reflecting different levels of experience,
various areas of expertise, and
shifting workloads. In response to the new distribution of work,
managers adjusted their
evaluation criteria to reflect the changed responsibilities and
roles within the CSD.
Another change which emerged over time was a shift in the
nature of collaboration within the
CSD from a primarily reactive mode of collaboration to one that
was more proactive. Because all
specialists now had access to the database of calls being worked
on in the department, they
began to browse through each others' calls to see which ones
they could provide help on. Rather
than waiting to be asked if they had a solution to a particular
problem (which is how they had
solicited and received help in the past), specialists actively
browsed through the database of calls
seeking problems for which they could offer help. This shift
from solicited to unsolicited
assistance was facilitated by the capabilities of the groupware
technology, the complex nature of

the work, existing evaluation criteria that stressed teamwork,
and the long-standing cooperative
and collegial culture in the CSD. Consider the following
specialists' comments: "Everyone
realizes that we all have a certain piece of the puzzle ... I may
have one critical piece, and Jenny
may have another piece. ... And if we all work separately, we're
never going to get the puzzle
together. But by everybody working together, we have the entire
puzzle"; "Here I don't care who
grabs credit for my work ... this support department does well
because we're a team, not because
we're all individuals" (Orlikowski, 1995). Managers responded
to this shift in work practices by
adjusting specialists' evaluation criteria to specifically take
unsolicited help giving into account.
As one manager explained: "When I'm looking at incidents, I'll
see what help other people have
offered, and that does give me another indication of how well
they're working as a team."
After approximately one year of using ITSS, the CSD
implemented two further organizational
changes around the groupware technology. Both of these had
been anticipated in the initial
planning for ITSS, although the exact timing for their
implementation had been left unspecified.
First, the ITSS application was installed in three overseas
support offices, with copies of all the
ITSS databases replicated regularly across the four support sites
(US, UK, Australia, and
Europe). This provided all support specialists with a more
extensive knowledge base on which to
search for possibly helpful resolutions. The use of ITSS in all
the support offices further allowed
specialists to transfer calls across offices, essentially enacting a

global support department within
Zeta.
Second, the CSD initiated and funded the development of a
number of bug tracking systems
which were implemented within groupware and deployed in
Zeta's departments of product
development, product management, and quality assurance.
These bug tracking applications,
which were modeled on the ITSS application, were linked into
ITSS and enabled specialists to
enter any bugs they had discovered in their problem resolution
activities directly into the relevant
product's bug tracking system. Previously, the reporting of bugs
by the CSD to other departments
was done manually, took many weeks, and involved minimal
communication. With the new bug
tracking applications and linkages to ITSS, specialists could
also directly query the status of
particular bugs, and even change their priority if customer calls
indicated that such an escalation
was needed. Specialists in particular found this change very
valuable. For the other departments,
the link with ITSS allowed users such as product managers and
developers to access the ITSS
records and trace the particular incidents that had uncovered
certain bugs or uncovered certain
use problems. Only the developers had some reservations about
the introduction of the bug
tracking application, reservations that were associated with the
severe time constraints under
which they worked to produce new releases of Zeta products.

In addition to the improved coordination and integration
achieved with other departments and
offices, the CSD also realized further opportunity-based
innovations and emergent changes
within their own practices. For example, as the number of
incidents in ITSS grew, some of the
senior specialists began to realize that the information in the
system could be used to help train
newcomers. By extracting certain records from the ITSS
database, these specialists
opportunistically created a training database of sample problems
with which newly hired
specialists could work. Using the communication capabilities of
the groupware technology, these
senior specialists could monitor their trainees' progress through
the sample database and
intervene to educate when necessary. As one senior specialist
noted: "So we can kind of keep up
to the minute on their progress. ... If they're on the wrong track,
we can intercept them and say,
'Go check this, go look at that.' But it's not like we have to
actually sit with them and review
things. It's sort of an on-line, interactive thing." As a result of
this new training mechanism, the
time that it took for new specialists to begin taking customer
calls was reduced from eight weeks
to about five weeks.
An emergent change realized during this time related to access
control. An ongoing issue for the
CSD was who (if anybody) outside of the CSD should be given
access to the ITSS database with
its customer call information and specialists' work-in-progress
documentation. This issue was not
one that had been anticipated prior to the acquisition of the
technology. While the managers were

worried about how to respond to the increasing demand for
access to ITSS as the database
became more valuable and word about its content spread
throughout the company, they
continued to handle each access request as it came up. Over
time, they had used a variety of
control mechanisms ranging from giving limited access to some
"trusted" individuals, generating
summary reports of selected ITSS information for others, and
refusing any access to still others.
As one of the managers explained, it was only after some time
that they realized that their
various ad hoc responses to different access requests amounted
to, in essence, a set of rules and
procedures about access control. By responding locally to a
variety of requests and situations
over time, an implicit access control policy for the use of ITSS
had evolved and emerged.
Summary of Zeta Case
Figure 2 represents the change model around the groupware
technology followed by Zeta in its
CSD. Along with the introduction of the new technology and the
development of the ITSS
application, the CSD first implemented some planned
organizational changes, expanding the
specialists' work to include work-in-progress documentation and
adjusting the managers' work to
take advantage of the real-time access to workload information.
These changes were anticipated
prior to introducing the new technology. As specialists and
managers began to work in new ways
with the technology, a number of changes emerged in practice,

such as the specialists developing
norms to determine the quality and value of prior resolutions,
and managers paying attention to
documentation skills in hiring and evaluation decisions.
Building on these anticipated and emergent changes, the CSD
introduced a set of opportunity-
based changes, creating junior-senior specialist partnerships to
take advantage of the shared
database and communication capabilities of the technology, and
then adding the new role of
intermediary in response to the unexpected problems that arose
around partnership and work
reassignment. These changes were not anticipated at the start,
nor did they simply emerge
spontaneously in working with the new technology. Rather, they
were conceived of and
implemented in situ and in response to the opportunities and
issues which arose as the CSD
gained experience and developed a deeper understanding of the
new technology and their
particular use of it. This change process around the groupware
technology continued through the
second year at Zeta when some anticipated organizational
changes were followed by both
emergent and opportunity-based changes associated with
unfolding events and the learning and
experience gained by using the new technology in practice.
Overall, what we see here is an iterative and ongoing series of
anticipated, emergent, and
opportunity-based changes which allowed Zeta to learn from
practical experience, respond to
unexpected outcomes and capabilities, and adapt both the
technology and the organization as
appropriate. In effect, Zeta's change model cycles through

anticipated, emergent, and
opportunity-based organizational changes over time. It is a
change model which explicitly
recognizes the inevitability, legitimacy, and value of ongoing
learning and change in practice.
Enabling Conditions
Clearly, there were certain aspects of the CSD and the Zeta
organization which enabled it to
effectively adopt an improvisational change model to implement
and use the groupware
technology. Our research at Zeta and other companies suggests
that at least two sets of enabling
conditions are critical: aligning key dimensions of the change
process, and dedicating resources
to provide ongoing support for the ongoing change process. We
will consider each in turn.
Aligning Key Change Dimensions
An important influence on the effectiveness of any change
process is the interdependent
relationship among three dimensions: the technology, the
organizational context (including
culture, structure, roles and responsibilities), and the change
model used to manage change (see
Figure 3). Ideally, the interaction among these three dimensions
is compatible, or at a minimum,
not in opposition.

