HAMILTON COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT                              HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIOSTOR-ALL ALFRED, LLC                    ...
Defendant. Said allegation by Stor-All is merely words and its abuse of process of the       judicial process and/or legal...
Plaintiff for rent and late fees in the amount of $552.39.” Moreover, while Stor-All        makes such allegation and/or a...
1.       State in short and plain terms Stor-All’s defenses to each claim asserted                 and shall admit or deny...
delay of proceedings, obstruction of justice, etc. will be subject to the                 provisions of Rule 11.4        6...
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: That Defendant’s Counter-Claim has been filed in goodfaith and has been drafted to save time and costs...
5.    Nothing in the Rental Agreement between Crown Storage and Defendantstates how such matters involving the property be...
ALL LEASE AGREEMENT” to date remains unexecuted. See EXHIBIT “2” attachedhereto and incorporated by reference.      15.   ...
form of motion for communication; however, Whiteside with her own motives ignoredthe information provided by the Defendant...
scam, that they were waiving any right to seek damages of and against Stor-All if theyelected to take Stor-All up on its f...
of interest that may arise had Defendant still been employed with Wood & Lamping andworking with Thomas J. Breed when Stor...
Notebook and the Employer’s Guide available to the public. A              Guide clearly addressing violations of Wood & La...
42.     Stor-All’s filing of its Forcible Entry and Detainer Complaint was not onlyto collect a frivolous debt that it kne...
51.     Stor-All elected to unlawfully seize and take the Defendant’s storage unitand property hostage. Stor-All making it...
56.    Stor-All knew that Defendant had no binding Rental Agreement with it;moreover, that Defendant’s Rental Agreement wa...
Moreover, with knowledge that Defendant did not wish to enter into a Rental Agreement       with it. Action by Stor-All wa...
Defendant seeks relief as a direct and proximate result of Stor-All’s abuse of process inthe filing of its Complaint for F...
Stor-All’s Complaint has perverted these proceeding and the               judicial process for purposes of attempting to a...
suffering, (c) mental suffering, (d) embarrassment, (e) humiliation, (f) loss of property orfreedom, etc..               4...
Defendants storage unit and taking her property for the means of extorting monies fromher.       77.    Acting with expres...
88.     In perpetrating the above acts, Stor-All acted malicious and wrongfullyand with the intent, design, and purpose to...
97.    In perpetrating the above acts, Stor-All acted maliciously and wrongfully       and with the intent, design, and pu...
Defendant brings this Counter-Claim for the wrongful eviction action of Stor-All. InStor-All’s filing of Complaint for For...
portion of them by the landlord, the act of third persons acting               under the authority of the landlord, or by ...
65 Ohio Jur.3d § 162 – Elements and requisites; actual orconstructive eviction:        An eviction, in the strict sense of...
to be of a substantial nature, and so injurious to the tenant as to              deprive him or her of the beneficial enjo...
action for alleged damages that perhaps never would have resulted.                         (Greenberg)]                   ...
the lessee has to pay more for comparable space over the term of              the original lease, plus any special damages...
A tenant who is constructively evicted . . . is entitled, as far              as it is possible to do so, to a monetary aw...
A commercial landlord acted with malice toward a tenant,                 and thus an award of punitive damages was warrant...
COUNT THREE                       LOSS OF ENJOYMENT/DISTURBANCE    (OF AND AGAINST STOR-ALL ALFRED, LLC – WHICH INCLUDES S...
514 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1953)),     the lessor is acting under              a right of entry provided by statute.  ...
012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)
012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)
012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)
012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)
012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)
012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)
012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)
012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)
012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)
012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)
012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)
012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)
012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)
012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)
012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)
012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)
012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)
012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)
012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)
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012909 answer&counterclaim (stor-all vs newsome)

  1. 1. HAMILTON COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIOSTOR-ALL ALFRED, LLC : CASE NO.: 09CV016901109 Alfred Street :Cincinnati, Ohio : Plaintiff : :vs. : DEFENDANT’S ANSWER TO : COMPLAINT FOR FORCIBLE ENTRYDenise V. Newsome : AND DETAINER; NOTIFICATIONPost Office Box 14731 : ACCOMPANYING COUNTER-CLAIM;Cincinnati, Ohio 45250 : COUNTER-CLAIM AND DEMAND FOR Defendant : JURY TRIAL1 COMES NOW Defendant, named as Denise V. Newsome (“Defendant”) and presentsthis, her Answer to Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer; Notification AccompanyingCounter-Claim; Counter-Claim and Demand for Jury Trial in the above referenced matter. Insupport thereof, Defendant states: DEFENDANT’S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINERFIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 1. Defendant denies the allegation contained in Paragraph 1 of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Without waiving said denial, Defendant has no knowledge of Plaintiff, Stor- All Alfred, LLC (“Stor-All” or “Plaintiff”), being the owner (not “owner and landlord” of the “premises located at 1109 Alfred Street, Cincinnati, Hamilton County, Ohio 45214.” This appears to be a factual assertion and/or allegation by Stor-All and a discoverable issue; however, Stor-All has presented no evidence to support its ownership of said premises. In its craftiness in the use of the pen, Stor-All is attempting to mislead this Court and the Defendant by intentionally and purposefully omitting the fact that it is not Defendant’s landlord. Furthermore, Stor-All has failed to present any factual documentation/evidence (i.e. Rental Agreement) to support its assertion that Defendant is a tenant of it. There is no contract, lease and/or rental agreement between Stor-All and 1 Boldface, Italics and Underline added for emphasis. Legal Resource materials utilized: AmericanJurisprudence Pleading and Practice Forms, Ohio Jurisprudence 3d, West’s Ohio Digest, Ohio Rules of CivilProcedure, etc.) EXHIBIT Page 1 of 51 104
  2. 2. Defendant. Said allegation by Stor-All is merely words and its abuse of process of the judicial process and/or legal process. 2. Defendant denies the allegation set forth in Paragraph 2 of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Without waiving said denial, this again appears to be a factual assertion accusing Defendant of being “in default of her rental agreement for failure to pay rent.” However, Stor-All has failed to produce the rental agreement it relies upon because no such rental agreement exist between Stor-All and the Defendant. Said allegation by Stor- All is merely words and its abuse of process of the judicial process and/or legal process. 3. Defendant denies the allegation set forth in Paragraph 3 of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Without waiving said denial, Defendant is in receipt of a “NOTICE TO LEAVE THE PREMISES” mailed to her on or about January 9, 2009 and not January 9, 2008. In said document Stor-All identifies itself as “Landlord: Stor-All Alfred, LLC. . .;” however, has failed to produce any factual documentation to assert such a claim. Stor- All has failed as alleged “Landlord” to provide any evidence to sustain a Landlord and Tenant relationship because no such relationship exist between Stor-All and the Defendant; moreover, no such document to sustain such an allegation. Stor-All was not authorized by Ohio statutes/laws to execute and/or serve such a notice identifying itself as Defendant’s landlord. Such action by Stor-All may be implied as being done with deceit and fraudulent intent. Furthermore, said action of Stor-All in the service of such notice, is an abuse of process of the judicial process and/or legal process. 4. Defendant denies the allegation set forth in Paragraph 4 of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Without waiving said denial, Stor-All has presented no factual documentation to support a contract between it and Defendant. In Paragraphs 2 and 4, Stor-All alleges Defendant has been in default “From and after, April 1, 2008;” then, asserts in Paragraph 4, “Defendant has, since Janury 19, 2009, unlawfully and forcibly detained from the Plaintiff possession of the above-described premises;” however, presents no factual documentation to support such allegations. Defendant on July 27, 2007, entered into a Rental Agreement with Crown Storage-Camp Washington for the storage unit located at 1109 Alfred Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45214; therefore, Defendant is in legal possession of storage “Unit 173.” See EXHIBIT “1” – Rental Agreement attached hereto and incorporated by reference. Said Agreement being provided to the Defendant by Stor-All upon request. There is no contractual and/or rental agreement between Stor-All and Defendant. Said allegation by Stor-All is merely words and its abuse of process of the judicial process and/or legal process.SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF: Defendant incorporates herein by reference her answers set forth in Paragraphs 1 through4 above as if fully restated and/or set forth herein. Defendant further states in response: 5. Defendant denies the allegation set forth in Paragraph 5 of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Without waiving said denial, Defendant denies that she “is indebted to Page 2 of 51
