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44 SHODH, SAMIKSHA AUR MULYANKAN
International Indexed & Refereed Research Journal, ISSN 0974-2832,(Print) E- ISSN-2320-5474, December,2013, VOL-V * ISSUE- 59
Introduction
Criminals have long employed the tactic of
masking their true identity, fromdisguises to aliases to
caller-id blocking. It should come as no surprise then,
thatcriminalswhoconducttheirnefariousactivitieson
networks and computers should employ such tech-
niques. IP spoofing is one of the most common forms
ofon-linecamouflage.InIPspoofing,anattackergains
unauthorized access to a computer or a network by
making it appear that a malicious message has come
from a trusted machine by "spoofing" the IP address
ofthat machine. In the subsequent pages ofthisreport,
we will examine the concepts of IP spoofing: why it is
possible, how it works, what it is used for and how to
defend against it.
TCP/IPProtocolSuite
IP SpoofingexploitstheflawsinTCP/IP pro-
tocol suite. In order to completely understand how
these attacks can take place, one must examine the
structure of the TCP/IP protocol suite. Abasic under-
standing of these headers and network exchanges is
crucial to the process.
3.1InternetProtocol-IP
The Internet Protocol (or IP as it generally
known),isthenetworklayeroftheInternet.IPprovides
a connection-less service. The job of IP is to route and
send a packet to the packet's destination. IP provides
no guarantee whatsoever, for the packets it tries to
deliver. The IP packets are usually termed datagrams.
The datagrams go through a series of routers before
they reach the destination. At each node that the
datagram passes through, the node determines the
next hop for the datagram and routes it to the next hop.
Since the network is dynamic, it is possible that two
Research Paper
December , 2013
IPSpoofing
* Yash Batra
IP spoofing is a method of attacking a network in order to gain unauthorized access. The attack is based on the fact that
Internet communication between distant computers is routinely handled by routers which find the best route by examining
the destination address, but generally ignore the origination address. The origination address is only used by the destination
machine when it responds back to the source. In a spoofing attack, the intruder sends messages to a computer indicating
that the message has come from a trusted system. To be successful, the intruder must first determine the IP address of a trusted
system, and then modify the packet headers to that it appears that the packets are coming from trusted user. In essence, the
attacker is fooling (spoofing) the distant computer into believing that they are a legitimate member of the network. The goal
of the attack is to establish a connection that will allow the attacker to gain root access to the host, allowing the creation
of a backdoor entry path into the target system.
A B S T R A C T
datagramsfromthesame sourcetake differentpaths to
make it to the destination. Since the network has vari-
able delays,it is notguaranteed that the datagrams will
be received in sequence. IP only tries for a best-effort
delivery.Itdoesnottakecareoflostpackets;thisisleft
to the higher layer protocols. There is no state main-
tained between two datagrams; in other words, IP is
connection-less
3.2TransmissionControlProtocol-TCP
IP can be thought of as a routing wrapper for layer 4
(transport), which contains the Transmission Control
Protocol(TCP).UnlikeIP,TCPusesaconnection-ori-
enteddesign.ThismeansthattheparticipantsinaTCP
session must first build a connection - via the 3-way
handshake (SYN-SYN/ACK-ACK) - then update one
another on progress - via sequences and
acknowledgements.This"conversation",ensuresdata
reliability, since the sender receives an OK from the
recipient after each packet exchange.
3.3 ConsequencesoftheTCP/IPDesign
Nowthat we have an overviewof the TCP/IP
formats, let's examine the consequences. Obviously,
it'sveryeasytomaskasourceaddressbymanipulating
an IP header. This technique is used for obvious rea-
sons and is employed in several of the attacks dis-
cussed below. Another consequence, specific to TCP,
is sequence number prediction, which can lead to ses-
sion hijacking or host impersonating. This method
builds on IP spoofing, since a session, albeit a false
one, is built. We will examine the ramifications of this
in the attacks discussed below.
