SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 11
Cyber Security in
Power Grid
JISHNU PRADEEP
The US Power Grid
An electrical grid is an interconnected network for
delivering electricity from suppliers to consumers.
The U.S. power transmission grid consists of about
300,000 km (186,411 mi) of lines operated by
approximately 500 companies.
American homes, industries, and businesses are
deeply dependent on reliable electricity, so threats to
the consistent delivery of electricity put modern life
itself at risk.
Threats to the Power Grid
 Protecting the nation’s electricity grid from attacks is a critical
national security issue.
 Cyber attacks on key energy infrastructure—and on the electricity
system in particular—are increasing, both in frequency and
sophistication. These trends are alarming because the potential
consequences of a successful large-scale cyber attack.
Cyber attacks in Power Grids
 Infecting industrial systems, such as power grids, with malware is so simple that
there are 5-minute YouTube tutorials on how to do it. By overwhelming network
links with traffic in a DDoS attack, Internet users or cyber-terrorists can and
have removed the ability of utilities to communicate with their own electrical
grids, effectively causing a blackout.
 The estimated price for 24 hours of consistent DDoS attack is a mere $40, making
such attacks available to pretty much anybody.
 What makes this attacks worse? Difficult to spot, even when they are happening
Results in a ‘nightmare scenario’
 Stores closed. Cell service fails. Broadband Internet is compromised.
 Hospitals are operating on generators, but rapidly running out of fuel.
 Water supply will be hit.
 Commerce would be brought to a standstill.
 Transport and Communication lines disrupted.
 Crimes will surge.
 The geopolitical fallout could be even worse.
RESULT: Complete Chaos!
The scenario isn’t completely hypothetical.
Vulnerabilities
 The power grid is controlled by more than just a panel of
digital buttons.
 Grid operation depends on control systems—called
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA)—that
monitor and control the physical infrastructure.
 The U.S. electrical grid is decentralized network owned by
numerous local operators.
 Any smart meters connected to the internet can be easily
exploited.
The U.S. power grid is full of seams that can be exploited
by hackers.
Examples of Cyber Attacks on Energy
Systems
 Stuxnet (worm): It gained attention for the damage it caused at a nuclear facility in
Iran.
 Aurora: The planned cyber attack on a generator control system led to the
destruction of the generator and a fire.
 Slammer (SQL Server worm): The worm disabled a safety-monitoring system for
several hours and led to a temporary failure of a nuclear power plant’s process
computer.
 Shamoon (virus): The national oil company of Saudi Arabia, Aramco, reported in
2012 that this was responsible for damaging about 30,000 computers in an effort to
disrupt energy and oil production.
Attack on Ukrainian Power Grid
 Took place on 23 December 2015 and is a considered to
be the first known successful cyber attack on a power
grid.
 Hackers were able to successfully compromise
information systems of three energy distribution
companies in Ukraine and temporary disrupt electricity
supply.
 They took out 60 substations leaving 700,000 residents in
the dark. This attack was relatively short-lived (7 hours)
and benign. The next one might not be.
Steps involved:
 Prior compromise of corporate networks using spear-fishing emails with
BlackEnergy malware.
 Seizing SCADA under control, remotely switching substations off.
 Disabling IT infrastructure components(UPS, Modem).
 Destruction of files stored on servers and workstations with the KillDisk malware.
 Denial-of-service attack on call-center to deny consumers up-to-date information
on the blackout.
BlackEnergy3 and KillDisk Malwares
 What is it? BlackEnergy is a Trojan malware designed to launch
DDoS attacks, download custom spam, and banking information-
stealer plugins.
 Function: BlackEnergy malware was known to have been used to
deliver KillDisk, a feature that could render systems unusable and
could obliterate critical components on an infected system.
 Who is responsible? The Ukraine attack has been attributed
to Sandworm, a Russian cyber espionage group known to have
been harassing Ukrainian officials.

