238777944 pfr-case

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G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUANMICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The court, how ever,
approved it.
The errors w hichthe oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approvalof said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order
approving the partition; (4) the approvalof the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's businessand the deed of transfer of said business;
and (5) the declaration that the Turkish law s are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approvalof the scheme of partition and the
delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish law s.

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The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisionsof Joseph G. Brimo's w illw hich are not in
accordance with the law sof his Turkish nationality, for w hich reason they are void as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code w hich, among other
things, provides the follow ing:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as w ellas to the amount of the successionalrights
and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shallbe regulated by the national law of the person w hose succession is in question, w hatever may
be the nature of the property or the country in w hich it may be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish law s, inasmuch as he did not
present any evidence showing what the Turkish law s are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such law s, they are presumed to be the same
as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish law s are. He, himself, acknow ledgesit w hen he desires to be given an opportunity to
present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approvalof the scheme of partition until the
receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish law s on the matter.
The refusalto give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such law s does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trialcourt, and, taking
into consideration that the oppositor w as granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, w e find no abuse of discretion on the part of the
court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo w as violated in the
testamentary dispositions in question w hich, not being contrary to our law s in force, must be complied w ith and executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approvalof the scheme of partition in this respect wasnot erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error w hich deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of the persons
designated as such in w ill, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the w ill, w hich says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law , I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me by conquest and not
by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands w here I
succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my w ish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection
w ith this, my w ill, be made and disposed of in accordance with the law s in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to
respect this w ish, otherwise, Iannul and cancelbeforehand w hateverdisposition found in this w illfavorable to the person or persons who fail
to comply w ith this request.
The institution of legatees in this w illis conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's w illto distribute his
property, not in accordance with the law sof his nationality, but in accordance with the law sof the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legaland valid, any legatee w ho fails to comply w ith it, as the herein oppositor w ho, by his attitude in these
proceedings has not respected the w illof the testator, as expressed, is prevented fromreceiving his legacy.
The fact is, how ever, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law , for article 792 of the civil Code provides the follow ing:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee
in any manner w hatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's nationallaw when, according to article 10 of the civil Code above quoted,
such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said w illis unconditional and
consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.
It results fromall this that the second clause of the w illregarding the law w hich shallgovern it, and to the condition imposed upon the legatees, is null
and void, being contrary to law .
All of the remaining clauses of said w illw ith alltheir dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effectiveit not appearing that said clauses are
contrary to the testator's nationallaw .
Therefore, the orders appealed fromare modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein
appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects,
w ithout any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

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EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTEROF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal froma decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in SpecialProceeding No. 622 of said
court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the finalaccounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy
Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue
of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death w ithout issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C.
Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the willof the testator Edw ard E. Christensen. The w illw as executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and
contains the follow ing provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), w ho wasborn in the
Philippines about tw enty-eight yearsago, and w ho is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
x x x x x x x x x
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age
and w ho, notwithstanding the fact that she w asbaptized Christensen, is not in any w ay related to me, nor has she been at any time
adopted by me, and w ho, fromall information I have now residesin Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen
Christensen w ith the Davao Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00),
Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as w ellas any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
x x x x x x x x x
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my w ell-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs.
Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from
the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personaland/or mixed, of w hatsoever kind or character, and
w heresoeversituated, of which Imay be possessed at my death and w hich may have come to me fromany source whatsoever,
during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to
Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approvalof the project of partition w as filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an
acknow ledged naturalchild, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknow ledged naturalchild of the deceased Edw ard E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the law s of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of
distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of tw o acknowledged naturalchildren, one-half of the estate in full
ow nership. In amplification of the above grounds it w as alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the
internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because severalforeign elements are involved, that the forumis the Philippines and even if the
case w ere decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, w hich requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be
applicable. It w as also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknow ledged naturalchild of the decedent, she is deemed for all
purposes legitimate fromthe time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edw ard E. Christensen w as a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death, the
successionalrights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his w illare to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has
the right to dispose of his property in the w ay he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re
McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor
Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these w ere denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follow s:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED
NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.

