19 c Europe, session 2.9; The German Question, 1850-66

Nineteenth Century Europe
PART 2
session 9
THE GERMAN QUESTION,
1850-1866

Major Themes of This Session
The Evolution of Prussian
Policy
PRUSSIA AFTER 1850
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT
BISMARCK’S POLITICAL IDEAS
From Düppel to Königgrätz
SCHLESWIG AND HOLSTEIN
AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN FRICTION
THE SEVEN WEEKS’WAR
The Consequences of the War
DUALISM IN THE AUSTRIAN EMPIRE
THE SURRENDER OF PRUSSIAN
LIBERALISM
THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION

Most of us are familiar with Bismarck’s “Blood and Iron” dictum.
Some have even heard of von Clausewitz’ “War is merely the continuation of policy by other
means.”
As we review the first two wars of German unification in this session, this is a good time to
develop a philosophy of war. It’s easy to agree to deplore war. Why, then, do states continue to
employ it?”
This session will explore how war settled the German question.
Europe’s “long peace” continues to unravel further. Now, as a another new Great Power emerges
and two others, Austria and France, lose ‘face,’ the final confrontation draws closer.
jbp

Bismarck
“Not through speeches and majority
decisions will the great questions of the
day be decided - that was the great mistake
of 1848 and 1849 - but by iron and blood.”
Sept 29, 1862

“The events that had taken place in Italy in 1859 and 1860 had their counterpart in
Germany in the decade that followed. There too the leadership in the movement toward
national unification was taken by the strongest and economically most progressive of the
interested states. There too the process was achieved by war and by the subsequent
absorption of some of the lesser states by the victor and the imposition of his control over
the others. And there too the victim was Austria, whose position in Germany was
destroyed as completely as her place in Italy had been, with serious resultant
repercussions on the internal structure of the Hapsburg empire.”
Gordon A. Craig, Europe Since 1815, Third Edition. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 1971. p. 204.

The Evolution of Prussian Policy
Prussia After 1850

“To the ordinary observer of German affairs in 1850, it would not have appeared
likely that Prussia would extend her hegemony over Germany in the foreseeable future. It
was true that the Prussian government had shown more imagination in economic affairs
than other governments and had maintained the primacy Prussia had won in commercial
matters when the Zollverein was founded earlier in the century;…”
Ibid.

Zollverein
The Prussian Customs Union

Economic Ties Become Political Ties

• although textiles and clothing still led, iron, steel and machine
works were coming on
• smaller industries: brick kilns, breweries, saw mills were moving
out into the countryside and changing the predominantly
agricultural character of the kingdom

Roads in and outside the Zollverein

“…All of this vitality and development was in sharp contrast to conditions in other
German states and particularly in Austria, where industrial growth was slow,
communications was backward, and government encouragement of economic progress
virtually nonexistent.
“Leaving economic progress aside, however, there were few other obvious
indications of progress in the Prussia of the 1850s and none of the political enlightenment
that would, presumably, be required if Prussia was to become the acknowledged leader of
the movement for national unification.…”
Craig, op. cit., p. 205.

triumphs of material progress
• French building of the Suez Canal, 1869
• Alpine carriage roads and tunnels
• laying of the Transatlantic cable, 1857-1866
• penetration to every seaport in the world of European goods and
peoples
• establishment of European entrepôts in the Far East
• annually 200,000-300,000 European emigrants carried European ideas
and institutions to the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
and Latin America during this period, 1850-1870

“The possibility of Prussia’s playing an independent hand in German affairs and
making any significant contribution to the cause of national unification seemed to be
even further reduced after Frederick William IV yielded the throne to his brother William,
…”
Ibid.

“The possibility of Prussia’s playing an independent hand in German affairs and
making any significant contribution to the cause of national unification seemed to be
even further reduced after Frederick William IV yielded the throne to his brother William,
who became regent in 1858 and king in January 1861. The accession of this ruler was
hailed as the beginning of a ‘new era’; but William was already sixty-one years old when
he became regent and was, if anything, more conservative than his brother. In any case,
his coming to power was followed by a domestic conflict that threatened to take Prussia a
complete nullity in foreign and German affairs.”
Ibid.

•born the second son, William received
little education and was destined for
the army
•1815, he fought at Waterloo and later
served successfully as a diplomat
•1848, he put down a popular revolt,
earning the name of Kartätschenprinz
—Prince of Grapeshot
•1857, his older brother, Fredrick Wm
iv, suffered a stroke and William
became regent
•1861, at his brother’s death, William
became king, age 64
•he was believed to be even more
conservative than his brother

The Constitutional Conﬂict

“The reasons for [the constitutional conflict] were rooted in the character of William I.
A soldier by profession, he had long been critical of certain aspects of Prussian military
organization and particularly of two things: the restriction of the term of active service.…
to two years, and the heavy reliance placed upon a civilian militia (Landwehr) that
elected its own officers and was largely independent of the regular army. In February
1860, on the basis of his war minister Albrecht von Roon (1803-1879),…”
Craig, op. cit., pp. 205-06.

“The reasons for [the constitutional conflict] were rooted in the character of William I.
A soldier by profession, he had long been critical of certain aspects of Prussian military
organization and particularly of two things: the restriction of the term of active service.…
to two years, and the heavy reliance placed upon a civilian militia (Landwehr) that
elected its own officers and was largely independent of the regular army. In February
1860, on the basis of his war minister Albrecht von Roon (1803-1879), William laid an
army reorganization bill before the Prussian parliament. It called for a marked increase in
the annual number of conscripts in order to provide for a regular army double its present
size; it lengthened the term of service to three years, with corresponding adjustments for
special services and the reserves; it sharply diminished the role and the independence of
the Landwehr; and it asked for a greatly expanded military budget to pay for the new
regiments envisaged, as well as for barracks, schools, and training grounds.”
Craig, op. cit., pp. 205-06.

“This bill aroused the immediate opposition of the
Prussian middle class…and its representatives…
who now controlled the majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies
When William dissolved the legislature in 1862 and called for new
elections; the majority against the Army bill was even larger
“What followed was a complete and dangerous deadlock.
“Emboldened by their electoral success and led now by the new
Progressive party,• the liberal opposition became…more intransigent
“… the conservative forces, confronted by what seemed to them to be a
revival of the spirit of 1848, became equally inﬂexible and increasingly
inclined to listen to those reactionaries who argued that force alone
would solve the parliamentary problem….”
op. cit.,, pp. 206-07.