  3. 3. Plaintiff for rent and late fees in the amount of $552.39.” Moreover, while Stor-All makes such allegation and/or assertion, it has presented no evidence to sustain the debt it alleges it is entitled to. Stor-All alleges Defendant owes the debt; however, has failed; (a) to prove that there is such a debt – has provided no documentation to sustain such a claim and/or that Plaintiff had agreed to such or obtained any such services warranting such charges, (b) how it arrived at said debt; and (c) its entitlement to said debt. Said allegation by Stor-All is merely words and its abuse of process of the judicial process and/or legal process. 6. Defendant denies the allegation set forth in the unnumbered Paragraph following Paragraph 5 which begins, “WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands restitution and recovery of said Premises” in Stor-All’s Complaint. Without waiving said denial, it is important for this Court to know that Stor-All and/or others have unlawfully and illegally seized the Premises it seeks this Court’s intervention on. Executing and enforcing its own self-made forcible entry and detainer action over the Defendant’s objections. Moreover, as a matter of law, Stor-All, its agents, representatives, etc. are not entitled to the relief sought in said Paragraph. Therefore, this Court is to deny the relief Stor-All is seeking. Said allegation by Stor-All is merely words and its abuse of process of the judicial process and/or legal process. 7. Defendant denies the allegation set forth in the unnumbered Paragraph that is blocked bearing a title, “NOTICE UNDER THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT.” Without waiving said denial, Stor-All, its agents, representatives, etc. are not entitled to the debt they allege is owed by the Defendant. Moreover, Stor-All, its agents, representatives, etc. is attempting to unlawfully and illegally collect a debt to which it knows is fraudulent and/or false. Stor-All is liable and subject to the injury/harm rendered and/or sustained by the Defendant for any bad faith actions – as its Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer filed in this lawsuit – to collect a debt to which it has full knowledge it is not entitled to. Said allegation by Stor-All is merely words and its abuse of process of the judicial process and/or legal process. NOTIFICATION ACCOMPANYING COUNTER-CLAIM FOR THE PURPOSES OF AVOIDING VEXATIOUS AND OPPRESSIVE LITIGATION, NEEDLESSLYINCREASING THE COST OF LITIGATION, ETC.: Plaintiff, Stor-All Alfred, LLC, is herebyNOTIFIED that should it elect to answer the Counter-Claim, that its responsive pleading shallcomply with the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 82 and/or the applicable laws governingsaid matters and those responses to Defendant’s Counter-Claim: 2 For reference purposes in preparation of Counter-Claim see legal source: Rule 8 General Rules ofPleadings – Wright & Miller Federal Practice and Procedure Civil 3d. Page 3 of 51
  4. 4. 1. State in short and plain terms Stor-All’s defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny averments upon which it relies; 2. If Stor-All is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, it shall so state and this has the effect of a denial. However, said denials shall fairly meet the substance of the averments denied; 3. If Stor-All intend in good faith to deny only a part or qualification of an averment, then it shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder; and 4. Be subject to the provisions of Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 11. Stor-All’s (which includes, its attorneys, representatives, agents, etc.) “failure to comply with Rule 11 is subject to possible disciplinary action.” Stor-All’s signing of pleading constitutes a certificate of the following: a. That the attorney (or party) has conducted a reasonable inquiry; b. That he or she is satisfied that the paper is well grounded in fact; c. That the pleading has a basis in existing law or that the attorney (or party) has a good faith argument to amend or reverse existing law; d. That the pleading is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as harassment, delay, or needless increase of his opponent’s costs of litigation. . . . If the pleading or other paper is signed in violation of this Rule, appropriate sanctions shall be imposed by the court on motion or on its own initiative. Sanctions may include an order to pay the other party the amount of reasonable expenses caused by the violation, including reasonable attorney fees.3Stor-All is hereby further NOTIFIED that: 5. It is to familiarize and/or acquaint itself with the Rules governing responsive pleadings. Answers such as “failure to state a claim,” “lack of subject matter jurisdiction,” provided for purposes of misrepresentation, 3 For reference purposes in preparation of Counter-Claim see legal source: Niles Federal Civil Procedure7.530 Signing of Pleadings, Motions and Other Papers. Page 4 of 51
  5. 5. delay of proceedings, obstruction of justice, etc. will be subject to the provisions of Rule 11.4 6. If Stor-All’s answer is not sufficiently definite in nature to give reasonable notice of the allegations in the Counter-Claim sought to be placed in issue, the Defendant’s, Denise Newsome’s (“Defendant”), averments may be treated as admitted (i.e. a corporate defendant’s denial of “each and every allegation” did not give “plain notice.”).5 7. A denial of knowledge or information requires that Stor-All not only lack first-hand knowledge of the necessary facts involved, but also that Stor-All lack information upon which it reasonably could form a personal belief concerning the truth of the Defendant’s allegations.6 8. Normally, Stor-All may not assert lack of knowledge or information if the necessary facts or data involved are within Stor-All’s knowledge or easily brought within its knowledge – (i.e. An answer denying information as to the truth or falsity of a matter necessarily within the knowledge of the party’s managing officers is a sham, and will be treated as an admission of allegation of the Counter-Claim.7) 9. An averment, that Stor-All is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to matters that are of common knowledge or of with it can inform itself with the slightest effort, will be treated as patently false and the effect and purpose will be taken as such to merely delay justice.8 10. If Stor-All’s Answer to the Counter-Claim is not incompliance with the rules and/or laws governing responsive pleadings and/or said matters, the applicable Motion to Strike the Answer will be filed and request for the proper relief (i.e. sanctions against Stor-All and/or its attorney [if applicable]) will be sought. 4 For reference purposes in preparation of Counter-Claim see legal source: Niles Federal Civil Procedure7.100 Pleadings Allowed through 7.262 Effect of Failure to Deny. 5 For reference purposes in preparation of Counter-Claim see legal source: Wright & Miller FederalPractice and Procedure Civil 3d § 1261. 6 For reference purposes in preparation of Counter-Claim see legal source: Wright & Miller FederalPractice and Procedure Civil 3d § 1262. 7 For reference purposes in preparation of Counter-Claim see legal source: Wright & Miller FederalPractice and Procedure Civil 3d § 1262 and also Harvey Aluminum (Inc.) v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 749, 758 (9th Cir.1964).. 8 For reference purposes in preparation of Counter-Claim see legal source: See Reed v. Turner, 2 F.R.D.12; and Squire v. Levan, 32 F.Supp. 437. Page 5 of 51
  6. 6. PLEASE TAKE NOTICE: That Defendant’s Counter-Claim has been filed in goodfaith and has been drafted to save time and costs and/or expenses. Defendant can only hope thatStor-All will allow wisdom to prevail. Stor-All is also NOTIFIED that unless it serves and file a written response to theCounter-Claim within the specified time allowed, the Defendant will seek judgment of andagainst it by default for the relief demanded in the Counter-Claim. DEFENDANT’S COUNTER-CLAIM and DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL COMES NOW Defendant, Denise V. Newsome – a/k/a Denise Newsome (“Defendant”)having answered and providing defense to Plaintiff’s, Stor-All Alfred, LLC’s (“Stor-All” or“Plaintiff”), Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer, and without waiving said defensesthereof, files this her Counter-Claim and Demand for Jury Trial. Defendant herein incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 7 of Defendant’s Answer toComplaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer as if set forth in full herein and reiterates her non-waiver of the denials therein stated.Statement of Facts: 1. On or about July 27, 2007, Defendant entered into a Rental Agreement with Crown Storage-Camp Washington (“Crown Storage”). See EXHIBIT “1” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. 2. Crown Storage at all times mentioned was the owner and/or landlord according to the Rental Agreement (Lease No. 2543) entered into with the Defendant. 3. On July 27, 2007, Defendant was lawfully possessed of a certain storage Unit Numbered 173 located at 1109 Alfred Street, Cincinnati, Ohio, Hamilton County, Ohio and lawfully possessed and owned the personal property placed in and/or contained therein. 4. Defendant rented the storage unit from Crown Storage for $29.82 per month and the rental contract was in full force and in effect at all times mentioned. Page 6 of 51
  7. 7. 5. Nothing in the Rental Agreement between Crown Storage and Defendantstates how such matters involving the property being sold during the Defendant’s tenancyshould be handled. Defendant did not agree to be bound by any terms and conditions ofsaid Rental Agreement upon Crown Storage through a sale of its property to another. 6. Under the Rental Agreement between Crown Storage and Defendant noproblem arose regarding unpaid rent. Defendant made payments in compliance with theterms and conditions of the Rental Agreement entered into with Crown Storage. 7. Defendant has duly performed all conditions, covenants, and promisesrequired to be performed by her under the Rental Agreement entered into with CrownStorage under its terms and conditions, except for those acts which have been prevented,delayed or excused by acts or omissions of Stor-All and Crown Storage. 8. For approximately eight (8) months under the Rental Agreement betweenCrown Storage and Defendant, Crown Storage had no problems in obtaining rentpayment from Defendant. 9. In April 2008, Stor-All unlawfully entered and seized the storage unit andproperty of the Defendant. Said acts are in violation of within meaning of RC § 5321.04of the Landlord and Tenant Act. 10. Problems arose with the Defendant’s rental of her storage unit after Stor-All’s assertion of entitlement of Defendant’s rent and unlawful seizure of her propertyand denial of access to said unit and property. 11. As a direct and proximate result of Stor-All’s constructive eviction ofDefendant from the premises, Defendant suffers from mental anguish and pain, all toDefendants general damage to be determined by a jury. 12. Stor-All’s constructive eviction of Defendant from the premises and theunlawful/illegal seizure of her storage unit and property were retaliatory, oppressive andmalicious within the meaning of RC §5321.03, in that it has subjected the Defendant tocruel and unjust hardship, harassment, threats, etc. in willful and conscious disregard ofDefendant’s rights, entitling Defendant to an award of punitive damages within meaningof RC §521.12. 13. As a further proximate result of Stor-All’s conduct as alleged in itsComplaint and in this Counter-Complaint, Defendant will incur moving expenses andadditional increase in storage cost in an amount to be determined. 14. Defendant made it verbally known and in writing she was not interestedwith leasing with Stor-All. Neither was she interested in entering a Rental Agreementwith Stor-All. As evidenced in the file of Stor-All regarding the Defendant, the “STOR- Page 7 of 51