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II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI
DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY
TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-
HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edw ard E. Christensen w as a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at the time of his death. But there is
also no question that at the time of his death he w as domiciled in the Philippines, as w itness the following factsadmitted by the executor himself in
appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the w illto probate, the facts of record show that the deceased Edw ard E. Christensen w as born
on November 29, 1875 in New YorkCity, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrivalin the Philippines, as an appointed schoolteacher, w ason
July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" w ith Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of
California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the follow ing nine years until1913, during
w hich time he resided in, and w as teaching schoolin Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrivalin the Philippines w as in July of the year 1913. How ever, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines
for the United States and came back here the follow ing year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his ow n
country, and came backto the Philippines the follow ing year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court,
w ithout prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen w as interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during World War II.
Upon liberation, in April1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective
Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473,
t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edw ard E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of his last w illand testament (now in
question herein) w hich he executed at his law yers' officesin Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City
of Manila on April30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, w e are persuaded by the fact that he w as born in New York, migrated to
California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits
(perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have ow ned or acquired a home or properties in that state, w hich would indicate that he
w ould ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used w ith many shades of meaning frommere temporary presence to the most permanent abode.
Generally, how ever, it is used to denote something more than mere physicalpresence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Law s, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, how ever, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California w hen he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913,
w as never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter w as a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that w hen he executed his w illin 1951 he declared that he w as a citizen of that State; so that he
appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle
expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Law s.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might w ellbe taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as
has been show n, has acquired a technicalmeaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place w here he has never been. And he may
reside in a place w here he has no domicile. The man w ith two homes, betw een which he divides his time, certainly resides in each
one, w hile living in it. But if he w ent on business which would require his presence for severalweeksor months, he might properly
be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, how ever, that, if he treated his settlement as

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continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker.
Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as w ellas physicalpresence. "Residence simply requires bodily
presence of an inhabitant in a given place, w hile domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it
one's domicile." Residence, how ever, is a term used w ith many shades of meaning, fromthe merest temporary presence to the
most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, w hich is as follow s:
ART. 16. Real property as w ellas personalproperty is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
How ever, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shallbe regulated by the national law of the person w hose succession
is under consideration, w hatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said propertymay be f ound.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national law" is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union having its ow n private law
applicable to its citizens only and in force only w ithin the state. The "national law " indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not,
therefore, possibly mean or apply to any generalAmerican law . So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personalproperty? The decision of the court below , sustains the
contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by w illin the form and manner he
desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code
of California, w hich is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place w here personalpropertyis situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its ow ner, and
is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there.
Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and testified to by a w itness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is
argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen w asa citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the
abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State
of California of w hich Christensen wasa citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith
and follow ing the doctrine of therenvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred backto the law of the
decedent's domicile, w hich is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this w ay: "When the Conflict of Law srule of the forumrefers a juralmatter to a foreign law for
decision, is the reference to the purely internalrules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its
Conflict of Law srules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Law srule of
Illinois w hich referred the matter back to Michigan law . But once having determined the the Conflict of Law s principle is the rule
looked to, it is difficult to see w hy the reference backshould not have been to Michigan Conflict of Law s. This would have resulted in
the "endless chain of references" which has so often been criticized be legal w riters. The opponents of the renvoiw ould have looked
merely to the internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoior the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason
w hy the originalreference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Law s rule. It is true that such a solution avoids
going on a merry-go-round, but those w ho have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the
second referenceand at that point applying internal law . Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look
alw ays to internallaw as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity w illresult fromadoption of
their respective views. And stillmore strange is the fact that the only w ay to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problemis if in
the dispute the tw o states whose lawsformthe legal basis of the litigation disagree as to w hether the renvoi should be accepted. If
both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation w illvary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had
the Michigan court rejected the renvoi, judgment w ould have been against the w oman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois
courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment w ould be for the w oman. The same result w ould happen, though the courts w ould
sw itch with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in tw o instances: where the title to land is in question, and w here the validity of a decree
of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Law srule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce
case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law . Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the
situs, w illbe recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, w illbe valid everywhere. (Goodrich,
Conflict of Law s, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France.
The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.