More Related Content

What's hot

Directional relay & Differential relay.pptx
Directional relay & Differential relay.pptxDirectional relay & Differential relay.pptx
Directional relay & Differential relay.pptx
UtthejNani1
 
FUNDAMENTALS OF POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION
FUNDAMENTALS OF POWER SYSTEM PROTECTIONFUNDAMENTALS OF POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION
FUNDAMENTALS OF POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION
Power System Operation
 
Power system protection
Power system protectionPower system protection
Power system protection
Anu Priya
 
TO control the speed of DC Motor Simple Project
TO control the speed of DC Motor Simple ProjectTO control the speed of DC Motor Simple Project
TO control the speed of DC Motor Simple Project
ZunAib Ali
 

What's hot (20)

Directional relay & Differential relay.pptx
Directional relay & Differential relay.pptxDirectional relay & Differential relay.pptx
Directional relay & Differential relay.pptx
 
Protective relay
Protective relay Protective relay
Protective relay
 
Er rahul sharma feeder protection
Er rahul sharma feeder protectionEr rahul sharma feeder protection
Er rahul sharma feeder protection
 
Inrush current
Inrush currentInrush current
Inrush current
 
induction motor protection system
induction motor protection systeminduction motor protection system
induction motor protection system
 
A Review of Protection Schemes for Active Distribution Systems
A Review of Protection Schemes for Active Distribution SystemsA Review of Protection Schemes for Active Distribution Systems
A Review of Protection Schemes for Active Distribution Systems
 
FUNDAMENTALS OF POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION
FUNDAMENTALS OF POWER SYSTEM PROTECTIONFUNDAMENTALS OF POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION
FUNDAMENTALS OF POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION
 
Module 6part1
Module 6part1Module 6part1
Module 6part1
 
Cybersecurity for Smart Grids: Vulnerabilities and Strategies to Provide Cybe...
Cybersecurity for Smart Grids: Vulnerabilities and Strategies to Provide Cybe...Cybersecurity for Smart Grids: Vulnerabilities and Strategies to Provide Cybe...
Cybersecurity for Smart Grids: Vulnerabilities and Strategies to Provide Cybe...
 
Unit 03 Protective relays
Unit  03 Protective relaysUnit  03 Protective relays
Unit 03 Protective relays
 
CYBER SECURITY IN THE SMART GRID
CYBER SECURITY IN THE SMART GRIDCYBER SECURITY IN THE SMART GRID
CYBER SECURITY IN THE SMART GRID
 
Transients in-power-systems
Transients in-power-systemsTransients in-power-systems
Transients in-power-systems
 
power qualit
 power qualit power qualit
power qualit
 
Electrical Load forcasting
Electrical Load forcastingElectrical Load forcasting
Electrical Load forcasting
 
Motor Protection
Motor ProtectionMotor Protection
Motor Protection
 
Power system protection_lecture_notes
Power system protection_lecture_notesPower system protection_lecture_notes
Power system protection_lecture_notes
 
Motor protection
Motor protectionMotor protection
Motor protection
 
surge diverters
surge diverterssurge diverters
surge diverters
 
Power system protection
Power system protectionPower system protection
Power system protection
 
TO control the speed of DC Motor Simple Project
TO control the speed of DC Motor Simple ProjectTO control the speed of DC Motor Simple Project
TO control the speed of DC Motor Simple Project
 

Viewers also liked

Cybercrime.ppt
Cybercrime.pptCybercrime.ppt
Cybercrime.ppt
Aeman Khan
 
Insights on it risks cyber attacks
Insights on it risks cyber attacksInsights on it risks cyber attacks
Insights on it risks cyber attacks
Vladimir Matviychuk
 
Information communication technology in libya for educational purposes
Information communication technology in libya for educational purposesInformation communication technology in libya for educational purposes
Information communication technology in libya for educational purposes
Zakaria Zubi
 
Vilde icon
Vilde icon Vilde icon
Vilde icon
SofiaNim
 
understanding networked infrastructure
understanding networked infrastructureunderstanding networked infrastructure
understanding networked infrastructure
Mohammad Salman
 