“The king resisted the advice of his more reactionary advisers, for he had sworn to
uphold the constitution and he took his oath seriously. But he resented the pretensions of
the parliamentarians and refused either to yield to their desires or to undo the military
reforms already instituted. Since the Chamber simultaneously held to its refusal to vote
any funds for the conduct of state affairs unless it had its way, Prussian government was
threatened with complete paralysis, and the king, in despair, seriously considered giving
up his throne. When he had got to the point of drafting an abdication note, however, his
war minister urged him to see whether a new chief minister might be able to break the
impasse and persuaded him, in September 1862, to appoint Otto von Bismarck
(1815-1898) as his minister president.”
op. cit., p. 207.

Bismarck’s Political Ideas

“Because it was known that he had been an outspoken foe of the revolution of March
1848 and had violently opposed all royal concessions made at that time, Bismarck was
generally considered to be a reactionary; and his appointment was greeted with
satisfaction by those who hoped to crush liberalism once and for all. In reality, although
he was himself an East Elbian landholder, the new minister president had none of the
provincialism of his fellow Junker, nor was he, like them, preoccupied only with the
domestic issues involved in the constitutional conflict. Since 1850, he had been serving
his country as a diplomat, first in the Diet of the Germanic Confederation at
Frankfurt[where he clashed with Friedrich, count von Thun und Hohenstein, Austria’s
delegate and president of the Diet], later in St. Petersburg and Paris; and this experience
had broadened his vision and his ambitions for Prussia. Far from sharing the sentimental
attachment to Austria that Prussian conservatives generally favored, he was convinced
that it was Prussia’s destiny to extend her power in Germany, and that this could only be
accomplished only at the expense of Austria. As early as 1856 Bismarck had written:
‘Germany id clearly too small for us both.…In the not too distant future, we shall have to
fight for our existence against Austria…since the course of events in Germany has no
other solution.’ ”
op. cit., p. 207.

Die deutsche Frage (The German Question),
1850-1866
With or without
Austria?
Groß oder
Klein deutsch
(greater or
lesser German
[solution])
THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION
1815-1866

“Bismarck’s views on the German question necessarily influenced his attitude toward
the conflict with parliament. He fully agreed with the king’s desire to reform the army,
which would, after all, be the instrument that assured Prussian growth; and, as a supporter
of the monarchial principle, he was opposed to any increase in parliamentary powers. On
the other hand, he knew that in the eventual struggle with Austria, Prussia would need the
intelligence and industry of the middle classes just as much as the valor of the army and
that the liberal opposition, for economic and other reasons, would be more sympathetic to
his German plans than the conservatives. He had no desire to turn the clock back by
smashing the constitutional regime, for this would merely confirm Prussia’s servitude to
Austria.
“After an initial attempt to persuade the parliamentary opposition to compromise was
unsuccessful, Bismarck did not therefore go over to the camp of the extreme absolutists
but struck out on a completely novel line. He decided to ignore the chamber’s failure to
support the government’s policy. If the Chamber of Deputies would not vote the budget,
he said, ‘we will take the money where we find it.’ He ordered the civil service to carry
out their duties—including those of recruiting troops and collecting the taxes needed to
support government activities—with no regard for the speeches in parliament; and he
punished or dismissed national, provincial, or city officials who had any qualms about
this or who associated with the Progressive party in any way.”
op. cit., pp. 207-08.

“These tactics kept the government going. They did not weaken the parliamentary
opposition, which increased its strength in the elections of 1863; but this was an illusory
gain. Bismarck was by now looking beyond the wall of parliament to the world of foreign
affairs. It was his belief that an active and successful foreign policy, which demonstrated
the need for an effective army, would break the opposition and swing many of the liberals
to his side; and he was determined to act upon this principle.
“His first sally into foreign politics did not justify his hopes, although it was
successful to a degree not realized at the time. At th end of 1862 the Russian government
promulgated a decree calling for the conscription of young Poles into the Russian army
and, in doing so, gave the patriotic party of Polish students and army officers the kind of
issue they had long been waiting for. They hastily improvised a network of cells to
sabotage the conscription process and drew up plans for an insurrection, which ultimately
broke out in January 1863.…”
op. cit.,, p. 208.

“…The Polish cause aroused sympathy in western Europe, particularly in France, and
Napoleon III, always sensitive to public opinion, mounted a diplomatic campaign to force
the tsar to restore to the Poles the autonomous position they had lost in 1831. To the
disgust of German liberals, Bismarck took a contrary line and concluded a secret
convention with the Russian government providing for collaboration in suppressing the
revolt. He did this out of fear that the tsar might otherwise defer to the pressure of the
Western Powers and free Poland, in which case Prussia could expect serious trouble in
her own Polish districts..”
op. cit.,, pp. 208-09.

her own Polish districts.• Bismarck’s action paid unexpected dividends. It not only
encouraged the tsar to stand firm (so that Napoleon’s efforts on behalf of the Poles came
to nothing to the clamant dissatisfaction of his own subjects) but it helped persuade him
to reorient his foreign policy, breaking off the cordial relations that he had had since the
Crimean War with France and inaugurating a friendship with Russia that was to last for
almost thirty years.
“Bismarck’s convention with Russia was not of any immediate use in solving his
domestic troubles, for it was roundly attacked by the liberals. Their opposition was to be
far less united, however, to the minister president’s next move in the foreign field.”
op. cit.,, pp. 208-09.

her own Polish districts. Bismarck’s action paid unexpected dividends. It not only
encouraged the tsar to stand firm (so that Napoleon’s efforts on behalf of the Poles came
to nothing to the clamant dissatisfaction of his own subjects) but it helped persuade him
to reorient his foreign policy, breaking off the cordial relations that he had had since the
Crimean War with France and inaugurating a friendship with Russia that was to last for
almost thirty years.
“Bismarck’s convention with Russia was not of any immediate use in solving his
domestic troubles, for it was roundly attacked by the liberals. Their opposition was to be
far less united, however, to the minister president’s next move in the foreign field.”
op. cit.,, pp. 208-09.