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Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of law sas to intestate succession to
movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile w as France, the
natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do w ould be to turn to French statute of distributions, or w hatever corresponds thereto in
French law , and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of French law , how ever, would show that if a French court w ere
called upon to determine how this property should be distributed, it w ould refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased,
thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusettscourt has open to it
alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court
and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is w hat a French court w ould do. If it accepts the
so-called renvoidoctrine, it w illfollow the latter course, thus applying its ow n law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented w hich the conflict-of-laws rule of the forumrefers to a foreign law , the conflict-
of-laws rule of which, in turn, refersthe matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoiin the narrow er sense. The German
term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (HarvardLaw Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the further ques tion may
arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of law s contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question w hich, while it
has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists;
and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or
the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answerto the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law
in toto w ould in many cases result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S.
872.)
Another theory, know n as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoiis that the court of the
forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the w hole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to
conflict of law s, and then apply the law to the actualquestion w hich the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law
of the forum. The doctrine of therenvoi has generally been repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below :
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of law s are to be understood as incorporating not only the
ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of law sas well. According to this theory 'the law of
a country' means the w hole of its law .
x x x x x x x x x
Von Bar presented his view sat the meeting of the Institute of International Law , at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the formof the follow ing
theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regardsthe application of foreign law s.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shallrespect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personalstatute,
and desires that said personalstatute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place
w here the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of tw o or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily competent,
w hich agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same systemof law .
x x x x x x x x x
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personalestate of an Englishman w ho has died domiciled in
Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire w hether the law of Belgiumw ould distribute personal
property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law w ould make the distribution in
accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must accept this reference backto his ow n law .
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of law s rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law . If the law on
succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its ow n intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re
Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid dow n of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters w ith foreign element involved is in accord w ith the
general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights w hich follow the person of the ow ner.
When a man dies leaving personalproperty in one or more states, and leaves a w illdirecting the manner of distribution of the
property, the law of the state w here he wasdomiciled at the time of his death w illbe looked to in deciding legal questions about the
w ill, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary
rules controldevolution of the personalestate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an
attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the
domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Law srules at the situs property, and the
reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the generalconvenience of the doctrine. The New Yorkc ourt

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has said on the point: 'The generalprinciple that a dispostiton of a personalproperty, valid at the domicile of the ow ner, is valid
anyw here, is one of the universalapplication. It had its origin in that international comity w hich wasone of the first fruits of
civilization, and it this age, w hen business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of boundary
lines, the practicalw isdomand justice of the rule is more apparent than ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Law s,Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that w hat Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national lawis the internal law of California. But as above
explained the law s of California have prescribed two sets of lawsforits citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of
law s rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If w e must enforce the law of California as in comity w e are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our
Civil Code, then w e must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal
law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-lawsrule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place w here the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California
Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that
the national lawof the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national
law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of law sin the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, w hich authorizes the reference or
return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of law s rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refersbackthe case,
w hen a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should
not refer the case backto California; such action w ould leave the issue incapable of determination because the case w illthen be like a football, tossed
back and forth betw een the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court
must apply its ow n law as directed in the conflict of law srule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application
of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children w hile the Philippine law , Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes
natural children legally acknow ledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; BabcockTempleton vs.
Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not poss ibly apply in the case at
bar, for tw o important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but w ith domicile in the
Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of w hich the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical w ith Art. 946 of
the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his w ill
depriving his acknow ledged naturalchild, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law , the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed fromis hereby reversed and the case returned to the low er court with instructions that the partition be made as
the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costsagainst appellees.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
The Law philProject - Arellano Law Foundation
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbsand Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law , froman order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April30, 1964, approving the
project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët
The facts of the case are as follow s:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, w as"a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first w ife, Mary E. Mallen, w homhe divorced, he had
five legitimate children: Edw ard A. Bellis, George Bellis (w ho pre-deceased himin infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by
his second w ife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edw in G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he
had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