First, consider the relation of the change model and the
technology being implemented. When
the technology has been designed to operate like a "black box,"
allowing little adaptation by
users, an improvisational approach may not be more effective
than the traditional approach to
technology implementation. Similarly, where the technology is
well-established and its impacts
are reasonably well understood, a traditional planned change
approach may be effective.
However, when the technology being implemented is new and
unprecedented, and additionally
has an open-ended and customizable nature, an improvisational
model providing the flexibility
for organizations to adapt and learn through use becomes more
appropriate. Such is the case, we
believe, with the groupware technologies available today.
Second, the relation of the change model to organizational
context is also relevant. A flexible
change model, while likely to be problematic in a rigid, control-
oriented or bureaucratic culture,
is well-suited to a more informal and cooperative culture such
as the one characterizing the CSD.
In another study (Gallivan et al., 1994), we examined the
MidCo organization's successful
adoption and implementation of CASE (Computer-Aided
Software Engineering) tools within its
IS organization. While MidCo, a multi-national chemical
products company with revenues of
over $1.5 billion, was a relatively traditional organization in

many ways, key aspects of its
culture--a commitment to total quality management, a focus on
organizational learning and
employee empowerment, as well as a long-term time
orientation--were particularly compatible
with the improvisational model it used to manage ongoing
organizational changes around the
new software development technology.
Finally, there is the important relationship between the
technology and the organizational
context. At Zeta, the CSD's cooperative, team-oriented culture
was compatible with the
collaborative nature of the new groupware technology. Indeed,
CSD's existing culture allowed it
to take advantage of the opportunity for improved collaboration
afforded by the groupware
technology. Moreover, when existing roles, responsibilities, and
evaluation criteria became less
salient, the CSD managers expanded or adjusted these to reflect
new uses of the technology.
Compare these change efforts to those of Alpha, a professional
services firm which introduced
the Notes groupware technology to leverage knowledge sharing
and to coordinate distributed
activities (Orlikowski, 1992). While the physical deployment of
groupware grew very rapidly,
anticipated benefits were realized much more slowly. Key to the
reluctance to use groupware for
knowledge sharing was a perceived incompatibility between the
collaborative nature of the
technology and the individualistic and competitive nature of the
organization. As in many
professional services firms, Alpha rewarded individual rather
than team performance, and
promoted employees via an "up or out" set of evaluation

criteria. In such an environment,
knowledge sharing via a global Notes network was seen to
threaten status, distinctive
competence, and power. In contrast to Zeta, managers at Alpha
did not adjust policies, roles,
incentives, and evaluation criteria to better align their
organization with the intended use and
capabilities of the technology they had invested in.
Dedicating Resources for Ongoing Support
An ongoing change process requires dedicated support over time
to adapt both the organization
and the technology to changing organizational conditions, use
practices, and technological
capabilities. Opportunity-based change, in particular, depends
on the ability of the organization
to notice and recognize opportunities, issues, breakdowns, and
unexpected outcomes as they
arise. This requires attention on the part of appropriate
individuals in the organization to track
use of the technology over time and to implement or initiate
organizational and/or technological
adjustments which will mitigate or take advantage of the
identified problems or opportunities. At
http://www.ida.liu.se/~TDEI36/documents/ccswp191.html#refg
Zeta, it was the managers and technologists who primarily
played this role, incorporating it into
their other responsibilities. So, for example, the managers
adjusted the structure of their
department by introducing first line/second line partnerships to
facilitate a dynamic division of

labor, and then made further adaptations by introducing an
intermediary role to overcome some
unanticipated difficulties associated with the initial change.
Similarly, the technologists working
with the CSD incorporated enhancements to the ITSS system as
they realized ways of improving
ease of use and access time. The CSD's commitment to noticing
and responding to changes when
appropriate did not end after the implementation of the
technology. The managers clearly
realized that the change process they had embarked on with the
use of groupware was an
ongoing one, as one manager noted: "We've had ITSS for two
years. I'm surprised that the
enthusiasm hasn't gone away. ... I think it's because it's been
changed on a regular
basis....Knowing that [the changes are going to get implemented
keeps you wanting to think
about it, and keep going."
Ongoing change around the use of groupware technology also
requires ongoing adjustments to
the technology itself as users learn and gain experience with the
new technology's capabilities
and their uses of it over time. Without dedicated technology
support to implement these
adaptations and innovations, the continued experimentation and
learning in use central to an
improvisational change model may be stalled or thwarted. At
Zeta, the CSD's use of groupware
and ITSS was supported by a dedicated technology group.
Initially consisting of one developer,
this group grew over time as use of the technology expanded.
After two years of technology use,
the group included four full-time technologists who provided
technology support for the various

systems that had been deployed within Zeta via the Notes
platform. The group also maintained
strong ties with all their users through regular meetings and
communications with them. This
dedicated and ongoing technical support ensured that the
technology would continue to be
updated, adjusted, and expanded as appropriate.
The value of ongoing support to enable ongoing organizational
and technological change was
similarly important in another organization we studied, the
R&D division of a large Japanese
manufacturing firm (Orlikowski et al., 1995). A newly-formed
product development team within
the R&D division installed its own groupware technology, the
Usenet news-system (a computer
conferencing system). Similar to Zeta, the team's use of this
new technology also iterated among
anticipated, emergent, and opportunity-based changes over time.
Here, a small group of users
who had previously used the groupware technology took on the
responsibility to manage and
support its ongoing use for themselves and their colleagues.
They tracked technology usage and
project events as they unfolded, responded as appropriate with
adjustments to communication
policies and technology functionality, and proactively made
changes to the team's use of the
conferencing system to leverage opportunities as they arose.
Conclusions
Global, responsive, team-based, networked--these are the
watchwords for organizations of the
nineties. As managers redesign and reinvent organizations in a
new image, many are turning to

information technologies to enable more flexible processes,
greater knowledge sharing, and
global integration. At the same time, effectively implementing
the organizational changes
associated with these technologies remains difficult in a
turbulent, complex, and uncertain
environment. We believe that a significant factor contributing to
these challenges is the growing
discrepancy between the way people think about technological
change and the way they actually
do it.
We have proposed here that people's assumptions about
technology-based change and the way it
is supposed to happen are based on models which are no longer
appropriate. Traditional models
for managing technology-based change treat change as a
sequential series of predefined steps
which are bounded within a specified period of time. With these
models as a guide, it makes
sense -- as the European navigator does -- to define a plan of
action in advance of the change and
track events against the plan, striving throughout the change to
remain on track. Deviations from
the intended course -- the anticipated versus the actual -- then
require explanation, the subtle (and
sometimes not-so-subtle) implication being that there has been
some failure, some inadequacy in
planning, that has led to this deviation. Indeed, many
organizational mechanisms such as
budgeting and resource planning are based on these notions. The
problem is that change as it

actually occurs today more closely resembles the voyage of the
Trukese navigator, and the
models and mechanisms most commonly used to think about and
manage change do not
effectively support the experience of change in practice.
In this paper, we have offered an improvisational change model
as a different way of thinking
about managing the introduction and ongoing use of information
technologies to support the
more flexible, complex, and integrated structures and processes
demanded by organizations
today. In contrast to traditional models of technological change,
this improvisational model
recognizes that change is typically an ongoing process made up
of opportunities and challenges
which are not necessarily predictable at the start. It defines a
process which iterates among three
types of change -- anticipated, emergent and opportunity-based
-- and which allows the
organization to experiment and learn as it uses the technology
over time. Most importantly, it
offers a systematic approach with which to understand and
better manage the realities of
technology-based change in organizations today.
Because such a model requires a flexible and responsive
environment, adopting it implies that
managers relinquish what is often an implicit paradigm of
"command and control" (Zuboff,
1995). An improvisational model, however, is not anarchy and
neither is it a matter of "muddling
through." We are not implying that planning is an activity which
is unnecessary or should be
abandoned. We are suggesting, instead, that a plan is a guide
rather than a blueprint (Suchman,

