236279141 injunction-cases

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G.R.Nos. 139275-76 and 140949 November 25, 2004 LRTA vs. CA
and T.N. LAL & CO., LTD. D E C I S I O N AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Both filed by petitioner Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA), G.R. Nos.
139275-76 assail the Decision dated February 26, 1999, rendered by
the Court of Appeals (CA) in the consolidated petitions docketed as
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 44220 and 44227;1 G.R. No. 140949, on the other
hand, questions the Decision dated November 12, 1999, issued by
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 52382.2 These cases originated from the
orders issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch 111)
in Civil Case No. 97-0423.
The antecedent facts of these consolidated petitions were summed
up by the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 44220 and 44227, as follows:
On October 1, 1986, T.N. LAL & CO., LTD. (private
respondent herein and hereafter to be referred to as LAL
for short) donated a stereo system to the LRTA, to provide
music for relaxation and amusement in the 18 stations
and all the rail vehicles of LRTA along its Line 1. On March
19, 1990, LAL and the LRTA entered into an agreement
whereby LAL was authorized to air commercial
advertisements through the aforesaid stereo system for a
period of five (5) years and three (3) months from March
19, 1990, in consideration of a fee equivalent to thirty
percent (30%) of the gross sales of advertisements (less
any agency commission) annually, with minimum annual
guaranteed fees. Subsequently, the period of the contract
was amended to five (5) years from April 1, 1992, or until
March 31, 1997.
On March 31, 1997, LAL filed an action for reformation of
contract and damages (with application for preliminary
mandatory & prohibitory injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order) against LRTA with the Regional Trial
Court at Pasay City, and the same was docketed as Civil
Case No. 97-0423 and raffled to Branch 111, presided over
by the respondent judge.
The complaint alleged that vibrations and noises coming
from the light rail vehicles caused disruptions in the sound
system, resulting in a sharp decline of advertisements
aired over the said system. LAL requested for a
moratorium of the agreement until the said problem can
be solved, but LRTA refused to grant such request. Hence,
the complaint prays that the contract be reformed by
including therein a provision allowing a moratorium in
case of disruption affecting the system attributable to
mechanical/technical problems in the LRT line or light rail
vehicles, including a pro rata extension of the agreement.
The complaint also prays for a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction ordering the defendant to
maintain the status quo and prohibiting it or any of its
agents from disrupting, cutting, severing or disconnecting
the electric power supplied to the plaintiff’s sound system.
Upon receipt of the complaint, the respondent Judge
issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the
parties to maintain the status quo, and restraining the
LRTA from disrupting, cutting, severing or disconnecting

the electric power supplied to LAL’s sound system
installed in all the LRT stations and vehicles. The TRO was
to expire on April 20, 1997.
On April 16, 1997, after notice and hearing, the respondent judge
issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, with all the foregoing considerations, and
subject to the condition of plaintiff posting a bond in the
amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00),
Philippine Currency, conditioned to answer for any
damage which the defendant may suffer by reason of the
injunction herein granted, let therefore, a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction be issued in favor of the plaintiff
against the defendant who is enjoined from:
(a) Terminating or declaring as terminated the
Agreement dated March 19, 1990 as amended
on August 6, 1993 and to observe the status
quo before March 31, 1997; and,
(b) As a consequence thereof, to desist from
removing, disrupting, interfering, disconnecting
or tampering the power supply leading to
plaintiff’s sound system, in all places, sites and
locations within the defendant’s area of
responsibility for the duration of this
proceedings, UNLESS THIS ORDER IS EARLIER
RECALLED by this Court.
SO ORDERED. (p. 57, Rollo)
On April 22, 1997, LRTA filed a Manifestation alleging that the
failure of LAL to post a bond has rendered the Order dated April 16,
1997 ineffective. On the same day, LRTA unplugged the electrical
connection of the sound system.
However, on April 25, 1997, LAL filed an injunction bond in the
amount of P500,000.00, and the writ of preliminary injunction was
issued by the respondent judge. The same was served on LRTA on
the same day.
On April 25, 1997, LAL filed a "Motion to Cite the Defendant in
Contempt", alleging that on April 22, 1997, in defiance of the court’s
Order of March 31, 1997 (sic), the defendant disconnected and cut
off the power supply to its sound system thereby disrupting and
disturbing the regular programs and advertisements aired therein.
The motion was set for hearing on April 29, 1997.
On April 28, 1997, LRTA filed a motion for postponement which was
granted and the hearing was reset to May 15, 1997. However, the
respondent judge issued an order dated April 29, 1997, the
dispositive portion of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, pending resolution of plaintiff’s ‘Motion To
Cite Defendant In Contempt’ which is calendared anew on
May 15, 1997 at 8:30 A.M., defendant Light Rail Transit
Authority as well as its counsel are hereby ORDERED to
comply with the Order of this Court dated April 16, 1997
to cause the complete restoration of the sound system to
its original status/condition immediately upon receipt
hereof. Let this Order be served for prompt
implementation by the Sheriff of this Court who is
directed to submit his report/return on the action taken in
this regard.
so ordered. (p. 32, Rollo)
On April 30, 1997, the LRTA filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said order.
On May 5, 1997, LAL filed another motion to cite
Evangeline M. Razon, Geronima P. Anastacio and Atty.
Moises S. Tolentino, [Jr.] for civil contempt, for refusing to
comply with the order of the court dated April 29, 1997.
The motion was requested to be submitted for[to] the
court for proper decision "immediately upon receipt
hereof".
On May 7, 1997, LRTA filed an opposition to the two
motions to cite in contempt.
On May 13, 1997, the respondent judge issued the herein
assailed order the dispositive portion of which is as
follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the defendants guilty of
indirect contempt for defying the Orders of April 16 and
29, 1997 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued in
this case. Since the act committed can still be corrected or
capable of being undone by the officers of the defendant
corporation and/or its agents/operators themselves, let
therefore a Warrant of Arrest be issued against the
following persons, namely:
1) Evangeline M. Razon, Officer-in-charge, LRTA;
2) Geronima P. Anastacio, Head of LRTA, Legal
Department; and,
3) Moises S. Tolentino, [Jr.], General Manager, Metro
Transit Organization, Operators of the LRT system.