8
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a w illin the Philippines, in w hich he directed that after alltaxes, obligations, and expenses of administration
are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the follow ing order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first w ife, Mary E. Mallen; (b)
P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing
tw o items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second w ives, namely: Edw ard A. Bellis, Henry A.
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edw in G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1äwphï1.ñët
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His w ill w as admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the w ill, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the formof shares
of stockto Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts
totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, w hich it released from time to time according as the low er
court approved and allow ed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration
and Project of Partition" w herein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stockamounting
to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of
P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the "Tw elfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary
estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they
w ere deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April27, 1964
by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the low er court, on April30, 1964, issued an order overruling the
oppositions and approving the executor's finalaccount, report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it
applied the national law of the decedent, w hich in this case is Texas law , w hich did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the low er court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to
raise the issue of w hich law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law .
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-
16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent w here the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present
case, it is not disputed that the decedent w as both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2
So that even assuming Texas has
a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system(law of the domicile) should govern, the same w ould not result in a reference back(renvoi) to
Philippine law , but w ould stillrefer to Texas law . Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex reisitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place w here the properties are situated, renvoiwould arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines.
In the absence, how ever, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different fromours.3
Appellants' position is therefore
not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls
under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with
regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the w ill; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as w ellas personalproperty is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
How ever, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shallbe regulated by the national law of the person w hose succession
is under consideration, w hatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be
found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants w ould however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive law s concerning persons, their acts or property, and those w hich have for their object public order, public polic y and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congressdeleted the phrase, "notwithstanding
the provisions of this and the next preceding article" w hen they incorporated Art.11 of the old Civil Code as Art.17 of the new Civil Code, w hile
reproducing w ithout substantialchange the second paragraph of Art.10 of the old Civil Code as Art.16 in the new . It must have been their purpose to
make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself w hich must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As furtherindication of this
legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decreesthat capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.

9
It is therefore evident that w hatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successionalrights, to the decedent's
national law . Specific provisions must prevailover generalones.
Appellants w ould also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing
fromthis that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such w asthe decedent's intention in executing a separate
Philippine w ill, it w ould not alter the law , for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's willto the effect that his
properties shallbe distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not w ith his nationallaw , is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in
regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, w as a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the law s of Texas, there are no forced
heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the w illand the amount of successionalrights are to be determined under
Texas law , the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, w ith costs against appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in this case as one of the oppositors-appellants; to file or adopt
the opposition of his sisters to the project of partition; to submit his brief after paying his proportionate share in the expenses
incurred in the printing of the record on appeal; or to allow him to adopt the briefs filed by his sisters — but this Court resolved to
deny the motion.
2
San Antonio, Texas w as his legalresidence.
3
Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
Regino Hermosisima for petitioner.
F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision of Court of Appeals modifying that of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed w ith said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral
damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever
promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by w ay of alimony pendente lite,
P50.00 a month, w hich was,on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later on, said court rendered a decision the dispositive
part of w hich reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of defendant, and
confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00),
payable on or before the fifth day of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actualand compensatory damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral
damages; and the further sumof FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costsagainst defendant.

10
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages,
w hich were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
The main issue before us is w hether moraldamages are recoverable, under our law s, forbreach of promise to marry. The pertinent facts are:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, w as born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and
petitioner, w ho wasalmost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and w ere regarded as engaged, although he had made no
promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underw riter in the City of Cebu, w here intimacy developed
among her and the petitioner, since one evening in 1953, w hen after coming fromthe movies, they had sexualintercourse in his cabin on board M/V
"Escaño," to w hich he w asthen attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she w as in the family w ay, whereupon he
promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, w as born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. How ever, subsequently, or on July
24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, w hich wascommenced on or about October 4, 1954.
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it w illbe noted that the Civil Code of Spain permitted the recovery of damages for breach to marry. Article
43 and 44 of said Code provides:
ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to contract marriage. No court shall entertain any
complaint by w hich the enforcement of such promise is sought.
ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by a minor w ith the concurrence of the person
w hose consent is necessaryfor the celebration of the marriage, or if the banns have been published, the one w ho without just cause
refuses to marry shallbe obliged to reimburse the other for the expenses which he or she may have incurred by reason of the
promised marriage.
The action for reimbursement of expenses to w hich the foregoing article refersmust be brought w ithin one year, computed from the
day of the refusalto celebrate the marriage.
Inasmuch as these articles w erenever in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil., 866), that "the action for breach of
promises to marry has no standing in the civillaw , apart fromthe right to recover money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The
Code Commission charged w ith the drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem it best, how ever, to change the law thereon. We quote
fromthe report of the Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:
Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these articles are not enforced in the Philippines. The
subject is regulated in the Proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspect treated of in said articles but also in other particulars. It is
advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions that might arise relative to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are:
That authorizing the adjudication of moral damages, in case of breach of promise of marriage, and that creating liability for causing a
marriage engagement to be broken.1awphîl.nèt
Accordingly, the following provisionswere insertedin said Proposed Civil Code, under Chapter I, Title III, Book I thereof:
Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.
Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future spouses.
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, w ithout the consent of the parent or guardian, be entered into by a male betw een
the ages of sixteen and tw enty yearsor by a female betw een the ages of sixteen and eighteen years. Without such consent of the
parents or guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be the basis of a civil action for damages in case of breach of the promise.
Art. 59. A promise to marry w hen made by a female under the age of fourteen years is not civilly actionable, even though approved
by the parent or guardian.
Art. 60. In cases referredto in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil responsibility of a male for seduction shallnot be
affected.
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be brought.
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved party even though a minor w ithout the assis tance
of his parent or guardian. Should the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian may institute the action.
Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and pecuniary losses but also compensation for
mental and moral suffering.
Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of the affiancedparties, who cause a marriage
engagement to be broken shall be liable for damages, both material and moral, to the engaged person w ho is rejected.
Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement shallbe obliged to return w hat he or she has
received fromthe other as gift on account of the promise of the marriage.