SpoofingAttacks
There are a few variations on the types of
attacksthatsuccessfullyemployIPspoofing.Although
*B.Tec(CSE)
45SHODH, SAMIKSHA AUR MULYANKAN
International Indexed & Refereed Research Journal, ISSN 0974-2832,(Print) E- ISSN-2320-5474, December,2013, VOL-V * ISSUE- 59
some are relatively dated, others are very pertinent to
current security concerns. IP-spoofing consists of
several steps, which I will briefly outline here, then
explain in detail. First, the targethost is chosen. Next,
a pattern of trust is discovered, along with a trusted
host. The trusted host is then disabled, and the target's
TCP sequence numbers are sampled. The trusted host
is impersonated, the sequence numbers guessed, and
a connection attempt is made to a service that only
requires address-based authentication. If successful,
the attacker executes a simple command to leave a
backdoor.
4.1MitnickAttack
4.2 Session Hijack
4.3 DosAttack
4.4Non-BlindSpoofing
4.5BlindSpoofing
MechanismOfTheAttack
They are supposed to go the trusted host. As
farasthenetworklayerisconcerned,thisiswherethey
originallycamefrom,andthisiswhereresponsesshould
go. Ofcourse oncethedatagrams arerouted there,and
theinformationisdemultiplexedup theprotocolstack,
and reachesTCP,itisdiscarded(thetrustedhost'sTCP
cannot respond-- see below). So the attacker has to be
smart and *know* what was sent, and *know* what
reponse the server is looking for. The attacker cannot
see what the target host sends, but she can *predict*
what it will send; that coupled with the knowledge of
what it *will* send, allows the attacker to work around
this blindness
infacttrustsomebody. Ifitdidn't,theattackwould end
here). Figuring out who a host trusts may or may not
beeasy. A'showmount-e'mayshowwherefilesystems
are exported, and rpcinfo can give out valuable infor-
mation as well. If enough background information is
known about the host, it should not be too difficult. If
allelse fails,trying neighboringIP addressesinabrute
force effort may be a viable option.
MethodsToPreventIpSpoofingAttack
6.1Packetfiltering
6.2 Filtering at the Router
6.3 Encryption and Authentication
6.4 Cryptographic Methods
ApplicationsOfIpSpoofing
7.1Asymmetricrouting(Splitting routing)
Asymmetric routing means traffic goes over
different interfaces for directions in and out. In other
words, asymmetric routing is when the response to a
packetfollowsadifferentpathfromonehosttoanother
thantheoriginalpacketdid.Themorecorrectandmore
general answer is, for any source IP address 'A' and
destination 'B', the path followed by any packet (re-
quest or response) from 'A' to 'B' is different than the
path taken by a packet from 'B' to 'A'.
After a target is chosen the attacker must
determine the patterns of trust (for the sake of argu-
ment, we are going to assume the target host *does*
Fig.ValidSourceIPAddress
7.2 Sat Dsl
SatelliteDSL(SATDSL)makesuseofasymmetricrout-
ing.
Fig. Satellite DSL
The advantage of a satellite network is to
provide high bandwidth services independent of the
46 SHODH, SAMIKSHA AUR MULYANKAN
International Indexed & Refereed Research Journal, ISSN 0974-2832,(Print) E- ISSN-2320-5474, December,2013, VOL-V * ISSUE- 59
userslocationoverawidegeographicalarea.Asatellite
network consists of two types of stations: feeds and
receivers.Everyreceiverhasasatellitedishconnected
toauserstation.Theuserstationhasanextrainterface,
DSL modem connected to the ISP, this is called return
channel. All requests to Internet are sent via DSL
connection, and responses from Internet should be
routed by a feed on the satellite network. After the
informationis sentfromthe feed to asatellite,it willbe
broadcasttoallthereceiversthatbelongto thesatellite
coverage. Installing feeds in strategic positions over
the Internet will create shorter paths and higher band-
width provided by the satellite network. The user host
has therefore two IP addresses, one for the satellite
subnetwork and the other for the regular connection
subnetwork (return channel).