Schleswig and Holstein

“In the last months of 1863 a new chapter opened in the tangled history of
Schleswig and Holstein. Those provinces, thanks to the historical accident that one of
their dukes had become king of Denmark, had been among the personal possessions of
the Danish sovereign, without actually being part of the Danish kingdom. A further
complication arose from the fact that Holstein, whose population was almost entirely
German, was a member of the Germanic Confederation,• while Schleswig was not,
although its German citizens, comprising two thirds of its population, wished it to
become so. This last wish was violently opposed by the Danish minority, which wanted
Schleswig to be absorbed by Denmark; and in November 1863, the wishes of these
nationalists were gratified by the promulgation of a new Danish constitution, which
declared Schleswig an integral part of the kingdom.”
op. cit., p. 209.

“This action was resisted in both Schleswig and Holstein, and it aroused a wave
of nationalistic indignation in Germany, where the Federal Diet immediately
protested and, when this was unavailing, ordered a federal army to prevent the
execution of the terms of Denmark’s new constitution. Throughout Germany there
was a vocal desire for the severance of all ties between Denmark and the two
duchies, and the establishment of the two latter as independent members of the
Confederation.
“Bismarck’s conduct in the subsequent course of this dispute was so devious
that one cannot, with any confidence, say what his thoughts and intentions were at
any given moment. It seems clear, however, that he was always opposed to a
solution that would have turned the duchies, which were of great potential
strategic importance to Prussia, into independent federal states; and he probably
thought from the beginning in terms of eventual Prussian annexation.…”
op. cit., pp. 209-10.

“…He did not, in any case, publish his true views but instead—when the crisis
broke out—stood forward as a defender of the treaty of 1852, by which the
European Concert had assured the king of Denmark possession of the duchies,
provided their autonomous position was left unchanged. He urged the Austrian
government to join Prussia in upholding international law, and the Vienna
government, doubtless feeling that it might be awkward to do anything else,
agreed. Disregarding the action of the Germanic Confederation, therefore, the two
powers sent an ultimatum to the Danes, demanding that the new constitution be
revoked; and, when the Danes refused (as Bismarck had calculated they would),
they declared war.”
op. cit., p. 210.

8 brigades angreb ved Dybbøl 1864, by Vilhelm Rosenstand (1894)

“The Danish war is important for several reasons. It provided a baptism of fire,
and a completely gratifying one, for the new Prussian army. It was in the
campaign in Jutland that the field commanders who were later to defeat Austrian
and French armies were tested, and it was here that the architect of those later
victories, Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891),…”
op. cit., pp. 209-10.

“The Danish war is important for several reasons. It provided a baptism of fire,
and a completely gratifying one, for the new Prussian army. It was in the
campaign in Jutland that the field commanders who were later to defeat Austrian
and French armies were tested, and it was here that the architect of those later
victories, Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891), won the
confidence of the king.And it was in this war, and particularly in the successful
assault on the formidable Danish strongpoint of Düppel, that the army as a whole
called itself to the attention of Europe. The victory at Düppel was described by the
historian Droysen as ‘one of the events that mark an epoch in a nation’s history’;
and this is just, for it aroused a degree of patriotic pride that simultaneously
weakened liberal opposition to the much-contested army reform and strengthened
the tendency of German nationalists to look to Prussia for leadership.”
op. cit., pp. 209-10.

“Aside from this, the Danish war demonstrated the inadequacy of the European
Concert in this new age, for, when the European powers, midway in the war, held
a conference on the Schleswig-Holstein question, they were unable to agree on a
settlement that would satisfy all parties and were powerless to prevent the
resumption of hostilities, which continued until Denmark was defeated by the
German powers and deprived of the duchies.”
Ibid.

Austro-Prussian Friction

“The comradeship in arms against the Danes had temporarily relieved a
deterioration of Austro-Prussian relations that had continued since 1859 and had
been marked, on each side, by economic maneuvering and attempts to reform the
machinery of the Germanic Confederation to its own advantage. The
rapprochement effected by the war was, however, quickly broken down by the
failure of the allies to agree on the disposition of the spoils. Denmark, in defeat,
had been forced to hand Schleswig and Holstein over to the victors; and it was up
to them to decide their future. The Austrian government advocated the
establishment of a separate Schleswig-Holstein state; Bismarck, with annexation
in the back of his mind, took the position that this could be permitted only on
condition that far-reaching military and commercial rights be granted to Prussia—
that Kiel, for instance, be made a Prussian naval base.• To this the Austrians, not
unnaturally, refused to agree.”
op. cit., p. 210.

“This Austrian opposition had the effect of causing a fundamental change in
the attitude of the Prussian court, and of Prussian conservatives in general, toward
the Habsburg monarchy. The king, who was proud of his army’s performance in
the recent war, gradually, unconsciously, but nonetheless firmly, began to regard
the duchies as having been won by Prussia alone and to view Austria’s policy as
an attempt to deprive Prussian troops of their legitimate reward; and, like him, the
traditionally pro-Austrian conservative circles showed increasing irritation over
Austrian tactics. It is significant that, in May 1865, a Prussian crown council could
actually discuss the advisability of making war upon Austria if her government did
not change its position.
“The Prussian government did not force the issue in 1865, primarily because
it realized that the power that took the initiative in precipitating a territorial
dispute would find German public opinion solidly against it. Instead, after much
involved haggling, the two disputants concluded the so-called Convention of
Gastein (August 1865),…”
op. cit., pp. 210-11.

“This Austrian opposition had the effect of causing a fundamental change in
the attitude of the Prussian court, and of Prussian conservatives in general, toward
the Habsburg monarchy.• The king, who was proud of his army’s performance in
the recent war, gradually, unconsciously, but nonetheless firmly, began to regard
the duchies as having been won by Prussia alone and to view Austria’s policy as
an attempt to deprive Prussian troops of their legitimate reward; and, like him, the
traditionally pro-Austrian conservative circles showed increasing irritation over
Austrian tactics. It is significant that, in May 1865, a Prussian crown council could
actually discuss the advisability of making war upon Austria if her government did
not change its position.
“The Prussian government did not force the issue in 1865, primarily because
it realized that the power that took the initiative in precipitating a territorial
dispute would find German public opinion solidly against it. Instead, after much
involved haggling, the two disputants concluded the so-called Convention of
Gastein (August 1865), by which they divided the duchies between them—Austria
taking over the administration of Holstein and Prussia that of Schleswig.…•”
op. cit., pp. 210-11.