Viewers also liked (20)

The Evolution of Cyber Attacks
The Evolution of Cyber AttacksThe Evolution of Cyber Attacks
The Evolution of Cyber Attacks
 
Cyber Security: Differences between Industrial Control Systems and ICT Approach
Cyber Security: Differences between Industrial Control Systems and ICT ApproachCyber Security: Differences between Industrial Control Systems and ICT Approach
Cyber Security: Differences between Industrial Control Systems and ICT Approach
 
61850easy Test Tool 2013
61850easy Test Tool 201361850easy Test Tool 2013
61850easy Test Tool 2013
 
Smart grid projects and ciber security in brazil conference
Smart grid projects and ciber security in  brazil conference Smart grid projects and ciber security in  brazil conference
Smart grid projects and ciber security in brazil conference
 
National Oil Company Conference 2014 - Evolving Cyber Security - A Wake Up Ca...
National Oil Company Conference 2014 - Evolving Cyber Security - A Wake Up Ca...National Oil Company Conference 2014 - Evolving Cyber Security - A Wake Up Ca...
National Oil Company Conference 2014 - Evolving Cyber Security - A Wake Up Ca...
 
Cybercrime.ppt
Cybercrime.pptCybercrime.ppt
Cybercrime.ppt
 
Paper Presentation - "Your Botnet is my Botnet : Analysis of a Botnet Takeover"
Paper Presentation - "Your Botnet is my Botnet : Analysis of a Botnet Takeover"Paper Presentation - "Your Botnet is my Botnet : Analysis of a Botnet Takeover"
Paper Presentation - "Your Botnet is my Botnet : Analysis of a Botnet Takeover"
 
Insights on it risks cyber attacks
Insights on it risks cyber attacksInsights on it risks cyber attacks
Insights on it risks cyber attacks
 
Information communication technology in libya for educational purposes
Information communication technology in libya for educational purposesInformation communication technology in libya for educational purposes
Information communication technology in libya for educational purposes
 
Educ 2 d slideshare
Educ 2 d slideshareEduc 2 d slideshare
Educ 2 d slideshare
 
Vilde icon
Vilde icon Vilde icon
Vilde icon
 
understanding networked infrastructure
understanding networked infrastructureunderstanding networked infrastructure
understanding networked infrastructure
 
61850easy Test Tool for IEC 61850 Networks & Systems
61850easy Test Tool for IEC 61850 Networks & Systems61850easy Test Tool for IEC 61850 Networks & Systems
61850easy Test Tool for IEC 61850 Networks & Systems
 
Analysis of database tampering
Analysis of database tamperingAnalysis of database tampering
Analysis of database tampering
 
Secure Data Sharing in Cloud (SDSC)
Secure Data Sharing in Cloud (SDSC)Secure Data Sharing in Cloud (SDSC)
Secure Data Sharing in Cloud (SDSC)
 
Basic concept cybersecurity
Basic concept cybersecurityBasic concept cybersecurity
Basic concept cybersecurity
 
Basic knowledge of cyber security
Basic knowledge of cyber securityBasic knowledge of cyber security
Basic knowledge of cyber security
 
The Not So Smart Grid
The Not So Smart GridThe Not So Smart Grid
The Not So Smart Grid
 
Mysore, pilot project
Mysore, pilot projectMysore, pilot project
Mysore, pilot project
 
CYBERCRIMES AND DUE DILIGENCE
CYBERCRIMES AND DUE DILIGENCECYBERCRIMES AND DUE DILIGENCE
CYBERCRIMES AND DUE DILIGENCE
 

Similar to Cyber Security of Power grids

US Power Grid Vs. Smart Grid
US Power Grid Vs. Smart GridUS Power Grid Vs. Smart Grid
US Power Grid Vs. Smart Grid
Josh Wentz
 