1987), and that deviations from the plan, rather than being seen
as a symptom of failure, are to be
expected and actively managed.
Rather than pre-defining each step to be taken and then
controlling events to fit the plan, the idea
is to create an environment which facilitates improvisation. In
such an environment, management
provides, supports, and nurtures a set of expectations, norms,
and resources which guide the
ongoing change process. Malone (1996) refers to such a style of
managing as "cultivation."
Consider again the jazz band. While each member of the band is
free to improvise during the
performance, the result is typically not discordant. Rather, it is
harmonious because each player
operates within an overall framework, conforms to a shared set
of values and norms, and has
access to a known repertoire of rules and resources. Similarly,
while many of the changes at
Zeta's CSD were not pre-planned, they were compatible with the
overall objectives and
http://www.ida.liu.se/~TDEI36/documents/ccswp191.html#refz
http://www.ida.liu.se/~TDEI36/documents/ccswp191.html#refz
intentions of the department's members, their shared norms and
team orientation, and the designs
and capabilities of the technology at hand.
Effectively executing an improvisational change model also
requires aligning the technology and

the organizational context with the change model. Such
alignment does not happen
automatically. It requires explicit and ongoing examination and
adjustment, where and when
necessary, of the technology and the organization. As such,
mechanisms and resources allocated
to ongoing support of the change process are critical. Tracking
and noticing events and issues as
they unfold is a responsibility that needs to be owned by
appropriate members of the
organization. Along with the responsibility, these organizational
members require the authority,
credibility, influence, and resources to implement the ongoing
changes. Creating the
environment, aligning the technology, context, and change
model, and distributing the
appropriate responsibility and resources are critically important
in the effective use of an
improvisational model, particularly as they represent a
significant (and therefore challenging)
departure from the standard practice in effect in many
organizations today.
It is important to bear in mind, however, that an improvisational
model of change will not apply
to all situations. As we have noted, it is most appropriate for
open-ended, customizable
technologies or for complex and unprecedented change. In
addition, as one of our reviewers
noted, "jazz is not everyone's 'cup of tea'... some people are
incapable of playing jazz much less
able to listen to what they consider to be 'noise.'" We noted
above that some cultures do not
support experimentation and learning. As a result, they are
probably not receptive to an
improvisational model, and are less likely to succeed with it.

However, as these organizations
attempt to implement new organizational forms, they too may
find an improvisational model to
be a particularly valuable approach to managing technological
change in the 21st century.
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Gallivan, M.J., Hofman, J.D., and Orlikowski, W.J.
"Implementing Radical Change: Gradual
Versus Rapid Pace," Proceedings of the Fifteenth International
Conference on Information
Systems, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, December 14-
17, 1994: 325-339.
Kwon, T.K. and Zmud, R.W. "Unifying the Fragmented Models
of Information Systems
Implementation," in R.J. Boland Jr. and R.A. Hirschheim (Eds.)
Critical Issues in Information
Systems Research, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1987: 227-
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Lewin, K. "Group Decision and Social Change," in Newcombe,
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Readings in Social Psychology, New York: Henry Holt, 1952:
459-473.
Malone, T.W., Lai, K.Y. and Fry, C. "Experiments with OVAL:

A Radically Tailorable Tool for
Cooperative Work, Proceedings of the Third Conference on
Computer Supported Cooperative
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Malone, T.W. Private communication. 1996.
McGrath, R.G. and MacMillan, I.C. "Discovery-Driven
Planning," Harvard Business Review,
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Mintzberg, H. "The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning,"
Harvard Business Review, 72, 1, 1994:
107-114.
Orlikowski, W.J. "Learning from Notes: Organizational Issues
in Groupware Implementation,"
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Cooperative Work, Toronto,
November 1992: 362-369.
Orlikowski, W.J. "Evolving with Notes: Organizational Change
around Groupware
Technology," Sloan School of Management Working Paper
#3823, MIT, Cambridge, MA, 1995.
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over Time: A Situated Change
Perspective," Information Systems Research, 7, 1, 1996: 63-92.
Orlikowski W.J., Yates, J., Okamura, K. and Fujimoto, M.
"Shaping Electronic Communication:
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Pettigrew, A.M. The Awakening Giant. Oxford, UK: Blackwell

Publishers, 1985.
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Zuboff, S. In the Age of the Smart Machine, New York: Basic
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Footnotes
[1] Not all goupware technologies are flexible and customizable
(e.g., fixed-function electronic
mail systems). We are interested here only in those that are
(e.g., Lotus Notes).
An Improvisational Model of Change Management: The Case of
Groupware Technologies Wanda J. Orlikowski and J. Debra
HofmanTable of ContentsReferencesFootnotes
Organizational Change Management
Dr. Charles Poplos, PMP
*

Organizational Change ManagementOrganized, systematic
application of KnowledgeToolsResources of changeTo provide
organizations with a key process to achieve their business
strategy
*
Difference Between Project and Change ManagementProject
Management focus is on specific project activities and
deliverablesChange Management focus is on the impact the
project will have on the organization
ThusProject Management – the changeChange Management –
getting the change accepted
*
Essential ComponentsSponsor ManagementEnd-user
CommunicationReadinessTrainingCoachingTransition
PlanningResistance Management
*

