199050037 notes-of-ethics-cases

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[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
*Penalty:
A.C. No. 7435 September 10, 2009
REY C. SARMIENTO, ANGELITO C. SARMIENTO, WILLY C. SARMIENTO and RAQUEL C.
SARMIENTO-CO, Complainants, vs. ATTY. EDELSON G. OLIVA, Respondent.
CORONA, J.:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
*Penalty:
ATTY. JOSABETH V. ALONSO and SHALIMAR P. LAZATIN, Complainants, vs. ATTY. IBARO B.
RELAMIDA, JR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 8481 [Formerly B.M. No. 1524] August 3, 2010
PERALTA, J.:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
*Penalty:
A.C. No. 5834 February 22, 2011 (formerly CBD-01-861)
TERESITA D. SANTECO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LUNA B. AVANCE, Respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
A.C. No. 8390 July 2, 2010 [Formerly CBD 06-1641]
A-1 FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., Complainant, vs. ATTY. LAARNI N. VALERIO, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:

Facts:
Issue:
Held:
*Penalty:
A.C. No. 8382 April 21, 2010
ALFREDO B. ROA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JUAN R. MORENO, Respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
*Penalty:
MANUEL C. YUHICO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.
A.C. No. 8391 [Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1631] November 23, 2010
PER CURIAM:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
*Penalty:
A.C. No. 7902 March 31, 2009
TORBEN B. OVERGAARD, Complainant, vs. ATTY. GODWIN R. VALDEZ, Respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
*Penalty:
[A.C. No. 5580. June 15, 2005]
SAN JOSE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION INC., as represented by REBECCA V. LABRADOR,
complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO B. ROMANILLOS, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
*Penalty:
A.M. No. P-06-2177 (Formerly A.M. No. 06-4-268-RTC) April 19, 2007
RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED ON THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF ATTY.
RAQUEL G. KHO, CLERK OF COURT IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ORAS, EASTERN SAMAR
CORONA, J.:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
*Penalty:
A.M. P-06-2124 (Formerly AM No. 05-12-747-RTC) September 20, 2006
Report on the Status of the Financial Audit Conducted in the RTC-Tarlac City
Tinga, J.:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
*Penalty:
A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007
JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
*Penalty:
A.M. No. P-07-2403 February 6, 2008 (formerly OCA IPI No. 07-2598-P)
RE: REGIDOR R. TOLEDO, RONALDO TOLEDO, AND JOEFFREY TOLEDO* v. ATTY. JERRY RADAM
TOLEDO, RTC, BRANCH 259, PARAÑAQUE CITY.
NACHURA, J.:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
*Penalty:
A.C. No. 6707 March 24, 2006
GISELA HUYSSEN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
*Penalty:
A.C. No. 5738 February 19, 2008
WILFREDO M. CATU, complainant, vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA, respondent.
CORONA, J.:
Facts:
Issue:
Held:
*Penalty:

A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC August 19, 2009
QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, FORMER Clerk of Court - BRANCH 81, ROMBLON,
ROMBLON - ON THE PROHIBITION FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF LAW.
BRION, J.:
Facts:
• Letter-query dated March 4, 2008 of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe (Atty. Buffe) addressed to the Office
of the Court Administrator.
• The query, as originally framed, related to Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, as
amended (or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). This
provision places a limitation on public officials and employees during their incumbency, and those
already separated from government employment for a period of one (1) year after separation, in
engaging in the private practice of their profession.
• In her letter-query, Atty. Buffe posed these questions: "Why may an incumbent engage in private
practice under (b)(2), assuming the same does not conflict or tend to conflict with his official duties, but
a non-incumbent like myself cannot, as is apparently prohibited by the last paragraph of Sec. 7? Why
is the former allowed, who is still occupying the very public position that he is liable to exploit, but a
non-incumbent like myself – who is no longer in a position of possible abuse/exploitation – cannot?"1
• The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon; she resigned from her position effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter
(and within the one-year period of prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted provision), she engaged
in the private practice of law by appearing as private counsel in several cases before RTC-Branch 81
of Romblon.
• Atty. Buffe’s allegation:
o Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential treatment to an incumbent public
employee.
o The intention of the prohibition is to remove the exercise of clout, influence or privity to
insider information, which the incumbent public employee may use in the private
practice of his profession.
o She could engage in the private practice of law before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon, so
long as her appearance as legal counsel shall not conflict or tend to conflict with her
former duties as former Clerk of Court of that Branch.
• Then Deputy Court Administrator (now Court Administrator) Jose P. Perez observed:
o The general intent of the law, as defined in its title is "to uphold the time-honored
principle of public office being a public trust."
o Section 4 thereof provides for the norms of conduct of public officials and employees,
among others: (a) commitment to public interest; (b) professionalism; and (c) justness
and sincerity. Of particular significance is the statement under professionalism that
"[t]hey [public officials and employees] shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions
of their roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
o The prohibition was intended to avoid any impropriety or the appearance of impropriety
which may occur in any transaction between the retired government employee and his
former colleagues, subordinates or superiors brought about by familiarity, moral
ascendancy or undue influence, as the case may be.
• SC referred the case to the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) which found:
o The premise of the query is erroneous. There is a misreading of that provision of law.
o The confusion apparently lies in the use of the term "such practice" after the phrase
"provided that." However, read in its entirety, "such practice" may only refer to practice
"authorized by the Constitution or law" or the exception to the prohibition against the
practice of profession. The term "law" was intended by the legislature to include "a
memorandum or a circular or an administrative order issued pursuant to the authority of
law."