for their apprehension and incarceration/imprisonment
until such time when they have performed or cause to be
performed the act complained of in this case, by
reconnecting, replugging or reactivating plaintiff’s sound
system at all LRT facilities and restoring them in the same
state and condition as it was on April 16, 1997.
SO ORDERED. (p. 25, Rollo)
Accordingly, warrants of arrest were issued against the
persons named in the order. Motions to quash warrants of
arrest were filed by LRTA, Evangeline M. Razon, [and]
Geronima P. Anastacio. At the same time, the LRTA filed a
motion for the respondent judge to inhibit himself from
further hearing the case. …3
Atty. Moises S. Tolentino, Jr., General Manager of Metro Transit
Organization (operators of the LRT system), then filed a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition (CA-G.R. SP No. 44227) on May
21, 1997, assailing the trial court’s order dated May 13, 1997,
finding him, Evangeline M. Razon, and Geronima P. Anastacio, guilty
of indirect contempt and ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest
against them. Atty. Tolentino contended that the trial court issued
the orders in disregard of substantive and procedural due process.4
Petitioner LRTA, meanwhile, filed a special civil action for certiorari
(CA-G.R. SP No. 44220) on May 28, 1997, seeking the annulment of
the following orders issued by the trial court: (1) Order dated April
29, 1997, ordering petitioner to comply with the trial court’s Order
dated April 16, 1997; and (2) Order dated May 13, 1997, denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and finding Atty. Tolentino,
Razon, and Anastacio, guilty of indirect contempt and ordering the
issuance of warrants of arrest against them.
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 44220 and 44227 were thereafter consolidated as
both involved related issues.5
On February 26, 1999, the CA rendered its decision in the above-
mentioned cases, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petitions filed in these cases are hereby
GIVEN DUE COURSE, and judgment is hereby rendered
ANNULLING AND SETTING ASIDE the Order dated May
13, 1997 and the warrants of arrest in connection
therewith, issued by the respondent judge in Civil Case
No. 97-0423.
SO ORDERED.6
While the CA annulled the Order dated May 13, 1997 and the
warrants of arrest issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 97-0423,
it nevertheless ruled that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
the trial court per Order dated April 16, 1997, as well as the Order
dated April 29, 1997, is valid and binding.7
Respondent then filed with the trial court a Motion to Enforce the
Order dated April 16, 1997. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed a
Manifestation asking that the resolution of respondent’s motion be
suspended on the ground that there appears to be an inconsistency
with the body and the dispositive portion of the CA’s decision.8
Notwithstanding petitioner’s manifestation, the trial court issued an
order dated April 7, 1999, granting respondent’s motion and
ordering petitioner to immediately restore the power supply to
respondent’s sound system within 24 hours.9 Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but the trial court denied it in another
(second) order dated April 7, 1999.
On April 22, 1999, the trial court issued an order amending the
second order dated April 7, 1999, to be dated April 20, 1999.10
Thus, petitioner filed on April 22, 1999, another special civil action
for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 52382) with the CA, contesting the trial
court’s orders dated April 7, 1999 and April 20, 1999 (previously
dated April 7, 1999).
Petitioner alleged that the assailed orders were issued with grave
abuse of discretion, as these are not in accordance with the CA’s
decision dated February 26, 1999.11
In the meantime, petitioner, on April 14, 1999, filed in CA-G.R. SP
Nos. 44220 and 44227 a Motion for Clarification of Decision,12 but it
was denied by the CA per Resolution dated May 21,
1999.13 Petitioner sought reconsideration but it was also denied per
Resolution dated July 9, 1999,14 prompting petitioner to institute on
July 29, 1999, a petition for certiorari with this Court, docketed as
G.R. Nos. 139275-76.
The CA then promulgated its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 52382 on
November 12, 1999, dismissing the petition and affirming the
assailed orders dated April 7, 1999 and April 20, 1999. Petitioner
elevated the dismissal to this Court via petition for review filed on
December 20, 1999, docketed as G.R. No. 140949.
On February 21, 2000, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R.
Nos. 139275-76 and G.R. No. 140949.15
In G.R. Nos. 139275-76, petitioner raises the following issues:
I

IF THE BODY OF THE DECISION IN THE SAID
CONSOLIDATED CASES IS IN CONFLICT WHICH HAS
BECOME FINAL CONFLICTS WITH THE DISPOSITIVE
PORTION THEREOF, WHICH OF THEM SHALL PREVAIL?
II
CAN THE LIFETIME OF AN EXPIRED CONTRACT BE
EXTENDED BY A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION?16
In G.R. No. 140949, the following:
1. CAN A BODY OF THE DECISION [WHICH DOES NOT
HAVE ANY SUPPORT IN OR CONTRARY TO THE
DISPOSITIVE PORTION THEREOF] BE ENFORCED OR
EXECUTED?
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT A
QUO DATED APRIL 7, 1999 AND THE OTHER ONE ALSO
DATED APRIL 7, 1999 [WHICH WAS LATER AMENDED BY
THE TRIAL COURT A QUO TO BE DATED APRIL 20, 1999
IN AN ORDER DATED APRIL 22, 1999] ENFORCING THE
BODY OF THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS DATED FEBRUARY 26, 1999 IN CA-G.R. SP NO.
44220 AND CA-G.R. SP NO. 44227 ARE NULL AND VOID.17
Petitioner’s argument rests mainly on its adamant belief that the
discussion of the CA in the body of its Decision dated February 26,
1999, rendered in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 44220 and 44227, is inconsistent
with its fallo, which nullified and set aside the trial court’s order
dated May 13, 1997. According to petitioner, since the May 13, 1997
order is premised on the April 16, 1997 (granting the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction) and April 29, 1997 (enforcing
compliance with the injunctive writ) orders, therefore, these orders
are likewise invalid, and respondent cannot seek its enforcement.
The Court, however, has carefully read the assailed decision and
cannot find anything inconsistent with the body and fallo. Even a
student of law can understand its import. It has been said that, to
understand the dispositive portion of a decision, one has only to
ascertain the issues of the action.18
CA-G.R. SP Nos. 44220 and 44227 involved three issues. First is
whether or not an injunction order, as embodied in the April 16,
1997 order, is effective prior to the posting of an injunction bond
and the issuance of the injunctive writ;19 second, whether or not the
Order of April 29, 1997 is valid and binding;20 and the third is
whether or not the petitioners were validly held guilty of contempt
of court per Order dated May 13, 1997.21
On the first issue, the CA categorically ruled that the April 16, 1997
order is binding even without the filing of the injunction bond.22 On
the second issue, the CA likewise ruled that the April 29, 1997 Order
is valid and binding.23It was on the third issue that the CA found
grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial court, and the
Order dated May 13, 1997 was consequently rendered null and void.
The CA is clear on this score. It held, viz.:
The Motion to Cite Defendant in Contempt, dated April
23, 1997 (Annex "G", Petition, SP No. 44227) does not
name them as respondents. It prays only that the
defendant (LRTA) "and its officers and employees who are
responsible for the act complained of" be held in
contempt. It is only in the Motion to Cite Defendants for
Civil Contempt Under Rule 71, Section 7 of the Revised
Rules of Court dated May 5, 1997 (sic) that Evangeline M.
Razon, Geronima P. Atanacio, and Moises S. Tolentino, [Jr.]
are mentioned as "responsible on the continuing defiance
of the Orders of the Honorable Court." But the said
motion was fatally defective in that it did not contain a
proper notice of hearing, as required by Sec. 4, Rule 15 of
the Revised Rules of Court. It only contains the request to
the Branch Clerk of Court that the said motion be
submitted to the court "immediately upon receipt hereof."
Worst of all, the respondent judge issued his disputed
order …, two (2) days before the date that he himself fixed
for the hearing of the motion to cite the defendant in
contempt. Clearly, the said persons were denied their day
in court.
Moreover, we have reviewed the transcript of the ex parte
hearing conducted by the respondent judge on April 29,
1997 (on the motion to cite defendant in contempt dated
April 23, 1997), and we find that the evidence presented
against the abovenamed persons (who are now facing
warrants of arrest) were basically hearsay testimony. … The
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing his disputed order, and its corresponding warrants
of arrest, without a hearing, and on the basis of flimsy
evidence.24 (Emphasis Ours)
It is plain to see that only the May 13, 1997 order was nullified by
the CA. The April 16 and 29, 1997 orders remain valid and binding.
Petitioner’s argument that these two orders should likewise have
been nullified because the May 13, 1997 order is based thereon, is
misplaced. The nullity of the May 13, 1997 order was not based on
these 2 orders, but on grounds of lack of due process and evidence.
These grounds inevitably led to the dispositive portion of the CA’s
decision. It must be stressed that it is the dispositive part of the
judgment that actually settles and declares the rights and