ThetrafficpathofsatelliteDSLis:
1. Following the Journey of a Spoofed Packet http://www.scs.carleton.ca/~dlwhyte/whytepapers/ipspoof.htm
2. NAT and Networks http://www.suse.de/~mha/linux-ip-nat/diplom/node4.html
3. Asymmetric routing - Jani Lakkakorpi http://keskus.hut.fi/tutkimus/ipana/paperit/QoSR/S130-QoSR-asymmetric.pdf
4. TCP/IP protocol suite - Thomas Toth
R E F E R E N C E
If one of these links were to do NAT, then they would
alter the source or destinations of the packet as it
passes through. Usually the link doing NAT will re-
member how it mangled a packet, and when a reply
packet passes through the other way, it will do the
reverse mangling on that reply packet, so everything
works.
Advantages
Freedom of spoofing. The attacker is not
bounded by a specific range of IPs. No wasted or
unneeded initiated packets. The attacker sends one
TCP/UDPpacket per port.No tracing of the original
scanner. Detection of the scanning machine
isimpossible at the IP layer.
Disadvantages
Noreplies.Therewillbenoreplypacketsarrivingatthe
scanning machine. No results. Since replies are not
received, the attacker won't know port status.
Conclusion
IP spoofing is less of a threat today due to the
patches to the Unix Operating system and the wide-
spread use of random sequence numbering. Many
securityexpertsare predictinga shift fromIP spoofing
attacks to application-related spoofing in which hack-
ers can exploit a weakness in a particular service to
send and receive information under false identities.As
Security professionals, we must remain current with
the Operating Systems that we use in our day to day
activities. A steady stream of changes and new chal-
lenges is assured as the hacker community continues
to seek out vulnerabilities and weaknesses in our sys-
tems and our networks.
Fig.TrafficPath of Satellite DSL
7.3NAT
NATisnetworkaddresstranslation.Normally,
packets on a network travel from their source to their
destinationthroughmanydifferentlinks.Noneofthese
links really alter your packet, they just send it onward.

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INTERNATIONAL INDEXED REFEREED RESEARCH PAPER

  • 1. 44 SHODH, SAMIKSHA AUR MULYANKAN International Indexed & Refereed Research Journal, ISSN 0974-2832,(Print) E- ISSN-2320-5474, December,2013, VOL-V * ISSUE- 59 Introduction Criminals have long employed the tactic of masking their true identity, fromdisguises to aliases to caller-id blocking. It should come as no surprise then, thatcriminalswhoconducttheirnefariousactivitieson networks and computers should employ such tech- niques. IP spoofing is one of the most common forms ofon-linecamouflage.InIPspoofing,anattackergains unauthorized access to a computer or a network by making it appear that a malicious message has come from a trusted machine by "spoofing" the IP address ofthat machine. In the subsequent pages ofthisreport, we will examine the concepts of IP spoofing: why it is possible, how it works, what it is used for and how to defend against it. TCP/IPProtocolSuite IP SpoofingexploitstheflawsinTCP/IP pro- tocol suite. In order to completely understand how these attacks can take place, one must examine the structure of the TCP/IP protocol suite. Abasic under- standing of these headers and network exchanges is crucial to the process. 3.1InternetProtocol-IP The Internet Protocol (or IP as it generally known),isthenetworklayeroftheInternet.IPprovides a connection-less service. The job of IP is to route and send a packet to the packet's destination. IP provides no guarantee whatsoever, for the packets it tries to deliver. The IP packets are usually termed datagrams. The datagrams go through a series of routers before they reach the destination. At each node that the datagram passes through, the node determines the next hop for the datagram and routes it to the next hop. Since the network is dynamic, it is possible that two Research Paper December , 2013 IPSpoofing * Yash Batra IP spoofing is a method of attacking a network in order to gain unauthorized access. The attack is based on the fact that Internet communication between distant computers is routinely handled by routers which find the best route by