o Constitutional policy on accountability of public officers stated in Article XI of the
Constitution - requires public officials and employees to devote full time public service
so that in case of conflict between personal and public interest, the latter should take
precedence over the former.
o With respect to lawyers in the judiciary, Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel governs (deals with outside employment by an incumbent judicial
employee and which limits such outside employment to one that "does not require the
practice of law).
o The prohibition to practice law with respect to any matter where they have intervened
while in the government service is reiterated in Rule 6.03, Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which governs the conduct of lawyers in the government
service.
• SC issued an En Banc Resolution directing:
o the Court Administrator to draft and submit to the Court a circular on the practice of
profession during employment and within one year from resignation, retirement from or
cessation of employment in the Judiciary
o the Executive Judge of the RTC of Romblon to submit a report verifying if Atty. Buffe
had appeared as counsel during her incumbency as clerk of court and after her
resignation
• Executive Judge Ramiro R. Geronimo of RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon reported 4 civil cases
wherein Atty. Buffe made appearances after her resignation.
• Atty. Buffe informed the Court that she had previously taken judicial remedies in regard to the
query (2 declaratory reliefs which has both been dismissed and she intends to elevate to the SC).
Issues: (1) Whether or not Atty. Buffe’s position on her query should be adopted
(2) Whether or not Atty. Buffe may object to the SC’s determination of her violations
(2) Whether or not Atty. Buffe violated RA 6713 and the CPR
Held: (1) No. The Court does not give interpretative opinions but can issue circulars and regulations
relating to pleading, practice and procedure in all courts and in the exercise of its administrative supervision
over all courts and personnel thereof. Considering the SC’s directive to the Office of the Court Administrator
to issue a circular on the subject of the query for the guidance of all personnel in the Judiciary, the present
administrative matter is to be considered a finished task. It is now subject only to confirmatory closure when
the OCA reports the completion of its undertaking to the SC.
(2) No. The essence of due process is the grant of the opportunity to be heard; what it abhors is
the lack of the opportunity to be heard.The records of this case show that Atty. Buffe has been amply heard
with respect to her actions. She was notified, and she even responded to the SC’s November 11, 2008
directive for the Executive Judge of the RTC of Romblon to report on Atty. Buffe’s appearances before
Branch 81; she expressly manifested that these appearances were part of the Branch records. Her legal
positions on these appearances have also been expressed before the SC; first, in her original letter-query,
and subsequently, in her Manifestation. Thus, no due process consideration needs to deter the SC from
considering the legal consequences of her appearances in her previous Branch within a year from her
resignation.
(3) Yes. Atty. Buffe’s admitted appearance, before the very same branch she served and
immediately after her resignation, is a violation of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713. At the time she filed her
letter-query (on March 4, 2008), Atty. Buffe had already appeared before Branch 81 in at least 3 cases. The
terms of Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 did not deter her in any way and her misgivings about the fairness
of the law cannot excuse any resulting violation she committed. She took the risk of appearing before her own
Branch and should suffer the consequences of the risk she took. She is aware of this provision and only
objects to its application to her situation; she perceives it to be unfair that she cannot practice before her old
office – Branch 81 – for a year immediately after resignation. From Atty. Buffe’s recourse to the SC and the
filing of the two declaratory petitions the intent to shop for a favorable answer to her query seems to take
place.
By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as "unlawful," Atty. Buffe contravened Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As indicated by the use of the mandatory word "shall,"
this provision must be strictly complied with. Atty. Buffe failed to do this, perhaps not with an evil intent,
considering the misgivings she had about Section 7 (b)(2)’s unfairness. Unlawful conduct under Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, however, does not necessarily require the element of criminality, although the Rule is broad enough
to include it. Likewise, the presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential to bring his or her
act or omission within the terms of Rule 1.01, when it specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful
conduct. Atty. Buffe also failed to live up to her lawyer’s oath and thereby violated Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Considering Atty. Buffe’s ready admission of violating Section 7(b)(2), the principle of res ipsa
loquitur finds application, making her administratively liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further
inquiry or resort to any formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the
determination of their administrative liability.
• As regards Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713:
o It generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public officials and
employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of
their profession during their incumbency. As an exception, a public official or employee
can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first,
the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the
practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his or her official functions.
o The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public
official or employee’s resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except for
the private practice of profession under subsection (b)(2), which can already be
undertaken even within the one-year prohibition period. As an exception to this
exception, the one-year prohibited period applies with respect to any matter before the
office the public officer or employee used to work with.
o The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public
trust; and serve to remove any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in
government transactions between a former government official or employee and his or
her former colleagues, subordinates or superiors. The prohibitions also promote the
observance and the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed office hours to
serve the public
• Practice of Law:

o In Cayetano v. Monsod, defined as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
o To perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to give notice or
render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of
legal knowledge or skill.
• Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
o Ceases apply after separation from service since it applies specifically to incumbents.
o Provides the definitive rule that "outside employment" of an incumbent court official or
court employee may be allowed by the head of office provided: (1) is not with a person
or entity that practices law before the courts or conducts business with the Judiciary; (2)
it can be performed outside of normal working hours and is not incompatible with the
performance of the court personnel’s duties and responsibilities; (3) it does not require
the practice of law except as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law schools,
review or continuing education centers or similar institutions; (4) it does not require or
induce the court personnel to disclose confidential information acquired while
performing officials duties; (5) it shall not be with the legislative or executive branch of
government, unless specifically authorized by the Supreme Court; and (6) if it there is
no conflict of interest or would not adversely reflect the integrity of the Judiciary.
• Power of Contempt:
o The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary
authority of the Court over lawyers.
o The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the
Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar.
o A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is
called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving
disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or
impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional
misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and contumacious
conduct warranting application of the contempt power.
o The absence of any formal charge against and/or formal investigation of an errant
lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its disciplining authority,
as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard.
*Ruling of SC: Violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
*Penalty: Fine of P10,000.00, with stern warning
A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006
PETER T. DONTON, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
Facts:
• Complainant filed an estafa case thru falsification of a public document against Stier (US citizen and
owner of real property in QC), Maggay, and Atty. Tansingco (notary public who notarized the
Occupancy Agreement between Stier).
• Atty. Tansingco filed a counter-charge for perjury vs. ccomplainant.
• Complainant filed disbarment complaint vs. Atty. Tansingco for serious misconduct and deliberate
violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the CPR.
• Allegation of complainant:
o Respondent’s act of preparing Occupancy Agreement despite his knowledge that Stier is
disqualified to own real property in his name constitutes serious misconduct.
o Respondent advised Stier to do something in violation of the law and assisted him in carrying
out a dishonest scheme.
• Answer of Atty. Tansingco:
o Since Stieris disqualified to own real property he agreed to transfer the property to Donton
(Filipino) subject to his undisturbed occupancy thereof.
o Respondent agreed to prepare and notarize Occupancy Agreement between Stier and
Donton which was tied up with a loan Stier extended to Donton.
o Complainant filed the disbarment case against him upon the instigation of complainant’s
counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan, because respondent refused to act as complainant’s
witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he
"prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due
execution.
• Court referred matter to IBP.
• IBP through Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan:
o respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition
against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines"
o suspension for 2 years and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public
• IBP Board of Governors: adopted IBP-CBD’s Resolution with modification of suspension for 6
months.
• IBP Board forward case to SC as per Rules of Court.
• Respondent filed motion for recon. Stating he was already 76 years old and would already retire by
2005 after the termination of his pending cases; his practice of law is his only means of support for
his family and his six minor children.
• IBP Board denied motion because jurisdiction already rests with the SC.
Issue: Whether or not respondent is liable.
Held: Yes. Respondent is liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the CPR. A lawyer should not
render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to
uphold and obey. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law
commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.
Respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real property. He
further admitted that he caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however,
aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainant’s name. But
respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several documents,including the Occupancy

Agreement, that would guarantee Stier’s recognition as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in
complainant’s name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership of lands by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when
he prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands.
Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice
in his office, for which he may be suspended.
*Penalty: Suspension for 6 months
A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, vs. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
CORONA, J.:
Facts:
• Complainant of Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office filed disbarment case against Atty.
Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.
• Complainant alleges:
o Respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced complainant’s clients to
transfer legal representation.
o Respondent promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims.
o To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
o Complainant attached the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to
prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s
services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000.
o Complainant also attached respondent’s calling card which stated “with financial assistance”
• Respondent denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the calling
card.
• Complaint referred to IBP-CBD
• IBP-CBD:
o respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 and
other canons of the CPR
o he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or
brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court
o recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning
Issue: Whether or not respondent violated the CPR
Held: Yes.The SC adopted the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent with
modification as to the penalty.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which
a lawyer’s services are to be made known. Canon 3 thereof provides that a lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
The practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents
as merchants advertise their wares. To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the
practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that
high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business. Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
disbarment. In connection therewith, Rule 1.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not, for any corrupt
motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause. This rule proscribes
"ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or
through an agent in order to gain employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the
mandatory hearing. Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen
were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that respondent could produce a
more favorable result. Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03,
and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer
should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good
result or reduced fees for his services. Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these
seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied
Labiano’s connection to his office. Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s
legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent
violated Rule 16.04 which provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal
matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of
his judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client
in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case
or an additional stake in its outcome. Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own
recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the
verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending
money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is grossly incommensurate to its
findings.
As to the calling card, a lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards. Professional
calling cards may only contain the following details:(a) lawyer’s name; (b) name of the law firm with which he
is connected; (c) address; (d) telephone number and (e) special branch of law practiced.
*Penalty: Suspension for 1 year and stern warning