Sponsor ManagementSponsor is keyCM team works to produce
the Sponsor RoadmapLet the sponsor know about expectations,
andHow the sponsor can help achieve success
*
End-user CommunicationPermeate the gaining organization’s
hierarchy with change informationKeep them informedGet them
ready for the impactMake them comfortable
*
ReadinessReadiness involvesAnalyzing an organization to
identifyThe current stateThe future desired state, What is
required to move from one state to the otherOrganizations need
to understandThe specific impacts the new system will have on
their own internal operations To prepare proactively for those
impacts
*
TrainingTraining plays a critical role in helping the gaining

organization adapt the new processes, hardware, software, etc.
into their operationsCM Team performs training needs
analysisDetermines the training strategyHelps manage the
training planIdentifies the skill gaps of the affected end-user
community
*
Hardware/software changes, redesigned business processes, new
or updated policies and procedures, data conversion, and
security role establishment all affect how an organization
works. Each of these activities requires training, and each
training initiative must encompass multiple audiences, venues,
and media. Although Organizational Change Management is not
responsible for training development or delivery, they play a
critical part in performing the training needs analysis,
determining the training strategy, helping manage the training
plan, and identifying the skill gaps of the affected end-user
community.
CoachingThe CM team works with supervisors to ensure they
are aware of theProject or what is being
changedImpactsExpectations of themThe coaching effort can
range fromCoaching info sheets toFormal meetings with
managers/supervisors to advise them on how best to coach their
staff
*
Managers and supervisors are key to all organizations. It is to
the manager or supervisor that employees first look when trying
to understand changes in the organization. The Organizational
Change Management team looks to this key resource and works
with them to ensure they are aware of the project, project

impacts, and the project team’s (and sponsor’s) expectations of
them. The coaching effort can range from coaching info sheets
all the way up to formal meetings with managers/supervisors to
advise them on how best to coach their staff.
Transition PlanningTransition Planning involvesPreparing the
organization to support the new system once the change is
completed The teamReviews the skills necessary to support the
new systemWorks with individuals on the production side to
develop transition plans to successfully support the new
applicationUsers mayRequire Training Require remedial
training in related skill setsNeed to acquire entirely new skill
setsWill have job reclassification issues
*
Once a system implements it becomes a production system, and
the project team moves on to the next project. Preparing the
organization to support this new system is an essential piece of
OCM. The team reviews the skills necessary to support the new
system, and works with individuals on the production side to
develop transition plans for them to be able to successfully
support the new application. The shift from project to
production is not the only concern when it comes to transition
planning. In some cases, individuals using the new application
will require more than just training on how to use the system.
They may need remedial training in related skill sets, or
acquisition of entirely new skill sets. In some extreme cases,
jobs will have to be reclassified. The OCM reviews these
situations and helps the sponsors, managers, and supervisors
plan accordingly.

Resistance ManagementA resistance management plan is a
proactive approach to managing resistanceIt is important to
identify potential resistance points by definingWhat resistance
may look likeHow to identify resistanceHow to mitigate the
impact of resistance
*
In GeneralChange ManagementManages change as a
processRecognizes that projects deal with peopleHelps people
through the change with open and honest
communicationProvides awareness of the new
environmentEnsuring readiness to function competently
*
Preparation For Major ChangeIt is important for organizations
to understandImpacts the implementation will have on their own
internal operationsAnd toPrepare proactively for those impacts
*
ConcernsOrganizational Change Management is concerned with:
Managing change as a process and recognizing that people are

the focusProviding direct, knowledgeable, and frequent
communication
*
The Change Problem Change problem isSome future state to be
realizedSome current state to be left behindA some structured,
organized process for getting from the one to the other
*
Change Answers Three QuestionsHow do we make the
change?What needs to be changed?Why is it being changed?
*
The Change Problem
At the heart of change management is the change problem, that
is, some future state to be realized (to-be), some current state to
be left behind (as-is), and some structured, organized process
for getting from the one to the other. The change problem might
be large or small in scope and scale, and it might focus on
individuals or groups, on one or more divisions or departments,
the entire organization, or one or on more aspects of the
organization’s environment.
Change as a “How” Problem
The change problem is often expressed as a “how” question.
How do we get people to be more open, to assume more

responsibility, to be more creative? How do we introduce self-
managed teams to the department? How do we change over from
one system to another? How do we move from a client-server
environment to a web-based one? How do we get this
organization to be more innovative, competitive, or productive?
Change as a “What” Problem
Change Managers also have to consider “what” questions. What
are we trying to accomplish? What changes are necessary? What
indicators will signal success? What standards apply? What
measures of performance are we trying to affect?
Change as a “Why” Problem
Frequently chains and networks of business must be traced out
before one finds the “true” reason for a change effort. In this
regard, the “why” questions prove to be extremely useful.
How Do We Make The Change?How do we get people toBe
more open?Assume more responsibility?Be more creative?
*
For example
How do we introduce self-managed teams to the department?
How do we change over from one system to another?
How do we move from a client-server environment to a web-
based one?
How do we get this organization to be more innovative,
competitive, or productive?
What Needs To Be Changed?What are we trying to
accomplish?What changes are necessary?What indicators will
signal success?What standards apply?What measures of
performance are we trying to affect?

*
Why Is It Being Changed?Frequently chains and networks of
business must be traced out before one finds the “true” reason
for a change effortCM wants to find the ultimate purposes of
functions and find new and better ways of performing themWhy
do we do what we do? Why do we do it the way we do it?
*
The TheoriesSatir’s Change Process ModelKubler-Ross Stages
of Change ModelKotter’s Phases of Change ModelLewin’s
Dynamic Stability ModelProsci Change Management Model
*
Satir’s Change Process ModelSatir’s change model is one of
many tools she invented to enhance communication and
encourage growth“Change” is the project announcement which
leads to a period of uncertainty, chaos, and productivity
decreasesAs people learn more and receive training/coaching,
their productivity begins to riseThere is a period of flux until
the new system becomes the status quo.

*
Satir’s change model is one of many tools she invented to
enhance communication and encourage growth. She assisted
hundreds of families make the changes they wanted to make,
and it has been widely adopted for use in the OCM field.
Following the diagram above, the “change” is the project
announcement which leads to a period of uncertainty, chaos,
and productivity decreases. As people learn more and receive
training/coaching, their productivity begins to rise. There is a
period of flux until the new system becomes the status quo.
Kubler-Ross Stages of Change ModelDescribes the process by
which people deal with griefSignificant changes in the working
environment can bring about a form of grief
*
The Kübler-Ross model describes, in five discrete stages, the
process by which people deal with grief. Significant changes in
the working environment can bring about a form of grief. This
is the familiar model where the stages are:
Denial: The initial stage: "It can't be happening." Project
announcement.
Anger: "Why ME? It's not fair?!" (either referring to God,
oneself, or anybody perceived, rightly or wrongly, as
"responsible") Recognition of changes in the day-to-day routine,
perceived (or real) loss of prestige, power, knowledge,
movement to the new state where things are unfamiliar and

uncomfortable.
Bargaining: "Just let me live to see my son graduate." A sense
of “just leave me alone”, or “just don’t change this one
particular thing too”. Sometimes expressed as “as long as I
don’t lose anything”, or “just make sure I get the training I
need”.
Depression: "I'm so sad, why bother with anything?" When a
system first implements feelings like “this is too hard”, “this is
too slow”, “this takes too much work”, and “this is stupid” are
not uncommon.
Acceptance: "It's going to be OK." Once people get used to the
new system, they begin to accept it, and in time will defend it
as strongly as they defended the old system.
Kubler-Ross Stages of Change ModelFive stagesDenial: The
initial stage: "It can't be happening."Anger: "Why ME? It's not
fair?!" Recognition of changes in the day-to-day routine,
perceived (or real) loss of prestige, power, knowledge,
movement to the new state where things are unfamiliar and
uncomfortable.Bargaining: "Just let me live to see my son
graduate." A sense of “just leave me alone”, or “just don’t
change this one particular thing too”. Sometimes expressed as
“as long as I don’t lose anything”, or “just make sure I get the
training I need”.Depression: "I'm so sad, why bother with
anything?" When a system first implements feelings like “this
is too hard”, “this is too slow”, “this takes too much work”, and
“this is stupid” are not uncommon.Acceptance: "It's going to be
OK." Once people get used to the new system, they begin to
accept it, and in time will defend it as strongly as they defended
the old system.
*
Five stages