11
These article w ere, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth in the report of the corresponding Senate Committee, fromw hich
w e quote:
The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decide in the case of De Jesus vs.
Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in England has show n that no other action lends itself more readily
to abuse by designing w omen and unscrupulous men. It is this experience w hich has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit
in many of the American States.
See statutes of:
Florida 1945 — pp. 1342 — 1344
Maryland 1945 — pp. 1759 — 1762
Nevada 1943 — p. 75
Maine 1941 — pp. 140 — 141
New Hampshire 1941 — p. 223
California 1939 — p. 1245
Massachusetts 1938 — p. 326
Indiana 1936 — p. 1009
Michigan 1935 — p. 201
New York1935
Pennsylvania p. 450
The Commission perhaps though that it has follow ed the more progression trend in legislation w hen it provided for breach of
promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the creation of such causes of action at a time w hen so many States, in consequence of
years of experience are doing aw aywith them, may w ellprove to be a step in the w rong direction. (CongressionalRecord, Vol. IV,
No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)
The view s thus expressed wereaccepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to
sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the aw ard of moraldamages made by the low er courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals
said aw ard:
Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by her love for him
finally yielded to his sexualdesires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a w oman after all, w e hold that said defendant-
appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moraldamages may be recovered fromhim under the provision of Article 2219,
paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.
Apart fromthe fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs preceding and those follow ing the one cited by the Court of
Appeals, and the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the "seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article
as such in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, w hich admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find ourselvesunable to say that
petitioner is morallyguilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — w ho around thirty-six(36)
years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high schoolteacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — w hen she became intimate
w ith petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "byhaving a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy."
The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the follow ing: (1) a monthly pension of P30.00 for the support of the child: (2) P4,500, representing
the income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child, as actualand compensation
damages; (3) P5,000, as moral damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25 —
consisting of P144.20, for hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection w ith the parturiation, and the balance representing expenses incurred to
support the child — and increased the moral damages to P7,000.00.
With the elimination of this aw ard for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other respects, without special
pronouncement as to cost in this instance. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, GutierrezDavid, Paredes and Dizon, J J., concur.
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

12
The facts that culminated in this case started w ith dreams and hopes, follow ed by appropriate planning and serious endeavors, but terminated in
frustration and, w hat is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, follow ing their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day.
On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet —
Will have to postpone w edding — My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason w hy — That w ould only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the follow ing telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor w as he heard fromagain.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answ er and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerkof court as commissioner,
and on April29, 1955, judgment w as rendered ordering defendantto pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief fromorders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff
moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this
stage of the proceedings the possibility of arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and
the opposition thereto w illbe deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the follow ing day his counselfiled a motion to defer for two weeksthe resolution
on defendants petition for relief. The counselstated that he w ould confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City — the latter's residence — on the
possibility of an amicable element. The court granted tw o weeks countedfromAugust 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the tw o weeks given by the court had expired on September 8, 1955 but that defendant and his counselhad
failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement w as given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and their attorneys to appear on July 13,
1956. This time.how ever, defendant'scounselinformed the court that chances of settling the case amicably w ere nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to this Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955
in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it w as stated that defendant filed
no answ erin the belief that an amicable settlement w as being negotiated.
A petition for relief fromjudgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly supported by an affidavit of merits
stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.) Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955
stated: "That he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to
fortuitous event and/or circumstancesbeyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions or opinions instead of facts is not valid.
(Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswanivs. P. Tarrachand Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, how ever,would contend that the affidavit of merits w asin fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to be set
aside w as nulland void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the clerkof court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October
30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the clerkof court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now
Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for he w as declared in def ault
and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trialand reconsideration," defendant assertsthat the judgment is contrary to law . The reason given is that "there is no
provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept.
30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs. Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable w rong. We
pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that w ould have it so.
It must not be overlooked, how ever, that the extent to w hich acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated w ith impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of
said Code provides that "any person w ho wilfully causesloss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage."