Presentation for power plant 2021 by link vue system
Presentation for power plant 2021 by link vue systemPresentation for power plant 2021 by link vue system
Presentation for power plant 2021 by link vue system
Mahesh Chandra Manav
 
CYBER SECURITY TRANDS FOR FUTURE SMART GRID SYSTEMS
CYBER SECURITY TRANDS FOR FUTURE SMART GRID SYSTEMSCYBER SECURITY TRANDS FOR FUTURE SMART GRID SYSTEMS
CYBER SECURITY TRANDS FOR FUTURE SMART GRID SYSTEMS
George Wainblat
 
Recommended Solutions to Major Security Challenges Facing OT & IT Personnel w...
Recommended Solutions to Major Security Challenges Facing OT & IT Personnel w...Recommended Solutions to Major Security Challenges Facing OT & IT Personnel w...
Recommended Solutions to Major Security Challenges Facing OT & IT Personnel w...
Power System Operation
 
Running head SMART GRID .docx
Running head SMART GRID                                          .docxRunning head SMART GRID                                          .docx
Running head SMART GRID .docx
todd521
 
Cyber Security for SCADA
Cyber Security for SCADACyber Security for SCADA
Cyber Security for SCADA
Richard Umbrino
 
Trans Block Show
Trans Block ShowTrans Block Show
Trans Block Show
mjsmith9
 

Similar to Cyber Security of Power grids (20)

Critical infrastructures brochure
Critical infrastructures brochureCritical infrastructures brochure
Critical infrastructures brochure
 
A_Review_of_Cybersecurity_in_Grid-Connected_Power_Electronics_Converters_Vuln...
A_Review_of_Cybersecurity_in_Grid-Connected_Power_Electronics_Converters_Vuln...A_Review_of_Cybersecurity_in_Grid-Connected_Power_Electronics_Converters_Vuln...
A_Review_of_Cybersecurity_in_Grid-Connected_Power_Electronics_Converters_Vuln...
 
Cybersecurity Considerations for Power Substation SCADA Systems Using IEC 618...
Cybersecurity Considerations for Power Substation SCADA Systems Using IEC 618...Cybersecurity Considerations for Power Substation SCADA Systems Using IEC 618...
Cybersecurity Considerations for Power Substation SCADA Systems Using IEC 618...
 
US Power Grid Vs. Smart Grid
US Power Grid Vs. Smart GridUS Power Grid Vs. Smart Grid
US Power Grid Vs. Smart Grid
 
Presentation for power plant 2021 by link vue system
Presentation for power plant 2021 by link vue systemPresentation for power plant 2021 by link vue system
Presentation for power plant 2021 by link vue system
 
CYBER SECURITY TRANDS FOR FUTURE SMART GRID SYSTEMS
CYBER SECURITY TRANDS FOR FUTURE SMART GRID SYSTEMSCYBER SECURITY TRANDS FOR FUTURE SMART GRID SYSTEMS
CYBER SECURITY TRANDS FOR FUTURE SMART GRID SYSTEMS
 
Recommended Solutions to Major Security Challenges Facing OT & IT Personnel w...
Recommended Solutions to Major Security Challenges Facing OT & IT Personnel w...Recommended Solutions to Major Security Challenges Facing OT & IT Personnel w...
Recommended Solutions to Major Security Challenges Facing OT & IT Personnel w...
 
Running head SMART GRID .docx
Running head SMART GRID                                          .docxRunning head SMART GRID                                          .docx
Running head SMART GRID .docx
 
Smart Grid Systems Based Survey on Cyber Security Issues
Smart Grid Systems Based Survey on Cyber Security IssuesSmart Grid Systems Based Survey on Cyber Security Issues
Smart Grid Systems Based Survey on Cyber Security Issues
 
CRASHOVERRIDE Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations. Cyber-attac...
CRASHOVERRIDE Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations. Cyber-attac...CRASHOVERRIDE Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations. Cyber-attac...
CRASHOVERRIDE Analysis of the Threat to Electric Grid Operations. Cyber-attac...
 