“…It is difficult to understand why the Austrians agreed to this arrangement, or
why they insisted it be a provisional rather than a definitive one, for this meant
that Prussia reserved her rights in Holstein and could protest against anything that
happened there that was not to her liking. This blunder played into Bismarck’s hands and
enabled him to create incidents that, he hoped, would further alienate his sovereign’s
sympathies from Vienna and might even goad the Austrians into injudicious action that
would give Prussia an excuse for war.
“Meanwhile, the minister president took the political steps that he felt would assure
success if the Austrians were persuaded to force the issue. In the first place, he made his
diplomatic preparations for war. He was reasonably sure that neither Great Britain nor
Russia would intervene; but France’s attitude was doubtful and, like Cavour before him,
Bismarck found it expedient to have discussions with Napoleon III. These took place at
Biarritz in October 1865,…”
op. cit., p. 211.

“…It is difficult to understand why the Austrians agreed to this arrangement, or
why they insisted it be a provisional rather than a definitive one, for this meant
that Prussia reserved her rights in Holstein and could protest against anything that
happened there that was not to her liking. This blunder played into Bismarck’s hands and
enabled him to create incidents that, he hoped, would further alienate his sovereign’s
sympathies from Vienna and might even goad the Austrians into injudicious action that
would give Prussia an excuse for war.
“Meanwhile, the minister president took the political steps that he felt would assure
success if the Austrians were persuaded to force the issue. In the first place, he made his
diplomatic preparations for war. He was reasonably sure that neither Great Britain nor
Russia would intervene; but France’s attitude was doubtful and, like Cavour before him,
Bismarck found it expedient to have discussions with Napoleon III.• These took place at
Biarritz in October 1865, and, while no written agreement was made, there seems to have
been an understanding that France would remain neutral in the case of a German war,
although she might receive some territorial compensation along the Rhine if a successful
Prussia felt called upon to make extensive annexations in Germany.…”
op. cit., p. 211.

“…The vagueness of this agreement, if it may be called that, was probably due to
Napoleon’s belief that a German war would be a protracted struggle with results far
different from those imagined by Bismarck and that his own role and compensation
would be best determined during the hostilities. But the Biarritz meeting gave Bismarck a
reasonable assurance against interference by France;…”
op. cit., pp. 211-12.

“…The vagueness of this agreement, if it may be called that, was probably due to
Napoleon’s belief that a German war would be a protracted struggle with results far
different from those imagined by Bismarck and that his own role and compensation
would be best determined during the hostilities. But the Biarritz meeting gave Bismarck a
reasonable assurance against interference by France; and he strengthened it, and created
military complications for his opponents, by concluding an alliance with the government
of Italy in April 1866, by which Italy agreed to fight on Prussia’s side if war came within
the next three months, and Prussia agreed to reward her with the province of Venetia.
This pact with Italy was a violation of Prussia’s obligations the Germanic Confederation,
which bound her not to make alliances against fellow members; but Bismarck was too
much the Realpolitiker to be deterred by that.
“Simultaneously, Bismarck made his bid for the support of German public opinion
by proposing a thoroughgoing reform of the Germanic Confederation, to be effected by
adding to that body a national assembly elected by universal suffrage in all the member
states. This revolutionary proposal, which summoned up memories of the Frankfurt
Assembly and which could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be accepted by the
Austrian government, bewildered but impressed liberal opinion throughout Germany,
which had long been drawn to Prussia by her economic and political vigor but repelled by
her reputation for reactionary government and militarism.…”
op. cit., pp. 211-12.

“Bismarck’s tactics in Holstein and the Diet at Frankfurt were in the end
successful. As early as April 1866, the Austrians had convinced themselves that war
was inevitable—‘How can one avoid war,’ Francis Joseph was reported to have
said,’when the other side wants it?’—and, after that, they neither tried very hard to
avoid it nor guarded against measures that might seem to indicate that they were
responsible for causing it. They actually resigned themselves to the loss of Venetia,
promising Napoleon III (who was by now negotiating with both sides) that they
would cede it to him for transfer to Italy if he would maintain a benevolent neutrality
in case of war. One might have thought that knowledge that Venetia was lost to them
regardless of the fortunes of war would have persuaded the Vienna cabinet to grasp at
any straw to avoid a conflict. Instead it was Austria that first began the mobilization
of troops; and, when Napoleon III suggested an international conference of the
powers to consider the whole German question, it was Austria’s objections and
conditions that made the meeting impossible.”
op. cit., p. 212.
“…To the extent that it did so, it prepared the way for the radical revision of the
tenets of German liberalism that was soon to come.

“After that events moved swiftly. On June 1, 1866, Austria brought the
Schleswig-Holstein question before the Diet of the Germanic Confederation, a
move of questionable legality which Bismarck promptly described as a violation
of the Gastein Convention. The Prussians immediately moved into Holstein. The
Austrian government countered with a demand for military action by the
Confederation against Prussia, and the Diet voted in favor of this on June 14. The
Prussian government had warned that this would be considered a declaration of
war. They now declared the Confederation dissolved and threw their armies into
the field.”
Ibid.

The Seven Weeks’War

“The war between Austria and Prussia lasted a scant seven weeks and ended with
the overwhelming defeat of Austria. The Austrian debacle was the result of a number
of factors. The army, for one thing, had not kept abreast of the latest military
advances. Its administration and its intelligence and staff work were lamentably
deficient in comparison with the Prussian army’s general staff system,…”
op. cit., p. 212.

“The war between Austria and Prussia lasted a scant seven weeks and ended with
the overwhelming defeat of Austria. The Austrian debacle was the result of a number
of factors. The army, for one thing, had not kept abreast of the latest military
advances. Its administration and its intelligence and staff work were lamentably
deficient in comparison with the Prussian army’s general staff system, which was
unrivaled for efficiency in Europe. Its commanding generals, including Benedek, the
commander-in-chief on the Bohemian front, lacked confidence and—thanks to the
role played by imperial favoritism in the upper echelons of the army—had
insufficient control over their subordinates….”
op. cit., p. 212.

“…The [Austrian] troops were willing and brave, but they were trained in outmoded
shock tactics in a day when battles were won by superior firepower [a situation to be
replayed with even more horrible results in WW I]; and they found it virtually
impossible to come to grips with the Prussian infantry who were armed with the new
Dreyse ‘needle-gun,’ a breech-loading rifle that fired farther and more rapidly than
their own….”
op. cit., pp. 212-13.