obligations of the parties, finally, definitively, and authoritatively,
notwithstanding the existence of inconsistent statements in the
body that may tend to confuse.25
If there was any error committed by the CA, it was in failing to state
in the dispositive portion of the decision that the petition was only
partially granted. But this does not affect the decision, as its import
can be grasped notwithstanding the lapse. Consequently, the
Decision dated February 26, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 44220 and
44227 nullifying the Order dated May 13, 1997 is a valid decision.
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with petitioner that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the injunctive writ.
Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for the
grounds justifying the issuance of a preliminary injunction,
to wit:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A
preliminary injunction may be granted when it is
established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded,
and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining
the commission or continuance of the act or acts
complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act
or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance
of the act or acts complained of during the litigation
would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the
subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render
the judgment ineffectual.
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their
claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. To be entitled to
an injunctive writ, the petitioner has the burden to establish the
following requisites:26
(1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be
protected;
(2) a violation of that right;
(3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
In the present case, respondent’s entitlement to the injunctive writ is
found on its prima facie legal right to remain in the premises and
continue broadcasting commercial advertisements within the LRT
stations. The only way to determine this is to look into the terms of
the contract between petitioner and respondent, as it provides for
their respective rights and obligations. It is fundamental that if the
terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention
of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
control. No amount of extrinsic aids are required and no further
extraneous sources are necessary in order to ascertain the parties’
intent 27
The "Agreement" contains the following stipulations, inter alia:
Whereas, for purposes of adjusting the five-year period
corresponding to the annual minimum guaranteed
amount disrupted by the start-up ninety-day period and
the six-month moratorium period effective September 1,
1990, to end March 1, 1991, the parties have agreed to
formally amend the "Agreement" to reflect the changes
thereon;
…
1. Article I (a) of the "Agreement" is hereby amended to
read as follows:
(a.) This Agreement shall be effective for five (5) years to
commence on April 1, 1992 until March 31, 1997, unless
sooner terminated as provided hereunder."28
The contract explicitly states that it was due to expire on March 31,
1997, the same day respondent filed its action for reformation of
contract. When the trial court issued its Order dated April 16, 1997,
ordering petitioner to refrain from terminating the contract and to
retain respondent’s services until further orders from the court, the
contract had already expired. Respondent, therefore, has no clear
and unmistakable right to be protected by the issuance of the writ.
This is but a consequence of their stipulation of a determinate
period for its expiration.29 The injunction, in effect, virtually extended
the original period agreed upon.
It was the trial court’s belief that to allow the contract to expire
would render respondent’s action for reformation of contract moot
and academic.30 Needless to say, a contract can be renewed, revived
or extended only by mutual consent of the parties. No court can
compel a party to agree to a contract through the instrumentality of
a writ of preliminary injunction.31 Also, the possibility of irreparable

damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an
injunction.32
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 139275-76 and 140949, are
hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated February 26, 1999, in CA-G.R.
SP Nos. 44220 and 44227, and the Decision dated November 12,
1999, in CA-G.R. SP No. 52382, rendered by the Court of Appeals
are hereby SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Orders dated April 16 and
29, 1997, issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City (Branch
111) in Civil Case No. 97-0423, and all other orders appurtenant
thereto, are NULLIFIED.
The trial court is ORDERED to proceed with Civil Case No. 97-0423
with immediate dispatch.
G.R. No. 144755 June 8, 2005
SPOUSES ELISEO F. ESTARES and ROSENDA P. ESTARES, petitioners,
vs.COURT OF APPEALS, HON. DAMASO HERRERA as Presiding Judge
of the RTC, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna PROMINENT LENDING &
CREDIT CORPORATION, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF LAGUNA and
Sheriff IV ARNEL G. MAGAT, respondents.
D E C I S I O N AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court which assails the Decision1 and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals dated April 17, 2000 and July 7, 2000, respectively,
in CA-G.R. SP No. 56123.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On May 21, 1999, petitioner Spouses Eliseo F. Estares and Rosenda
P. Estares (Estares spouses for brevity) filed a complaint for
"Damages and Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction" against private
respondent Prominent Lending & Credit Corporation (PLCC) before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna, docketed as Civil
Case No. B-5476.2
They alleged that: on January 12, 1998, they obtained a loan from
PLCC for P800,000.00 secured by a real estate mortgage over a 363-
square meter parcel of land with improvements situated in the
Municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 99261; the promissory note and the real estate
mortgage were falsified because they affixed their signatures on two
blank documents; the monthly interest of 3.5% and 3% penalty on
each delayed monthly interest are different from the 18% interest
per annum to which they agreed to; for failure to pay their
obligation despite repeated demands, PLCC filed a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure with the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of
Laguna; and on June 8, 1999, the Sheriff sent a Notice of
Extrajudicial Sale to the Estares spouses.
Accordingly, the Estares spouses sought to declare as null and void
the promissory note and the real estate mortgage for not reflecting
their true agreement. In the interim, they prayed for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin PLCC from taking possession of the mortgaged property and