Encryption Security in SCADA Networks
Encryption Security in SCADA NetworksEncryption Security in SCADA Networks
Encryption Security in SCADA Networks
 
Protecting Industrial Control Systems V1.2, Ahmad Alanazy, 2012
Protecting Industrial Control Systems V1.2, Ahmad Alanazy, 2012Protecting Industrial Control Systems V1.2, Ahmad Alanazy, 2012
Protecting Industrial Control Systems V1.2, Ahmad Alanazy, 2012
 
Fault Prediction and Interdependencies Identification in Smart Grids Using De...
Fault Prediction and Interdependencies Identification in Smart Grids Using De...Fault Prediction and Interdependencies Identification in Smart Grids Using De...
Fault Prediction and Interdependencies Identification in Smart Grids Using De...
 
Utilization of Encryption for Security in SCADA Networks
Utilization of Encryption for Security in SCADA NetworksUtilization of Encryption for Security in SCADA Networks
Utilization of Encryption for Security in SCADA Networks
 
Power System Essay
Power System EssayPower System Essay
Power System Essay
 
8 fault-analysis-and-electrical
8 fault-analysis-and-electrical8 fault-analysis-and-electrical
8 fault-analysis-and-electrical
 
Cyber Security for SCADA
Cyber Security for SCADACyber Security for SCADA
Cyber Security for SCADA
 
Yugo Neumorni - prezentare - Cyber Security Trends 2020
Yugo Neumorni - prezentare - Cyber Security Trends 2020Yugo Neumorni - prezentare - Cyber Security Trends 2020
Yugo Neumorni - prezentare - Cyber Security Trends 2020
 
Cyber-security of smart grids
Cyber-security of smart gridsCyber-security of smart grids
Cyber-security of smart grids
 
Trans Block Show
Trans Block ShowTrans Block Show
Trans Block Show
 

Recently uploaded

FULL ENJOY Call Girls In Mahipalpur Delhi Contact Us 8377877756
FULL ENJOY Call Girls In Mahipalpur Delhi Contact Us 8377877756FULL ENJOY Call Girls In Mahipalpur Delhi Contact Us 8377877756
FULL ENJOY Call Girls In Mahipalpur Delhi Contact Us 8377877756
dollysharma2066
 
Structural Analysis and Design of Foundations: A Comprehensive Handbook for S...
Structural Analysis and Design of Foundations: A Comprehensive Handbook for S...Structural Analysis and Design of Foundations: A Comprehensive Handbook for S...
Structural Analysis and Design of Foundations: A Comprehensive Handbook for S...
Dr.Costas Sachpazis
 
Call Now ≽ 9953056974 ≼🔝 Call Girls In New Ashok Nagar ≼🔝 Delhi door step de...
Call Now ≽ 9953056974 ≼🔝 Call Girls In New Ashok Nagar  ≼🔝 Delhi door step de...Call Now ≽ 9953056974 ≼🔝 Call Girls In New Ashok Nagar  ≼🔝 Delhi door step de...
Call Now ≽ 9953056974 ≼🔝 Call Girls In New Ashok Nagar ≼🔝 Delhi door step de...
9953056974 Low Rate Call Girls In Saket, Delhi NCR
 
VIP Call Girls Ankleshwar 7001035870 Whatsapp Number, 24/07 Booking
VIP Call Girls Ankleshwar 7001035870 Whatsapp Number, 24/07 BookingVIP Call Girls Ankleshwar 7001035870 Whatsapp Number, 24/07 Booking
VIP Call Girls Ankleshwar 7001035870 Whatsapp Number, 24/07 Booking
dharasingh5698
 
UNIT-V FMM.HYDRAULIC TURBINE - Construction and working
UNIT-V FMM.HYDRAULIC TURBINE - Construction and workingUNIT-V FMM.HYDRAULIC TURBINE - Construction and working
UNIT-V FMM.HYDRAULIC TURBINE - Construction and working
rknatarajan
 