  8. 8. ALL LEASE AGREEMENT” to date remains unexecuted. See EXHIBIT “2” attachedhereto and incorporated by reference. 15. In or about April 2008, Stor-All claimed that Defendant went into default.When Defendant submitted payment for her storage unit, it was rejected by Stor-All.Payment was submitted under the terms and agreement of the Rental Agreement betweenCrown Storage and the Defendant. Defendant advised of her objections. WhenDefendant advised wanting to retrieve her property, Stor-All denied her request anddemanded that she pay monies for rent and late fees and lien charges applied. 16. In or about April 2008, Stor-All forcibly seized the Defendant’s storageunit. Defendant did not authorize and/or agree to such forcible seizure. 17. In or about April 2008, Stor-All and Stor-All’s agent(s), representative(s),etc. unlawfully invaded the Defendant’s storage unit. Defendant did not authorize and/oragree to such invasion. 18. In or about April 2008, Stor-All and Stor-All’s agent(s), representative(s),etc. forcibly seized the Defendant’s storage unit and prevented, interfered, refused anddenied Defendant access to her storage unit unless she gave it money. 19. Since April 2008, Defendant’s right to her storage unit was striped awayfrom her without legal and/or statutory authority by Stor-All. Defendant has not been toher storage unit for approximately ten (10) months because of the unlawful/illegal actionsof Stor-All. 20. On December 9, 2008, Stor-All’s representative, Lori Whiteside(“Whiteside”), contacted Defendant at her place of employment by use of Defendant’semployer’s fax machine at (513) 852-6087. See EXHIBIT “3” attached hereto andincorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. 21. On December 9, 2008, Whiteside contacted Defendant at her place ofemployment via facsimile at (513) 852-6087. Whiteside doing so without theauthorization of the Defendant to correspond with her through her employer’s fax number(513) 852-6087. Whiteside using said method of correspondence to place theDefendant’s employer and Defendant’s co-workers on notice as to the personal andprivate affairs of the Defendant. Whiteside knew and/or should have known that sendingcorrespondence to Defendant’s employer’s fax number (513) 852-6087 would have beenreceived by Defendant’s employer and or Defendant’s co-workers. The action ofWhiteside was done with forethought and premeditation. The action of Whiteside waswillful, malicious and wanton and was done with reckless regard to the rights and privacyof the Defendant. 22. On December 9, 2008, Defendant advised Whiteside of her objections insending her correspondence to her employer at the fax number (513) 852-6087.Whiteside was provided with a fax number by the Defendant had she wanted to use this Page 8 of 51
  9. 9. form of motion for communication; however, Whiteside with her own motives ignoredthe information provided by the Defendant and sent fax to the Defendant at a number notauthorized by her. Through Defendant’s correspondence to Whiteside, she placedWhiteside of her knowledge that sending of fax to employer’s fax number (513) 852-6087 was ill motivated. Whiteside was advised of the emotional, mental anguish, etc.harm/injury sustained by Defendant. See EXHIBIT “4” attached hereto andincorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. 23. On December 19, 2008, Whiteside advised the Defendant that Stor-All’sfile in the matter regarding her was being submitted to Stor-All’s attorney, Dave Meranusin Cincinnati, Ohio. Whiteside withholding the name of the law firm in which Meranuswas employed. Whiteside withholding name of law firm that Meranus was employed atbecause of knowledge and/or may have been made aware that Defendant was workingwith an attorney, Thomas J. Breed, who was formerly employed with Stor-All’scounsel’s law firm prior to coming to Defendant’s employer, Wood & Lamping LLP.See EXHIBIT “5” attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as if set forth infull herein. 24. Information as to the attorney(s) Defendant assisted could be heard whencalling and listening to her voicemail message at her place of employment, Wood &Lamping LLP. Said information (i.e. name of law firm, attorneys she provided assistanceto) was in Defendant’s voicemail. 25. Whiteside was able to obtain the information regarding the Defendant’splace of employment and the attorney(s) to which she assisted. Whiteside having calledthe Defendant at her place of employment and in failing to reach her, proceeded to callDefendant at home. 26. Whiteside advised Defendant she has a background in the legal field. 27. In the December 19, 2008 facsimile to Defendant, Whiteside also advisedof Stor-All’s plans scheduling an “amnesty weekend for January 9, 10, and 11, 2009.”Said weekend would entail, “at which time we are going to have a moving truck anddriver available for any of the tenants that wish to vacate the premises at absolutely nocost to the tenant.” See Exhibit “5.” 28. The amnesty weekend by Stor-All was done with willful and maliciousintent to deprive the Defendant of any damages to which she may be entitled. Theamnesty weekend by Stor-All was to release other tenants from such similar criminal andcivil wrongs they had subjected the Defendant to. Stor-All’s amnesty weekend was forthe benefit of masking/ shielding its liability for the illegal/unlawful acts rendered theDefendant and perhaps others. 29. Stor-All having knowledge that it was in violation of the statutes/laws;however, failed to notify its tenants who elected to participate in the amnesty weekend Page 9 of 51
  10. 10. scam, that they were waiving any right to seek damages of and against Stor-All if theyelected to take Stor-All up on its frivolous and ill-motive good will offer. 30. On December 19, 2008, Defendant provided Whiteside with Ohiostatutes/laws to advise her of the violations of Stor-All. To no avail. See EXHIBIT “6”attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. 31. On or about December 23, 2008, Defendant advised Whiteside ofconcerns that the amnesty weekend appeared to be “only in the interest of Stor-Allalone.” Defendant also advising knowledge that Stor-All was considering bringing aForcible Entry and Detainer action. Stor-All only deciding to bring such an action uponbeing advised by Defendant that their threats (which lasted for several months) of Liensand her property being sold/auctioned were prohibited by the statutes/laws of Ohio.Whiteside having already confirmed that Defendant was right that they were not entitledto the “LIEN-actions” they repeatedly harassed her with. In Defendant’s December 23,2008, correspondence, Defendant provided Whiteside with a draft of a Complaint she isconsidering filing. See EXHIBIT “7” attached hereto and incorporated by reference asif set forth in full herein. 32. On or about December 23, 2008, Defendant advised Whiteside, “you arenot a lawyer; the courts are here to interpret and enforce the laws. I am certain that thereason why Stor-All has not received rent is not due to any breach on my part. So letStor-All move forward with their lawsuit and I will counter in that it is clear where thelaws lie. The offer made was only what was in Stor-All’s best interest, so let the Court(s)decide if it had a legal right to withhold my rent and continue to threaten me with liens –when I proved case law to support it was not entitle to such. The delay was not due to mypart and neither was nonpayment for any contribution on my part, but all attributed tothe direct acts of Stor-All and its insistence on imposing liens on me in which it was notentitled and neither was there a lease between me and Stor-all.” See Exhibit “7”attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. 33. On January 9, 2009, Stor-All mailed Defendant “NOTICE TO LEAVETHE PREMISES” by January 19, 2009. Stor-All did not fax and mail said notice. Itprovided notice to the Defendant via regular mail and certified mail. Defendant was ather place of employment all day. Apparently Stor-All having knowledge as toDefendant’s employer’s intent to terminate her employment. A causal link/connectionestablished. Whiteside taking a far departure from the method of communication she hadbeen using prior to January 9, 2009. Moreover, since introducing herself to Defendant. 34. On January 9, 2009, Defendant was terminated from her place ofemployment with Wood & Lamping LLP. Being advised that her termination was due toher position being eliminated. Said termination was without just cause. 35. Defendant’s termination was done with willful and malicious intent to aidStor-All. Moreover, to aid Stor-All in obtaining an undue advantage over the Defendant.By succeeding in getting the Defendant terminated, this eliminated the potential conflict Page 10 of 51
  11. 11. of interest that may arise had Defendant still been employed with Wood & Lamping andworking with Thomas J. Breed when Stor-All’s counsel filed its Complaint in this action. 36. Defendant’s termination was done to cause her financial ruin anddevastation. Stor-All thinking that with said ruin and devastation, the Defendant wouldbe forced to waive important rights secured to her under the Ohio Constitution, UnitedStates Constitution, Ohio Landlord and Tenant Act, and other statutes/laws governingsaid matters. Stor-All believing that if the Defendant is terminated that she would beforced to succumb to its attempts of extorting monies from her. Nevertheless, with allits hard work – failing on December 9, 2008, to obtain Defendant’s termination – Stor-All was ruthless, unrelenting and determined to see that Defendant was terminated fromemployment with Wood & Lamping LLP. Said acts by Stor-All was done for ill gain. 37. What Stor-All did not know which proved to be very beneficial to theDefendant: (a) That prior to December 2008 and in December 2008, Defendant had notified her employer of a medical procedure. (b) That in December 2008, when Defendant again notified her employer of the need for medical procedure, from the time of notification Defendant was covered and/or protected under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). (c) That on January 8, 2009, Defendant provided her written request form to begin this process. That said leave was approved by her attorneys, which included Thomas J. Breed’s approval. (d) That the very NEXT day (January 9, 2009) in retaliation and in efforts of aiding Stor-All, Wood & Lamping LLP terminated Defendant’s employment with no just cause and in violation of the FMLA; moreover, in efforts of assisting Stor-All in the criminal and civil wrongs undertaken against the Defendant. (e) That in an effort to cover up their unlawful/illegal acts, Wood & Lamping had a representative remove Defendant’s Employee Handbook from her desk. The taking of the Employee Handbook was done with malicious intent to cover-up and/or mask/shield an illegal animus. With laughter, that was not the Defendant’s only copy. Defendant retaining a copy of her Employee Handbook at her residence as well. (f) That during Defendant’s employment with Wood & Lamping, she assisted an attorney by the name of Julie R. Pugh, who specialized in employment law. That Pugh and another attorney, Heather Walsh, conducted an Employment Seminar in which the Defendant attended. At said Seminar attendees were provided with a Notebook containing Wood & Lamping LLP’s Employer’s Guide. With laughter of which Defendant also received and retained. A Page 11 of 51