proceeding with the extrajudicial sale scheduled on July 13, 1999 at
10:00 a.m.
On June 30, 1999, the Estares spouses amended their complaint to
include the Register of Deeds of Laguna-Calamba Branch, the
Provincial Sheriff of Laguna and Sheriff IV Arnel G. Magat as party-
defendants.3
On July 12, 1999, the trial court issued a TRO in favor of the Estares
spouses.4 The parties subsequently agreed to maintain the status
quo until August 20, 1999.5
On August 6, 1999, PLCC filed its Answer with Counterclaim alleging
that the Estares spouses were duly apprised of the terms and
conditions of the loan, including the rate of interest, penalties and
other charges, in accordance with the Truth in Lending Act or
Republic Act No. 3765. It opposed the prayer for restraining order
on the ground that there is no factual and legal basis for its
issuance since the Estares spouses’ fear of eviction is false.6
At the hearing on the Estares spouses’ application for a writ of
preliminary injunction, Rosenda P. Estares (Rosenda for brevity)
testified that: the loan proceeds of P637,000.00, received on January
12, 1998, was used in the improvement and renovation of their
boarding house; they did not question PLCC in writing why they
only received P637,000.00; when they received the Statement of
Account, they did not question the figures appearing therein; when
they received PLCC’s demand letter, they went to the former’s office
not to question the loan’s terms and conditions but merely to
request for extension of three months to pay their obligation. They
adduced in evidence the promissory note, real estate mortgage,
statement of account, petition for extrajudicial foreclosure and the
notice of extrajudicial sale. The Estares spouses then rested their
case.
In opposition to the application for a writ of preliminary injunction,
PLCC presented its manager, Rey Arambulo, who testified that the
Estares spouses were duly apprised of the terms and conditions of
the loan, including the rate of interest, penalties and other charges,
in accordance with the Truth in Lending Act or Republic Act No.
3765. It submitted the same evidence offered by the Estares
spouses, along with the latter’s credit application, the credit
investigation report, the receipts PLCC issued, and the disclosure
statement on the loan.
On August 18, 1999, the trial court denied the Estares spouses’
application for a writ of preliminary injunction, holding that the
latter failed to establish the facts necessary for an injunction to
issue.7
On August 31, 1999, the Estares spouses filed a motion for
reconsideration.8 During the hearing on the motion for
reconsideration on September 17, 1999, Eliseo P. Estares (Eliseo for
brevity) moved that he be allowed to testify on the circumstances of
the loan but the trial court denied it. The trial court deemed it best
that he be presented during the trial on the merits.9 On October 1,
1999, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.10
On December 7, 1999, the Estares spouses filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition in the Court of Appeals ascribing grave
abuse of discretion upon the trial court in issuing the Orders dated
August 18, 1999 and October 1, 1999 which denied their prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction and motion for reconsideration,
respectively.11
On December 14, 1999, without giving due course to the petition,
the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution requiring the PLCC to file
its comment to the petition. The action on the Estares spouses’
application for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction was
deferred and held in abeyance until after receipt of the comment.12
With no restraining order enjoining him, Sheriff Magat conducted
an auction sale on January 5, 2000, with PLCC as highest bidder for
P1,500,000.00.13
In its Comment dated January 15, 2000, PLCC claimed that the trial
court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the
Estares spouses’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction since
the latter failed to prove their right to injunctive relief and the
action sought to be enjoined has been rendered moot by the
auction sale conducted on January 5, 2000.14
On April 17, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for
lack of merit, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the Estares spouses’ application for a writ of preliminary
injunction since the latter failed to prove the requisites for the
issuance thereof. 15
The Estares spouses then moved for reconsideration of the April 17,
2000 decision. In addition, they prayed that the auction sale on
January 5, 2000, as well as the minutes of auction sale and
certificate of sale, be declared null and void not only because there
was no publication of the notice of auction sale but the auction sale
preempted the Court of Appeals in the disposition of the case and

was conducted in defiance of the Resolution dated December 14,
1999.16
On July 7, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the Estares spouses’
motion for reconsideration.17
On September 16, 2000, the Estares spouses filed the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition anchored on the following
grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT GRANTING A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO PREVENT RESPONDENTS PLCC AND
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF LAGUNA/ SHERIFF ARNEL MAGAT FROM
FORECLOSING THE MORTGAGE AND CONDUCTING THE AUCTION
SALE OF PETITIONERS’ PROPERTY AND/OR IN UPHOLDING THE
ORDER DATED AUGUST 18, 1999 OF JUDGE DAMASO A. HERRERA,
RTC-BRANCH 24, LAGUNA.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS NULL AND
VOID AND/OR SETTING ASIDE THE AUCTION SALE OF THE
PETITIONERS’ HOUSE AND LOT CONDUCTED BY SHERIFF ARNEL
MAGAT ON JANUARY 5, 2000 FOR LACK OF RE-PUBLICATION OF
NOTICE OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL SALE, FOR PRE-EMPTING THE COURT
OF APPEALS IN DECIDING THE CASE, AND FOR RENDERING THE
PETITION IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 56123 MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING DENIAL OF
DUE PROCESS TO OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKER ELISEO ESTARES
WHEN JUDGE DAMASO A. HERRERA REFUSED TO ALLOW HIM TO
TESTIFY ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THEIR LOAN WITH PLCC.18
Anent the first ground, the Estares spouses insist that they firmly
established their right to injunctive relief. They claim that the
promissory note, credit application, disbursement voucher,
disclosure statement and real estate mortgage are falsified; the
promissory note is not reflective of the true amount of the loan, as
well as the term, interest and charges thereon; the P126,362.28
represent additional charges, not as part of the loan, that were not
agreed upon prior to or before the consummation of the loan; and
the amount of the loan and rate of interest stated in the falsified
promissory note are fictitious or simulated.
With respect to the second ground, they maintain that the auction
sale conducted on January 5, 2000 should be nullified because it
lacked republication of the notice of auction sale and it was
conducted in violation of the Court of Appeals’ Resolution dated
December 14, 1999 which enjoined the parties to maintain the
status quo pending the filing by the respondents of their Comment
to the petition. They argue that PLCC and Sheriff Magat preempted
the Court of Appeals from resolving their petition by conducting the
auction sale on January 5, 2000.
As to the third ground, they aver that Eliseo was denied due
process when the trial court refused to allow him to testify during
the hearing on the motion for reconsideration. They contend that
Eliseo, an overseas contract worker, purposely took leave from work
in the Middle East to testify on the circumstances of the loan and
his testimony was material to clarify the matter of notarization of
the real estate mortgage and show that said document was falsified.
On October 2, 2000, the Court granted the TRO prayed for in the
petition and required the respondents to comment thereon.19
In its Comment dated October 25, 2000, PLCC asserts that the
petition should be dismissed for being deficient on both procedural
and substantive aspects.
As to the procedural aspect, PLCC posits that the petition is filed
beyond the sixty-day period required by the rules and therefore
filed out of time. PLCC further claims that the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping are both insufficient. The
verification speaks of a "Pre-Trial Brief" while the certification of
non-forum shopping was executed only by Rosenda.
As to the substance of the petition, PLCC argues that the Estares
spouses failed to establish their right to injunctive relief; the validity
of the January 5, 2000 auction sale was brought only in the motion
for reconsideration which is improper because it is a factual issue
best addressed to the trial court; Sheriff Magat did not preempt the
Court of Appeals in deciding CA-G.R. SP No. 56123 when he
conducted the auction sale on January 5, 2000 because the
Resolution dated December 14, 1999 of the said court did not
suspend or restrain the sheriff from conducting the foreclosure sale;
Eliseo was not denied due process because he sought to testify on
factual matters in the hearing on their motion for reconsideration
which is improper as factual matters are best brought and proved
during the trial on the merits of the case.

The Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties
to submit their respective memoranda20 which they complied
with.21
Before ruling on the issues raised in the petition, it is necessary to
dwell on the procedural aspects of the case.
From a reading of the grounds on which the instant petition for
certiorari and prohibition are based, it is readily apparent that the
Estares spouses are appealing a decision of the Court of Appeals by
resorting to Rule 65, when their remedy should be based on Rule 45
of the Rules of Court. A petition for review under Rule 45 is not
similar to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or
proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for
review on certiorari, which would be but a continuation of the
appellate process over the original case.22 In contrast, a special civil
action under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific
grounds therein provided and proper only if there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.23 Thus, certiorari cannot be availed of as a substitute for the
lost remedy of an ordinary appeal.24
By their own account, the Estares spouses received the Order dated
July 7, 2000 denying their motion for reconsideration from the Court
of Appeals on July 18, 2000. Instead of filing a petition for review
with this Court within 15 days thereof or until August 2, 2000, they
filed this special civil action by registered mail on September 16,
2000 or 60 days from receipt of the Order dated July 7, 2000. By
then, they had already lost the remedy of appeal. By availing of a
wrong remedy, the instant petition should have merited outright
dismissal.
Concerning the verification, we note that Rosenda stated therein
that she caused the preparation of the "foregoing Pre-Trial Brief"
but we consider the same as a slight error and honest mistake in
the preparation of the petition. In any event, the purpose of
requiring a verification is simply to secure an assurance that the
allegations of the petition have been made in good faith; or are true
and correct, not merely speculative.25 This requirement is simply a
condition affecting the form of pleadings, and noncompliance
therewith does not necessarily render it fatally defective.26 Indeed,
verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement.27
With regard to the certification of non-forum shopping signed only
by Rosenda, the rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping
must be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case and the
signing by only one of them is insufficient because a lone signatory
cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the matters
required to be stated in the attestation.28
However, the Court has also stressed that the rules on forum
shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with
such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective which is simply to prohibit and penalize the
evils of forumshopping.29 The fact that the rules on forumshopping
require strict compliance merely underscores its mandatory nature
that it cannot be dispensed with or its requirements altogether
disregarded, but it does not thereby interdict substantial compliance
with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.30
We find that the execution by Rosenda of the certificate of non-
forum shopping in behalf of her co-petitioner and husband, Eliseo,
constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules. After all they
share a common interest in the property involved since it is
conjugal property, and the petition questioning the propriety of the
decision of the Court of Appeals originated from an action brought
by the spouses, and is clearly intended for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Considering that the husband was at that time
an overseas contract worker working in Algeria, whereas the petition
was prepared in Sta. Rosa, Laguna, a rigid application of the rules
on forumshopping that would disauthorize the wife’s signing the
certification in her behalf and that of her husband is too harsh and
clearly uncalled for.31
In any event, we find that this petition must still be dismissed as the
Court of Appeals did not commit any grave abuse of discretion
amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the
petition.
Generally, injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of
substantive rights or interests. It is not a cause of action in itself but
merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. The
controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue
the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their
claims can be thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It
is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid
injurious consequences which cannot be remedied under any

standard of compensation. The application of the writ rests upon an
alleged existence of an emergency or of a special reason for such
an order before the case can be regularly heard, and the essential
conditions for granting such temporary injunctive relief are that the
complaint alleges facts which appear to be sufficient to constitute a
cause of action for injunction and that on the entire showing from
both sides, it appears, in view of all the circumstances, that the
injunction is reasonably necessary to protect the legal rights of
plaintiff pending the litigation.32
The Estares spouses had the burden in the trial court to establish
the following requirements for them to be entitled to injunctive
relief: (a) the existence of their right to be protected; and (b) that
the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative
of such right.33] To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner
must show, inter alia, the existence of a clear and unmistakable right
and an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent
serious damage.34 Thus, an injunctive remedy may only be resorted
to when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard
compensation.35
In the present case, the Estares spouses failed to establish their right
to injunctive relief. They do not deny that they are indebted to PLCC
but only question the amount thereof. Their property is by their
own choice encumbered by a real estate mortgage. Upon the
nonpayment of the loan, which was secured by the mortgage, the
mortgaged property is properly subject to a foreclosure sale.
Rosenda’s testimony sealed the fate of the necessity of the writ of
preliminary injunction. She admitted that: they did not question
PLCC in writing why they only received P637,000.00; they did not
question the figures appearing in the Statement of Account when
they received it; and, when they received PLCC’s demand letter, they
went to the former’s office not to question the loan’s terms and
conditions but merely to request for extension of three months to
pay their obligation.36 She acknowledged that they only raised the
alleged discrepancy of the amount loaned and the amount received,
as well as the blank documents which they allegedly signed, after
PLCC initiated the foreclosure proceedings.37
It must be stressed that the assessment and evaluation of evidence
in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction involve findings
of facts ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive
determination.38 As such, a trial court’s decision to grant or to deny
injunctive relief will not be set aside on appeal unless the court
abused its discretion. In granting or denying injunctive relief, a court
abuses its discretion when it lacks jurisdiction, fails to consider and
make a record of the factors relevant to its determination, relies on
clearly erroneous factual findings, considers clearly irrelevant or
improper factors, clearly gives too much weight to one factor, relies
on erroneous conclusions of law or equity, or misapplies its factual
or legal conclusions.39
In the present case, the Estares spouses clearly failed to prove that
they have a right protected and that the acts against which the writ
is to be directed are violative of said right. Hence, the Court of
Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of its discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioners’ petition for
certiorari.
There is likewise no merit to the claim that the Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion when it denied the prayer to nullify the
auction sale held on January 5, 2000 for lack of republication of the
notice of auction sale and for preempting the Court of Appeals in
deciding the case and rendering the petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
56123 moot and academic.
The absence of republication of the notice of auction sale is a
factual matter which by the weight of judicial precedents cannot be
inquired into by this Court in a petition for certiorari. It is best
addressed to the attention of the trial court and taken up in the trial
of the case, necessitating presentation of evidence by both parties.
The propriety of the auction sale is a matter which the trial court is
in the best position to determine. For it is basic that certiorari under
Rule 65 is a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is
not a general utility tool in the legal workshop.40 It offers only a
limited form of review. Its principal function is to keep an inferior
tribunal within its jurisdiction.41 It can be invoked only for an error
of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act complained of was issued
by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction,42 not to be used for any other
purpose,43 such as to cure errors in proceedings or to correct
erroneous conclusions of law or fact.44 Again suffice it to say that
the only issue settled here is the propriety of the non-issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction pending the final outcome of the case.
As to petitioners’ assertion that the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution dated December 14, 1999 impliedly directed the parties
to maintain the status quo, we deemed it worthy to quote in full the
said Resolution, thus:

Without necessarily giving due course to the petition, the Court
requires the respondents to file their comment (not motion to
dismiss) within ten (10) days from notice, which may be treated as
their Answer should the petition be given due course.
Respondents are likewise ordered to show cause in the same
Comment why a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction should not be issued.
The action of the petitioners’ application for a temporary restraining
order and writ of preliminary injunction is deferred and held in
abeyance until after receipt of respondents’ Comment.45
Clearly, the Court of Appeals did not give due course to the petition
but merely required PLCC to comment thereon. The Court of
Appeals did not enjoin the conduct of the auction sale. In any case,
the necessity for the issuance of the writ of injunction has been
found wanting.
Lastly, the Estares spouses’ claim that Eliseo was denied due process
when the trial court refused to allow him to testify during hearing
on the motion for reconsideration deserves scant consideration.
It must be remembered that a writ of preliminary injunction is
generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The
evidence submitted during the hearing on an application for a writ
of preliminary injunction is not conclusive or complete for only a
"sampling" is needed to give the trial court an idea of the
justification for the preliminary injunction pending the decision of
the case on the merits.46
We note that it was the Estares spouses’ choice to present only
Rosenda to testify on the circumstances of the loan at the hearing
on their application for a writ of preliminary injunction and they
cannot assert that Eliseo should have been accorded that
opportunity during the hearing on the motion for reconsideration.
The essence of due process is found in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of
one's defense. What the law proscribes is the lack of opportunity to
be heard.47 As long as a party is given the opportunity to defend
his interests in due course, he would have no reason to complain,
for it is this opportunity to be heard that makes up the essence of
due process.48 Eliseo cannot complain that he was deprived of due
process since he is given the full opportunity to testify on the
circumstances of the loan during the trial of the main case.49
All told, no grave abuse of discretion could therefore be imputed to
the Court of Appeals in dismissing petitioners’ petition for certiorari
with prohibition, for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is
DISMISSED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated April 17, 2000 and July 7, 2000, respectively, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 56123 are AFFIRMED in all respects. The temporary
restraining order issued by this Court is lifted. Costs against
petitioners.

G.R. No. 140058 August 1, 2002
MABAYO FARMS, INC., herein represented by its President MRS.
RORAIMA SILVA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO SANTOS, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks to reverse the decision1 promulgated
on August 27, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
51375. The appellate court enjoined the enforcement of the writ of
preliminary injunction dated April 14, 1998, issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan, Branch 1, in Civil Case No. 6695
against private respondent, Antonio Santos.
The factual antecedents of this case are as follows:
On August 22, 1969, the Bureau of Lands declared Francisco
Domingo, Reynaldo Florida, Cornelio Pilipino and Severino Vistan,
lawful possessors of Lot 1379 of the Morong, Bataan Cadastre. Lot
1379 consists of 144 hectares. Domingo, Florida, Pilipino and Vistan
through their forebears and by themselves had been in open,
notorious, and exclusive possession of portions of Lot 1379 since
1933 in the concept of owners. The Bureau then directed them to
confirm their titles over the property by filing the appropriate
applications for the portions of the property respectively occupied
by them.1âwphi1.nêt
In October 1970, petitioner bought the respective portions of
Domingo, Florida, Pilipino and Vistan, totaling 69,932 square meters
and entered into a compromise settlement with six other persons
occupying the property, whose applications had been rejected by
the Bureau. Petitioner then filed an application for land registration
docketed as LRC Cad. Rec. No. N-209 with the then Court of First
Instance of Bataan, Branch 1. The application was contested by
several oppositors, among them the heirs of one Toribio Alejandro.
On December 20, 1991, the trial court decided the land registration
case in petitioner’s favor. The losing parties appealed to the Court
of Appeals, where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 40452.
On March 14, 2000, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s
decision.2
In June 1997, a group of occupants entered the land, destroyed the
fences and drove away livestock owned by petitioner.
On October 9, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for injunction with
damages, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, docketed
as Civil Case No. 6695, with the RTC of Balanga, Bataan. Named as
defendants were Juanito Infante, Domingo Infante, Lito Mangalidan,
Jaime Aquino, John Doe, Peter Doe, and Richard Doe.
The trial court issued the temporary restraining order (TRO) and on
January 16, 1998, the sheriff served copies on the defendants. The
sheriff accompanied petitioner’s president to the property where
they found five (5) persons cultivating the land. The latter refused to
give their names or receive copies of the TRO. They claimed that
they were only farm workers of a certain Antonio Santos who
allegedly owned the land.3
On April 14, 1998, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the defendants or persons acting on their
behalf from entering and cultivating the disputed property. The
aforementioned writ was also served upon respondent who was
occupying a portion of Lot No. 1379.4
On February 24, 1999, private respondent filed a special civil action
for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 51375 with the Court of
Appeals. Private respondent averred that he only learned about the
writ of preliminary injunction on February 16, 1999, when he
secured a copy of the order. He claimed that he was an innocent
purchaser for value of the property from Francisco, Armando, and
Conchita, all surnamed Alejandro and the injunction prevented him
from using his property. He alleged that he was not a party to Civil
Case No. 6695 and that it was grave abuse of discretion for the trial
court to enforce the injunctive writ against him since it did not have
jurisdiction over him.
On August 27, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No.
51375 in private respondent’s favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant Petition is
hereby GRANTED. Public respondent is enjoined from
imposing the questioned writ of preliminary injunction
dated April 14, 199[8] against petitioner [Santos].
SO ORDERED.5