examining the destination address, but generally ignore the origination address. The origination address is only used by the destination machine when it responds back to the source. In a spoofing attack, the intruder sends messages to a computer indicating that the message has come from a trusted system. To be successful, the intruder must first determine the IP address of a trusted system, and then modify the packet headers to that it appears that the packets are coming from trusted user. In essence, the attacker is fooling (spoofing) the distant computer into believing that they are a legitimate member of the network. The goal of the attack is to establish a connection that will allow the attacker to gain root access to the host, allowing the creation of a backdoor entry path into the target system. A B S T R A C T datagramsfromthesame sourcetake differentpaths to make it to the destination. Since the network has vari- able delays,it is notguaranteed that the datagrams will be received in sequence. IP only tries for a best-effort delivery.Itdoesnottakecareoflostpackets;thisisleft to the higher layer protocols. There is no state main- tained between two datagrams; in other words, IP is connection-less 3.2TransmissionControlProtocol-TCP IP can be thought of as a routing wrapper for layer 4 (transport), which contains the Transmission Control Protocol(TCP).UnlikeIP,TCPusesaconnection-ori- enteddesign.ThismeansthattheparticipantsinaTCP session must first build a connection - via the 3-way handshake (SYN-SYN/ACK-ACK) - then update one another on progress - via sequences and acknowledgements.This"conversation",ensuresdata reliability, since the sender receives an OK from the recipient after each packet exchange. 3.3 ConsequencesoftheTCP/IPDesign Nowthat we have an overviewof the TCP/IP formats, let's examine the consequences. Obviously, it'sveryeasytomaskasourceaddressbymanipulating an IP header. This technique is used for obvious rea- sons and is employed in several of the attacks dis- cussed below. Another consequence, specific to TCP, is sequence number prediction, which can lead to ses- sion hijacking or host impersonating. This method builds on IP spoofing, since a session, albeit a false one, is built. We will examine the ramifications of this in the attacks discussed below. SpoofingAttacks There are a few variations on the types of attacksthatsuccessfullyemployIPspoofing.Although *B.Tec(CSE)
  • 2. 45SHODH, SAMIKSHA AUR MULYANKAN International Indexed & Refereed Research Journal, ISSN 0974-2832,(Print) E- ISSN-2320-5474, December,2013, VOL-V * ISSUE- 59 some are relatively dated, others are very pertinent to current security concerns. IP-spoofing consists of several steps, which I will briefly outline here, then explain in detail. First, the targethost is chosen. Next, a pattern of trust is discovered, along with a trusted host. The trusted host is then disabled, and the target's TCP sequence numbers are sampled. The trusted host is impersonated, the sequence numbers guessed, and a connection attempt is made to a service that only requires address-based authentication. If successful, the attacker executes a simple command to leave a backdoor. 4.1MitnickAttack 4.2 Session Hijack 4.3 DosAttack 4.4Non-BlindSpoofing 4.5BlindSpoofing MechanismOfTheAttack They are supposed to go the trusted host. As farasthenetworklayerisconcerned,thisiswherethey originallycamefrom,andthisiswhereresponsesshould go. Ofcourse oncethedatagrams arerouted there,and theinformationisdemultiplexedup theprotocolstack, and reachesTCP,itisdiscarded(thetrustedhost'sTCP cannot respond-- see below). So the attacker has to be smart and *know* what was sent, and *know* what reponse the server is looking for. The attacker cannot see what the target host sends, but she can *predict* what it will send; that coupled with the knowledge of what it *will* send, allows the attacker to work around this blindness infacttrustsomebody. Ifitdidn't,theattackwould end here). Figuring out who a host trusts may or may not beeasy. A'showmount-e'mayshowwherefilesystems are exported, and rpcinfo can give out valuable infor- mation as well. If enough background information