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CYBER ATTACKS
THE EVOLUTION OF
PRESENTS
As enterprises and governments connect literally everything to the Internet, the size of
their attack surface has grown, opening more opportunities for cyber criminals. Many of
their current exploits are going unnoticed.
AwarenessVisibilityDetection
+
+
–
– Ability to Respond
Keys &
Certificates
IAM
IDS
Firewall
A/V
VPN
DLP
IPS
MDM
1997
2004
2007
2010
2013
Viruses &
Worms
For-Profit
Malware
APTs
Key & Certificate-Based Attacks
• Code Signing Certificates
• SSH Key Theft
• Server Key Theft
• Weak Crypto Exploits
The Evolving Cyberattack Landscape
The cyber criminal community has evolved from pranksters, lone wolves, and organized
gangs to nation-states and hacktivist groups whose primary results have been increased
costs and lost productivity.
DAMAGE LEVEL: DISRUPTION
VIRUSES, WORMS & DDoS
CIH COMPUTER VIRUS
The virus infected over 60 million computers worldwide, causing an
estimated billion dollars in damage. Launched by a university student in
Taiwan, Chen Ing-hau claimed to have created the virus to challenge the
bold claims of the antivirus community.
1998
DAMAGELEVEL:DISRUPTIONDAMAGELEVEL:DISRUPTION
This worm drove a DDoS for multiple Internet hosts and dramatically
slowed down Internet traffic. The worm, based on a proof-of-concept
code demonstrated at Black Hat by David Litchfield, infected
75,000 victims in the first 10 minutes of its release by exploiting a
vulnerability that allowed it to generate random IP addresses and
send itself out to them.
SLAMMER WORM
VIRUSES, WORMS & DDoS
DAMAGE LEVEL: DISRUPTION
DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE
The first distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks ever recorded
targeted the Mexican government and the Pentagon.
1998
2003
DAMAGELEVEL:DISRUPTIONDAMAGELEVEL:DISRUPTIONDAMAGELEVEL:DISRUPTION
DAMAGELEVEL:CYBERCRIME
DAMAGE LEVEL: CYBERCRIME
FOR-PROFIT MALWARE
MYDOOM
Mydoom spread via spam. Mydoom stole email addresses to
further proliferate, and then added a backdoor to victims’ machines
to be used for further practices like a remote proxy for DDOS
whereby victims’ machines would be part of a botnet.
SPAM SPAM
SPAM
SPAM
SPAM
2004
FAKEWARE/SCAMWARE
A popup message warns users that their machines may
be infected, and that they should download and install
fake Antivirus or spyware. Instead, this is a hoax to fool
the user into installing malicious code.
UPDATE
ANTIVIRUS!
FOR-PROFIT MALWARE
DAMAGE LEVEL: CYBERCRIME
2005
DAMAGELEVEL:CYBERCRIME
DAMAGELEVEL:CYBERESPIONAGE
DAMAGE LEVEL: CYBER ESPIONAGE
APTs
ZEUS TROJAN
This is one of the first examples of an attack that takes advantage
of technologies used to ensure trusted digital communications.
This Trojan steals banking information by using
man-in-the-browser keystroke logging and form-grabbing
methods to steal credentials. Zeus stole information from the U.S.
Department of Transportation and is now believed to have infected
over 74,000 websites including BankOfAmerica.com,
NASA.gov, ABC.com and Amazon.com.
T O
N
R
A J
BANK
2007
APTs
DAMAGE LEVEL: CYBER ESPIONAGE
DAMAGELEVEL:CYBERESPIONAGE
Targeting the Microsoft Windows operating system, Conficker used flaws
in Windows software and dictionary attacks on administrator
passwords to propagate while forming a botnet, and has been unusually
difficult to counter because of its combined use of many advanced
malware techniques.
The Conficker infected millions of
computers including government,
business and home computers in
over 200 countries. It was also the
same year MD5 was discovered to
be exploitable.