Hence, the instant petition, submitting the following issues for our
consideration:
A. WHETHER [PRIVATE] RESPONDENT WAS DEPRIVED OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE HEARD.
B. WHETHER RULE 3, SEC. 11 OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE6 IS APPLICABLE IN THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED CASE.
We find the lone issue to be: Is private respondent bound by the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court?
First, petitioner contends that the injunctive writ of April 14, 1998
was issued not only against all named defendants in Civil Case No.
6695, but also against three unnamed "Does." It now argues that
the "Does" in the complaint are all those who violated its rights,
including private respondent. Petitioner asks us to note that the writ
of injunction was served not only against the defendants in Civil
Case No. 6695, but also against other persons who were seen
entering and cultivating petitioner’s property, including private
respondent. Since the latter personally received the injunctive order
on June 5, 1998, he was already forewarned to intervene in Civil
Case No. 6695 if he had any right or interest to protect in the
disputed property. This he failed to do. Since private respondent did
not then take the opportunity to present his side, he cannot now
claim that he was denied due process when the writ was enforced
against him.
In his comment, private respondent counters that he was not legally
bound nor required by law to file his pleadings in Civil Case No.
6695 as he was not a party in said case. Likewise, he was not
required to act on or protest the injunctive writ in the
aforementioned civil case. Private respondent avers that what
petitioner wants is to have a continuing writ in its favor, to include
not only the defendants in Civil Case No. 6695 but also all those
who may subsequently intrude into the land dispute. Private
respondent submits that the court a quo committed no error in
describing petitioner’s posture as a violation of the fundamental
rights to notice and hearing.
We have minutely scrutinized the order granting the writ of
preliminary injunction and are unable to say that the writ applied to
private respondent. The order merely stated "[L]et a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining and restraining the
defendants or any person or persons acting in their place or stead
from further entering and cultivating the said land of the plaintiff
subject matter of this case until further order from the Court."7The
persons specifically enjoined in the order were the defendants in
Civil Case No. 6695 or persons acting in their stead. Petitioner itself
admitted that private respondent was not a defendant in Civil Case
No. 6695 since "at the institution of the case in 1997, he (private
respondent) did not have a right over any portion of petitioner’s
lot."8 Neither was he a trespasser then.9 Also, nothing in the records
indicate that private respondent was acting on behalf of any of the
defendants. Taking all these into consideration, we must hold that
the writ of preliminary injunction thus cannot be made to apply to
private respondent.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an
action prior to final judgment, requiring a person to refrain from a
particular act.10 As an ancillary or preventive remedy, a writ of
preliminary injunction may therefore be resorted to by a party to
protect or preserve his rights and for no other purpose during the
pendency of the principal action.11 Its object is to preserve the
status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.12 It is not a
cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy, an adjunct
to a main suit.13 Thus, a person who is not a party in the main suit,
like private respondent in the instant case, cannot be bound by an
ancillary writ, such as the writ of preliminary injunction issued
against the defendants in Civil Case No. 6695. He cannot be
affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger.14
Second, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred when it
observed that petitioner should have impleaded private respondent
as defendant in Civil Case No. 6695 pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.15 Instead, private respondent
should have intervened in Civil Case No. 6695 to protect his rights.
Petitioner avers that at the time the injunctive writ was issued, it had
already rested its case and to require it to amend its complaint to
include private respondent was too late.
Private respondent counters that there was no reason why Section
11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should not be made
to apply to Civil Case No. 6695. He argues that contrary to
petitioner’s posture, his inclusion as a defendant in Civil Case No.
6695 is procedurally correct since no final judgment had yet been
rendered in said case. Moreover, he avers that petitioner cannot
insist that private respondent be vigilant in protecting his rights by
intervening in Civil Case No. 6695.1âwphi1.nêt
We agree with private respondent. First, private respondent had no
duty to intervene in the proceedings in Civil Case No. 6695.
Intervention in an action is neither compulsory nor mandatory but
only optional and permissive.16Second, to warrant intervention, two
requisites must concur: (a) the movant has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation,17 and (b) intervention must not unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties18nor should
the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in
a separate proceeding.19 The interest, which entitles a person to
intervene in a suit, must involve the matter in litigation and of such
direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain

or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the
judgment.20 Civil Case No. 6695 was an action for permanent
injunction and damages. As a stranger to the case, private
respondent had neither legal interest in a permanent injunction nor
an interest on the damages to be imposed, if any, in Civil Case No.
6695. To allow him to intervene would have unnecessarily
complicated and prolonged the case.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that to make the injunctive writ
applicable against private respondent, petitioner should have
impleaded the latter as an additional defendant in Civil Case No.
6695. Petitioner’s insistence that it had rested its case and hence
was too late to include defendant finds no support in Section 11.
The rule categorically provides that "Parties may be dropped or
added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own
initiative at any stage of the action (stress supplied) and on such
terms as are just."21 We find it inexplicable why petitioner pointedly
resisted the advice of the appellate court to implead private
respondent as an additional defendant in Civil Case No. 6695.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
51375 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION, SPOUSES JOEY
& MARY JEANNIE CASTRO and
SPOUSES RICHARD & EDITHA
NOGOY,
Petitioners,
- versus -
BENJAMIN CO, ENGR. DALE
OLEA and THREE KINGS
CONSTRUCTION & REALTY
CORPORATION,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 174569
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 17, 2008
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner China Banking Corporation sold a lot located at St.
Benedict Subdivision, Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, which was
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 450216-R to
petitioner-spouses Joey and Mary Jeannie Castro (the Castro
spouses). It sold two other lots also located in the same place
covered by TCT Nos. 450212-R and 450213-R to petitioner-spouses
Richard and Editha Nogoy (the Nogoy spouses).
The lots of the Castro spouses and the Nogoy spouses are
commonly bound on their southeastern side by Lot No. 3783-E,
which is covered by TCT No. 269758-R in the name of respondent
Benjamin Co (Co) and his siblings.
Co and his siblings entered into a joint venture with respondent
Three Kings Construction and Realty Corporation for the
development of the Northwoods Estates, a subdivision project
covering Lot No. 3783-E and adjacent lots. For this purpose, they
contracted the services of respondent, Engineer Dale Olea.
In 2003, respondents started constructing a perimeter wall on Lot
No. 3783-E.
On November 28, 2003, petitioners, through counsel, wrote
respondents asking them to stop constructing the wall, and remove
all installed construction materials and restore the former condition
of Lot No. [3]783-E which they (petitioners) claimed to be a road
lot.1 They also claimed that the construction obstructed and closed
the only means of ingress and egress of the Nogoy spouses and
their family, and at the same time, caved in and impeded the
ventilation and clearance due the Castro spouses’ residential house.2
Petitioners’ demand remained unheeded, prompting them to file
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga a
complaint,3 docketed as Civil Case No. 12834, for injunction,
restoration of road lot/right of way and damages with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Before respondents filed their Answer,4 petitioners filed an Amended
Complaint,5 alleging that the construction of the perimeter wall was
almost finished and thus modifying their prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction to a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
viz:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that:
A. Before trial on the merits, a temporary restraining order be issued
immediately restraining the defendants from doing further
construction of the perimeter wall on the premises, and thereafter, a
writ ofpreliminary mandatory injunction be issued enjoining the
defendants from perpetrating and continuing with the said act and
directing them jointly and severally, to restore the road lot, Lot
3783-E to its previous condition.
x x x x 6 (Underscoring in the original; emphasis supplied)