“…The [Austrian] troops were willing and brave, but they were trained in outmoded
shock tactics in a day when battles were won by superior firepower [a situation to be
replayed with even more horrible results in WW I]; and they found it virtually
impossible to come to grips with the Prussian infantry who were armed with the new
Dreyse ‘needle-gun,’ a breech-loading rifle that fired farther and more rapidly than
their own.
“In addition, Italy’s intervention in the war forced Austria to fight on two fronts
and made impossible a concentration of all forces against Prussia. This need not have
been as serious as it turned out to be, for, as early as June 24, the Austrians virtually
knocked Italy out of the war by a crushing victory at Custoza,• which should have
freed troops for transfer to the Bohemian front.”
op. cit., pp. 212-13.

“But the truly decisive factor in the war proved to be Austria’s deficiency in
railroads. This not only made the movement of troops from the Italian front difficult
but reduced Austrian mobility and paralyzed Austrian energies generally. The fact that
there was only one main line running north from Vienna to Olmütz meant that the
route to the main theater of the war was clogged. It was this that prevented Austrian
troops, despite a head start in mobilization, from effecting a juncture with their
German allies and deprived Benedek of the reinforcements he wanted when he took
his stand on the Bohemian plain….”
op. cit., pp. 212-13.

“But the truly decisive factor in the war proved to be Austria’s deficiency in
railroads. This not only made the movement of troops from the Italian front difficult
but reduced Austrian mobility and paralyzed Austrian energies generally. The fact that
there was only one main line running north from Vienna to Olmütz meant that the
route to the main theater of the war was clogged. It was this that prevented Austrian
troops, despite a head start in mobilization, from effecting a juncture with their
German allies and deprived Benedek of the reinforcements he wanted when he took
his stand on the Bohemian plain.
“In contrast, the Prussians had a highly developed rail net • that enabled the chief
of staff, Moltke, to deploy his troops along an arc 600 miles wide,.…”
op. cit., pp. 212-13.

German families bid farewell to troops traveling to the Austrian
front in freight cars

Origin of Red and Blue significance
Drawing inspiration from Chess, Hellwig, Master of Pages to the Duke of
Brunswick, created a battle emulation game in 1780. According to Max Boot's
book War Made New (2006), p. 122, sometime between 1803 and 1809, the
Prussian General Staff developed war games, with staff officers moving metal
pieces around on a game table (with blue pieces representing their forces and red
pieces those of the enemy), using dice rolls to indicate random chance and with a
referee scoring the results. Increasingly realistic variations became part of military
training in the 19th century in many nations, and were called Kriegsspiel or
"wargame". Wargames or military exercises remain an important part of military
training today.—Wikipedia
My explanation is shaped by this military usage. I learned in the ‘50s that the enemy was
colored red from this 19th century usage—red for revolutionaries—and blue for ‘good guys’/
Prussians, conservatives, ‘true blue’ &c. So when did the Main Stream Media start labelling the
Democrats the ‘good guys’ and Republicans the ‘enemies?’ Wikipedia has a very complex
answer to that question here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_states_and_blue_states . But I
found NBC taking credit here:
In the early days of color T.V. the networks made graphics a big feature of their political news
reporting and someone at NBC cooked this branding up. Makes sense to me—jbp
https://www.npr.org/2014/11/13/363762677/the-color-of-politics-how-did-red-and-blue-states-come-to-be

Origin of Red and Blue significance
Drawing inspiration from Chess, Hellwig, Master of Pages to the Duke of Brunswick,
created a battle emulation game in 1780. According to Max Boot's book War Made New
(2006), p. 122, sometime between 1803 and 1809, the Prussian General Staff developed
war games, with staff officers moving metal pieces around on a game table (with blue
pieces representing their forces and red pieces those of the enemy), using dice rolls to
indicate random chance and with a referee scoring the results. Increasingly realistic
variations became part of military training in the 19th century in many nations, and were
called Kriegsspiel or "wargame". Wargames or military exercises remain an important part
of military training today.—Wikipedia
https://www.npr.org/2014/11/13/363762677/the-color-of-politics-how-did-red-and-blue-states-come-to-be

So when did we become a nation of red states and blue states? And what do they mean
when they say a state is turning purple?
Painting whole states with a broad brush bothers a lot of people, and if you're one of
them you may want to blame the media. We've been using these designations rather
vigorously for the last half-dozen election cycles or so as a quick way to describe the
vote in given state in a given election, or its partisan tendencies over a longer period.
It got started on TV, the original electronic visual, when NBC, the first all-color
network, unveiled an illuminated map — snazzy for its time — in 1976. John
Chancellor was the NBC election night anchor who explained how states were going to
be blue if they voted for incumbent Republican Gerald Ford, red if they voted for
Democratic challenger Jimmy Carter.
That arrangement was consistent with the habit of many texts and reference books,
which tended to use blue for Republicans in part because blue was the color of the
Union in the Civil War. Blue is also typically associated with the more conservative
parties in Europe and elsewhere.
As the other TV operations went to full color, they too added vivid maps to their
election night extravaganzas. But they didn't agree on a color scheme, so viewers
switching between channels might see Ronald Reagan's landslide turning the
landscape blue on NBC and CBS but red on ABC.—Ibid.

“In contrast, the Prussians had a highly developed rail net that enabled the chief
of staff, Moltke, to deploy his troops along an arc 600 miles wide,…from the Elbe to
the Neisse, to overrun the middle states and defeat the army of Hanover, and then to
concentrates forces against Benedek.”
op. cit., p. 213.

SILESIA (PRUSSIA)
BOHEMIA (AUSTRIA)
SAXONY
(INDEPENDENT)
POLAND
(RUSSIA)

night of 26 June
two Prussian armies
cross the Iser River

27June
Benedek, despite
great loses, defeats
Prussian 2nd army
near Tratenau

29 June
Prussian 1st army
defeats Benedek at
Jitschin

“…After a series of clashes between isolated units in places where the armies of
Frederick the Great had maneuvered against the Austrians a century earlier, the
decisive battle of the war was fought on July 3, 1866 in the hilly terrain between the
Bohemian towns of Sadowa and Königgrätz. One of the greatest battles of the modern
era (between 440,000 and 460,000 men were engaged), this encounter was also an
almost perfect illustration of the way in which Moltke’s principle of ‘dispersed
advance but concentration on the battlefield’ could be applied to encircle and defeat
an enemy….
op. cit., pp. 213-14.