13
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, w hich wassubsequently issued (Exhs. A,
A-1). Their w edding w asset for September 4, 1954. Invitations w ere printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The
bride-to-be's trousseau, partydrsrsesand other apparelfor the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dressesforthe maid of honor and the
flow ergirlw ere prepared. A matrimonial bed, w ith accessories, was bought. Bridalshowerswere given and gifts received (Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then,
w ith but tw o days before the w edding, defendant, who wasthen 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone w edding —
My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the w edding, he w ired plaintiff: "Nothing changed
rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and w as neverheard fromagain.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable w rong. But to formally set
a w edding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to w alkout of it w hen the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answ erable in damages in accordance with Article
21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages aw arded were excessive. No question is raised as to the aw ard of actualdamages. What
defendant w ould really assert hereunderis that the aw ard of moraland exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As
to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the
condition precedent is that "the defendant acted in a w anton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of merit
as under the above-narrated circumstancesof this case defendant clearly acted in a "w anton ... , reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's
opinion, how ever, is that considering the particular circumstancesof this case, P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a
reasonable aw ard.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, w ith the above-indicated modification, the low er court'sjudgment is hereby affirmed, w ith costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, and Zaldivar, JJ.,concur.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOUT. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the Decision 1
of the respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 w hich affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in
Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of w hether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, w ithout the assistance of counsel, filed w ith the aforesaid trialcourt a complaint 2
for damages against the
petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is tw enty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino
and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at
the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northw estern Colleges in Dagupan
City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they w ould get married; they
therefore agreed to get married after the end of the schoolsemester, w hich wasin October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's

14
parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approvalto the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live w ith him
in the Lozano Apartments; she w as a virgin before she began living w ith him; a w eekbefore the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude tow ards her
started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a
representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her
not to live w ith him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment
ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actualexpenses amounting to P600.00,
attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint w as docketed as CivilCase No.
16503.
In his Answ erwith Counterclaim, 3
petitioner admitted only the personalcircumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of
the allegations either for lack of know ledge or information sufficient to forma belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as
his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married w ith the private respondent; he
neither sought the consent and approvalof her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to
his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation tookplace w ith a
representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he w as
unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mentalanxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an
aw ard of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trialon 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order 4
embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed
upon, to w it:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, w hile the defendant is single, Iranian
citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at LyceumNorthw estern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year
medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up
to the present and a (sic) high schoolgraduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other w hen the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino
introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trialon the merits, the low er court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision 5
favoring the private respondent.
The petitioner w as thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of tw enty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moraldamages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and
tw o thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied. 6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent w ere lovers, (b) private respondent is not
a w oman of loose morals or questionable virtue w ho readily submits to sexualadvances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false
pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allow ed herself to be deflow eredby him, (e) by
reason of that deceitfulpromise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations
for the w edding that w as to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors,
(f) petitioner did not fulfillhis promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, w ho is a foreigner and w ho has abused Philippine hospitality, have
offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter
alia, she w ould not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim
w as false. 7
The above findings and conclusions were culled fromthe detailed summary of the evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision,
digested by the respondent Court as follow s:
According to plaintiff, w ho claimed that she w as a virgin at the time and that she never had a boyfriend before, defendant
started courting her just a few daysafter they first met. He later proposed marriage to her severaltimes and she accepted
his love as w ellas his proposalof marriage on August 20, 1987, on w hich same day he w ent with her to her hometow n of
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he w anted to meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their intention
to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant w ith members of plaintiff's family or
w ith plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he
intended to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he w as good
and trusted him, they agreed to his proposalfor him to marry their daughter, and they likew ise allow ed himto stay in their
house and sleep w ith plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned
to Dagupan City, they continued to live together in defendant's apartment. How ever, in the early days of October, 1987,
defendant w ould tie plaintiff's hands and feet w hile he w ent to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clockin the