Recently uploaded (20)

Glass Ceramics: Processing and Properties
Glass Ceramics: Processing and PropertiesGlass Ceramics: Processing and Properties
Glass Ceramics: Processing and Properties
 
FULL ENJOY Call Girls In Mahipalpur Delhi Contact Us 8377877756
FULL ENJOY Call Girls In Mahipalpur Delhi Contact Us 8377877756FULL ENJOY Call Girls In Mahipalpur Delhi Contact Us 8377877756
FULL ENJOY Call Girls In Mahipalpur Delhi Contact Us 8377877756
 
Call Girls Walvekar Nagar Call Me 7737669865 Budget Friendly No Advance Booking
Call Girls Walvekar Nagar Call Me 7737669865 Budget Friendly No Advance BookingCall Girls Walvekar Nagar Call Me 7737669865 Budget Friendly No Advance Booking
Call Girls Walvekar Nagar Call Me 7737669865 Budget Friendly No Advance Booking
 
Thermal Engineering Unit - I & II . ppt
Thermal Engineering  Unit - I & II . pptThermal Engineering  Unit - I & II . ppt
Thermal Engineering Unit - I & II . ppt
 
Intze Overhead Water Tank Design by Working Stress - IS Method.pdf
Intze Overhead Water Tank  Design by Working Stress - IS Method.pdfIntze Overhead Water Tank  Design by Working Stress - IS Method.pdf
Intze Overhead Water Tank Design by Working Stress - IS Method.pdf
 
The Most Attractive Pune Call Girls Budhwar Peth 8250192130 Will You Miss Thi...
The Most Attractive Pune Call Girls Budhwar Peth 8250192130 Will You Miss Thi...The Most Attractive Pune Call Girls Budhwar Peth 8250192130 Will You Miss Thi...
The Most Attractive Pune Call Girls Budhwar Peth 8250192130 Will You Miss Thi...
 
Structural Analysis and Design of Foundations: A Comprehensive Handbook for S...
Structural Analysis and Design of Foundations: A Comprehensive Handbook for S...Structural Analysis and Design of Foundations: A Comprehensive Handbook for S...
Structural Analysis and Design of Foundations: A Comprehensive Handbook for S...
 
Call Now ≽ 9953056974 ≼🔝 Call Girls In New Ashok Nagar ≼🔝 Delhi door step de...
Call Now ≽ 9953056974 ≼🔝 Call Girls In New Ashok Nagar  ≼🔝 Delhi door step de...Call Now ≽ 9953056974 ≼🔝 Call Girls In New Ashok Nagar  ≼🔝 Delhi door step de...
Call Now ≽ 9953056974 ≼🔝 Call Girls In New Ashok Nagar ≼🔝 Delhi door step de...
 
UNIT - IV - Air Compressors and its Performance
UNIT - IV - Air Compressors and its PerformanceUNIT - IV - Air Compressors and its Performance
UNIT - IV - Air Compressors and its Performance
 
(INDIRA) Call Girl Bhosari Call Now 8617697112 Bhosari Escorts 24x7
(INDIRA) Call Girl Bhosari Call Now 8617697112 Bhosari Escorts 24x7(INDIRA) Call Girl Bhosari Call Now 8617697112 Bhosari Escorts 24x7
(INDIRA) Call Girl Bhosari Call Now 8617697112 Bhosari Escorts 24x7
 
data_management_and _data_science_cheat_sheet.pdf
data_management_and _data_science_cheat_sheet.pdfdata_management_and _data_science_cheat_sheet.pdf
data_management_and _data_science_cheat_sheet.pdf
 
Roadmap to Membership of RICS - Pathways and Routes
Roadmap to Membership of RICS - Pathways and RoutesRoadmap to Membership of RICS - Pathways and Routes
Roadmap to Membership of RICS - Pathways and Routes
 
UNIT-II FMM-Flow Through Circular Conduits
UNIT-II FMM-Flow Through Circular ConduitsUNIT-II FMM-Flow Through Circular Conduits
UNIT-II FMM-Flow Through Circular Conduits
 