The Turning Point
Batterie Myrtich—Battery of the Dead
by 1515 Prussian artillery had replaced them
on this commanding position, and the battle
turned into an Austrian route

The Prussian King Wilhelm I, Bismarck and General Helmuth von Moltke the Elder observe the largest encirclement in
military history: On July 3, 1866, approximately 180,000 Austrians faced 200,000 Prussians. 1,500 guns were used. With the
victory of the Prussian army, the way for a uniﬁcation opened under Prussian leadership - without Austria—painted by
George Bleibtrau, after 1869—Wikipedia
Note the Red Cross emblem on the stretcher bearer carrying oﬀ the Austrian wounded POW • —jbp

“For the student of the political aspects of military affairs the war between Austria
and Prussia has a special interest, for it illustrates the sharp conflict between civilian
and military authority that became commonplace as techniques of warfare expanded
in scope and in technical complexity.• After Königgrätz Bismarck had serious
difficulties with the Prussian high command which, now that it smelled victory,
wished to make it as big as possible, with heavy annexations of Austrian territory and
a triumphal march in the Austrian capital. Bismarck opposed this plan because it
would needlessly protract the war, thus increasing the risk of intervention by the other
powers….”
op. cit., p. 214.

in scope and in technical complexity. After Königgrätz Bismarck had serious
powers. During July, through his ambassador in Paris,• he was carrying on delicate
negotiations with Napoleon III, seeking to win his permission to organize all north
Germany into a new confederation under Prussian leadership and, simultaneously, to
make very extensive annexations.…”
op. cit., p. 214.

in scope and in technical complexity.• After Königgrätz Bismarck had serious
powers. During July, through his ambassador in Paris,• he was carrying on delicate
negotiations with Napoleon III, seeking to win his permission to organize all north
Germany into a new confederation under Prussian leadership and, simultaneously, to
make very extensive annexations. He was afraid that the policy favored by the
soldiers and the king would make those negotiations fail and bring Napoleon to
Austria’s side.• Moreover, he saw no point in inflicting needless punishment on
Austria, for this would only serve as a barrier to future friendship.”
op. cit., p. 214.

the Bund was dissolved and Austria renounced all hope of German
leadership

“After the great victory in Bohemia, then, Bismarck boldly opposed all military plans
for new advances to the southeast, and by doing so he earned the dislike of Moltke and
the circle of young general staff officers, ‘the demigods,’ who resented a civilian
intervening in what they considered a strictly military sphere. Four years later, during the
war against France, they showed that their resentment was still alive by seeking to
exclude Bismarck from all strategic conferences, even when political issues were at stake.
In 1870 as in 1866, however, Bismarck had his way, pointing out that as long as he was
responsible for policy, he could not cede his power to soldiers simply because there
happened to be a war on, and that, in any case, wars were fought for political objectives
and should stop when those objectives were achieved. In 1866, he was aided in winning
his point by Napoleon III’s agreement that Prussia could have the annexations she desired
in north Germany and could organize Germany north of the Main [River] into a
confederation, provided the southern states of Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria
remained independent and Saxony was not wholly destroyed. Even so, to make King
William, who was more belligerent than his most belligerent soldiers, agree to peace on
these handsome terms was not easy; and before William was won over Bismarck had to
enlist the support of the crown prince and threaten resignation.”
Ibid.

“Peace terms were drawn up at Nikolsburg in July and confirmed and completed by
the Peace of Prague a month later. Austria was forced to recognize its permanent
separation from Germany, to pay a small indemnity, and to cede Venetia to Italy.
Otherwise it lost nothing.• Its German allies were less fortunate. The kingdom of
Hanover, the duchies of Nassau and Hesse-Cassel, and the free city of Frankfurt were
annexed by Prussia, whose territory was now united by the absorption of all the states
between her eastern and western provinces and increased by 1300 square miles and four
and a half million new subjects. All north Germany was under Prussian control, and even
the independence of the southern states, upon which Napoleon III had insisted, was
compromised,• for, immediately after the re-establishment of peace, Bismarck negotiated
offensive and defensive military alliances with all of them.”
op. cit., pp. 214-15.

Christian Sell’s lithograph of the Battle of Königgrätz dates from 1866. In the central scene, Prussia’s King Wilhelm I pursues the
retreating Austrians while accepting the “Hurrahs!” of his victorious foot-soldiers and cavalry. The painting also features specific
parts of the battlefield and turning points in the day’s events, including, at the lower right, the cavalry battle that ensued during the
Austrians’ panicked flight from the field of battle towards the town of Königgrätz.—Wikipedia

Dualism in the Austrian Empire

Ausgleich (Compromise)
of 1867

“Austria’s defeat and its subsequent exclusion from Germany made it imperative for
the Hapsburg monarchy to hasten the execution of plans that transformed the internal
structure of the empire but which, as events were to prove, aggravated rather than
alleviated its most pressing internal problems. To understand this change it is necessary to
return, very briefly, to the events of 1848-1849.
“The revolutions of those years had shaken the empire to its foundations and had
revealed grave dissatisfaction, on the part of Austria’s subject nationalities, with a form of
government that did not recognize their historic rights or give scope to their cultural
differences. They seemed to indicate further that a federal structure—similar to that
proposed in the constitution drawn up at Kremsier—would have the best chance of
holding the multinational empire together. These things, however, were completely
disregarded by Francis Joseph and the Schwarzenberg government, who, after the
revolutions had been suppressed, made absolutism and centralization their guiding
principles. In the ten years that followed, local diets were abolished and the ancient
constitution of Hungary was declared in abeyance; and the empire was ruled by an
elaborately bureaucratic machine. This was directed by the minister of the interior,
Alexander Bach, who sent his civil servants (the so-called Bach Hussars) into every nook
and cranny of the empire.…”
op. cit., p. 215.