  12. 12. Notebook and the Employer’s Guide available to the public. A Guide clearly addressing violations of Wood & Lamping under the FMLA. (g) While Defendant knew that her termination was unlawful, the icing on the cake came upon receipt of Stor-All’s Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer; wherein said document not only provided the name of counsel, David Meranus, but that Stor-All had engaged the services of Schwartz Manes Ruby & Slovin, LPA – former law firm of Thomas J. Breed. Breed being the attorney Defendant assigned to assist at Wood & Lamping LLP. A causal link established between Defendant’s wrongful discharge and Stor- All’s unlawful/illegal acts against her. Moreover, an established relationship and/or shared interest between Stor-All, their counsel – his law firm, and Wood & Lamping. (h) Defendant is thankful, thankful, thankful, for the additional information obtained and/or received in that it has opened the door for many, many, many. . . opportunities for justice and the recovery of damages. 38. On January 17, 2009, Defendant advised Stor-All of its receipt of itsNotice of Eviction. Defendant advising that any such action by Stor-All would be metwith a Counter-Claim. In said correspondence, Defendant extended a good faith offer of$5,500. Said offer was declined by Stor-All as evidenced in the filing of their Complaint.In said correspondence, Defendant advised, “I believe a wise man would tell you that$5,500 is a reasonable and/or good faith offer – considering the additional damages andcosts I may be entitled to should a lawsuit be have to be filed by me and/or on my behalf(attorney fees, compensatory damages, etc.).” Nevertheless, Stor-All refused said offer.Taking the path of a fool. Stor-All refusing said offer in that it was aware of itsunlawful/illegal acts. 39. On or about January 20, 2009, Stor-All brought a Forcible Entry andDetainer action against the Defendant. 40. For the Defendant, it was a good thing Stor-All refused her January 17,2009 offer. The doors have been swung open for exceedingly higher damages well abovethat which Defendant was not aware was entitled to at the time of her January 17, 2009offer. Yes, it was a good thing and very beneficial to the Defendant when Stor-Alldeclined her offer. Especially, upon learning of what was taking place behind the sceneand Stor-All appears to have been in the driver seat of such wrongs being committedagainst Defendant. 41. Stor-All had actual knowledge that Defendant owed it no rent and that ithad unlawfully and illegally seized the Defendant’s unit and property without legalauthority and/or statute. Page 12 of 51
  13. 13. 42. Stor-All’s filing of its Forcible Entry and Detainer Complaint was not onlyto collect a frivolous debt that it knew it was not entitled to from the Defendant, but touse such Complaint for “abuse of process” purposes to unlawfully and illegally extortmonies from the Defendant to which it is not entitled. 43. Stor-All by filing its Forcible Entry and Detainer Complaint againstDefendant, intended to deceive and commit fraudulent acts upon this Court in an effort toget this Court to engage in the furtherance of the criminal activities they have subjectedthe Defendant to. 44. None of the Defendant’s property has been recovered and she has beendenied access to the storage unit and retrieval of her property unless she pays moniesStor-All, its agents and/or representatives are attempting to extort from her. 45. Defendant has repeatedly in good faith provided Stor-All with dates thatshe would like to obtain her property; however, said requests were denied unlessDefendant agreed to pay the outrageous fee and/or charges imposed by Stor-All. 46. Not only has Stor-All stooped to such criminal acts in its extortionscheme; but in its demands to the Defendant, request that Defendant pay it the monieswithout any consequences and/or liability to Stor-All. Stor-All refusing to own up to itsliability in this matter. 47. During the time and place referred to above, Stor-All unlawfully andwrongfully seized the Defendant’s storage unit and denied her access and retrieval of herproperty which may be in value of $8,000.00, and refused to allow her to retrieve herproperty unless she paid the outrageous fees (late and lien) that it illegally and unlawfullyattached. 48. During the period of the unlawful seizure of the Defendant’s storage unitand property, Stor-All subjected the Defendant to repeated threats of placing a lien on herproperty and repeatedly serving her with documents entitled, “NOTICE OF INTENT TOENFORCE LIEN ON STORED PROPERTY PURSUANT TO RC §5322.01, ET. SEQ.”See EXHIBIT “8” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in fullherein. 49. Upon receipt of Stor-All’s “NOTICE OF INTENT TO ENFORCE LIENON STORED PROPERTY PURSUANT TO RC §5322.01, ET. SEQ.,” Defendantresponded in a timely manner as to her objections. Defendant being entitled to rightsguaranteed/secured to her under the Ohio Constitution, United States Constitution, OhioLandlord & Tenant Act, and any/all applicable statutes/laws governing said matters. 50. In early and/or mid 2008, Stor-All was timely, properly and adequatelyplaced on notice as to the statutes/laws it was in violation of in the handling ofDefendant’s storage unit and property. To no avail. Stor-All made a willful, consciousand knowing decision to continue to conduct business in such an illegal/unlawful manner. Page 13 of 51
  14. 14. 51. Stor-All elected to unlawfully seize and take the Defendant’s storage unitand property hostage. Stor-All making it clear Defendant would not be receiving herproperty unless she paid the monies it demanded from her. 52. While Defendant repeatedly requested and demanded that Stor-All provideher with legal conclusions to support its actions, to date, as with Stor-All’s Complaintfiled in this action, it has not been able to provide the Defendant with the informationrequested. Nevertheless, as with Stor-All’s Complaint, it continues to demand moniesfrom the Defendant to which it is not entitled. Stor-All being requested as early as May13, 2008 to provide said information. See EXHIBIT “9” – electronic copy9 attachedhereto and incorporated herein as if set forth in full. 53. Defendant acted in good faith, and, before the institution of the proceedingof Stor-All’s Complaint, Defendant stated all facts and circumstances connected with thismatter to support her defense in this lawsuit. Stor-All was provided with facts, evidenceand/or statutes/laws governing said matters which supported Defendant’s defense to themonies it was asserting was owed it. Moreover, with case laws/statutes supporting adefense to the relief she sought. A jury trial on this matter will sustain that there issufficient information in the possession of Stor-All to support the filing of its Complaintagainst Defendant is an abuse of process, is not sound in law and filed in furtherance ofthe criminal and civil wrongs already rendered against Defendant. 54. Defendant, as lessee in the Rental Agreement entered into between CrownStorage and her, entered into said Agreement of the storage unit in good faith. Upon theexecution of said Agreement, Defendant entered into possession of the premises underthe terms of the Agreement and pursuant to the Agreement, remained in good standing asa tenant of said premises at all times until Stor-All took over and began claiming rightand/or entitlement to Defendant’s rent and the outrageous fees and liens charges leveledagainst her. Moreover, Stor-All’s unlawful/illegal denying Defendant access anddepriving her of her property in storage unit. 55. During the period when Defendant was entitled to the peaceablepossession of the premises as a tenant under the Lease entered between she and CrownStorage, Stor-All unlawfully/illegally seized the Defendant’s property and denied heraccess and/or retrieval of said property unless she paid the monies it attempted to extortfrom her. Stor-All doing so intending to injure Defendant in her good name andreputation, and in order to cause the Defendant great loss and damages, falsely, willfully,maliciously and without probable cause whatever, unlawfully took possession ofDefendant’s storage unit and property over the Defendant’s objections, and caused thelock Defendant placed on her storage unit to secure her property to be removed and mayhave replaced it with a lock of its own to deprive the Defendant access to the demisedpremises and her property.9 Defendant reserving the right to supplement this Exhibit upon retrieving executed copy if requested. Page 14 of 51
  15. 15. 56. Stor-All knew that Defendant had no binding Rental Agreement with it;moreover, that Defendant’s Rental Agreement was with Crown Storage. However,through its unlawful seizure of the Defendant’s storage unit and property, it attempted tounlawfully/illegally extort monies from the Defendant in exchange for her receipt of herproperty. Stor-All’s sole purpose for filing its Forcible Entry and Detainer action is infurtherance of its unlawful and illegal practices of said extortion practices; moreover, todeprive Defendant access to her storage unit and her property. Thus, the filing of Stor-All’s Forcible Entry and Detainer Complaint is an abuse of process in that its lawsuit isbeing used for a purpose other than that for which it was lawfully intended to be used for. 57. Stor-All devised an elaborate scam to unlawfully/illegally obtain theproperty of persons renting space at the 1109 Alfred Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45214. Saidscam involving the taking of person’s property through a lawful process; however,through illegal means (i.e. by way of extorting money, etc. from persons through fear oflosing their property). Stor-All using such methods for financial gain from the moniesearned at auctioning off property. For instance, Defendant believes that an auction wouldhave yielded Stor-All a profit – her rent being approximately $29.82 and had Stor-Allsold it at auction, stood to earn a great deal more (perhaps hundreds and/or thousand ofdollars more). 58. As a direct and proximate result of Stor-All’s unlawful and illegal seizureand taking of Defendant’s storage unit and its removal of Defendant’s lock and may havereplaced it with one of its own, Defendant was deprived of her rights as a tenant and ofher personal property contained on the premises under the Rental Agreement between sheand Crown Storage. 59. To date, Defendant has not recovered her property and is not certain if herproperty is still there in that she has been denied access to it for almost a year. Aninability to recover because Stor-All has repeatedly attempted to extort monies from theDefendant in exchange and/or has attempted to get the Defendant to waive rights securedto her under the statutes/laws which would entitle her to relief for such unlawful/illegalpractices. 60. Stor-All’s acts were willful, malicious and wanton in hopes that Defendantwould weary and eventually abandon her property. To Stor-All’s disappointment,Defendant is literate, college educated and capable of researching the laws. 61. The record in Stor-All’s possession will support the good faith efforts bythe Defendant to support her response and the efforts made to resolve this matter andretrieve her property. However, Stor-All refused all such good faith efforts by Defendantin that it refused to accept its liability from the illegal/unlawful wrongs rendered theDefendant. 62. There is no Landlord and Tenant relationship between Stor-All andDefendant. Stor-All just asserted such title of Landlord over the Defendant’s objections. Page 15 of 51