Denial: The initial stage: "It can't be happening."
Anger: "Why ME? It's not fair?!" Recognition of changes in the
day-to-day routine, perceived (or real) loss of prestige, power,
knowledge, movement to the new state where things are
unfamiliar and uncomfortable.
Bargaining: "Just let me live to see my son graduate." A sense
of “just leave me alone”, or “just don’t change this one
particular thing too”. Sometimes expressed as “as long as I
don’t lose anything”, or “just make sure I get the training I
need”.
Depression: "I'm so sad, why bother with anything?" When a
system first implements feelings like “this is too hard”, “this is
too slow”, “this takes too much work”, and “this is stupid” are
not uncommon.
Acceptance: "It's going to be OK." Once people get used to the
new system, they begin to accept it, and in time will defend it
as strongly as they defended the old system.
KotterKotter’s change phases model deals with the phases of
change
*
Lewin’s Dynamic Stability ModelRefers to “unfreezing,

changing, and refreezing”It gives rise to thinking about a staged
approach to changing things. Looking before you leap is usually
sound practice.Using Lewin’s approach as a starting pointMost
change associated with projects comes from the envisioning of
some future state yet to be realizedTo arrive at the “to be” state,
it is important to understand the “as is” state.
*
Kurt Lewin’s adoption of the systems concept of dynamic
stability refers to “unfreezing, changing, and refreezing”. What
is useful about this framework for OCM is that it gives rise to
thinking about a staged approach to changing things. Looking
before you leap is usually sound practice.
Using Lewin’s approach as a starting point, it is clear that most
change associated with projects comes from the envisioning of
some future state yet to be realized. To arrive at the “to be”
state, it is important to understand the “as is” state. OCM,
while relying on all the theories mentioned above largely
revolves around developing a structured, organized process for
getting from the one to the other.
Prosci Change Management ModelProsci Is a nationally
recognized research and development company that specializes
in bench-marking change management best practicesHas made a
significant step forward in the integration of organizational
change management and project managementReleased its
Change Management ProcessFollowing eight years of research
with over 1000 organizations

*
Prosci is a nationally recognized research and development
company that specializes in bench-marking change management
best practices. They have capitalized on these best practices to
develop organizational change management training programs
for all levels of an organization. Prosci has made a significant
step forward in the integration of organizational change
management and project management. After eight years of
research with over 1000 organizations, Prosci released its
Change Management Process. Built into the process are scalable
and flexible components for customizing OCM activities to the
specific organizational change being implemented. Prosci
developed the ADKAR (Awareness, Desire, Knowledge,
Ability, Reinforcement) system for working through change.
Prosci provides tools to perform organizational analysis, and
has developed templates which can be customized to aid the
process of preparing organizations for change. Recently, Prosci
was reviewed and approved as a Registered Education Provider
of training by the Project Management Institute (PMI).
Prosci Change Management ModelBuilt into the process are
scalable and flexible components for customizing OCM
activities to the specific organizational change being
implementedADKAR (Awareness, Desire, Knowledge, Ability,
Reinforcement) system for working through
changeIncludesTools to perform organizational
analysisTemplates which can be customized to aid the process
of preparing organizations for change
*

Selecting a Change StrategyDegree of resistanceTarget
populationThe stakesTime
frameExpertiseDependencyOrganizational StrategyFunding
*
Basic Change Management StepsProvide awareness of the
change that is going to occurEnsure there is understanding
about why the change needs to happen and the benefits of that
changeFacilitate acceptance of the changeAct as someone who
cares, listens, and responds to individual needs and
concernsManage people and expectationsAssist people to use
their insights, skills, and sense of values to move forward with
organization/team efforts.
*
In SummaryOrganizational Change Management is an important
part of any process implementationGetting the people to accept
the change is essential in project successOrganizational change
management is made up of seven essential componentsSponsor

managementEnd-user communication
ReadinessCoachingTrainingTransition PlanningResistance
Management
*
In SummaryChange Managementhelps answer the question “how
are we going to move from this current state to the future
state?”is drawn from the fields of psychology, sociology,
business administration, economics, industrial engineering,
systems engineering, and the study of human and organizational
behaviorChange Management and Project Management must
work together to ensure project success and acceptance of the
change brought about by new systems
*
Leading Change:
Why Transformation
Efforts Fail
Harvard Business Review
by John P. Kotter
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MARCH-APRIL 1995
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WHO RULES THE WORLD’S FINANCIAL MARKETS? 95206
PERSPECTIVES
REDRAW THE LINE BETWEEN THE BOARD AND THE CEO
95208
JOHN G. SMALE • ALAN J. PATRICOF • DENYS
HENDERSON •
BERNARD MARCUS • DAVID W. JOHNSON
Harvard Business Review
Leading Change:
Why Transformation Efforts Fail
by John P. Kotter
HBR
M A R C H - A P R I L 1 9 9 5
Over the past decade, I have watched more than
100 companies try to remake themselves into sig-
nificantly better competitors. They have included
large organizations (Ford) and small ones (Land-
mark Communications), companies based in the
United States (General Motors) and elsewhere
(British Airways), corporations that were on their
knees (Eastern Airlines), and companies that were
earning good money (Bristol-Myers Squibb). These
efforts have gone under many banners: total quality
management, reengineering, right sizing, restruc-
turing, cultural change, and turnaround. But, in al-
most every case, the basic goal has been the same:
to make fundamental changes in how business is

conducted in order to help cope with a new, more
challenging market environment.
A few of these corporate change efforts have been
very successful. A few have been utter failures.
Most fall somewhere in between, with a distinct
DRAWINGS BY KURT VARGO Copyright © 1
tilt toward the lower end of the scale. The lessons
that can be drawn are interesting and will probably
be relevant to even more organizations in the in-
creasingly competitive business environment of
the coming decade.
The most general lesson to be learned from the
more successful cases is that the change process
goes through a series of phases that, in total, usual-
ly require a considerable length of time. Skipping
steps creates only the illusion of speed and never
produces a satisfying result. A second very general
John P. Kotter is the Konosuke Matsushita Professor of
Leadership at the Harvard Business School in Boston,
Massachusetts. He is the author of The New Rules: How
to Succeed in Today’s Post-Corporate World (New York:
Free Press, 1995), Corporate Culture and Performance,
coauthored with James L. Heskett (New York: Free Press,
1992), and A Force for Change: How Leadership Differs
from Management (New York: Free Press, 1990).
995 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All
rights reserved.
LEADING CHANGE
e

g
lesson is that critical mistakes in any of the phases
can have a devastating impact, slowing momentum
and negating hard-won gains. Perhaps because we
have relatively little experience in renewing organi-
zations, even very capable people often make at
least one big error.
Error #1: Not Establishing a Great
Enough Sense of Urgency
Most successful change efforts begin when some
individuals or some groups start to look hard at a
company’s competitive situation, market position,
technological trends, and financial performance.
They focus on the potential revenue drop when an
important patent expires, the five-year trend in de-
clining margins in a core business, or an emerging
market that everyone seems to be ignoring. They
then find ways to communicate this information
broadly and dramatically, especially with respect to
crises, potential crises, or great opportunities that
are very timely. This first step is essential because
just getting a transformation program started re-
quires the aggressive cooperation of many individu-
als. Without motivation, people won’t help and the
effort goes nowhere.
Compared with other steps in the change pro-
cess, phase one can sound easy. It is not. Well
over 50% of the companies I have
watched fail in this first phase. What
are the reasons for that failure?
Sometimes executives underesti-
mate how hard it can be to drive
people out of their comfort zones.