G.R. No. 106153 July 14, 1997
FLORENCIO G. BERNARDO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. SPECIAL SIXTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS and JIMMY TOMAS, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts:
• Private Respondent Jimmy Tomas filed before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City a complaint
for recovery of possession, quieting of title and damages with preliminary mandatory injunction vs.
Petitioner Florencio Bernardo, the National Housing Authority (NHA), Raymundo Dizon, Jr. and Jose
Vasquez in their official capacities as general manager and project manager, respectively, of NHA.
o the lot subject of the complaint was the object of a double sale by the NHA to Tomas and to
Bernardo (for P615,600)
• The first pleading filed by Bernardo was an ex parte motion for extension of time to file an answer
signed by "Atty. Jose B. Puerto" as counsel.
• When the answer was submitted, his counsel became "Puerto Nuñez & Associates," but with the same
"Jose B. Puerto" signing. Thereafter, all pleadings on behalf of Bernardo during the pre-trial were filed
by said law firm, and the other parties furnished him with their own pleadings through the same firm.
• On the scheduled date of hearing, Bernardo nor his counsel came despite due notice.
• During the proceedings, the court interpreter informed the judge that an "associate of Atty. Puerto"
allegedly called to say that Atty. Puerto had died.
• The court continued the proceedings.
• After Plaintiff Tomas and the NHA concluded the presentation of their respective evidence, Atty.
Marcelo J. Abibas, Jr. filed a notice of appearance as new counsel for Bernardo, mentioning therein
the death of Atty. Puerto.
• Trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against Bernardo without acting on the notice filed
by Bernardo's new counsel and without receiving evidence from Defendant Bernardo.
• Bernardo, through his new counsel, filed a nine-page Omnibus Motion seeking (1) reconsideration of
the above decision, (2) reopening of the case and (3) a new trial on the grounds that he had been
denied his substantive right to due process, particularly the right to be heard, and that said decision
was contrary to law.
• Trial court denied the motion.
• Trial court also denied notice of appeal filed by Bernardo upon opposition by Tomas' counsel on the
ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period to appeal.
• Bernardo filed before the CA a petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition with injunction and a
special prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
• CA (3rd
division) promulgated a Decision in favor of Bernardo
o Ordered the trial judge to set the case "for hearing for the reception of petitioner's evidence
after which a decision be rendered based on the evidence and applicable law."
o As of June 7, 1991, Atty. Marcelo J. Abibas, Jr. became the petitioner's new counsel. This
being so, copy of the decision should have been sent to him. Since this was not complied with,
and without being technical about it, his receipt on June 24, 1991 of the decision is considered
as the date from which the reglementary 15-day period to appeal should commence to run.
Thus, when petitioner filed his Omnibus Motion on June 25, 1991, this was well within the 15-
day period. And when the motion was denied on August 7, 1991 and received by petitioner on
August 23, 1991, there were fourteen more days left for petitioner within which to perfect his
appeal. When he filed his Notice of Appeal on September 4, 1991, it was only the 13th day of
the appeal period.
• Motion for Recon.filed by Tomas
• CA (6th
division) granted motion and affirmed trial court’s decision:
o considered as crucial the failure of a party to comply with the rules on substitution of counsel
o When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must be
made upon the said attorney and notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not the counsel
of record, is not notice in law.
o In order that there may be substitution of attorneys in a given case, there must be (1) written
application for substitution; (2) a written consent of the client; (3) a written consent of the
attorney to be substituted; and (4) in case such written consent cannot be procured, there
must be filed with the application for substitution proof of the service of notice of such motion
in a manner required by the rules on the attorney to be substituted.
o Where the procedure for substitution of attorney is not followed, the attorney who appears on
record before the filing of the application for substitution should be regarded as the attorney
entitled to be served with all the notices and pleadings, and the client is answerable for the
shortcomings of his counsel on record.
o The filing of notice of appearance by a new counsel does not amount to official substitution of
counsel of record. The courts may not presume that the counsel of record had already been
substituted by new counsel merely from the filing of formal appearance by the latter.
• Petitioner’s argument:
o CA (and the trial court) committed grave abuse of discretion in depriving him of due process
by failing to reopen the trial proceedings to enable him to present evidence to support his
defenses, counterclaim and cross-claim
o CA went beyond reliefs prayed for: Respondent Tomas merely prayed that Respondent
Court's original decision be modified such that a new trial would be denied the petitioner and
only his appeal would be given due course.
Issue: Did the trial court deny due process to the petitioner by its refusal to grant new trial and/or to
reopen the case in spite of the fact that the defendant was unable to participate and to present his evidence
du e to the death of the handling lawyer of the law firm representing him and the failure of the new attorney to
follow the rules on substitution of counsel?
Held: *Clarification of SC:
• Petitioner’s reference to a "respondent judge" and a "respondent sheriff" in his petition is an
error. Said "respondents" were not impleaded as parties, only "The Hon. Special Sixth
Division of the Court of Appeals and Jimmy Tomas" as respondents.
• Proper remedy of Petitioner Bernardo:
o should have been an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
o a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when "there is no appeal nor
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
o Certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal

No. Clearly, petitioner failed to comply with the requirements for the substitution of counsel. Under
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence, a valid substitution of counsel has
the following requirements: (1) the filing of a written application for substitution; (2) the client's written consent;
(3) the consent of the substituted lawyer if such consent can be obtained; and, in case such written consent
cannot be procured, (4) a proof of service of notice of such motion on the attorney to be substituted in the
manner required by the Rules. Where death of the previous attorney is the cause of substitution of the
counsel, a verified proof of the death of such attorney (usually a death certificate) must accompany the notice
of appearance of the new counsel.
His new counsel's notice of appearance merely mentioned that Atty. Jose B. Puerto "recently
died." A verified certificate of death was not attached thereto. It has been held that courts may not presume
that the counsel of record has been substituted by a second counsel merely from the filing of a formal
appearance by the latter. In any event, mere mention of the death of Atty. Puerto was of no moment for it was
the law firm of Puerto Nuñez & Associates, — not merely Atty. Jose Puerto — which was the legal
representative of petitioner. The death of said attorney did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship
between the firm and Bernardo.
The SC is not unmindful of the belated attestation of the former secretary of said law office that the
other partner, Dr. Constantino Nuñez, allegedly died even before 1986; that two associates ceased to be
connected with the firm since 1989; while a third associate, Atty. Jose Acejas predeceased Atty. Puerto in
March 1990, thereby leaving Atty. Puerto as the only lawyer in the office. But, obviously, it was petitioner's
former counsel who misled the trial court into believing that "Puerto Nuñez and Associates," a law firm
consisting of more than one lawyer, continued to legally represent Bernardo. Courts may presume that a law
firm that represented itself as such, with at least two name partners and more than one associate is
composed of at least three lawyers. It is not the duty of the courts to inquire during the progress of a case
whether the partnership continues to exist lawfully, or the partners are still alive or its associates are still
connected with the firm.
A client is bound by the conduct, negligence and mistakes of his counsel. Only when the counsel's
actuations are gross or palpable, resulting in serious injustice to the client, that the courts should accord relief
to the party. A thorough review of the instant case reveals that the negligence of the law firm engaged by the
petitioner to defend his cause, and the error of his new counsel in giving a defective substitution and notice of
the death of his former counsel, did not result in deprivation of due process to said party. Hence, a
nullification of the Respondent Court's Amended Decision grounded on grave abuse of discretion is not
warranted.
Worth mentioning is the fact that petitioner was likewise not entirely blameless in his alleged
deprivation of his day in court. Litigants, represented by counsel, should not expect that all they need to do is
sit back, relax and await the outcome of their case. They should give the necessary assistance to their
counsel for what is at stake is their interest in the case. The party-litigant should not rely totally on his counsel
to litigate his case even if the latter expressly assures that the former's presence in court will no longer be
needed. No prudent party will leave the fate of his case entirely to his lawyer. Absence in one or two hearings
may be negligible but want of inquiry or update on the status of his case for several months (four, in this case)
is inexcusable. It is the duty of a party-litigant to be in contact with his counsel from time to time in order to be
informed of the progress of his case. Petitioner simply claims that he was busy with his gravel and sand and
trading businesses which involved frequent traveling from Manila to outlying provinces. But this was not a
justifiable excuse for him to fail to ask about the developments in his case or to ask somebody to make the
query for him. Petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence.
The award by the trial court, affirmed by Respondent Court, of actual, moral and exemplary
damages to Private Respondent Tomas in the sums of P100,000.00, P200,000.00 and P200,000.00,
respectively, is however erroneous. Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the amount of loss must
not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised
upon competent proof or best evidence obtainable. Private Respondent Tomas' claim for actual damages
was only premised upon his testimony that he was deprived of his business and his relation with his friends
and counterparts in the business had been cancelled.
Neither did private respondent establish the legal basis for his claimed moral damages. Although
such damages are incapable of exact estimation and do not necessitate proof of pecuniary loss for them to
be awarded — the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion of the court — it is still essential to prove
that: (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the
cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. It is not enough that one merely says he suffered
mental anguish, serious anxiety, social humiliation, wounded feelings and the like as a result of the actuations
of the other party. Invariably, such actions must be shown to have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill
motive. Bad faith or ill motive under the law cannot be presumed but must be established with clear and
convincing evidence.
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC December 7, 2010
JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant, vs. JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent.
BRION, J.:
Facts:
• disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga filed by Mr. Jovito S.
Olazo
• respondent is charged of violating Rule 6.02,1 Rule 6.032 and Rule 1.013 of the CPR for representing
conflicting interests
• complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay Lower Bicutan in
the Municipality of Taguig
• land was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open for
disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476 and Proclamation No. 172
• To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary
Catalino Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a
recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands declared open for disposition.
• The Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the
Committee members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to
1998).
• Complainant charges violation of Rule 6.02 and alleges:
o respondent abused his position as Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards
when he unduly interfered with the complainant’s sales application because of his personal
interest over the subject land
o respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the complainant’s father, Miguel P.
Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainant’s sales application and claim the subject land for
himself
o respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of money as
payment of the latter’s alleged rights over the subject land

o respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondent’s deceased wife
• the complainant’s sales application was denied
• conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were subsequently given
due course by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
o involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo, the
complainant’s brother
o respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez; as a result the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez
o respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land
to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
o respondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay
Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig
o respondent executed an "Assurance" where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
o respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119
o Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not
qualify for an award
o the approval of his sales application by the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the
objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119
• Complainant charges violation of Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees or R.A. No. 6713:
o Respondent engaged in the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he
appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on
Awards
• Respondent’s defense:
o present complaint is the third malicious charge filed against him by the complainant
 first one was submitted before the JBC when he was nominated as an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court
 second complaint is now pending with the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation
of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended
o presented different version of events:
 Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he later conveyed these rights to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
 Miguel Olazo’s rights over the subject land and the transfer of his rights to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez were duly recognized by the Secretary of the DENR before whom the conflict
of rights over the subject land (between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, on
one hand, and the complainant on the other hand) was brought
 the DENR found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and his application over
the subject land was given due course
 the DENR decision is now final and executor and was affirmed by the Office of the
President, by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court
o denied complainant’s allegations of offering complainant P50,000 for the land and that he
exerted undue influence and orchestrated to get the land
o there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazo’s affidavit where the latter
asserted his rights over the subject land (affidavit merely attested to the truth)
o he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter decided to sell his rights over the subject
land for the medical treatment of his heart condition and the illness of his daughter, Francisca
Olazo
o respondent insisted that the money he extended to them was a form of loan.
o respondent’s participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez involved the payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel Olazo.
o Manuel’s belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20,
2000, regarding what his father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay
with Francisca Olazo, dated August 2, 1997.
o denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
 during his third term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of
the complainants were not included in the agenda for deliberation of the Committee on
Awards
 their conflicting claims and their respective supporting documents were before the Office
of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR which ruled over the conflicting claims
becoming the basis of the decision of the Secretary of the DENR
o cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02, CPR since the provision applies to lawyers in the
government service who are allowed by law to engage in private law practice and to those who,
though prohibited from engaging in the practice of law, have friends, former associates and
relatives who are in the active practice of law. - respondent had already completed his third term
in Congress and his stint in the Committee on Awards when he represented Rodriguez
o cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03, CPR since he did not intervene in the disposition of the
conflicting applications of the complainant and Rodriguez because the applications were not
submitted to the Committee on Awards when he was still a member
Issue: Whether the respondent’s actions constitute a breach of the standard ethical conduct:
1.while respondent was still in Congress and a member of the Committee on Awards
2.when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client before
the office he was previously connected with
Held: No, the case is dismissed. Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. He
may be disciplined by the SC as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer.
• Accountability of a government lawyer in public office:
o Canon 6, CPR highlights the continuing standard of ethical conduct to be observed by
government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks

o In addition to the standard of conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713 for government
employees, a lawyer in the government service is obliged to observe the standard of
conduct under the CPR
o Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the
government service is more exacting than the standards for those in private practice.
o Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of
public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private
interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with
the discharge of their official functions.
o Rule 6.02: A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote
or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
 Reasons: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow
private interest to interfere with his or her public duties.
 promotion of private interest:
• includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction
requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be affected by the functions
of his or her office
• not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing the interest of relatives
• when the respondent uses the office and his or her knowledge of the intricacies
of the law to benefit relatives
o absence of any concrete proof that the respondent abused his position as a Congressman
and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02
o circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his
private interests in the discharge of his official duties since the sales application was not
brought before the Committee on Awards when the respondent was still a member
o complainant’s allegation that the respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to get the subject
land does not specify how the orchestration was undertaken
o the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support
his claim that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father (namely:
the letter, dated June 22, 1996, to the DENR Regional Director-NCR;21 the Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated July 12, 1996;22 and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 199623), do
not contain any reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the respondent over
Miguel Olazo. The documents merely showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in
having his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed and acted as a mere
witness.
o respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation - backed by corroborating
evidence - of the nature of the transaction in which he gave the various sums of money to
Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo in the year 1995
 affidavits of Francisca Olazo corroborated the respondent’s claim that the sums of
money he extended to her and Miguel Olazo were loans used for their medical
treatment
 Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay asserted that some of the money
borrowed from the respondent was used for his medical treatment and hospitalization
expenses
 affidavit of Rodriguez further corroborated the respondent’s claim that the latter’s
involvement was limited to being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and
Francisca Olazo
 Rodriguez and Miguel Olazo agreed that a portion of the loan would be directly paid
by Rodriguez to the respondent and the amount paid would be considered as part of
the purchase price of the subject land
• Private practice of law after separation from public office:
o practice of law:
 any activity, in and out of court, that requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience
 to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession
 to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill
o definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03, CPR which impose certain
restrictions on government lawyers to engage in private practice after their separation from
the service
o rule: government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their
profession during their incumbency.
o Exception: a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her profession under
the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the
law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official
functions.
o Exception to the exception: a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection
with any matter before the office he used to be with
o Rule 6.03 echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after leaving the government
service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in the said service – keyword = "intervene"
o no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the sales
application covering Manuel’s land when the former was still a member of the Committee on
Awards
o the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the preparation of a single
document
o private practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.
o even granting that respondent’s act fell within the definition of practice of law, the available
pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before
the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be presented before it
• Violation of Rule 1.01
o rule prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct
o SC already struck down the complainant’s allegation that respondent engaged in an
unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards

o similar treatment should be given to the complainant’s claim that the respondent violated
paragraph 4(1)33 of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified
applicant
o already resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the decision dated April
3, 2004,34 when the DENR gave due course to his sales application over the subject land
o the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the President, the Court of Appeals and,
the SC per Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No. 173453
• considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member of
the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for
the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers
• respondent generally is under no obligation to prove his/her defense, until the burden shifts to
him/her because of what the complainant has proven
• where no case has in the first place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense
A.M. No. P-02-1555 April 15, 2004
(Formerly A.M. No. 02-1-68-RTC)
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. EDGAR ALLAN C. MORANTE,
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City, Branch 275, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
A.C. No. 5708 November 11, 2005
BERNARDO A. TADLIP, Complainant, vs. ATTY. FIDEL H. BORRES, JR., Respondent.
Tinga, J.:
ELPIDIO P. TIONG, Complainant, vs, ATTY. GEORGE M. FLORENDO, Respondent.
A.C. No. 4428 December 12, 2011
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Facts:
• administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Elpidio P. Tiong against Atty. George M. Florendo for
gross immorality and grave misconduct
• Tiong, an American Citizen, and his wife, Ma. Elena T. Tiong, are real estate lessors in Baguio City
and engaged in the assembly and repair of motor vehicles in Paldit, Sison, Pangasinan
• they engaged the services of respondent Atty. George M. Florendo not only as legal counsel but also
as administrator of their businesses whenever complainant would leave for the US
• complainant began to suspect that respondent and his wife were having an illicit affair
• his suspicion was confirmed when, in their residence, he chanced upon a telephone conversation
between the two and heard respondent utter the words "I love you, I'll call you later"
• when confronted, his wife initially denied but eventually broke down and confessed to their love affair
that began in 1993
• respondent likewise admitted the relationship
• at a meeting initiated by respondent and held at the Salibao Restaurant in Burnham Park, Baguio City,
respondent and complainant's wife, confessed anew to their illicit affair before their respective spouses
• the parties met again at the Mandarin Restaurant in Baguio City and, in the presence of a Notary
Public, Atty.Liberato Tadeo, respondent and Ma. Elena executed and signed an affidavit attesting to
their illicit relationship (adultery) and seeking their respective spouses' forgiveness
• complainant instituted the present suit for disbarment
• respondent admitted the material allegations of the complaint but interposed the defense of pardon
• SC referred case to IBP
• IBP-CBD through Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga:
o Complaint has merit
o Recommended suspension of respondent for 1 year
• IBP Board of Governors adopted CBD’s recommendation
Issue: Whether the pardon extended by complainant in the Affidavit dated May 15, 1995 is sufficient to
warrant the dismissal of the present disbarment case against respondent for gross immoral conduct.
Held: No. The SC resolves to adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD except as to the
penalty imposed. Respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 7, and Rule 7.03 of the CPR.
Possession of good moral character is not only a condition for admission to the Bar but is a
continuing requirement to maintain one's good standing in the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of law
practitioners to observe the highest degree of morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar.
Consequently, any errant behaviour on the part of a lawyer, be it in his public or private activities, which tends
to show him deficient in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant his
suspension or disbarment.
Respondent admitted his illicit relationship with a married woman not his wife, and worse, that of
his client. Contrary to respondent's claim, their consortium cannot be classified as a mere "moment of
indiscretion” considering that it lasted for 2 years and was only aborted when complainant overheard their
amorous phone conversation on March 13, 1995.
Respondent's act of having an affair with his client's wife manifested his disrespect for the laws on
the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. It showed his utmost moral depravity and low
regard for the ethics of his profession. Likewise, he violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by
complainant which in itself is prohibited under Canon 17.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney may be disbarred or
suspended from his office by the Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
office, grossly immoral conduct, among others.
A case of suspension or disbarment is sui generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant
as in a civil case but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in
order to protect the public and the courts. It is not an investigation into the acts of respondent as a husband
but on his conduct as an officer of the Court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar. Hence, the
Affidavit dated March 15, 1995, which is akin to an affidavit of desistance, cannot have the effect of abating
the instant proceedings.