Government Home & Business
CONFICKER2008
DAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUST
DAMAGE LEVEL: WORLD WITHOUT TRUST
Code Signing Certificates, SSH Key Theft,
Server Key Theft & Weak Crypto Exploits
Discovered in June 2010, this malware – reported to have been created
by the United States and Israel to attack Iran's nuclear facilities –
was the first cyber attack recognized as being made possible by
compromised digital certificates.
Stuxnet leveraged unprecedented and
advanced sophistication, zero-day exploits
and a network of insiders to install itself
in Windows systems used to manage
industrial control systems. Stuxnet
remained undetected on the network for
months, using a compromised digital
certificate to validate it. Its payload left
behind a trail of physical destruction.
ACCESS
GRANTED
STUXNET2010
Code Signing Certificates, SSH Key Theft,
Server Key Theft & Weak Crypto Exploits
DAMAGE LEVEL: WORLD WITHOUT TRUST
DAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUST
This attack on a Certificate Authority (CA) marked a significant point in the
history of cyber attacks. For the first time, a trust technology provider, the CA
itself, forced customers, including a national government, to warn the world
that they could not be trusted.
The attack took complete control of all eight of the company’s
certificate-issuing servers during the operation. Though it is unconfirmed, there
is a possibility the attacker may also have issued some rogue certificates that
have not yet been identified. What is known is that 300,000 Gmail accounts
were attacked. The attack also proved that a cyber debacle could ruin a
business, as the CA itself was forced out of business due to the incident.
OUT OF
BUSINESS
=
CA
DIGINOTAR
2011
DAMAGELEVEL:WOAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTRUST Code Signing Certificates, SSH Key Theft,
Server Key Theft & Weak Crypto Exploits
DAMAGE LEVEL: WORLD WITHOUT TRUST
DAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUST
FLAME
Designed to spread from one infected computer to other machines on the
same network using a rogue certificate, Flame allowed attackers to take
control of what noted cyber-war expert Richard Stiennon once referred to
as the "Holy Grail" of all potential cyber weapons – the Microsoft update
server. When infected computers updated, Flame intercepted the request
and instead of downloading the update delivered a malicious executable to
the machine that was signed with a rogue, but technically valid,
Microsoft certificate. While Microsoft closed the door on Flame in their
systems by issuing a patch, Flame essentially gave the blueprint to cyber
criminals to execute similar attacks.
UPDATE!
2012
In 2012, the number of malware signed by stolen certificates grows 10x
DAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTUST Code Signing Certificates, SSH Key Theft,
Server Key Theft & Weak Crypto Exploits
DAMAGE LEVEL: WORLD WITHOUT TRUST
DAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUST
AwarenessVisibilityDetection
+
+
–
– Ability to Respond
Keys &
Certificates
IAM
IDS
Firewall
A/V
VPN
DLP
IPS
MDM
WEAK
LINK
DAMAGELEDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTHOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WOAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUST Code Signing Certificates, SSH Key Theft,
Server Key Theft & Weak Crypto Exploits
DAMAGE LEVEL: WORLD WITHOUT TRUST
Few are looking at the real problem:
600% = Year over year growth in compromised digital certificates in 2013
TURKTRUST
The CA issued two SSL intermediary certificates that could be used to
issue certificates for any domain. One of the intermediary certificates was
used to issue an SSL certificate put into use for google.com. Google
discovered the unauthorized certificate in January 2013 and noted that it
was from an intermediary CA that had obtained authority from a
TURKTRUST certificate. No foul play was suspected at TURKTRUST,
and the damage has yet to be fully assessed.
2013
DAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUST Code Signing Certificates, SSH Key Theft,
Server Key Theft & Weak Crypto Exploits
DAMAGE LEVEL: WORLD WITHOUT TRUST
In February, over 800 different trojans launched
designed to steal keys and certificates
BIT9 HACK
Hackers compromised this security provider's network and digitally
signed malware using Bit9's own encryption keys, which made it
impossible for customers using its cyber defense technologies to know
whether or not they were downloading legitimate files or malware. The
extent of the damage may never be fully known, but the company claims
to provide white-listing services for 30 Fortune 100 firms, almost
one-third of the largest companies in the world.
