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Trust Levels in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Vehicular Network
Dr. IA.Sumra
V TEA N
 Introduction
 REQUIREMENT OF TRUST IN P2P VEHICULAR NETWORK
 PROPERTIES AND COMPONENTS OF TRUST IN VEHICULAR
NETWORK
 PROPOSED TRUST LEVELS
 TYPES OF TRUST IN VEHICULAR NETWORK
 Conclusion
 References
 Q&A
2
 Vehicular ad-hoc network is a special kind of network in which
nodes (Vehicles) can communicate with each other on the road
and with its Infrastructure.
Road Side Unit (RSU)
V2VV2V
Basic VANET Architecture
3
V2I
 Safety Applications
 Non Safety Applications
Work
in Progress
Plz! use Alt.
route
Work Zone
Warning:!!!
Work Zone
Warning:!!!
Shopping MALL
( TESCO )
Parking Slot
Available!!!
RSU Parking Slot
Available!!!
4
 “an entity can be trusted if it always behaves in
the expected manner for intended purpose”.
 all components of the network (vehicles and
infrastructure) are behaving in an
expected manner
 (secure communication between the
components) and serve the users and save
human lives.
Attacker
Change
the
behavior
 Security is one of the most important issues in vehicular
network. Applications of vehicular network should be secure
and user receives right information while traversing along
their journey.
 Trust is also a key component of security and trust is governs
the behavior all components in the network which must
behave in the expected manner.
 User, vehicle and road side unit (RSU) are some components
of trusted vehicular network. If any of these components of
network unexpectedly change their behavior then it would
signify that there is a breach of trust in the network.
 What is TRUST : “A system or component that behaves in
expected manner for the particular purpose” .
 TRUST in VANET : All components of the network (user,
vehicles and infrastructure) are behaving in an expected
manner (trusted communication between the components)
and serve users which subsequently would save human lives.
NODE
C
NODE
B
RSU
D
NODE
A
 Trust = Expectancy + Belief in expectancy +
Willingness to be vulnerable for that belief.
 Expectancy: First module of the trust is expectancy. It means that
the Trustor node (A) expects a specific behavior of the Trustee node (B) such
as receiving valid messages or effectively performing cooperative action upon
that receiving safety or non safety messages.
 Belief in Expectancy: Trustor (node A) believes that the expected thing is
true, based on evidence of the trustee’s (RSU) competence and goodwill.
NODE
A
NODE
B
RSU
NODE
A
 Trust in Belief
 “Trust in belief is the trust placed on what
trustee believes”.
 Trust in belief semantics is that the trustor entity (Node A (a)) believes on
information x (safety or non safety message) that the trustee entities (Node B
(b), RSU (r)) in the context of k within the trustor’s context of trust. Entity (a)
has relationship with two entities, so we explain the belief of trust from
entity (a) to entity (b) and then from entity (a) to entity RSU (r).
NODE
B
RSU
NODE
A
 Trust in Performance
 “Trust in performance is the trust in what trustee performs such as
the information created or the actions performed.”
 Trustor (Node A) believes on messages that is created and receiving
from trustee (node B, RSU) in a context within the trustor’s context
of trust, or the trustor (node A) believes in the performance of an
action (sending safety or non safety messages) committed by the
trustee (node B, RSU) in a context within the trustor’s context of
trust.
NODE
B
RSU
NODE
A
 Context Dependence
 Function of Uncertainty
 Quantitative Values
 Transitivity
 Asymmetry
 Personalization Vehicular TRUST
Component
Behavior
Expected
Manner
Particular
Purpose
User
Node
RSU
Safety
Application
Serve
UserNon Safety
Application
Components of TRUST in Vehicular Network
 User Behavior
 Node Behavior
 Road Side Unit (RSU) Behavior
Attacker RSU
Node
User
Attack
User
Node
RSU
Attacker
Attacks
Exchange
Secure
information
A B
HF
C
G
Warning:!!!
Accident at location Y.
D E
Broadcast Road
Condition Warning !!!!!
RSU
DC
A B
ZeroTrust
(ZT)
Weak Trust
(WT)
Strong Trust
(ST) [ , ]
[0,1,2]
[ , ]
e n r
l
a


  
 Zero Trust
 This is the first level of trust in which the attacker
is dominant and launch different kinds of attack
and it is not possible for other users of network
to communicate and take service from network.
 attacker X launched two different kinds of attacks
(DOS attacks and send wrong message). In this
scenario, Node B could not take service from RSU
due to DOS attack and Node X also sent wrong
message to node B and node B sent this wrong
message to node A, causing the whole network to
be affected.
NODE
X
NODE
A
NODE
B
RSU
0
0
RSU
B
D E
A
C
X
Jam Area
ZeroTrust
(ZT)
Weak Trust
(WT)
Strong Trust
(ST) [ , ]
[0,1,2]
[ , ]
e n r
l
a