*Penalty: Suspension for 6 months for Gross Imorality
MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, Complainant, vs. ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and ROMANA P.
VALENCIA, Respondents.
A.C. No. 6593
PER CURIAM:
Facts:
• Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit for disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel
E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) at the IBP Committee on
Discipline for gross immorality.
• Complainant alleges that:
o She is the legal wife of Atty. Garrido with 6 children namely, Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito,
Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all surnamed Garrido
o one of their daughters, Madeleine told complainant that on 1987, an unknown caller talked with
her claiming that the former is a child of Atty. Garrido
o another daughter, May Elizabeth, also told complainant that on August 1990, she saw Atty.
Garrido strolling at the Robinson’s Department Store at Ermita, Manila together Atty. Ramona
Paguida Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido (child)
o complainant was able to secure the Certificate of Live Birth of the child, stating among others
that the said child is their daughter and that Atty. Angel Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana
Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong on 1978
o on June 1993, Atty. Garrido left the conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at
their residence
o since then, Atty. Garrido failed to give complainant and family financial support causing the
children to stop schooling
o a disbarment case is also filed against his mistress Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that
out of their immoral acts, mental anguish and besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and
sleepless nights was suffered by complainant
• Atty. Garrido denied the charges and imputations:
o alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David
(Constancia) when he married Maelotisea
o he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways
o Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood his “bad boy” image before they married
o he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems
o he met Atty. Valencia and they became close
o denied that he failed to give financial support to his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that
all his 6 children were educated in private schools, all graduated from college except for Arnel
Victorino, who finished a special secondary course
o alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her profession for the
past 10 years
o emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of the bar on
1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on 1977
o likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer
• Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido:
o explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between
them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with
Constancia
o claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as
they met in 1978
o Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence
when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family
o alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent
when things were favorable and beneficial to her
o Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.
• the parties filed 3 motions before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:
o respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings in view of the criminal complaint for
concubinage Maelotisea filed against them and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of marriage
Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea  motion denied
o respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaints after the RTC of Quezon City declared the
marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea “an absolute nullity”  motion denied
o Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the respondents,
arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido  motion denied
• IBP-CBD recommended respondents’ disbarment (thru Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San
Juan)
• IBP Board of Governors adopted recommendation with modification:
o Atty. Garrido = DISBARRED for gross immorality
o Atty. Valencia = case DISMISSED for lack of merit
• Atty. Garrido appeals to SC arguing:
o he did not commit any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment
o the offenses charged have prescribed under the IBP rules
o pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his profession (already old)
• Atty. Risos-Vidal (Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline) filed her Comment recommending a
modification of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand on the ground that disbarment is very harsh
considering that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his ways
by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage; also no other administrative case
has ever been filed against Atty. Garrido
Issue: Whether Atty. Garrido should be disbarred.
Held: Yes. The findings of the IBP Board of Governors against Atty. Garrido is adopted except for its
recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.
Atty. Garrido
• laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure, in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing
of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do not apply in the determination of a lawyer’s
qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar

• admission to the practice of law is a component of the administration of justice and is a matter of
public interest because it involves service to the public
• admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to
practice law
• complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is
wholly his or her own - his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the
attention of the Court
• the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not material
in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the practice of law,
and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession
• the possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement
to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal profession
• admission to the practice only creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the
qualifications to become a lawyer - may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary
even after admission to the Bar
• Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over the
members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit applicants to the
practice of law
• Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any
deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission
to the practice of law
• Maelotisea’s affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating the disbarment
proceedings due to public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment
proceedings as a public interest concern.  Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant
and she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence making it
available for the Court’s examination
• Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.
• Gross immoral conduct is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency
• the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply
immoral conduct + for lawyers who contracted an unlawful second or multiple marriages
• the admissions of Atty. Garrido established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his
disbarment
• his conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree
• Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically, violations of the bar
admission rules, of his lawyer’s oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession:
1.Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during
the marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to
this Court that the study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of
law are not mutually exclusive.
2.He misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already married
to Constancia. This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a
prohibited relationship.
3. Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence
of his first marriage. This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the
commission of a crime.
4. Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages
were in place and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his
actions on the two women he took as wives and on his 6 children by his second marriage.
5. Instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of
Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.
6. Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a
lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not
“valid.”
7. Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy
to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.
8. After admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual
relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a
double life with two (2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years.
9. Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position
advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or
an act of mending his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to escape
liability for his past actions by having his second marriage declared void after the present
complaint was filed against him.
• He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the
Bar.
• He violated his lawyer’s oath, Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and Canon 1 of the
CPR, all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land.
• In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second marriage while
his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting.
• He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01, Canon 7, and Rule 7.03, CPR
• When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives, he
discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws are mere tools of
convenience that can be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires.
• Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
• Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community approbation.
Atty. Valencia
• Atty. Valencia should be administratively liable under the circumstances for gross immorality.
• Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality. To have good
moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good.
• It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation.