2013
DAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUST Code Signing Certificates, SSH Key Theft,
Server Key Theft & Weak Crypto Exploits
DAMAGE LEVEL: WORLD WITHOUT TRUST
APT1
In what has been the most shocking and bold cyber attack revelation to
date, Mandiant revealed in its APT1 report that nation-backed,
China-based hackers had used self-signed digital certificates to
implant malware into hundreds of U.S. companies over a period of
several years. As part of the ground-breaking revelation, Mandiant stated
that 100 percent of the APTs used compromised digital certificates
that included keys and certificates.
2013
DAMAGELEVELDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUST Code Signing Certificates, SSH Key Theft,
Server Key Theft & Weak Crypto Exploits
DAMAGE LEVEL: WORLD WITHOUT TRUST
2013
The Snowden compromise was not so much based on malicious code,
but the blind trust organizations have on keys and certificates, while
highlighting the lack of control and visibility into these cryptographic
assets that provide insiders unfettered access to highly sensitive
systems. Snowden used fabricated digital keys to elevate his
privileges and gain access to sensitive information.
USERNAME:
PASSWORD:
SNOWDEN
DAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTREL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTDAMDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTITHOUTTRUST
100% of over 2,300 Global 2000 organizations
surveyed acknowledged having attacks on keys
and certificates in the last 2 years
Keys & Certificates
are under attack
They are the perfect target
and recipe for success
DADAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTWORLDWITHOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:DAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUST
Today’s Cyber criminal Attack Vector of Choice
Cryptographic Keys and Certificates
Little
Awareness
or detection
capability
More than
17,000 in
every
organization
Attackers are
granted
privileged
status
No tools for
responding
to attacks
WIDE
REACH LOW
VIS
IBILITY
POORRE
SPONSE TRUSTE
D
STATE
DAMAGELEVEL:WORLDDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUS:WORLDWITHOUTTRUST
Download the full report: A Historical Overview of the Evolving Cyber Attack Landscape
venafi.com/EvolvingCyberattacks

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The Evolution of Cyber Attacks

  • 3. As enterprises and governments connect literally everything to the Internet, the size of their attack surface has grown, opening more opportunities for cyber criminals. Many of their current exploits are going unnoticed. AwarenessVisibilityDetection + + – – Ability to Respond Keys & Certificates IAM IDS Firewall A/V VPN DLP IPS MDM
  • 4. 1997 2004 2007 2010 2013 Viruses & Worms For-Profit Malware APTs Key & Certificate-Based Attacks • Code Signing Certificates • SSH Key Theft • Server Key Theft • Weak Crypto Exploits The Evolving Cyberattack Landscape The cyber criminal community has evolved from pranksters, lone wolves, and organized gangs to nation-states and hacktivist groups whose primary results have been increased costs and lost productivity.