  16. 16. Moreover, with knowledge that Defendant did not wish to enter into a Rental Agreement with it. Action by Stor-All was for purpose of abuse of process. 63. Stor-All since asserting such relationship (Landlord and Tenant), has retaliated and deprived the Defendant of quiet enjoyment of premises as a direct result of Defendant’s refusal to enter a Rental Agreement and to deprive her of property. 64. Stor-All’s actions were intentional. Stor-All’s conduct and behavior being done to deprive the Defendant beneficial enjoyment of premises and the retrieval of her property in that Defendant does not wish to enter a Rental Agreement with Stor-All. 65. Stor-All has intentionally filed its Forcible Entry and Detainer action knowing it is not entitled to the relief it seeks. Stor-All using a lawful purpose with unlawful/illegal intent; moreover, for abuse of process. 66. Since Stor-All’s filing of its Complaint, Plaintiff was able to obtain the additional information and ill motive of Stor-All and its unrelenting efforts to destroy her life. 67. Defendant has given Stor-All reasonable time to return her property and in good faith has attempted to reach a financial settlement to compensate her for the injury/harm sustained. To no avail. Stor-All merely wants the Defendant to let it go without consequences for the criminal and/or illegal/unlawful wrongs rendered her. 68. Defendant believe that prior to bringing this counter-claim, she has in good faith attempted to mitigate damages; however, Stor-All again, simply wanted Defendant to agree to monies to which it was not entitled and/or leave without holding it accountable for the damages (injury/harm) Defendant sustained as a direct and proximate result of its unlawful/illegal actions. COUNT ONE ABUSE OF PROCESS (OF AND AGAINST STOR-ALL ALFRED, LLC – WHICH INCLUDES STORE-ALL ALFRED, LLC, ITS AGENTS, REPRESENTATIVES, ATTORNEY, ETC.) Defendant herein incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 68 of her Counter-Claim andParagraphs 1 through 7 of Defendant’s Answer to Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer asif set forth herein with said protection as that argued therein. Page 16 of 51
  17. 17. Defendant seeks relief as a direct and proximate result of Stor-All’s abuse of process inthe filing of its Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer. In support thereof, Defendantalleges: 69. Stor-All in the filing of its Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer has filed said action for purposes of abuse of process. Stor-All’s bringing of its forcible entry and detainer action in a manner not proper in the regular conduct of such proceedings with ill and/or ulterior motives – i.e. to obtain an undue advantage over the Defendant, obtain storage unit and monies from the Defendant to which it was not entitled, subject the Defendant to injury/harm, etc.. Neither was Stor-All entitled, as a matter of law to bring said forcible entry and detainer action against the Defendant. 45 Ohio Jur.3d § 66 – Distinctions: While the gist of the action for malicious prosecution is that the prosecution has been carried on maliciously and without probable cause, the essence of the action for abuse of process is the use of process in a manner not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding, with an ulterior motive. 45 Ohio Jur.3d § 215 – Distinguished from malicious prosecution: Under Ohio law, the tort of abuse of process differs from the tort of malicious criminal prosecution in that the gist of the tort of abuse of process is not commencing an action or causing process to issue without justification, but misusing, or misapplying process justified in itself for an end other than that which it was designed to accomplish; the purpose for which the process is used, once it is issued, is the only thing of importance. (Bickley v. FMC Technologies, Inc., 282 F.Supp.2d 631 (N.D. Ohio 2003). 70. To support the prima facie requirement for abuse of process Defendant must show: (a) a legal proceeding has been set in motion in proper form and with probable cause; (b) the proceeding was perverted to attempt to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed; and (c) direct damage has resulted from the wrongful use of process. Therefore, in support of said allegation that Stor-All’s Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer is an abuse of process, Defendant states: (a) The filing of Stor-All’s Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer initiated a legal proceeding in proper form and, through said acts, with its assertion for probable cause; (b) the filing of Page 17 of 51
  18. 18. Stor-All’s Complaint has perverted these proceeding and the judicial process for purposes of attempting to accomplish an ulterior purpose – such as (i) extorting monies from the Defendant, (ii) cover-up/shield the unlawful/illegal eviction it initiated about April 2008, (iii) obstruct the administration of justice, deprive Defendant equal protection of the laws and due process of laws, (iv) financially devastating the Defendant for purposes of obtaining an undue advantage over her – Stor-All working on and/or seeing that Defendant was terminated from her place of employment in hopes that it would destitute the Defendant and force her to waive protected rights secured/guaranteed under the Ohio Constitution, U.S. Constitution, Landlord and Tenant Act, and other applicable statutes/laws governing said matters; and (c) as a direct a direct and proximate result of the unlawful/illegal as well as criminal and civil wrongs Stor-All leveled against the Defendant, she has sustained direct damage from the wrongful use of process – i.e. Stor-All’s filing of Complaint was in furtherance of their criminal and civil wrongs already initiated against the Defendant. Stor All having already taken the laws into its hands and evicting the Defendant without legal authority and/or court order. Stor-All’s filing of Complaint was merely a continuance of it pattern-of- practice in abuse of process and when it failed up under its repeated “Notice of Intent to Enforce Lien. . . ,” it sought ways and means to see that Defendant was terminated from her place of employment until it accomplished such efforts on January 9, 2009, then it moved forward on January 20, 2009, and in continuance with abuse of process, filed its Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer. 45 Ohio Jur.3d § 214 – Generally; Nature and elements of cause of action: Under Ohio law, the elements of a claim of abuse of process are that (1) a legal proceeding has been set in motion in proper form and with probable cause; (2) the proceeding has been perverted to attempt to accomplish an ulterior purpose for which it was not designed; and (3) direct damage has resulted from the wrongful use of process (Voyticky v. Village of Timberlake, Ohio, 412 F.3d 669, 2005 FED App. 0273P (6th Cir. 2005); Bickley v. FMC Technologies, Inc., 282 F.Supp. 631 (N.D. Ohio 2003); Greenwood v. Delphi Automotive Systems, Inc., 257 F.Supp.2d 1047 (S.D. Ohio 2003), aff’d, 103 Fed. Appx. 609 (6th Cir. 2004))… 71. In determining what relief, if any, the Defendant is entitled to for the Stor-All’s abuse of process, the Court may: (a) consider loss of earnings, (b) physical Page 18 of 51
  19. 19. suffering, (c) mental suffering, (d) embarrassment, (e) humiliation, (f) loss of property orfreedom, etc.. 45 Ohio Jur.3d § 218 – Damages: A prevailing plaintiff in an action for abuse of process is entitled to recover the amount of money which will reasonably compensate him for the actual damages he has sustained as a proximate result of the abuse of process in determining compensatory damages, the court may consider the plaintiff’s loss of earnings, medical and other expenses, physical suffering, mental suffering, embarrassment, humiliation, and loss of personal property or freedom. The plaintiff may recover only those damages which naturally resulted from defendant’s acts, and the court cannot consider remote, indefinite or speculative injuries or damages. Actual malice is necessary for a recovery of punitive damages in an abuse of process case. Where defendant’s abuse of the legal process involved a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of the plaintiff, as where the defendant was aware that his acts had a great probability of causing substantial harm to the plaintiff, an award of punitive damages is appropriate. (Donohoe v. Burd, 722 F.Supp. 1507 (S.D. Ohio 1989), judgment aff’d, 923 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1991). 72. Stor-All having knowledge of the injury that would be rendered and/orhad been rendered Defendant, resorted to a commonly used practice used by it indepriving citizens, such as Defendant, of equal protection of the laws and due process oflaws, in unlawfully/illegally seizing Defendants storage unit without legal authority. 73. The legal process for obtaining premises through a forcible entry anddetainer action was abused by Stor-All. Stor-All evaded process and unlawfully evictedthe Defendant and seized her property without just cause and without legal authority. 74. The perverted use by Stor-All of the legal process was done to depriveDefendant rights secured and/or guaranteed under the Ohio Constitution, U.S.Constitution, Ohio Landlord and Tenant Act and any/all applicable statutes/lawsgoverning said matters. 75. Stor-All committed an illegal and wrongful act in commencing an evictionof the Defendant by seizing her storage unit and taking her property without legaljustification and/or probable cause. 76. Stor-All resorted to abuse of process to coerce and obtain collateraladvantage to force the Defendant to surrender her storage unit and/or abandon saidstorage unit, by abusing process, taking the laws into its own hands, unlawfully seizing Page 19 of 51