• The requirement of good moral character has four general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the
public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to protect
errant lawyers from themselves.
• Prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either
to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already had a family.
• As Atty. Garrido’s admitted confidante, she was under the moral duty to give him proper advice;
instead, she entered into a romantic relationship with him for about 6 years during the subsistence of
his two marriages.
• In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had an outstanding second marriage.
These circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character;
even without being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values, whose confidential advice
was sought by another with respect to the latter’s family problems, would not aggravate the situation
by entering into a romantic liaison with the person seeking advice, thereby effectively alienating the
other person’s feelings and affection from his wife and family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garrido’s marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact
remains that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have
required her to ward off Atty. Garrido’s advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man with
both marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead,
she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing
his relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencia’s presence and
willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children for a third marriage with her. This
scenario smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law.
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencia’s expressed belief that Atty. Garrido’s second marriage to
Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict legal
sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido’s marriage to Maelotisea,
we do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the
country. Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garrido’s second
marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of
celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty. Valencia’s claim that she agreed to marry Atty.
Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the
celebration of their marriage in Hongkong[39]
leads us to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in
Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage
outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to
retain and use her surname instead of using the surname of her “husband.” Atty. Valencia, too, did not
appear to mind that her husband did not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife
and the family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all “sharing” her husband with
another woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencia’s perverse sense of moral values.
Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencia’s actions grossly
immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all
appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her actions were also unprincipled and
reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and
engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already
mentioned, Atty. Valencia’s conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the
community’s sense of decency; while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second
family build a house prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her husband with the
woman of his second marriage.
We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply
failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality.[40]
In Barrientos v.
Daarol,[41]
we held that lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character but must
also be seen to be of good moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to
the bar and after she became a member of the legal profession.
Conclusion
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law
through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show
the lawyer’s lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from
Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to
disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects
the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court.[42]
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them.
The records show the parties’ pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental
and emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties imposed on
lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court.
While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garrido’s plea for compassion and his act of supporting his
children with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his demonstrated
violations of his oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides what under
other circumstances are commendable traits of character.
In like manner, Atty. Valencia’s behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a
basic and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity
of the legal profession and without placing the integrity of the administration of justice into question. She was
not an on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle
whose incidents crossed into the illicit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and

(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty.
Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P.
Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009
ANTERO J. POBRE, Complainant, vs. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Respondent
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the
Court’s attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the
Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am
suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing
up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the
face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am
no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots.
I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x
x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker
towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted direct
contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be taken
against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does
not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were covered
by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in the
discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech, according to her,
was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial legislation.
She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed “to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council
[JBC],” which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief
Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify
for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting
members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section 11
of the Constitution, which provides: “A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is
in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.” Explaining the import of the underscored portion of
the provision, the Court, in Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental
privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the
English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a representative of the
public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be
protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of
that liberty may occasion offense.”[1]
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and
arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department. Without
parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating
forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for
their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be
subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the
hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judge’s speculation as to the motives.[2]
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of
parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of
the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body to look diligently
into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and its
citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they
perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of
the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the
privilege.[3]
The disciplinary authority of the assembly[4]
and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage
or correct such abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.[5]
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a
disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last word on the
matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of
the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has
undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her
statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as
stating that she wanted “to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court,” and calling the Court a “Supreme Court of idiots.”
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.[6]
We draw her attention to the ensuing passage
in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this
Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to
take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the result.

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to
erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for themselves.
She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and
international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to
stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, is duty-bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public
service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social responsibility, perhaps
higher than their brethren in private practice.[7]
Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive
individual, the impact her statements would make on the people’s faith in the integrity of the courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial
legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of
what she said. We quote the passage once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am
homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I
feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in
the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to
be surrounded by idiots. Iwould rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of
personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her
remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must not
be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its
magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity
is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their
personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting
rhetoric and offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiago’s outburst was directly traceable to what she considered
as an “unjust act” the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief Justice. But
while the JBC functions under the Court’s supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief
Justice who sits as the JBC’s ex-officio chairperson,[8]
have no official duty to nominate candidates for
appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiago’s
wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and defamatory
words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: x x x x
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to
the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
(Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the
end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within
its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and assist
it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence; x x x x
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.[9]
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,[10]
we reiterated our
pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer[11]
that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be
maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to
uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that “[i]t is
the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance.” That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent
upon lawyers to support the courts against “unjust criticism and clamor.” And more. The
attorney’s oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be “with all good fidelity x x
x to the courts.”
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v.
Cloribel[12]
that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, “like the court itself, an instrument
or agency to advance the ends of justice.” His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority
of the courts to which he owes fidelity, “not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice.” Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the
judicial edifice “is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of

the liberties of the people.” Thus has it been said of a lawyer that “[a]s an officer of the
court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice.”[13]
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code.
Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally
speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a
violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.[14]
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long as
their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,[15]
a good character being an essential
qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not
confined to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers’ professional duties, but
also covers any misconduct, which––albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their profession––would show
them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which their license and the law invest in them.[16]
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the people’s faith in courts and trust in the rule of
law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal
malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and
embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it in the case of former
Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty.
Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang[17]
who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a most insolent
manner.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago
for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its
members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing so, even
without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senator’s offensive and disrespectful
language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in
Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that
the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against
prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the people’s representatives, to perform the
functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the
congressional hall.[18]
It is intended to protect members of Congress against government pressure and
intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that
enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, “offensive or improper language against another
Senator or against any public institution.”[19]
But as to Senator Santiago’s unparliamentary remarks, the
Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate Ethics
Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such circumstance.[20]
The lady
senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and
avoided imposing their own rules on her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobre’s motives in filing his complaint, stating that disciplinary
proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We cannot
overstress that the senator’s use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest court of the
land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.[21]
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made the
statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied making
such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. Her implied
admission is good enough for the Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-
Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7199 [Formerly CBD 04-1386] July 22, 2009
FOODSPHERE, INC., Complainant, vs. ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat processing and
manufacture and distribution of canned goods and grocery products under the brand name “CDO,” filed a
Verified Complaint[1]
for disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as “Batas Mauricio” (respondent),
a writer/columnist of tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TOROand HATAW!, and a
host of a television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program Double
B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyer’s oath and (3)
disrespect to the courts and to investigating prosecutors.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in
Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as Cordero and his
relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and soon discovered
a colony of worms inside the can.
Cordero’s wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration
(BFAD). Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.
Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the BFAD conducted a
conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during which the spouses Cordero demanded P150,000 as damages
from complainant. Complainant refused to heed the demand, however, as being in contravention of company
policy and, in any event, “outrageous.”

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