15
morning that made her sleep the w hole day and night until the follow ing day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff
became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live w ith defendant
and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he w as already
married to a girl in Bacolod City. That w as the time plaintiff left defendant, w ent home to her parents, and thereafter
consulted a law yerwho accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her law yer, her godmother,
and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain w ent to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but
defendant insisted that he could not do so because he w as already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as
stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he
already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and
even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming w edding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals w hich docketed the case as CA -G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, 9
he
contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lackof factualand legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10
affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining
the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the follow ing analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old w hen she met defendant w ho was already 29 years old at the time, does not
appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she w as a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with
defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the low er court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to
trend of modern urban life", and certainly w ould (sic)not have allow ed
"herself to be deflow ered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry her." In
fact, w e agree with the low ercourt that plaintiff and defendant must have been sw eetheartsor so the plaintiff must have
thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allow ed herself to be photographed
w ith defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot
believe, therefore, defendant'spretense that plaintiff wasa nobody to him except a w aitress at the restaurant where he
usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he w ent to plaintiff's hometow n of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least
thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together w ith the
manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 w hen he
allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother w ho told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left
Dagupan City w here he wasinvolved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometow n in Bañaga, Bugallon,
unless there w as (sic)some kind of specialrelationship betw een them? And this specialrelationship must indeed have led
to defendant's insincere proposalof marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic)
Marites Rabino, the ow ner of the restaurant where plaintiff wasworking and w here defendant first proposed marriage to
her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's proposalof marriage to plaintiff, w hich she declared was the reason why
plaintiff resigned fromher job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal(pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must think so low and have so
little respect and regard for Filipino w omen that he openly admitted that w hen he studied in Bacolod City for severalyears
w here he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law w ife in
Bacolod City. In other w ords, he also lived w ith another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that w oman, just like
w hat he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and
promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustfulcountry girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, w e are strongly convinced and so hold that it w asdefendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of
love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and w omanhood to him and to live w ith him on
the honest and sincere belief that he w ould keep said promise, and it w as likew ise these (sic) fraud and deception on
appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in w ith him preparatory to their supposed
marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy,
and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our w omen, coming as they do froma foreigner w ho has
been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions of
learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate
for the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the low er court orderedhim to do in its decision in this
case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of w hether or not Article 21 of the
Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral w rong or injury or violated any good customor
public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar w ith Catholic and Christian w ays. He stressesthat even if he had made a
promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfillthe same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim
Code w hich purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) w ivesand concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not
posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial"common law life" is now his legal w ife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil
ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlaw fulcohabitation w ith the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be
pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner

16
asseverates that even if it w as to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her,
such acts w ould not be actionable in view of the specialcircumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, w hich they subsequentlycomplied w ith.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, w hich boildow n
to the issue of the credibility of w itnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as
to the credibility of w itnesses, the latter court having heard the w itnessesand having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and
manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter
the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the
function of this Court to analyze or w eigh allover again the evidence introduced by the parties before the low er court. There are, however, recognized
exceptions to this rule. Thus, inMedina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16
this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93
Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15
[1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6)
When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, w ent beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622
[1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusionswithout citation of
specific evidence on w hich they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as w ellas in the petitioners
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,);and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33
SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of
the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable w rong. 17
Congress deliberately eliminated fromthe draft of the New
Civil Code the provisions that w ould have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil
Code, from w hich We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided
in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18
The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has
show n that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing w omen and unscrupulous men. It is this
experience w hichhas led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American
states. . . . 19
This notw ithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, w hich is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral w rongswhich is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in
the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of w rongs defined or determined by positive law . Fully
sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, w hich leave so many victims of moral w rongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered materialand moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice,
to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the follow ing rule:
Art. 23. Any person w ho wilfully causesloss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
An example w illillustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise
of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present law s, there is
no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed.
Therefore, though the grievous moral w rong has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and
her parents w ould have such a right of action.