(INDIRA) Call Girl Aurangabad Call Now 8617697112 Aurangabad Escorts 24x7
(INDIRA) Call Girl Aurangabad Call Now 8617697112 Aurangabad Escorts 24x7(INDIRA) Call Girl Aurangabad Call Now 8617697112 Aurangabad Escorts 24x7
(INDIRA) Call Girl Aurangabad Call Now 8617697112 Aurangabad Escorts 24x7
 
The Most Attractive Pune Call Girls Manchar 8250192130 Will You Miss This Cha...
The Most Attractive Pune Call Girls Manchar 8250192130 Will You Miss This Cha...The Most Attractive Pune Call Girls Manchar 8250192130 Will You Miss This Cha...
The Most Attractive Pune Call Girls Manchar 8250192130 Will You Miss This Cha...
 
PVC VS. FIBERGLASS (FRP) GRAVITY SEWER - UNI BELL
PVC VS. FIBERGLASS (FRP) GRAVITY SEWER - UNI BELLPVC VS. FIBERGLASS (FRP) GRAVITY SEWER - UNI BELL
PVC VS. FIBERGLASS (FRP) GRAVITY SEWER - UNI BELL
 
VIP Call Girls Ankleshwar 7001035870 Whatsapp Number, 24/07 Booking
VIP Call Girls Ankleshwar 7001035870 Whatsapp Number, 24/07 BookingVIP Call Girls Ankleshwar 7001035870 Whatsapp Number, 24/07 Booking
VIP Call Girls Ankleshwar 7001035870 Whatsapp Number, 24/07 Booking
 
VIP Model Call Girls Kothrud ( Pune ) Call ON 8005736733 Starting From 5K to ...
VIP Model Call Girls Kothrud ( Pune ) Call ON 8005736733 Starting From 5K to ...VIP Model Call Girls Kothrud ( Pune ) Call ON 8005736733 Starting From 5K to ...
VIP Model Call Girls Kothrud ( Pune ) Call ON 8005736733 Starting From 5K to ...
 
Water Industry Process Automation & Control Monthly - April 2024
Water Industry Process Automation & Control Monthly - April 2024Water Industry Process Automation & Control Monthly - April 2024
Water Industry Process Automation & Control Monthly - April 2024
 
UNIT-V FMM.HYDRAULIC TURBINE - Construction and working
UNIT-V FMM.HYDRAULIC TURBINE - Construction and workingUNIT-V FMM.HYDRAULIC TURBINE - Construction and working
UNIT-V FMM.HYDRAULIC TURBINE - Construction and working
 