  • 5. DAMAGE LEVEL: DISRUPTION VIRUSES, WORMS & DDoS CIH COMPUTER VIRUS The virus infected over 60 million computers worldwide, causing an estimated billion dollars in damage. Launched by a university student in Taiwan, Chen Ing-hau claimed to have created the virus to challenge the bold claims of the antivirus community. 1998 DAMAGELEVEL:DISRUPTIONDAMAGELEVEL:DISRUPTION
  • 6. This worm drove a DDoS for multiple Internet hosts and dramatically slowed down Internet traffic. The worm, based on a proof-of-concept code demonstrated at Black Hat by David Litchfield, infected 75,000 victims in the first 10 minutes of its release by exploiting a vulnerability that allowed it to generate random IP addresses and send itself out to them. SLAMMER WORM VIRUSES, WORMS & DDoS DAMAGE LEVEL: DISRUPTION DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE The first distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks ever recorded targeted the Mexican government and the Pentagon. 1998 2003 DAMAGELEVEL:DISRUPTIONDAMAGELEVEL:DISRUPTIONDAMAGELEVEL:DISRUPTION
  • 7. DAMAGELEVEL:CYBERCRIME DAMAGE LEVEL: CYBERCRIME FOR-PROFIT MALWARE MYDOOM Mydoom spread via spam. Mydoom stole email addresses to further proliferate, and then added a backdoor to victims’ machines to be used for further practices like a remote proxy for DDOS whereby victims’ machines would be part of a botnet. SPAM SPAM SPAM SPAM SPAM 2004
  • 8. FAKEWARE/SCAMWARE A popup message warns users that their machines may be infected, and that they should download and install fake Antivirus or spyware. Instead, this is a hoax to fool the user into installing malicious code. UPDATE ANTIVIRUS! FOR-PROFIT MALWARE DAMAGE LEVEL: CYBERCRIME 2005 DAMAGELEVEL:CYBERCRIME
  • 9. DAMAGELEVEL:CYBERESPIONAGE DAMAGE LEVEL: CYBER ESPIONAGE APTs ZEUS TROJAN This is one of the first examples of an attack that takes advantage of technologies used to ensure trusted digital communications. This Trojan steals banking information by using man-in-the-browser keystroke logging and form-grabbing methods to steal credentials. Zeus stole information from the U.S. Department of Transportation and is now believed to have infected over 74,000 websites including BankOfAmerica.com, NASA.gov, ABC.com and Amazon.com. T O N R A J BANK 2007
  • 10. APTs DAMAGE LEVEL: CYBER ESPIONAGE DAMAGELEVEL:CYBERESPIONAGE Targeting the Microsoft Windows operating system, Conficker used flaws in Windows software and dictionary attacks on administrator passwords to propagate while forming a botnet, and has been unusually difficult to counter because of its combined use of many advanced malware techniques. The Conficker infected millions of computers including government, business and home computers in over 200 countries. It was also the same year MD5 was discovered to be exploitable. Government Home & Business CONFICKER2008
  • 11. DAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUST DAMAGE LEVEL: WORLD WITHOUT TRUST Code Signing Certificates, SSH Key Theft, Server Key Theft & Weak Crypto Exploits Discovered in June 2010, this malware – reported to have been created by the United States and Israel to attack Iran's nuclear facilities – was the first cyber attack recognized as being made possible by compromised digital certificates. Stuxnet leveraged unprecedented and advanced sophistication, zero-day exploits and a network of insiders to install itself in Windows systems used to manage industrial control systems. Stuxnet remained undetected on the network for months, using a compromised digital certificate to validate it. Its payload left behind a trail of physical destruction. ACCESS GRANTED STUXNET2010
  • 12. Code Signing Certificates, SSH Key Theft, Server Key Theft & Weak Crypto Exploits DAMAGE LEVEL: WORLD WITHOUT TRUST DAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUST This attack on a Certificate Authority (CA) marked a significant point in the history of cyber attacks. For the first time, a trust technology provider, the CA itself, forced customers, including a national government, to warn the world that they could not be trusted. The attack took complete control of all eight of the company’s certificate-issuing servers during the operation. Though it is unconfirmed, there is a possibility the attacker may also have issued some rogue certificates that have not yet been identified. What is known is that 300,000 Gmail accounts were attacked. The attack also proved that a cyber debacle could ruin a business, as the CA itself was forced out of business due to the incident. OUT OF BUSINESS = CA DIGINOTAR 2011