17
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, w ould vouchsafe adequate legalremedy for that untold
number of moral w rongswhich it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, w hich definesa quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractualrelation betw een the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of w illfulnessor intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal
treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civillaw concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader
than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as w ellsuch as assault and battery,
false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal systemenvisioned by the Commission responsible for
drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, w ith certain exceptions,are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code
w hile negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22
In betw een these opposite spectrums are
injurious acts w hich,in the absence of Article 21, w ould have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even
postulated that together w ith Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil
w rongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that w here a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his love by a w oman and his representation to fulfillthat promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in a sexualcongress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise w as only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexualact, could justify the aw ard of damages pursuant to
Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the w illfulinjury to her honor and reputation w hich
follow ed thereafter. It is essential, how ever, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it w as the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestationsof love for and promise to marry plaintiff
that made her surrender her virtue and w omanhood to him and to live w ith him on the honest and sincere belief that he w ould keep said promise, and it
w as likew ise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in w ith him preparatory to their
supposed marriage." 24
In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of everysingle Filipina, not because of lust
but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable
for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent w as above eighteen
(18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry w here the woman is a victim of moral
seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 25
this Court denied recovery of damages to the w oman because:
. . . w e find ourselvesunable to say that petitioner is morallyguilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten
(10) years younger than the complainant — w ho was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a
former high schoolteacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — w hen she became intimate w ith petitioner,
then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to
petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him byhaving a fruit of their engagement
even before theyhad the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26
w hile this Court likew ise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery waseventually
denied because We w ere not convinced that such seduction existed. The follow ing enlightening disquisition and conclusion w ere made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers
to a tort upon a minor w ho had been seduced. The essentialfeature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual
intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior pow er or
abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to w hich the w oman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121;
U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducementand the
woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely fromcarnal
lust and the intercourse is frommutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par.
56) She must be induced to depart fromthe path of virtue by the use of some species of arts,
persuasions and w iles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and w hich result in her
person to ultimately submitting her person to the sexualembraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence w e find:
On the other hand, in an action by the w oman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the
essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction w here the willingness arisesout of sexualdesire of curiosity of the
female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It
has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of

18
the female sex, and w ould be a rew ard for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be
sw ift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one w hole year, from1958 to 1959, the plaintiff -
appellee, a w oman of adult age, maintain intimate sexualrelations w ith appellant, w ith repeated acts of intercourse. Such
conduct is incompatible w ith the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the
appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artfulpersuasionsand w iles of the
defendant, she w ould not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, w ithout exacting early fulfillment of
the alleged promises of marriage, and w ould have cut short all sexualrelations upon finding that defendant did not intend
to fulfillhis defendant did not intend to fulfillhis promise. Hence, w e conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the
Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error w as committed by the Court of First Instance in
dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28
Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, w ho recently retired fromthis Court, opined that in a breach of promise to
marry w here there had been carnalknow ledge, moral damages may be recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse w asdue to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz
Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other w ords, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and
the EFFECT be the carnalknow ledge, there is a chance that there w as criminalor moral seduction, hence recovery of
moral damages w illprosper. If it be the other w ay around, there can be no recovery of moraldamages, because here
mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together w ith "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the w edding presentations (See Domalagon v.
Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29
is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30
still subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation of the present
article 31
in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there w as seduction, not necessarily in the
legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But w hen the sexualact is accomplished w ithout any deceit or qualifying
circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the w oman, already of age, has know ingly given herself to a man, it
cannot be said that there is an injury w hich can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, w hich is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court, how ever, must w eigh
the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the w oman under the circumstances, because an act which would deceive
a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there
is a w rongfulact and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law
and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
We are unable to agree w ith the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the
private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil
Code and the doctrine laid dow n inBatarra vs. Marcos, 32
the private respondent cannot recover damages fromthe petitioner. The latter even goes as far
as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her ow n doing, 33
for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter w illbecome a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain
high schoolgraduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a w aitress(TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a
luncheonette and w ithout doubt, is in need of a man w ho can give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of
financialassistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may
have been offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements revealthe true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the
private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educationalbackground, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, fromthe very beginning, he w as not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying w ith a w oman so circumstancescould
not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry w ere empty w ords directlyintended to fool, dupe, entice,
beguile and deceive the poor w oman into believing that indeed, he loved her and w ould want her to be his life's partner. His w as nothing but pure lust
w hich he w antedsatisfied by a Filipina w ho honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposalof marriage, she w ould be able to enjoy
a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their
w omen. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code w hich directsevery
person to act w ith justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
obligations.
No foreigner must be allow ed to make a mockery of our law s, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for w hile indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she
eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexualcongress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of
conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner w as not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,

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