Sometimes they grossly overesti-
mate how successful they have al-
ready been in increasing urgency.
Sometimes they lack patience:
“Enough with the preliminaries;
let’s get on with it.” In many cases, executives be-
come paralyzed by the downside possibilities. They
worry that employees with seniority will become
defensive, that morale will drop, that events will
spin out of control, that short-term business results
will be jeopardized, that the stock will sink, and
that they will be blamed for creating a crisis.
A paralyzed senior management often comes
from having too many managers and not enough
leaders. Management’s mandate is to minimize risk
and to keep the current system operating. Change,
by definition, requires creating a new system,
which in turn always demands leadership. Phase
one in a renewal process typically goes nowhere un-
til enough real leaders are promoted or hired into
senior-level jobs.
O
d
lar
60
Transformations often begin, and begin well,
when an organization has a new head who is a good
leader and who sees the need for a major change. If
the renewal target is the entire company, the CEO
is key. If change is needed in a division, the division
general manager is key. When these individuals are
not new leaders, great leaders, or change champi-
ons, phase one can be a huge challenge.

Bad business results are both a blessing and a
curse in the first phase. On the positive side, losing
money does catch people’s attention. But it also
gives less maneuvering room. With good business
results, the opposite is true: convincing people of
the need for change is much harder, but you have
more resources to help make changes.
But whether the starting point is good perfor-
mance or bad, in the more successful cases I have
witnessed, an individual or a group always facili-
tates a frank discussion of potentially unpleasant
facts: about new competition, shrinking margins,
decreasing market share, flat earnings, a lack of
revenue growth, or other relevant indices of a de-
clining competitive position. Because there seems
to be an almost universal human tendency to shoot
the bearer of bad news, especially if the head of the
organization is not a change champion, executives
in these companies often rely on outsiders to bring
unwanted information. Wall Street analysts, custom-
ers, and consultants can all be helpful in this re-
gard. The purpose of all this activity, in the words of
one former CEO of a large European company, is
“to make the status quo seem more dangerous than
launching into the unknown.”
In a few of the most successful cases, a group has
manufactured a crisis. One CEO deliberately engi-
neered the largest accounting loss in the company’s
history, creating huge pressures from Wall Street in
the process. One division president commissioned
first-ever customer-satisfaction surveys, knowing
full well that the results would be terrible. He then

made these findings public. On the surface, such
moves can look unduly risky. But there is also risk
in playing it too safe: when the urgency rate is not
pumped up enough, the transformation process
ne chief executive officer
liberately engineered the
est accounting loss in the
history of the company.
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW March-April 1995
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW March-April 1995 61
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Eight Steps to Transforming Your Organization
Establishing a Sense of Urgency
Examining market and competitive realities
Identifying and discussing crises, potential crises, or major
opportunities
Forming a Powerful Guiding Coalition

Assembling a group with enough power to lead the change
effort
Encouraging the group to work together as a team
Creating a Vision
Creating a vision to help direct the change effort
Developing strategies for achieving that vision
Communicating the Vision
Using every vehicle possible to communicate the new vision
and strategies
Teaching new behaviors by the example of the guiding coalition
Empowering Others to Act on the Vision
Getting rid of obstacles to change
Changing systems or structures that seriously undermine the
vision
Encouraging risk taking and nontraditional ideas, activities, and
actions
Planning for and Creating Short-Term Wins
Planning for visible performance improvements
Creating those improvements
Recognizing and rewarding employees involved in the
improvements

Consolidating Improvements and Producing Still More Change
Using increased credibility to change systems, structures, and
policies that don’t fit the vision
Hiring, promoting, and developing employees who can
implement the vision
Reinvigorating the process with new projects, themes, and
change agents
Institutionalizing New Approaches
Articulating the connections between the new behaviors and
corporate success
Developing the means to ensure leadership development and
succession
LEADING CHANGE
cannot succeed and the long-term future of the or-
ganization is put in jeopardy.
When is the urgency rate high enough? From
what I have seen, the answer is when about 75% of
a company’s management is honestly convinced
that business-as-usual is totally unacceptable. Any-
thing less can produce very serious problems later
on in the process.
Error #2: Not Creating a Powerful
Enough Guiding Coalition

Major renewal programs often start with just one
or two people. In cases of successful transformation
efforts, the leadership coalition grows and grows
over time. But whenever some minimum mass is
not achieved early in the effort, nothing much
worthwhile happens.
It is often said that major change is impossible
unless the head of the organization is an active sup-
porter. What I am talking about goes far beyond
that. In successful transformations, the chairman
or president or division general manager, plus an-
other 5 or 15 or 50 people, come together and devel-
op a shared commitment to excellent performance
through renewal. In my experience, this group nev-
er includes all of the company’s most senior execu-
tives because some people just won’t buy in, at least
not at first. But in the most successful cases, the
coalition is always pretty powerful – in terms of
titles, information and expertise, reputations and
relationships.
In both small and large organizations, a success-
ful guiding team may consist of only three to five
people during the first year of a renewal effort. But
in big companies, the coalition needs to grow to the
62
In failed transformations, you often find pl
20 to 50 range before much progress can be made in
phase three and beyond. Senior managers always
form the core of the group. But sometimes you find
board members, a representative from a key cus-
tomer, or even a powerful union leader.
Because the guiding coalition includes members

who are not part of senior management, it tends to
operate outside of the normal hierarchy by defini-
tion. This can be awkward, but it is clearly neces-
sary. If the existing hierarchy were working well,
there would be no need for a major transformation.
But since the current system is not working, reform
generally demands activity outside of formal bound-
aries, expectations, and protocol.
A high sense of urgency within the managerial
ranks helps enormously in putting a guiding coali-
tion together. But more is usually required. Some-
one needs to get these people together, help them
develop a shared assessment of their company’s
problems and opportunities, and create a minimum
level of trust and communication. Off-site retreats,
for two or three days, are one popular vehicle for ac-
complishing this task. I have seen many groups of 5
to 35 executives attend a series of these retreats
over a period of months.
Companies that fail in phase two usually under-
estimate the difficulties of producing change and
thus the importance of a powerful guiding coali-
tion. Sometimes they have no history of teamwork
at the top and therefore undervalue the importance
of this type of coalition. Sometimes they expect the
team to be led by a staff executive from human re-
sources, quality, or strategic planning instead of a
key line manager. No matter how capable or dedi-
cated the staff head, groups without strong line
leadership never achieve the power that is required.
enty of plans and programs, but no vision.