  20. 20. Defendants storage unit and taking her property for the means of extorting monies fromher. 77. Acting with express authorization by Stor-All, its employees, agentsand/or representatives willfully, maliciously, unlawfully and illegally entered theDefendant’s storage unit in order to evict her without legal process and/or statutory right. 78. Access to the Defendant’s storage unit was obtained by force without legalprocess and/or statutory right. 79. The malicious and wrongful acts of Stor-All caused Defendant damages,inconvenience and discomfort, mental suffering, embarrassment, humiliation, distress,loss of employment and more to Plaintiff’s loss and damage in the sum to be determined. 80. Under Ohio law, the laws are clear on how matters involving rental ofcommercial property is to be handled. 81. Stor-All placed the cart-before-the-horse when it took the laws into itsown hands and unlawfully/illegally evicted the Defendant from her storage unit. Now ina desperate effort to cover up such unlawful/illegal and criminal acts, it filed its January20, 2009 Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer failing to advise the Court of thelegal wrongs that it had rendered the Defendant. If Stor-All believed that it had a right tothe Defendant’s storage unit (when it did not), it should have brought a forcible entry anddetainer action BEFORE the unlawful/illegal eviction it performed under its self-imposedlaws. 82. Defendant was never indebted to Stor-All and neither has Stor-Allpresented any evidence to sustain such claim to monies alleged to be owed. 83. Stor-All’s failure to comply with statutes/laws governing said mattersubjected the Defendant to an illegal/unlawful eviction and the seizure of her property. 84. At any given time prior to Stor-All’s filing of the instant lawsuit, it couldhave settled this matter; however, elected to move forward with ill motive. 85. On January 20, 2009, Stor-All maliciously sued out and caused Summonsin Action in Forcible Entry, Detainer, and Money to be issued against Defendant, falselyand maliciously in connection to its Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer in theHamilton County Municipal Court – Hamilton County, Ohio alleging failure to pay rent. 86. Stor-All had actual knowledge that the Defendant owed it no moniesalleged prior to bringing this instant lawsuit. Nevertheless, is abusing the judicial processfor ill motive. 87. None of Defendant’s property that was unlawfully/illegal seized by Stor-All has been returned to the Defendant. Page 20 of 51
  21. 21. 88. In perpetrating the above acts, Stor-All acted malicious and wrongfullyand with the intent, design, and purpose to injure Defendant. 89. Stor-All’s filing of this instant lawsuit and seeking out the Summons to beissued in this matter and causing said Summons to be executed, was willful, maliciousand wanton. 90. Stor-All through its representative(s) contacted Defendant’s employer viafacsimile and/or other means known to it regarding dispute between it and Defendant.Stor-All doing so with ill intent/motive. 91. By filing this instant lawsuit and due to acts prior to filing by Stor-All,Defendant has incurred and continues to incur legal expenses. Said expenses andservices which is expected to exceed $15,000. Moreover, Defendant may be required toretain an attorney in the representation of this matter. 92. Ohio Constitution, Ohio Landlord and Tenant Act and other statutes/lawsgoverning such matters are clear that Stor-All’s handling of Defendant has created aninfringement upon her protected rights. 93. A reasonable mind may conclude that there were other means available toStor-All prior to its unlawful/illegal eviction of Defendant from her storage unit and theseizure of her property. If Stor-All believed that it had a legal right (although it did not)to bring a forcible entry and detainer, it should have brought such action when at the timeit claims rent was not paid – in April 2008 or shortly thereafter. Instead it elected tounlawful/illegally forcibly enter and seize the Defendant’s storage unit and propertyrather than use the legal process to resolve this matter. A reasonable mind may concludethat the unlawful/illegal method used by Stor-All in the taking of the Defendant’s storageunit and property is one commonly used by it to deprive citizens, such as Defendant, ofprotected rights. 94. The abuse of process by Stor-All was done with malice, forethought,harassment, retaliation, and improper motive to all this Court to grant punitive damages. 95. Stor-All with knowledge of the way its employees, agents andrepresentatives were conducting business on its behalf, did nothing to deter, preventand/or correct such legal wrongs rendered the Defendant. Instead, Stor-All made awillful and conscious decision to unlawfully/illegally evict the Defendant and seize herstorage unit and property. 96. As a direct and proximate result Stor-All’s acts, Defendant was injured,deprived entitlement to storage unit and property, deprived rights secured under the OhioConstitution, U.S. Constitution, Ohio Landlord and Tenant Act, and any/all applicablelaws governing said matters. Page 21 of 51
  22. 22. 97. In perpetrating the above acts, Stor-All acted maliciously and wrongfully and with the intent, design, and purpose to injure Defendant. Accordingly, Defendant requests exemplary damages, compensatory damages, punitive damages against Stor-All in the sum to be determined by a jury. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff request judgment of and against Plaintiff, Stor-All Alfred, LLC for: 98. Compensatory damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of $250,000. 99. Actual damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) to be determined. 100. Consequential damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of $225,000. 101. Future damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of $225,000. 102. Punitive damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of $750,000. 103. Enter the applicable injunctions and restraining orders requiring Plaintiff, Stor-All Alfred, LLC, their agents, employees, attorneys, representatives and all persons acting in concert with them to cease their unconstitutional and unlawful practices. 104. Reasonable fees and/or attorney fees. 105. Costs of suit; and 106. Such other further relief as the Court deem just and proper. COUNT TWO WRONGFUL EVICTION (OF AND AGAINST STOR-ALL ALFRED, LLC – WHICH INCLUDES STORE-ALL ALFRED, LLC, ITS AGENTS, REPRESENTATIVES, ATTORNEY, ETC.) Defendant herein incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 106 of her Counter-Claim andParagraphs 1 through 7 of Defendant’s Answer to Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer asif set forth herein with said protection as that argued therein. Page 22 of 51
  23. 23. Defendant brings this Counter-Claim for the wrongful eviction action of Stor-All. InStor-All’s filing of Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer it has asserted itself as a Landlordand, thus, has voluntarily surrendered itself to be liable to the damages and relief Defendantseeks through her Counter-Claim. Stor-All’s Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer is donefor purposes of wrongful eviction action. Even if Stor-All would now want to abandon its“Landlord” title to avoid liability, such acts would also fail in that such relinquishing of titlewould then allow the Defendant to bring an action against it for “malicious prosecution.”Therefore, Defendant alleges: 107. On January 20, 2009, Stor-All filed Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer against the Defendant. 108. There is no Rental Agreement between Stor-All and the Defendant. An unexecuted Stor-All Lease Agreement between Stor-All and Defendant supports said averment. Therefore, under Ohio law, Stor-All has no right to entry and/or the relief sought in their Forcible Entry and Detainer action. 65 Ohio Jur.3d § 73 – Generally: The estate of a landlord during the existence of an outstanding leasehold is a mere reversion, though, in the case of a tenancy under a lease, the lessor has an ever-present interest – a constant right to participate in the benefits of possession. However, in the absence of an agreement or statute to the contrary, the landlord has no right of entry during the lease term. 109. As a matter of Ohio law, Defendant was wrongfully evicted about April 2008, or shortly thereafter, in that Stor-All: (a) subjected her to disturbance in the use of her storage unit; (b) deprived Defendant of the enjoyment of her storage unit apparently as a third party either acting under its own authority or that of Crown Storage-Camp Washington, Defendant’s landlord and/or in which a Rental Agreement was entered; (c) denied the Defendant access unless she paid the charges/fees alleged; (d) had the Defendant’s lock removed from the storage unit in taking possession of it. 65 Ohio Jur.3d § 161 – Generally: The term “eviction” is one with peculiar reference to a tenant, being the disturbance of his possession, or his expulsion, depriving him of the enjoyment of the premises demised, or any Page 23 of 51
  24. 24. portion of them by the landlord, the act of third persons acting under the authority of the landlord, or by act of someone having a paramount title. 110. Stor-All’s Forcible Entry and Detainer action has been brought against theDefendant although it is fully aware that it has already made an unlawful entry in anunreasonable manner of Defendant’s storage unit. Moreover, Stor-All has repeatedlyserved the Defendant with “NOTICE OF INTENT TO ENFORCE LIEN ON STOREDPROPERTY PURSUANT TO RC § 5322.01 ET.SEQ.” with knowledge and/or shouldhave known that such action was not permissible under the laws of the State of Ohio.Stor-All placing the cart-before-the-horse and being unsuccessful in such threats has nowbrought its Forcible Entry and Detainer action in furtherance of such threats, harassmentand other unlawful/illegal means of which Defendant has had to endure in Stor-All’sefforts of obtaining her property. Therefore, this action is necessary to obtain injunctiverelief as well as additional relief to which the laws of the state of Ohio entitle theDefendant to. 65 Ohio Jur.3d § 130 – Wrongful entry or wrongful refusal of access under 1974 Landlord and Tenant Act: If a landlord under a rental agreement enters upon the demised premises in violation of the statutory provision governing the right of entry (R.C. 5321.04(A)(8), makes lawful entry in an unreasonable manner, or makes repeated demands for entry otherwise lawful, which have the effect of harassing the tenant, the tenant may recover actual damages resulting from the entry or demands, obtain injunctive relief to prevent the recurrence of the conduct, and obtain a judgment for reasonable attorney fees, or terminate the rental agreement. (R.C. 5321.04(B). As to award of attorney’s fees under R.C. ch. 5321 and/or § 135). 111. Defendant has been subjected to acts of actual eviction by Stor-All in thatshe has been excluded from her storage unit and Stor-All has repeatedly denied her accessunless she paid monies it was attempting to extort from her. Defendant has also beensubjected to acts of constructive eviction by Stor-All in that: (a) it has repeatedlyinterfered and/or obstructed Defendant’s access to her storage unit, removed theDefendant’s lock she had on her storage unit and may have replaced it with one of theirown, (b) it has substantially deprived the Defendant of the beneficial use of her storageunit and the Defendant has not returned; and (c) the Defendant has involuntarilyrelinquished possession of her storage unit – i.e. Stor-All unlawfully/illegally seizingstorage unit and taking it as its own, (d) Stor-All’s acts were meritless, done in maliceand bad faith; moreover, so severe that it not only interfered with Defendant’s peacefulenjoyment of the storage unit, but went as far as bringing such unlawful/illegal practicesto the Defendant’s place of employment which resulted in the Defendant beingterminated. Page 24 of 51