Cyber Security of Power grids

  • 1. Cyber Security in Power Grid JISHNU PRADEEP
  • 2. The US Power Grid An electrical grid is an interconnected network for delivering electricity from suppliers to consumers. The U.S. power transmission grid consists of about 300,000 km (186,411 mi) of lines operated by approximately 500 companies. American homes, industries, and businesses are deeply dependent on reliable electricity, so threats to the consistent delivery of electricity put modern life itself at risk.
  • 3. Threats to the Power Grid  Protecting the nation’s electricity grid from attacks is a critical national security issue.  Cyber attacks on key energy infrastructure—and on the electricity system in particular—are increasing, both in frequency and sophistication. These trends are alarming because the potential consequences of a successful large-scale cyber attack.
  • 4. Cyber attacks in Power Grids  Infecting industrial systems, such as power grids, with malware is so simple that there are 5-minute YouTube tutorials on how to do it. By overwhelming network links with traffic in a DDoS attack, Internet users or cyber-terrorists can and have removed the ability of utilities to communicate with their own electrical grids, effectively causing a blackout.  The estimated price for 24 hours of consistent DDoS attack is a mere $40, making such attacks available to pretty much anybody.  What makes this attacks worse? Difficult to spot, even when they are happening
  • 5. Results in a ‘nightmare scenario’  Stores closed. Cell service fails. Broadband Internet is compromised.  Hospitals are operating on generators, but rapidly running out of fuel.  Water supply will be hit.  Commerce would be brought to a standstill.  Transport and Communication lines disrupted.  Crimes will surge.  The geopolitical fallout could be even worse. RESULT: Complete Chaos! The scenario isn’t completely hypothetical.
  • 6.
  • 7. Vulnerabilities  The power grid is controlled by more than just a panel of digital buttons.  Grid operation depends on control systems—called Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA)—that monitor and control the physical infrastructure.  The U.S. electrical grid is decentralized network owned by numerous local operators.  Any smart meters connected to the internet can be easily exploited. The U.S. power grid is full of seams that can be exploited by hackers.
  • 8. Examples of Cyber Attacks on Energy Systems  Stuxnet (worm): It gained attention for the damage it caused at a nuclear facility in Iran.  Aurora: The planned cyber attack on a generator control system led to the destruction of the generator and a fire.  Slammer (SQL Server worm): The worm disabled a safety-monitoring system for several hours and led to a temporary failure of a nuclear power plant’s process computer.  Shamoon (virus): The national oil company of Saudi Arabia, Aramco, reported in 2012 that this was responsible for damaging about 30,000 computers in an effort to disrupt energy and oil production.
  • 9. Attack on Ukrainian Power Grid  Took place on 23 December 2015 and is a considered to be the first known successful cyber attack on a power grid.  Hackers were able to successfully compromise information systems of three energy distribution companies in Ukraine and temporary disrupt electricity supply.  They took out 60 substations leaving 700,000 residents in the dark. This attack was relatively short-lived (7 hours) and benign. The next one might not be.
  • 10. Steps involved:  Prior compromise of corporate networks using spear-fishing emails with BlackEnergy malware.  Seizing SCADA under control, remotely switching substations off.  Disabling IT infrastructure components(UPS, Modem).  Destruction of files stored on servers and workstations with the KillDisk malware.  Denial-of-service attack on call-center to deny consumers up-to-date information on the blackout.
  • 11. BlackEnergy3 and KillDisk Malwares  What is it? BlackEnergy is a Trojan malware designed to launch DDoS attacks, download custom spam, and banking information- stealer plugins.  Function: BlackEnergy malware was known to have been used to deliver KillDisk, a feature that could render systems unusable and could obliterate critical components on an infected system.  Who is responsible? The Ukraine attack has been attributed to Sandworm, a Russian cyber espionage group known to have been harassing Ukrainian officials.

Editor's Notes

  1. Every single home, industry and business depends greatly on electricity and any sort of disruption to the power grid would put modern life at risk.
  2. Out of all the threats faced by the power grid including weather, Cyberattacks are the ones to watch out for. It is increasing in both frequency and sophistication.
  3. By overwhelming network links with traffic in a DDOS attack, cyber terrorists can disable power grids causing blackouts.
  4. Any disruption to power grids would result in a nightmare scenario where all communication and transportation lines will be affected bringing life to a standstill.
  5. Moreover, with the advent of smart grid systems, Blackouts such as this, shown in Watchdogs, would not just exist in games, but also in everyday life.
  6. All the generating plants and substations are connected to a control center through a public network. Attacks are mainly launched through these decentralized networks. Even the IOT smart meters connected to internet become an easy target.
  7. Examples of a few cyber attacks launched against energy systems.
  8. World’s first power outage caused by hackers. They successfully managed to compromise information systems of 3 energy distribution companies to disrupt electricity in Ukraine, leaving 700,000 residents in the dark for 7 hours.
  9. Spear phishing is an e-mail spoofing fraud attempt that targets a specific organization, seeking unauthorized access to confidential data. Consumers were denied information about the blackout.
  10. Blackenergy is a trojan malware that launches a DDOS attack to deliver killdisk malware which in turn destroys files on information systems. A Russian group of hackers called Sandworm has been claimed to be responsible for this attack.