is known about the host, it should not be too difficult. If allelse fails,trying neighboringIP addressesinabrute force effort may be a viable option. MethodsToPreventIpSpoofingAttack 6.1Packetfiltering 6.2 Filtering at the Router 6.3 Encryption and Authentication 6.4 Cryptographic Methods ApplicationsOfIpSpoofing 7.1Asymmetricrouting(Splitting routing) Asymmetric routing means traffic goes over different interfaces for directions in and out. In other words, asymmetric routing is when the response to a packetfollowsadifferentpathfromonehosttoanother thantheoriginalpacketdid.Themorecorrectandmore general answer is, for any source IP address 'A' and destination 'B', the path followed by any packet (re- quest or response) from 'A' to 'B' is different than the path taken by a packet from 'B' to 'A'. After a target is chosen the attacker must determine the patterns of trust (for the sake of argu- ment, we are going to assume the target host *does* Fig.ValidSourceIPAddress 7.2 Sat Dsl SatelliteDSL(SATDSL)makesuseofasymmetricrout- ing. Fig. Satellite DSL The advantage of a satellite network is to provide high bandwidth services independent of the
  • 3. 46 SHODH, SAMIKSHA AUR MULYANKAN International Indexed & Refereed Research Journal, ISSN 0974-2832,(Print) E- ISSN-2320-5474, December,2013, VOL-V * ISSUE- 59 userslocationoverawidegeographicalarea.Asatellite network consists of two types of stations: feeds and receivers.Everyreceiverhasasatellitedishconnected toauserstation.Theuserstationhasanextrainterface, DSL modem connected to the ISP, this is called return channel. All requests to Internet are sent via DSL connection, and responses from Internet should be routed by a feed on the satellite network. After the informationis sentfromthe feed to asatellite,it willbe broadcasttoallthereceiversthatbelongto thesatellite coverage. Installing feeds in strategic positions over the Internet will create shorter paths and higher band- width provided by the satellite network. The user host has therefore two IP addresses, one for the satellite subnetwork and the other for the regular connection subnetwork (return channel). ThetrafficpathofsatelliteDSLis: 1. Following the Journey of a Spoofed Packet http://www.scs.carleton.ca/~dlwhyte/whytepapers/ipspoof.htm 2. NAT and Networks http://www.suse.de/~mha/linux-ip-nat/diplom/node4.html 3. Asymmetric routing - Jani Lakkakorpi http://keskus.hut.fi/tutkimus/ipana/paperit/QoSR/S130-QoSR-asymmetric.pdf 4. TCP/IP protocol suite - Thomas Toth R E F E R E N C E If one of these links were to do NAT, then they would alter the source or destinations of the packet as it passes through. Usually the link doing NAT will re- member how it mangled a packet, and when a reply packet passes through the other way, it will do the reverse mangling on that reply packet, so everything works. Advantages Freedom of spoofing. The attacker is not bounded by a specific range of IPs. No wasted or unneeded initiated packets. The attacker sends one TCP/UDPpacket per port.No tracing of the original scanner. Detection of the scanning machine isimpossible at the IP layer. Disadvantages Noreplies.Therewillbenoreplypacketsarrivingatthe scanning machine. No results. Since replies are not received, the attacker won't know port status. Conclusion IP spoofing is less of a threat today due to the patches to the Unix Operating system and the wide- spread use of random sequence numbering. Many securityexpertsare predictinga shift fromIP spoofing attacks to application-related spoofing in which hack- ers can exploit a weakness in a particular service to send and receive information under false identities.As Security professionals, we must remain current with the Operating Systems that we use in our day to day activities. A steady stream of changes and new chal- lenges is assured as the hacker community continues to seek out vulnerabilities and weaknesses in our sys- tems and our networks. Fig.TrafficPath of Satellite DSL 7.3NAT NATisnetworkaddresstranslation.Normally, packets on a network travel from their source to their destinationthroughmanydifferentlinks.Noneofthese links really alter your packet, they just send it onward.