On 18 February 1853, Franz Joseph survived an assassination attempt by Hungarian nationalist János Libényi.[11] The emperor was taking a
stroll with one of his ofﬁcers, Count Maximilian Karl Lamoral O'Donnell, on a city bastion, when Libényi approached him. He immediately struck
the emperor from behind with a knife straight at the neck. Franz Joseph almost always wore a uniform, which had a high collar that almost
completely enclosed the neck. The collars of uniforms at that time were made from very sturdy material, precisely to counter this kind of attack.

“Most implacable in their resistance were the Magyars of Hungary, who found a leader
in Francis Déak (1803-1876),• a superb tactician who exploited all the weaknesses of the
imperial government. Déak was no extremist; he set his face against the ambitions of
exiles like Kossuth, who dreamed of Hungarian independence, because he did not believe
that Hungary could stand alone. But he insisted that agreement with the Vienna
government was possible only on the basis of the restoration to Hungary of all the
liberties she had won in 1848; and, until these were granted, he advocated a policy of non
collaboration on Hungary’s part—which meant refusal to participate in meetings of the
Imperial Diet or to pay taxes or to participate in other imperial activities.
“The opposition of the subject nationalities made the efficient operation of the imperial
system impossible, and, as Francis Joseph’s ministers became convinced that war with
Prussia was unavoidable, they were oppressed with visions of strikes and military
desertions like those that had occurred during the war of 1859. They decided, therefore,
to temporize and entered into negotiations with the most formidable of the dissidents, the
Magyars. These discussions were interrupted by the outbreak of the war with Prussia, and
it is impossible to say what their result would have been had that war been won. The fact
that it was not won, however, made it inevitable that an arrangement would be reached on
Hungary’s terms….”
op. cit., p. 216.

“The Compromise had the long-run effect of transforming the desire of the subject
nationalities for autonomy within the empire into a desire for independence from the
empire. As early as 1867, for instance, Czech leaders went to Moscow to attend a Pan-
Slav congress; and in July 1868 the celebration in Prague of the anniversary of the birth
of John Huss was so obviously an anti-Hapsburg demonstration that the city had to be
placed under martial law. This was a sign of things to come. In short, the defeat in
Germany, which might have led to the kind of reform of the imperial structure that would
encourage internal harmony and peaceful development, bought instead an exacerbation of
the national differences that were to pull the empire to pieces.”
op. cit., p. 217.

The Surrender of Prussian Liberalism

“When the Prussian army smashed Benedek’s forces at Königgrätz, it simultaneously
inflicted a decisive defeat upon the liberal opposition in the Chamber of Deputies. The
vigor and enthusiasm with which the liberals had opposed the royal military reforms in
1862 and 1863 had begun to wane during the campaign against Denmark and had been
further attenuated when Bismarck announced in April 1866,• that he favored a basic
reform of the Germanic Confederation and the creation of a national assembly elected by
universal manhood suffrage. It disappeared almost completely as the war with Austria
approached, for even the diehards of the Progressive party began to see that their
opposition was losing them the support not only of the masses, who were filled with
patriotic spirit, but also of the middle classes, who had formerly supported them in their
fight against Bismarck but who were now becoming convinced that his policies promised
to create the national unity that they had always advocated.
op. cit., p. 217.

Supported by the rising bourgeois middle class, the "Progressives" had the largest group in the
Prussian Lower House between 1861 and 1865. In 1862 their refusal to furthermore pass the
government budget for a reorganization of the Prussian Army instigated by War Minister Albrecht
von Roon led to the resignation of the centrist Prime Minister Prince Charles Anthony of
Hohenzollern. King William, on the verge of his abdication, was persuaded by Roon to appoint the
young conservative Otto von Bismarck Prussian Minister President. Bismarck ignored the
parliament's blockade by proclaiming his Lückentheorie ("gap theory"), whereafter in a deadlock
situation between the king and the assembly, for want of provision by the Prussian Constitution,
the decision of the monarch had to tip the balance.
Bismarck was able to keep the public indignation covered, accompanied by his famous Blood and
Iron speech in the Prussian Abgeordnetenhaus [1862].• He continued to rule against the
parliamentary majority, while the MPs of the Progressive Party found themselves unable to
overthrow his government. In 1866, upon the Prussian victory at the Battle of Königgrätz ending
the Austro-Prussian War, Bismarck initiated a law confirming the parliament's power of the purse,
but also granting an amnesty for the arbitrary conduct of his government. Meant as an attempt for
reconciliation, a vast majority of the parliament approved it, however the liberals were at strife
among themselves and the Progressive Party finally split apart. In 1867 the right wing which
supported Bismarck's policy seceded to form the National Liberal Party. In 1868 a democratic-
republican wing in Southern Germany seceded to form German People's Party.---Wikipedia

English: Leading politicians of the
National Liberal Party of Germany
(Woodcut c. 1878):
• Top row (L-R):
• Wilhelm Wehrenpfennig
• Eduard Lasker
• Heinrich von Treitschke
• Johannes von Miquel
• Bottom row (L-R):
• Franz von Roggenbach
• Karl Braun
• Rudolf von Gneist
• Ludwig Bamberger

“Thus in October 1866, the Progressive party [Fortschrittspartei] split in two. One
group announced their complete acceptance of Bismarck’s foreign policy, adding, almost
as an afterthought, that in domestic affairs they would carry out ‘the duties of a vigilant
and loyal opposition.’ This marked the birth of the National Liberal party, which was to
be the chief spokesman of the middle classes in the next generation; but the gulf that
separated its principles from those of the liberalism of 1848 and 1862 may be seen in the
words of one of its members, who said: ‘The time of ideals is past.…Politicians must ask
themselves today less what is desirable than what is attainable.’ Middle class liberals had
become somewhat ashamed of their earlier history and seemed determined to
demonstrate that they were as realistic and as capable of appreciating the importance of
facts as anyone else. All of this showed how effective Bismarck had been in debauching
the values of his opponents so that they could now forget their former desire for freedom
in face of the seductive attractions of force and its achievements.
“Two other points may be made in this connection. In the first place, the Prussian
victory over Austria, soon to be followed by an even more glorious victory over France,
weakened the self-confidence of the middle classes when they compared themselves to
the aristocracy.…”
op. cit., pp. 218-19.