  
 Weak Trust (a)
 Weak Trust is the second level of trust in which
the attacker is able to launch different kind of
attacks within some specific region. Some entities
are affected with these attacks whereas other
entities of the network can still perform their task
properly and serve the users of the network.
 explains the scenario in which node B is not
possible to make communication with RSU but it
is capable to make communicate with other node
A.
NODE
X
NODE
A
NODE
B
RSU
0
1
RSU
B
D E
A
C
X
Jam Area
ZeroTrust
(ZT)
Weak Trust
(WT)
Strong Trust
(ST) [ , ]
[0,1,2]
[ , ]
e n r
l
a


  
 Weak Trust (b)
 explains the second scenario in which
communication is disturbed between vehicle to
vehicle (V2V) due to DOS attack. However, Node B
is still able to communicate and take service with
RSU. But Node C could not communicate with
node A due to DOS attack.
NODE
X
NODE
A
NODE
B
RSU
1
0
RSU
B
E
CA
D X
Jam
Area
ZeroTrust
(ZT)
Weak Trust
(WT)
Strong Trust
(ST) [ , ]
[0,1,2]
[ , ]
e n r
l
a


  
 Strong Trust
 Strong trust refers to the situation in which all
entities of the network are trusted and work
properly. There are no attackers in the network
and this is a very ideal condition and every entity
performing their task properly.
 the strong trust levels in which node B is
performing all types of task and take services
from other nodes and also from RSU.
NODE
A
NODE
B
RSU
1
1
RSU
B
D E
A
C
 Security and trust are becoming increasingly key challenges in
vehicular network.
 Safety and non safety applications serve users when
components (user, vehicle and RSU) of the network behave in
an expected manner in peer to peer vehicular communication.
Whenever any component of the network unexpectedly
changes their behavior then it would be harmful for other
users of the network.
 We proposed three different trust levels in peer to peer
vehicular network. We discussed in detail the functionality of
different component of network pertaining to the trust levels,
and emphasized the role of trusted users in peer to peer
vehicular communication.
18
19
 Send email: isomro28@gmail.com
 Please download complete paper
◦ IEEEE website
◦ ResearchGate
◦ Video Available on given link:-
◦ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0SBlL8hM_I4