  25. 25. 65 Ohio Jur.3d § 162 – Elements and requisites; actual orconstructive eviction: An eviction, in the strict sense of the term, is to enter uponlands and expel the tenant (Forbus v. Collier, 7 Ohio Dec. Rep.331, 2 W.L.B. 122, 1877 WL 7471 (Ohio Dist. Ct. 1877).However, the result is also an eviction if the tenant loses theenjoyment of any part of the leased premises by some act of thelandlord, of a permanent character, done with the intention ofdepriving him or her of the enjoyment (Id.) An eviction may be actual or constructive (McAlpine v.Woodruff, 11 Ohio St. 120, 1860 WL 31 (1860); Wetzel V.Richcreek, 53 Ohio St. 62, 40 N.E. 1004 (1895)). Actual evictioninvolves expulsion or exclusion from the demised premises(Liberal Sav. & Loan Co. v. Frankel Realty Co., 137 Ohio St. 489,19 Ohio Op. 170, 30 N.E.2d 1012 (1940); Foote Theatre, Inc. v.Dixie Roller Rink, Inc., 14 Ohio App. 3d 456, 471 N.E. 2d 866 (3dDist. Hardin County 1984)). In order to establish constructiveeviction, there must be proof of active interference by the landlordor someone authorized by the landlord which compelled the tenantto leave (Eckhart v. Robert E. Lee Motel, 2 Ohio App. 3d 80, 440N.E.2d 824 (10th Dist. Franklin County 1981)). Constructiveeviction occurs when the landlord has substantially deprived thetenant of beneficial use of the premises, and the tenant vacates(Wood v. Rathfelder, 128 F. Supp.2d 1079 (N.D. Ohio 2000). Solong as the tenant remains in possession, he or she cannot maintainthat there has been a constructive eviction. Thus, for constructiveeviction to occur when there is merely interference with thetenant’s possession and enjoyment, the tenant must relinquishpossession of premises (Doll v. Rapp, 74 Ohio Misc.2d 140, 660N.E.2d 542 (Mun. Ct. 1995)). . . . Constructive eviction alsooccurs when the landlord’s actions are meritless, done in malice orbad faith, and so severe as to interfere with the tenant’s peacefulenjoyment of the premises. (Wood v. Rathfelder, 128 F.Supp.2d1079 (N.D. Ohio 2000)). Thus, a constructive eviction has alsobeen defined as a failure or interference on the part of the landlordwith the intended enjoyment of the leased premises, which is of asubstantial nature, and so injurious as to deprive the tenant of thebeneficial enjoyment of the leased premises. (Nye v. Schuler, 110Ohio App. 443, 13 Ohio Op.2d 208, 82 Ohio L. Abs. 321, 165N.E.2d 16 (4th Dist. Ross County 1959)).65 Ohio Jur.3d § 173 – Pleading and proof; Trial: i Illustration: A charge to the jury that aconstructive eviction is such a failure or interference on the part ofthe landlord with the intended enjoyment of the leased premises as Page 25 of 51
  26. 26. to be of a substantial nature, and so injurious to the tenant as to deprive him or her of the beneficial enjoyment of the leased premises, is a clear and concise definition of a constructive eviction, and in the absence of a request for a more complete definition, is sufficient. (Nye v. Schuler, 110 Ohio App. 443, 13 Ohio Op.2d 208, 82 Ohio L. Abs. 321, 165 N.E.2d 16 (4th Dist. Ross County 1959)). In an action for damages for breach of covenants in a lease, a defense that the lessor’s agent evicted the lessee raises an issue of fact as the agency, which must be passed on by a jury unless a jury is waived (Shepfer v. Hannenkrat, 48 Ohio App. 35, 1 Ohio Op. 19, 17 Ohio L. Abs. 561, 192 N.E. 274 (5th Dist. Tuscarawas County 1933)). 112. On January 9, 2009, and on the same date that Defendant was terminatedfrom her place of employment, Stor-All served her with “NOTICE TO LEAVE THEPREMISES” asserting that the Defendant rented from it. Requesting the Defendant toleave the premises with knowledge it has not allowed her on the premises and/or entryinto her storage unit since about April 2008. Had Defendant complied with said noticeand vacated, she would have lost her rights to bring this Counter-Claim, in that hervacating would have been taken as voluntary. At the time of Stor-All’s filing of itsComplaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer as well as its claim to ownership of theproperty, the Defendant was rightfully in possession of her storage unit and entitled toremain. In the interest of justice and in compliance with Ohio law, Defendant: (a) shouldawait legal proceedings threatened against her – in which she has; and (b) rather thancomply with Stor-All’s notice to leave the premises (which it has denied her access foralmost a year), bring an action such as her Counter-Claim for alleged damages thatperhaps never would have resulted. In fact, Stor-All was so determined to ruin theDefendant; it went as far as engaging and/or providing information for review by herformer employer for purposes of obtaining an undue advantage over the Defendant in thehandling of this matter. A causal link between Stor-All’s acts and Defendant’s wrongfultermination is established. 65 Ohio Jur.3d § 164 – Notice to vacate; bringing possessory action: A notice by the landlord that the tenancy is being terminated, combined with a demand by him or her for possession of the premises, and voluntary compliance therewith by the tenant without protest, is not an eviction for which damages may be recovered. (Greenberg v. Murphy, 16 Ohio C.D. 359, 1904 WL 1147 (Ohio Cir. Ct. 1904)). [Practice Guide: If the tenant is rightfully in possession and entitled to remain, the tenant should await legal proceedings that are threatened, and make defense thereto, rather than comply with the demand, and then bring an Page 26 of 51
  27. 27. action for alleged damages that perhaps never would have resulted. (Greenberg)] Where a tenant, upon request or notice to vacate, voluntarily abandons the premises without protest, no action for damages against the landlord, based on fraud or misrepresentations as to the reasons for such request can be maintained under rights recognized by the common law, or any statute of Ohio. (Ferguson v. Buddenberg, 87 Ohio App. 326, 42 Ohio Op. 488, 57 Ohio L. Abs. 473, 94 N.E.2d 568 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 1950)). 113. Stor-All through the filing of its Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer is attempting force the Defendant to give up her storage unit. The actions of Stor-All are in violation of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and statutory provisions governing rights given to the Defendant under the Ohio Landlord and Tenant Act. As a direct and proximate result of Stor-All’s actions, Defendant has sustained damages and/or injury/harm to which she is entitled to compensatory damages to the extent that she is being forced to leave as well as having to pay more for a comparable space elsewhere. 65 Ohio Jur.3d § 131 – Generally; liquated damages: General contract principles govern damages recoverable in an action for the breach of a lease, including claims for breach of a covenant of quiet enjoyment, breach of a warranty of habitability, and breach of a landlord’s statutory duties. (Allen v. Lee, 43 Ohio App. 3d 31, 538 N.E.2d 1073 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1987)). A party injured by a breach of a contract is entitled to his or her expectation interest, which is the injured party’s interest in having the benefit of the bargain by being put in as good a position as that party would have been in had the contract been performed. (Ohio Jur. 3d, Damages § 18; see F. Enterprises, Inc. v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 47 Ohio St. 2d 154, 1 Ohio Op. 3d 90, 351 N.E.2d 121 (1976)) [Observation: Under Ohio law, any ambiguities in commercial lease language setting forth damages recoverable upon default must be strictly construed against drafter of lease10 (New Market Acquisitions, Ltd. v. Powerhouse Gym, 212 F.Supp. 2d 763 (S.D. Ohio 2002)).] As to the damages recoverable for a breach by the lessor, the general rule is that a lessee who is forced by the lessor’s breach to give up the lease incurs compensable damages to the extent that 10 § 89 Construction Against Party Preparing Lease: The general rule that ambiguities in a writteninstrument must be construed against the person who prepared it (Bevy’s Dry Cleaners & Shirt Laundry, Inc. v.Streble, 2 Ohio St.2d 250, 31 Ohio Op. 2d 507, 208 N.E.2d 528 (1965); Crickets of Ohio, Inc. v. Hines Invests,L.L.C., 2006-Ohio-2901, 2006 WL 1575212 (Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist. Fairfield County 2006); Shaker Bldg. Co. v.Federal Lime & Stone Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 246, 57 Ohio Op. 2d 486, 277 N.E.2d 584 (Mun. Ct. 1971), rev’d onother grounds, 1972 WL 20379)(Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1972)) and favorably to the person whohad no voice in the selection of the language (Madden v. American News Co., 11 Ohio Misc. 119, 40 Ohio Op.2d355, 229 N.E.2d 119 (C.P. 1967)) applies to the interpretation of the leases. Page 27 of 51