v
Efforts that don’t have a powerful enough guiding
coalition can make apparent progress for a while.
But, sooner or later, the opposition gathers itself to-
gether and stops the change.
Error #3: Lacking a Vision
In every successful transformation effort that I
have seen, the guiding coalition develops a picture
of the future that is relatively easy to communicate
and appeals to customers, stockholders, and em-
ployees. A vision always goes beyond the numbers
that are typically found in five-year plans. A vision
says something that helps clarify the direction in
which an organization needs to move. Sometimes
the first draft comes mostly from a single individu-
al. It is usually a bit blurry, at least initially. But
after the coalition works at it for 3 or 5 or even 12
months, something much better emerges through
their tough analytical thinking and a little dream-
ing. Eventually, a strategy for achieving that vision
is also developed.
In one midsize European company, the first pass
at a vision contained two-thirds of the basic ideas
that were in the final product. The concept of
global reach was in the initial version
from the beginning. So was the idea
of becoming preeminent in certain
businesses. But one central idea in
the final version – getting out of low
value-added activities – came only
after a series of discussions over a

period of several months.
Without a sensible vision, a trans-
formation effort can easily dissolve into a list of
confusing and incompatible projects that can take
the organization in the wrong direction or nowhere
at all. Without a sound vision, the reengineering
project in the accounting department, the new 360-
degree performance appraisal from the human re-
sources department, the plant’s quality program,
the cultural change project in the sales force will
not add up in a meaningful way.
In failed transformations, you often find plenty of
plans and directives and programs, but no vision. In
one case, a company gave out four-inch-thick note-
books describing its change effort. In mind-numb-
ing detail, the books spelled out procedures, goals,
methods, and deadlines. But nowhere was there a
clear and compelling statement of where all this
was leading. Not surprisingly, most of the employ-
ees with whom I talked were either confused or
alienated. The big, thick books did not rally them
together or inspire change. In fact, they probably
had just the opposite effect.
A
clari
an or
In a few of the less successful cases that I have
seen, management had a sense of direction, but it
was too complicated or blurry to be useful. Recent-
ly, I asked an executive in a midsize company to de-
scribe his vision and received in return a barely
comprehensible 30-minute lecture. Buried in his

answer were the basic elements of a sound vision.
But they were buried – deeply.
A useful rule of thumb: if you can’t communicate
the vision to someone in five minutes or less and
get a reaction that signifies both understanding
and interest, you are not yet done with this phase
of the transformation process.
Error #4: Undercommunicating the
Vision by a Factor of Ten
I’ve seen three patterns with respect to commu-
nication, all very common. In the first, a group ac-
tually does develop a pretty good transformation
vision and then proceeds to communicate it by
holding a single meeting or sending out a single
communication. Having used about .0001% of the
yearly intracompany communication, the group is
startled that few people seem to understand the
new approach. In the second pattern, the head of
the organization spends a considerable amount
of time making speeches to employee groups, but
most people still don’t get it (not surprising, since
vision captures only .0005% of the total yearly
communication). In the third pattern, much more
effort goes into newsletters and speeches, but some
very visible senior executives still behave in ways
that are antithetical to the vision. The net result is
that cynicism among the troops goes up, while be-
lief in the communication goes down.
Transformation is impossible unless hundreds or
thousands of people are willing to help, often to the
point of making short-term sacrifices. Employees

will not make sacrifices, even if they are unhappy
with the status quo, unless they believe that useful
change is possible. Without credible communica-
tion, and a lot of it, the hearts and minds of the
troops are never captured.
This fourth phase is particularly challenging if
the short-term sacrifices include job losses. Gain-
ision says something that
fies the direction in which
ganization needs to move.
63
LEADING CHANGE
t
ing understanding and support is tough when
downsizing is a part of the vision. For this reason,
successful visions usually include new growth pos-
sibilities and the commitment to treat fairly any-
one who is laid off.
Executives who communicate well incorporate
messages into their hour-by-hour activities. In a
routine discussion about a business problem, they
talk about how proposed solutions fit (or don’t fit)
into the bigger picture. In a regular performance ap-
praisal, they talk about how the employee’s behav-
ior helps or undermines the vision. In a review of
a division’s quarterly performance, they talk not
only about the numbers but also about how the
division’s executives are contributing to the trans-
formation. In a routine Q&A with employees at

a company facility, they tie their answers back to
renewal goals.
In more successful transformation efforts, execu-
tives use all existing communication channels to
broadcast the vision. They turn boring and unread
company newsletters into lively articles about the
vision. They take ritualistic and tedious quarterly
management meetings and turn them into exciting
discussions of the transformation. They throw out
much of the company’s generic management edu-
cation and replace it with courses that focus on
business problems and the new vision. The guiding
principle is simple: use every possible channel, es-
pecially those that are being wasted on nonessen-
tial information.
Perhaps even more important, most of the execu-
tives I have known in successful cases of major
change learn to “walk the talk.” They consciously
attempt to become a living symbol of the new cor-
porate culture. This is often not easy. A 60-year-old
plant manager who has spent precious little time
over 40 years thinking about customers will not
suddenly behave in a customer-oriented way. But
I have witnessed just such a person change, and
change a great deal. In that case, a high level of ur-
gency helped. The fact that the man was a part of
the guiding coalition and the vision-creation team
also helped. So did all the communication, which
Worst of all are bosses who
refuse to change and who m
demands that are inconsis
with the overall effort.

64
kept reminding him of the desired behavior, and all
the feedback from his peers and subordinates,
which helped him see when he was not engaging in
that behavior.
Communication comes in both words and deeds,
and the latter are often the most powerful form.
Nothing undermines change more than behavior
by important individuals that is inconsistent with
their words.
Error #5: Not Removing Obstacles to
the New Vision
Successful transformations begin to involve large
numbers of people as the process progresses. Em-
ployees are emboldened to try new approaches, to
develop new ideas, and to provide leadership. The
only constraint is that the actions fit within the
broad parameters of the overall vision. The more
people involved, the better the outcome.
To some degree, a guiding coalition empowers
others to take action simply by successfully com-
municating the new direction. But communication
is never sufficient by itself. Renewal also requires
the removal of obstacles. Too often, an employee
understands the new vision and wants to help make
it happen. But an elephant appears to be blocking
the path. In some cases, the elephant is in the per-
son’s head, and the challenge is to convince the in-
dividual that no external obstacle ex-
ists. But in most cases, the blockers
are very real.