“…There had been a time when when their own economic triumphs and their virtual
monopoly of both wealth and culture had made them think of themselves as the future
ruling class of Germany and encouraged them to regard the aristocracy with
condescension, as a class of titled boobies, penniless backwoodsmen, and boorish brass
hats. But the victories on the battlefield, and their own political failure, had transformed
this picture. The prestige of the officer corps, and the nobility that supplied it with
candidates, rose to an all-time high, and their social and political position was made
virtually impregnable. The upper middle class tended henceforth to accept this situation,
while at the same time seeking to associate themselves with this now respected and
glamorous upper social stratum by sedulous aping of its manners, its pastimes, and even
its vices. Thus, one of the long-term results of the wars of unification was a kind of
feudalization of the upper middle class.
“Another result, which stemmed from the sharp contrast between military and
diplomatic success on the one hand and parliamentary ineffectiveness on the other, was to
confirm many Germans in the belief, already widespread after 1848, that nothing much
could be expected from parliaments and politicians. This was to impede Germany’s
progress toward democracy.”
op. cit., p. 219.

The North German Confederation
The North German
Confederation (red). The
southern German states that
joined in 1870 to form the
German Empire are in orange.
Alsace-Lorraine, the territory
annexed following the Franco-
Prussian War of 1871, is in tan.
The red territory in the South
marks the original princedom of
the House of Hohenzollern,
rulers of the Kingdom of Prussia.
—Wikipedia

“The war with Austria had destroyed the old Germanic Confederation, and Prussia
now gave to the part of the nation that she controlled a new one. In July 1867, after
months of planning, drafting and debate, the constitution of this new body came into
effect. The North German Confederation comprised the twenty-two German states that
lay north of the Main River. Its president was the king of Prussia,…”
op. cit., p. 219.

lay north of the Main River. Its president was the king of Prussia, and it had a bicameral
legislature: a parliament (Reichstag)…”
op. cit., p. 219.

lay north of the Main River. Its president was the king of Prussia, and it had a bicameral
legislature: a parliament (Reichstag) elected by universal manhood suffrage and
possessing budgetary powers and the right to debate and approve or disapprove of all
laws, but with no rights of legislative initiative and no effective control over ministers or
over foreign and military policy, which were under the king’s direction; and a Federal
Council (Bundesrat) of delegates appointed by the princes of the federal states, which
could veto laws passed by the Reichstag and had to approve amendments proposed there.
Prussian preponderance was assured by the king’s right to choose his ministers, by their
immunity to Reichstag control, by Prussian control of the army, and by the fact that
Prussia had 17 of the 43 seats in the Bundestag, which made it easy for her, with a
minimum of negotiation, to get enough additional votes for a majority.”
op. cit., p. 219.

“There was nothing about this organization to prevent its being widened to include
other states, and it was, of course, the hope of those who voted for it that it would in fact
be expanded soon to include Baden, Württemberg, Bavaria, and the part of Hesse-
Darmstadt that lay south of the Main. It was true that the governing classes of those
southern states did not look forward to union with enthusiasm, and that the Catholic
clergy and many Catholic believers as well as democrats, socialists, and professional anti-
militarists opposed it bitterly; but it was also undeniable that strong segments of the
populations of all these states were eager to join the northern confederation. The National
Society (Nationalverein), which had been working for a united Germany under Prussian
leadership since 1859, had branches in all these states and found no difficulty making
converts. Even people who hated the thought of being under Prussian leadership had to
admit that there was no very attractive alternative.…”
op. cit., pp. 219-20.

“…The southern states could not join Austria, for she was permanently excluded from
Germany; if they formed a union of their own, it would be dominated by Bavaria, a
prospect that did not seem desirable to the citizens of Baden and Württemberg; and, if
they remained as they were, their economic and political position in a troubled Europe
would be precarious. Slowly, therefore, the sentiment for fusion with the north grew.…”
op. cit., p. 220.

would be precarious. Slowly, therefore, the sentiment for fusion with the north grew.
The state of southern opinion was one of Bismarck’s main concerns after 1866, for,
although he was determined to complete the German nation, he did not want to move in
this direction until he was reasonably sure that a majority of the populations of the
southern states would support him. But this was not, of course, his only concern. France
was also interested in the fate of southern Germany, and Bismarck’s policy.…”
op. cit., p. 220.

would be precarious. Slowly, therefore, the sentiment for fusion with the north grew.
The state of southern opinion was one of Bismarck’s main concerns after 1866, for,
although he was determined to complete the German nation, he did not want to move in
this direction until he was reasonably sure that a majority of the populations of the
southern states would support him. But this was not, of course, his only concern. France
was also interested in the fate of southern Germany, and Bismarck’s polic had to be
determined with Napoleon III in mind.”
op. cit., p. 220.

“The German Confederation was ended with steel, not ink. Its inglorious
disappearance highlights the importance of choice in public policy. While
not designed to cope with either cold or hot war between Prussia or Austria,
the Confederation had the potential to adapt to that situation—particularly
since it developed over at least a decade. Middle Germany, however was
unwilling to accept the social, financial and political demands of supporting
armed forces sufficiently effective to act as a magnet and a deterrent for
Prussia and Austria alike. Added together and including Hanover, the lesser
states had a minimum responsibility for maintaining about four corps, and
were at liberty to increase their contingents as they saw fit. Four corps were
certainly not negligible when compared with the deployable forces of Prussia
—nine corps—and Austria’s seven or eight. Four good corps had every
possibility of holding the diplomatic and military balance in German affairs.
The individual and collective decision to de-emphasize the military aspects of
security, and instead put faith in negotiations and pieces of paper, meant
Confederation policy in 1866 was the stuff of words, blown away this time
not by a whiff of grapeshot, but by the fire of the needle gun. Thus ends the
lesson—which remains as pertinent for the twenty-first century as it was for
the nineteenth.”
Dennis Showalter, The Wars of German Unification. Oxford University Press. 2004.

It is fitting to end this session with the focus on Bismarck. His central role in the second half of
the Long Peace is comparable to that of Metternich’s in its first half.
The next session, the final presentation of Part Two, 1850-1871, will finish the story of German
unification and the contemporaneous events in Russia and Great Britain. In 1866 Austria was
bested militarily but not humiliated. In 1870-71, France will taste both.
The stage will be set for the last act in this drama, what Lawrence LaFore called “the long fuze,”
the thirty-five year build-up to the Great War.
jbp

19 c Europe, session 2.9; The German Question, 1850-66

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19 c Europe, session 2.9; The German Question, 1850-66