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VANET Trust

  • 1. Trust Levels in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Vehicular Network Dr. IA.Sumra V TEA N
  • 2.  Introduction  REQUIREMENT OF TRUST IN P2P VEHICULAR NETWORK  PROPERTIES AND COMPONENTS OF TRUST IN VEHICULAR NETWORK  PROPOSED TRUST LEVELS  TYPES OF TRUST IN VEHICULAR NETWORK  Conclusion  References  Q&A 2
  • 3.  Vehicular ad-hoc network is a special kind of network in which nodes (Vehicles) can communicate with each other on the road and with its Infrastructure. Road Side Unit (RSU) V2VV2V Basic VANET Architecture 3 V2I
  • 4.  Safety Applications  Non Safety Applications Work in Progress Plz! use Alt. route Work Zone Warning:!!! Work Zone Warning:!!! Shopping MALL ( TESCO ) Parking Slot Available!!! RSU Parking Slot Available!!! 4
  • 5.  “an entity can be trusted if it always behaves in the expected manner for intended purpose”.  all components of the network (vehicles and infrastructure) are behaving in an expected manner  (secure communication between the components) and serve the users and save human lives. Attacker Change the behavior
  • 6.  Security is one of the most important issues in vehicular network. Applications of vehicular network should be secure and user receives right information while traversing along their journey.  Trust is also a key component of security and trust is governs the behavior all components in the network which must behave in the expected manner.  User, vehicle and road side unit (RSU) are some components of trusted vehicular network. If any of these components of network unexpectedly change their behavior then it would signify that there is a breach of trust in the network.
  • 7.  What is TRUST : “A system or component that behaves in expected manner for the particular purpose” .  TRUST in VANET : All components of the network (user, vehicles and infrastructure) are behaving in an expected manner (trusted communication between the components) and serve users which subsequently would save human lives. NODE C NODE B RSU D NODE A
  • 8.  Trust = Expectancy + Belief in expectancy + Willingness to be vulnerable for that belief.  Expectancy: First module of the trust is expectancy. It means that the Trustor node (A) expects a specific behavior of the Trustee node (B) such as receiving valid messages or effectively performing cooperative action upon that receiving safety or non safety messages.  Belief in Expectancy: Trustor (node A) believes that the expected thing is true, based on evidence of the trustee’s (RSU) competence and goodwill. NODE A NODE B RSU NODE A
  • 9.  Trust in Belief  “Trust in belief is the trust placed on what trustee believes”.  Trust in belief semantics is that the trustor entity (Node A (a)) believes on information x (safety or non safety message) that the trustee entities (Node B (b), RSU (r)) in the context of k within the trustor’s context of trust. Entity (a) has relationship with two entities, so we explain the belief of trust from entity (a) to entity (b) and then from entity (a) to entity RSU (r). NODE B RSU NODE A
  • 10.  Trust in Performance  “Trust in performance is the trust in what trustee performs such as the information created or the actions performed.”  Trustor (Node A) believes on messages that is created and receiving from trustee (node B, RSU) in a context within the trustor’s context of trust, or the trustor (node A) believes in the performance of an action (sending safety or non safety messages) committed by the trustee (node B, RSU) in a context within the trustor’s context of trust. NODE B RSU NODE A
  • 11.  Context Dependence  Function of Uncertainty  Quantitative Values  Transitivity  Asymmetry  Personalization Vehicular TRUST Component Behavior Expected Manner Particular Purpose User Node RSU Safety Application Serve UserNon Safety Application Components of TRUST in Vehicular Network
  • 12.  User Behavior  Node Behavior  Road Side Unit (RSU) Behavior Attacker RSU Node User Attack User Node RSU Attacker Attacks Exchange Secure information A B HF C G Warning:!!! Accident at location Y. D E Broadcast Road Condition Warning !!!!! RSU DC A B
  • 13. ZeroTrust (ZT) Weak Trust (WT) Strong Trust (ST) [ , ] [0,1,2] [ , ] e n r l a       Zero Trust  This is the first level of trust in which the attacker is dominant and launch different kinds of attack and it is not possible for other users of network to communicate and take service from network.  attacker X launched two different kinds of attacks (DOS attacks and send wrong message). In this scenario, Node B could not take service from RSU due to DOS attack and Node X also sent wrong message to node B and node B sent this wrong message to node A, causing the whole network to be affected. NODE X NODE A NODE B RSU 0 0 RSU B D E A C X Jam Area
  • 14. ZeroTrust (ZT) Weak Trust (WT) Strong Trust (ST) [ , ] [0,1,2] [ , ] e n r l a       Weak Trust (a)  Weak Trust is the second level of trust in which the attacker is able to launch different kind of attacks within some specific region. Some entities are affected with these attacks whereas other entities of the network can still perform their task properly and serve the users of the network.  explains the scenario in which node B is not possible to make communication with RSU but it is capable to make communicate with other node A. NODE X NODE A NODE B RSU 0 1 RSU B D E A C X Jam Area
  • 15. ZeroTrust (ZT) Weak Trust (WT) Strong Trust (ST) [ , ] [0,1,2] [ , ] e n r l a       Weak Trust (b)  explains the second scenario in which communication is disturbed between vehicle to vehicle (V2V) due to DOS attack. However, Node B is still able to communicate and take service with RSU. But Node C could not communicate with node A due to DOS attack. NODE X NODE A NODE B RSU 1 0 RSU B E CA D X Jam Area
  • 16. ZeroTrust (ZT) Weak Trust (WT) Strong Trust (ST) [ , ] [0,1,2] [ , ] e n r l a       Strong Trust  Strong trust refers to the situation in which all entities of the network are trusted and work properly. There are no attackers in the network and this is a very ideal condition and every entity performing their task properly.  the strong trust levels in which node B is performing all types of task and take services from other nodes and also from RSU. NODE A NODE B RSU 1 1 RSU B D E A C
  • 17.  Security and trust are becoming increasingly key challenges in vehicular network.  Safety and non safety applications serve users when components (user, vehicle and RSU) of the network behave in an expected manner in peer to peer vehicular communication. Whenever any component of the network unexpectedly changes their behavior then it would be harmful for other users of the network.  We proposed three different trust levels in peer to peer vehicular network. We discussed in detail the functionality of different component of network pertaining to the trust levels, and emphasized the role of trusted users in peer to peer vehicular communication.
  • 18. 18
  • 19. 19  Send email: isomro28@gmail.com  Please download complete paper ◦ IEEEE website ◦ ResearchGate ◦ Video Available on given link:- ◦ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0SBlL8hM_I4