  • 13. DAMAGELEVEL:WOAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTRUST Code Signing Certificates, SSH Key Theft, Server Key Theft & Weak Crypto Exploits DAMAGE LEVEL: WORLD WITHOUT TRUST DAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUST FLAME Designed to spread from one infected computer to other machines on the same network using a rogue certificate, Flame allowed attackers to take control of what noted cyber-war expert Richard Stiennon once referred to as the "Holy Grail" of all potential cyber weapons – the Microsoft update server. When infected computers updated, Flame intercepted the request and instead of downloading the update delivered a malicious executable to the machine that was signed with a rogue, but technically valid, Microsoft certificate. While Microsoft closed the door on Flame in their systems by issuing a patch, Flame essentially gave the blueprint to cyber criminals to execute similar attacks. UPDATE! 2012 In 2012, the number of malware signed by stolen certificates grows 10x
  • 14. DAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTUST Code Signing Certificates, SSH Key Theft, Server Key Theft & Weak Crypto Exploits DAMAGE LEVEL: WORLD WITHOUT TRUST DAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUST AwarenessVisibilityDetection + + – – Ability to Respond Keys & Certificates IAM IDS Firewall A/V VPN DLP IPS MDM WEAK LINK
  • 15. DAMAGELEDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTHOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WOAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUST Code Signing Certificates, SSH Key Theft, Server Key Theft & Weak Crypto Exploits DAMAGE LEVEL: WORLD WITHOUT TRUST Few are looking at the real problem: 600% = Year over year growth in compromised digital certificates in 2013 TURKTRUST The CA issued two SSL intermediary certificates that could be used to issue certificates for any domain. One of the intermediary certificates was used to issue an SSL certificate put into use for google.com. Google discovered the unauthorized certificate in January 2013 and noted that it was from an intermediary CA that had obtained authority from a TURKTRUST certificate. No foul play was suspected at TURKTRUST, and the damage has yet to be fully assessed. 2013
  • 16. DAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUST Code Signing Certificates, SSH Key Theft, Server Key Theft & Weak Crypto Exploits DAMAGE LEVEL: WORLD WITHOUT TRUST In February, over 800 different trojans launched designed to steal keys and certificates BIT9 HACK Hackers compromised this security provider's network and digitally signed malware using Bit9's own encryption keys, which made it impossible for customers using its cyber defense technologies to know whether or not they were downloading legitimate files or malware. The extent of the damage may never be fully known, but the company claims to provide white-listing services for 30 Fortune 100 firms, almost one-third of the largest companies in the world. 2013
  • 17. DAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUST Code Signing Certificates, SSH Key Theft, Server Key Theft & Weak Crypto Exploits DAMAGE LEVEL: WORLD WITHOUT TRUST APT1 In what has been the most shocking and bold cyber attack revelation to date, Mandiant revealed in its APT1 report that nation-backed, China-based hackers had used self-signed digital certificates to implant malware into hundreds of U.S. companies over a period of several years. As part of the ground-breaking revelation, Mandiant stated that 100 percent of the APTs used compromised digital certificates that included keys and certificates. 2013
  • 18. DAMAGELEVELDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUST Code Signing Certificates, SSH Key Theft, Server Key Theft & Weak Crypto Exploits DAMAGE LEVEL: WORLD WITHOUT TRUST 2013 The Snowden compromise was not so much based on malicious code, but the blind trust organizations have on keys and certificates, while highlighting the lack of control and visibility into these cryptographic assets that provide insiders unfettered access to highly sensitive systems. Snowden used fabricated digital keys to elevate his privileges and gain access to sensitive information. USERNAME: PASSWORD: SNOWDEN
  • 19. DAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTREL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTDAMDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTITHOUTTRUST 100% of over 2,300 Global 2000 organizations surveyed acknowledged having attacks on keys and certificates in the last 2 years Keys & Certificates are under attack They are the perfect target and recipe for success
  • 20. DADAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTWORLDWITHOUTTRUSTDAMAGELEVEL:DAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUST Today’s Cyber criminal Attack Vector of Choice Cryptographic Keys and Certificates Little Awareness or detection capability More than 17,000 in every organization Attackers are granted privileged status No tools for responding to attacks WIDE REACH LOW VIS IBILITY POORRE SPONSE TRUSTE D STATE
  • 21. DAMAGELEVEL:WORLDDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUSTSTDAMAGELEVEL:WORLDWITHOUTTRUS:WORLDWITHOUTTRUST Download the full report: A Historical Overview of the Evolving Cyber Attack Landscape venafi.com/EvolvingCyberattacks