  28. 28. the lessee has to pay more for comparable space over the term of the original lease, plus any special damages (Am. Jur. 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 97, 98. As to measure of damages for breach of covenant of title of quiet enjoyment, see § 184). 114. Stor-All’s Forcible Entry and Detainer action has been brought forpurposes of extorting monies from the Defendant and to have her unlawfully/illegallyevicted. 115. Stor-All having no authority under Ohio statutes/laws to bring this actionagainst the Defendant. 116. Prior to Stor-All’s filing of Forcible Entry and Detainer action, it knewand/or should have known that it was not entitled to bring this lawsuit against theDefendant. 117. As a direct and proximate result of Stor-All’s acts, the Defendant hassustained damages and/or injury/harm to which she seeks relief thereof through the filingof this instant Counter-Claim. Said relief as allowed under Ohio law: 65 Ohio Jur.3d § 174 – Measure and elements of damages: In many jurisdictions, the view is taken that in a tort action for wrongful eviction by a landlord or by persons for whose act the landlord is responsible, the tenant may recover as general damages the actual or rental value of the unexpired lease term less the rent reserved (Am. Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant § 668). There is authority in Ohio supporting this view (Grunau v. Faflik, 50 Ohio L. Abs. 142, 77 N.E.2d 719 (Ct. App. 8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1947)(damage for eviction by or under authority of landlord is reasonable value of leasehold) and also the view that a lessor is liable to the lessee (or a sublessor is liable to the sublessor) for all damages sustained by reason of a wrongful eviction for which he or she is responsible. (Hoffstetter v. Harris, 23 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 579, 1921 WL 1344 (C.P. 1921)). In actions based on the wrongful eviction of a tenant, damages for special losses, such as . . . expenses in defending an ejectment action, have been recovered. . . .exemplary damages are not recoverable in an action for breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for which punitive damages are recoverable (Ohio Jur.3d, Damages § 128). . . . [Illustration: A landlord’s constructive eviction of the tenants. . . in changing the locks of the tenants’ door one day after posting a three-day eviction notice . . .entitled the tenants to punitive damages (Proctor v. Frame, 90 Ohio Mis. 2d 11, 695 N.E.2d 357 (Mun. Ct. 1998)). Page 28 of 51
  29. 29. A tenant who is constructively evicted . . . is entitled, as far as it is possible to do so, to a monetary award in order to be placed in the position that the tenant would have been in had constructive eviction not occurred, keeping in mind the purpose for which the premises were leased. Thus, where there is a constructive eviction of the tenant, the tenant may be awarded judgment on the landlord’s counterclaims which are based on unpaid rent for the balance of the lease agreement (Weingarden v. Eagle Ridge Condominiums, 71 Ohio Misc.2d 7, 653 N.E.2d 759 (Mun. Ct. 1995)). 118. Defendant seeks any and all relief afforded to her under the laws of theState of Ohio and/or applicable statutes/laws governing such matters relating to thewrongful eviction she sustained. While Stor-All brought Complaint for Forcible Entryand Detainer on January 20, 2009, it had already taken the laws into its own hands byunlawfully/illegally evicting the Defendant under its own self-made laws. Since April2008 to present, the Defendant has not been allowed to return to her storage unit.Moreover, in order to retrieve her property she was required to pay the monies Stor-Allwas attempting to extort from her. The acts of Stor-All were retaliatory, fraudulent,oppressive, willful, malicious and wanton entitling the Defendant to punitive damages.Moreover, the extremes of such acts are evidenced in Stor-All’s obsessive acts indestroying the Defendant’s life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. The evidence supportsthat aggravation and outrage, spite and malice, fraudulent and evil intent, as well as aconscious and deliberate disregard for the interests and rights of the Defendant. 49 Am. Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant § 538 – Generally, Measure of damages: Where a tenant is wrongfully evicted by the landlord or by persons for whose acts the landlord is responsible, the tenant may maintain an action in tort against the landlord and may recover as general damage the actual or rental value of the unexpired term less the rent reserved. In addition, the tenant may recover all losses actually sustained, or which the tenant will necessarily sustain, under the circumstances, as a result of the unlawful eviction. Such losses may include the cost of moving, actual expenses, reasonably incurred, and lost profits. 49 Am. Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant § 544 – Punitive damage: The damages recoverable for wrongful eviction, actual or constructive, may include punitive damages. The mere commission of the tort of wrongful eviction, however, is insufficient. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the landlord’s conduct may be call willful or wanton. Page 29 of 51
  30. 30. A commercial landlord acted with malice toward a tenant, and thus an award of punitive damages was warranted on unlawful eviction and conversion claims, where the landlord suddenly locked the tenant out of the rented premises, wrongfully retained the tenant’s business equipment, . . . and expressed personal animosity toward the tenant. . . It has also been stated that punitive damages may be awarded to tenants when a landlord’s conduct is morally culpable or actuated by evil and reprehensible motives (Maula v. Milford Management Corp., 559 F.Supp. 1000 (1983)), or is malicious and wanton (Stewart v. Johnson, 209 W. Va. 476, 549 S.E.2d 670 (2001)). In addition, a lessee who does not move, and is not evicted, because of a lessor’s retaliatory act may nevertheless recover a statutory punitive damages award of the lessor’s retaliatory act of fraud, oppression, or malice.WHEREFORE, Plaintiff request judgment of and against Plaintiff, Stor-All Alfred, LLC for: 119. Compensatory damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of $75,000. 120. Actual damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) to be determined. 121. Consequential damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of $20,000. 122. Future damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of $50,000. 123. Punitive damages (if permissible by statutes/laws) in the amount of $250,000. 124. Enter the applicable injunctions and restraining orders requiring Plaintiff, Stor-All Alfred, LLC, their agents, employees, attorneys, representatives and all persons acting in concert with them to cease their unconstitutional and unlawful practices. 125. Reasonable fees and/or attorney fees. 126. Costs of suit; and 127. Such other further relief as the Court deem just and proper. Page 30 of 51
  31. 31. COUNT THREE LOSS OF ENJOYMENT/DISTURBANCE (OF AND AGAINST STOR-ALL ALFRED, LLC – WHICH INCLUDES STORE-ALL ALFRED, LLC, ITS AGENTS, REPRESENTATIVES, ATTORNEY, ETC.) Defendant herein incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 127 of her Counter-Claim andParagraphs 1 through 7 of Defendant’s Answer to Complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer asif set forth herein with said protection as that argued therein. Defendant seeks relief for the loss of enjoyment and disturbance to as a direct andproximate result of Stor-All’s unlawful/illegal actions. In support thereof, Defendant alleges: 128. Stor-All had no right to enter remove the lock Defendant had placed on her storage unit. Defendant did not authorize said removal. Stor-All had no right to enter the Defendant’s storage unit. Defendant did not authorize said entry. Even if Defendant’s tenancy was at will (when it was not), Stor-All had no legal and/or statutory authority to enter the Defendant’s storage unit; moreover, seize said unit and deny her access to it. Neither did Stor-All have a judgment from a court authorizing its actions taken against the Defendant. Stor-All bypassed the laws and took matters into it own hands and evicted the Defendant about April 2008. 65 Ohio Jur.3d § 137 – Landlord’s right of entry: In light of the fact that the interest that a lessor normally retains in the leased premises is merely that of a reversion, a lessor generally has no right to enter the demised premises during the term of the lease (State of Cincinnati Tin & Japan Co., 66 Ohio St. 182, 64 N.E. 68 (1902); Nigh v. Keifer, 3 Ohio C.D. 1, 1890 WL 343 (Ohio Cir. Ct. 1890); Kilfoyl v. Hull, 4 Ohio Dec. Rep. 552, 2 Cleve. Law Rep. 369, 1879 WL 6355 (Ohio C.P. 1879)). Even under a tenancy at will, the landlord has no right to enter without the tenant’s permission; he or she must resort to a legal remedy to enforce a right to possession. (Coward v. Fleming, 89 Ohio App. 485, 46 Ohio Op. 289, 102 N.E.2d 850 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 1951)). Notwithstanding the general rule that a lessor has no right to enter the demised premises during the term of the lease, a lessor may enter the premises without incurring liability as a trespasser where:. . . there has been a breach of condition, the entry is limited to common areas, the lessor is acting under an express right of entry provided for in the lease (Helvich v. George A. Rutherford Co., 96 Ohio App. 367, 54 Ohio Op. 365, 114 N.E.2d Page 31 of 51
  32. 32. 514 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1953)), the lessor is acting under a right of entry provided by statute. 129. The July 27, 2007, Rental Agreement was entered into between CrownStorage-Camp Washington (“Crown Storage”) and Defendant. Stor-All claims it is nowowner of the property at which Defendant has a storage unit. Even if said property wassold and Stor-All purchased it, said purchase did not pass possession and control underthe Rental Agreement to it. Accordingly, Stor-All by having no right to enter the leasedpremises has no power to authorize someone else to enter on its behalf. While Stor-Allclaims ownership of said property, it provided no evidence to support such claim. 65 Ohio Jur.3d § 138 – Landlord’s right of entry – Entry of others on landlord’s behalf: In conjunction with the passing of possession and control of the premises under a lease agreement to the lessee, the lessor parts with the power and right to admit people to the premises or to exclude them. Accordingly, a landlord who has no right to enter the leased premises has no power to authorize someone else to enter on his or her behalf. (Richmond Glass and Aluminum Corp. v. Wynn, 1991 WL 172902 (Ohio Ct. App. 7th Dist. Columbiana County 1991)). 130. In entering the Rental Agreement with Crown Storage, the “covenant ofquiet enjoyment” is implied and protected Defendant’s right to peaceful and undisturbedenjoyment of her storage unit. Under said covenant, Defendant was entitled to believethat Crown Storage would do no act (or allow anyone else – i.e. such as Stor-All) whichinterrupts the free and peaceable enjoyment of her storage unit and/or premises during theterms of said Agreement, and indemnified the Defendant from against suchunlawful/illegal acts as committed against her by Stor-All. 65 Ohio Jur.3d § 176 – Covenants respecting enjoyment of premises by lessee: A covenant of quiet enjoyment is implied into every lease contract for realty (Hamilton Brownfields Redevelopment, LLC v. Duro Tire & Wheel, 156 Ohio App.3d 525, 2004-Ohio-1365, 806 N.E.2d 1039 (12th Dist. Butler County 2004); Dworkin v. Paley, 93 Ohio App.3d 383, 638 N.E.2d 636 (8th Dist. Cuyahoga County 1994)) and protects the tenant’s right to peaceful and undisturbed enjoyment of the leasehold. (Dworkin). A covenant of quiet enjoyment, insofar as leases are concerned, has been defined as an undertaking on the part of the grantor to do no act which interrupts the free and peaceable enjoyment of the premises demised during the continuance of the term, and to indemnify the lessee against all acts committed by virtue of paramount title (Barker v. Blanchard, 5 Ohio N.P. 398, 7 Page 32 of 51

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