Sometimes the obstacle is the or-
ganizational structure: narrow job
categories can seriously undermine
efforts to increase productivity or
make it very difficult even to think
about customers. Sometimes com-
pensation or performance-appraisal
systems make people choose be-
tween the new vision and their own self-interest.
Perhaps worst of all are bosses who refuse to change
and who make demands that are inconsistent with
the overall effort.
One company began its transformation process
with much publicity and actually made good
progress through the fourth phase. Then the change
effort ground to a halt because the officer in charge
of the company’s largest division was allowed to
undermine most of the new initiatives. He paid lip
service to the process but did not change his behav-
ior or encourage his managers to change. He did not
reward the unconventional ideas called for in the
vision. He allowed human resource systems to re-
main intact even when they were clearly inconsis-
ake
ent
Too often, an employee understands the new vision and wants to
help make it happen.
But something appears to be blocking the path.

tent with the new ideals. I think the officer’s mo-
tives were complex. To some degree, he did not be-
lieve the company needed major change. To some
degree, he felt personally threatened by all the
change. To some degree, he was afraid that he could
not produce both change and the expected oper-
ating profit. But despite the fact that they backed
the renewal effort, the other officers did virtually
nothing to stop the one blocker. Again, the reasons
were complex. The company had no history of
confronting problems like this. Some people were
afraid of the officer. The CEO was concerned that
he might lose a talented executive. The net result
was disastrous. Lower level managers concluded
that senior management had lied to them about
their commitment to renewal, cynicism grew, and
the whole effort collapsed.
In the first half of a transformation, no organiza-
tion has the momentum, power, or time to get rid of
all obstacles. But the big ones must be confronted
and removed. If the blocker is a person, it is impor-
tant that he or she be treated fairly and in a way that
is consistent with the new vision. But action is es-
sential, both to empower others and to maintain
the credibility of the change effort as a whole.
Error #6: Not Systematically Planning
For and Creating Short-Term Wins
Real transformation takes time, and a renewal ef-
fort risks losing momentum if there are no short-
term goals to meet and celebrate. Most people
won’t go on the long march unless they see com-
pelling evidence within 12 to 24 months that the
journey is producing expected results. Without

short-term wins, too many people give up or active-
ly join the ranks of those people who have been re-
sisting change.
One to two years into a successful transforma-
tion effort, you find quality beginning to go up on
certain indices or the decline in net income stop-
ping. You find some successful new product intro-
ductions or an upward shift in market share. You
find an impressive productivity improvement or
a statistically higher customer-satisfaction rating.
But whatever the case, the win is unambiguous.
The result is not just a judgment call that can be
discounted by those opposing change.
Creating short-term wins is different from hop-
ing for short-term wins. The latter is passive, the
former active. In a successful transformation, man-
agers actively look for ways to obtain clear perfor-
mance improvements, establish goals in the yearly
planning system, achieve the objectives, and re-
ward the people involved with recognition, promo-
tions, and even money. For example, the guiding
coalition at a U.S. manufacturing company pro-
duced a highly visible and successful new product
introduction about 20 months after the start of its
renewal effort. The new product was selected about
six months into the effort because it met multiple
criteria: it could be designed and launched in a rela-
tively short period; it could be handled by a small
team of people who were devoted to the new vision;
it had upside potential; and the new product-devel-
opment team could operate outside the established
departmental structure without practical problems.
Little was left to chance, and the win boosted the

credibility of the renewal process.
Managers often complain about being forced to
produce short-term wins, but I’ve found that pres-
sure can be a useful element in a change effort.
65
66
While celebrating a win is fine, declaring the war won
can be catastrophic.
When it becomes clear to people that major change
will take a long time, urgency levels can drop.
Commitments to produce short-term wins help
keep the urgency level up and force detailed analyt-
ical thinking that can clarify or revise visions.
Error #7: Declaring Victory Too Soon
After a few years of hard work, managers may be
tempted to declare victory with the first clear per-
formance improvement. While celebrating a win is
fine, declaring the war won can be catastrophic.
Until changes sink deeply into a company’s cul-
ture, a process that can take five to ten years, new
approaches are fragile and subject to regression.
In the recent past, I have watched a dozen change
efforts operate under the reengineering theme. In
all but two cases, victory was declared and the ex-
pensive consultants were paid and thanked when
the first major project was completed after two to
three years. Within two more years, the useful
changes that had been introduced slowly disap-

peared. In two of the ten cases, it’s hard to find any
trace of the reengineering work today.
Over the past 20 years, I’ve seen the same sort
of thing happen to huge quality projects, organi-
zational development efforts, and more. Typically,
the problems start early in the process: the urgency
level is not intense enough, the guiding coalition is
not powerful enough, and the vision is not clear
enough. But it is the premature victory celebra-
tion that kills momentum. And then the powerful
forces associated with tradition take over.
Ironically, it is often a combination of change
initiators and change resistors that creates the pre-
mature victory celebration. In their enthusiasm over
a clear sign of progress, the initiators go overboard.
They are then joined by resistors, who are quick to
spot any opportunity to stop change. After the cele-
bration is over, the resistors point to the victory as
a sign that the war has been won and the troops
should be sent home. Weary troops allow them-
selves to be convinced that they won. Once home,
the foot soldiers are reluctant to climb back on the
ships. Soon thereafter, change comes to a halt, and
tradition creeps back in.
Instead of declaring victory, leaders of successful
efforts use the credibility afforded by short-term
wins to tackle even bigger problems. They go after
systems and structures that are not consistent with
the transformation vision and have not been con-
fronted before. They pay great attention to who is
promoted, who is hired, and how people are devel-
oped. They include new reengineering projects that
are even bigger in scope than the initial ones. They

LEADING CHANGE
understand that renewal efforts take not months
but years. In fact, in one of the most successful
transformations that I have ever seen, we quanti-
fied the amount of change that occurred each year
over a seven-year period. On a scale of one (low) to
ten (high), year one received a two, year two a four,
year three a three, year four a seven, year five an
eight, year six a four, and year seven a two. The
peak came in year five, fully 36 months after the
first set of visible wins.
Error #8: Not Anchoring Changes
in the Corporation’s Culture
In the final analysis, change sticks when it be-
comes “the way we do things around here,” when it
seeps into the bloodstream of the corporate body.
Until new behaviors are rooted in social norms and
shared values, they are subject to degradation as
soon as the pressure for change is removed.
Two factors are particularly important in institu-
tionalizing change in corporate culture. The first is
a conscious attempt to show people how the new
approaches, behaviors, and attitudes have helped
improve performance. When people are left on their
own to make the connections, they sometimes cre-
ate very inaccurate links. For example, because re-
sults improved while charismatic Harry was boss,
the troops link his mostly idiosyncratic style with
those results instead of seeing how their own im-

proved customer service and productivity were in-
strumental. Helping people see the right connec-
tions requires communication. Indeed, one company
was relentless, and it paid off enormously. Time
was spent at every major management meeting
to discuss why performance was increasing. The
company newspaper ran article after article show-
ing how changes had boosted earnings.
The second factor is taking sufficient time to
make sure that the next generation of top manage-
ment really does personify the new approach. If the
requirements for promotion don’t change, renewal
rarely lasts. One bad succession decision at the top
of an organization can undermine a decade of hard
work. Poor succession decisions are possible when
boards of directors are not an integral part of the re-
newal effort. In at least three instances I have seen,
the champion for change was the retiring execu-
tive, and although his successor was not a resistor,
he was not a change champion. Because the boards
did not understand the transformations in any de-
tail, they could not see that their choices were not
good fits. The retiring executive in one case tried
unsuccessfully to talk his board into a less seasoned
candidate who better personified the transforma-
tion. In the other two cases, the CEOs did not resist
the boards’ choices, because they felt the transfor-
mation could not be undone by their successors.
They were wrong. Within two years, signs of re-
newal began to disappear at both companies.
There are still more mistakes that people make,
but these eight are the big ones. I realize that in a
short article everything is made to sound a bit too

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