After hearing petitioners’ application for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, Branch 44 of the San Fernando, Pampanga
RTC denied the same, without prejudice to its resolution after the
trial of the case on the merits, in light of the following
considerations:
After a judicious evaluation of the evidence, the Commissioner’s
Report on the Conduct of the Ocular Inspection held on February
14, 2004, as well as the pleadings, the Court is of the opinion and
so holds that a writ of preliminary injunction should not be issued
at this time. Plaintiffs have not clearly shown that their rights have
been violated and that they are entitled to the relief prayed for and
that irreparable damage would be suffered by them if an injunction
is not issued. Whether lot 3783-E is a road lot or not is a factual
issue which should be resolved after the presentation of evidence.
This Court is not inclined to rely only on the subdivision plans
presented by plaintiffs since, as correctly argued by defendants, the
subdivision plans do not refer to lot 3783-E hence are not
conclusive as to the status or classification of lot 3783-E. This court
notes further that Subdivision Plan Psd-03-000577 of Lot 3783 from
which the other subdivision plans originates [sic] does not indicate
lot 3783-E as a road lot.
Even the physical evidence reveals that lot 3783-E is not a road lot.
The Court noticed during the ocular inspection on February 14,
2004, that there is a PLDT box almost in front of lot 3783-E. There is
no visible pathway either in the form of a beaten path or paved
path on lot 3783-E. Visible to everyone including this court are wild
plants, grasses, and bushes of various kinds. Lot 3783-E could not
have been a road lot because Sps. Nogoy, one of the plaintiffs, even
built a structure on lot 3783-E which they used as a coffin factory.
Plaintiffs failed to prove that they will be prejudiced by the
construction of the wall. The ocular inspection showed that they will
not lose access to their residences. As a matter of fact, lot 3783-E is
not being used as an access road to their residences and there is an
existing secondary road within St. Benedict Subdivision that serves
as the main access road to the highway. With respect to the
blocking of ventilation and light of the residence of the Sps. Castro,
suffice it to state that they are not deprived of light and ventilation.
The perimeter wall of the defendants is situated on the left side of
the garage and its front entrance is still open and freely accessible.
This is indeed an issue of fact which should be ventilated in a full
blown trial, determinable through further presentation of evidence
by the parties. x x x
x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, plaintiffs’ application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is denied
without prejudice to its resolution after the trial of the case on the
merits.7(Underscoring supplied)
Their Motion for Reconsideration8 having been denied, petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari9 before the Court of Appeals which
dismissed the same10 and denied their subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration.11
Hence, the petitioners filed the present petition,12 faulting the Court
of Appeals in
I.
. . . DECID[ING] AND RESOLV[ING] A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE BASIC
GOVERNING LAW (PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1529) AND
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II.
. . . PROMOTING THE LOWER COURT’S RATIOCINATION
THAT PETITIONERS ARE SEEKING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
AN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY, WHEN THEY ARE
CLAIMING THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE STATUTORY
PROHIBITION AGAINST CLOSURE OR DISPOSITION OF AN
ESTABLISHED ROAD LOT.
III.
. . . SANCTION[ING] THE LOWER COURT’S PATENT GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN PERFUNCTORILY DENYING
PETITIONERS’ APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION.13
It is settled that the grant of a preliminary mandatory injunction
rests on the sound discretion of the court, and the exercise of
sound judicial discretion by the lower court should not be interfered
with except in cases of manifest abuse.14
It is likewise settled that a court should avoid issuing a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction which would effectively dispose of
the main case without trial.15
In the case at bar, petitioners base their prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction on Section 44 of Act No. 496 (as amended by
Republic Act No. 440), Section 50 of Presidential Decree 1529, and
their claim that Lot No. 3783-E is a road lot.
To be entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, however, the
petitioners must establish the following requisites: (a) the invasion of
the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the

right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is
an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.16
Since a preliminary mandatory injunction commands the
performance of an act, it does not preserve the status quo and is
thus more cautiously regarded than a mere prohibitive
injunction.17 Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction is justified only in a clear case, free from
doubt or dispute.18 When the complainant’s right is thus doubtful or
disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the
issuance of injunctive relief is improper.
Section 44 of Act 496,19 which petitioners invoke, provides:
x x x x
Any owner subdividing a tract of registered land into lots shall file
with the Chief of the General Land Registration Office a subdivision
plan of such land on which all boundaries, streets and passageways,
if any, shall be distinctly and accurately delineated. If no streets or
passageways are indicated or no alteration of the perimeter of the
land is made, and it appears that the land as subdivided does not
need of them and that the plan has been approved by the Chief of
the General Land Registration Office, or by the Director of Lands as
provided in section fifty-eight of this Act, the Register of Deeds may
issue new certificates of title for any lot in accordance with said
subdivision plan. If there are streets and/or passageways, no new
certificates shall be issued until said plan has been approved by the
Court of First Instance of the province or city in which the land is
situated. A petition for that purpose shall be filed by the registered
owner, and the court after notice and hearing, and after considering
the report of the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, may
grant the petition, subject to the condition, which shall be noted on
the proper certificate, that no portion of any street or passageway
so delineated on the plan shall be closed or otherwise disposed of
by the registered owner without approval of the court first had, or
may render such judgment as justice and equity may
require.20 (Underscoring supplied by the petitioners)
Section 50 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,21 which petitioners
likewise invoke, provides:
SECTION 50. Subdivision and consolidation plans. – Any owner
subdividing a tract of registered land into lots which do not
constitute a subdivision project as defined and provided for under
P.D. No. 957, shall file with the Commissioner of Land Registration
or with the Bureau of Lands a subdivision plan of such land on
which all boundaries, streets, passageways and waterways, if any,
shall be distinctly and accurately delineated.
If a subdivision plan, be it simple or complex, duly approved by the
Commissioner of Land Registration or the Bureau of Lands together
with the approved technical descriptions and the corresponding
owner's duplicate certificate of title is presented for registration, the
Register of Deeds shall, without requiring further court approval of
said plan, register the same in accordance with the provisions of the
Land Registration Act, as amended: Provided, however, that the
Register of Deeds shall annotate on the new certificate of title
covering the street, passageway or open space, a memorandum to
the effect that except by way of donation in favor of the national
government, province, city or municipality, no portion of any street,
passageway, waterway or open space so delineated on the plan
shall be closed or otherwise disposed of by the registered owner
without the approval of the Court of First Instance of the province
or city in which the land is situated. x x x22 (Underscoring supplied
by petitioner)
The best evidence thus that Lot No. 3783-E is a road lot would be a
memorandum to that effect annotated on the certificate of title
covering it. Petitioners presented TCT No. 185702-R covering Lot
No. 3783-E in the name of Sunny Acres Realty Management
Corporation which states that the registration is subject to "the
restrictions imposed by Section 44 of Act 496, as amended by Rep.
Act No. 440."23 The annotation does not explicitly state, however,
that Lot No. 3783-E is a road lot.1awphi1.net
In any event, TCT No. 185702-R had been cancelled and in its stead
was issued TCT No. 247778-R24which, in turn, was cancelled by TCT
No. 269758-R25 in the name of respondent Co and his siblings.
TCT No. 247778-R and respondent Co’s TCT No. 269758-R do not
now contain the aforementioned memorandum annotated on TCT
No. 185702-R re the registration being "subject to restrictions
imposed by Section 44 of Act 496, as amended by Republic Act No.
440." Given the immediately foregoing circumstances, there is doubt
on whether Lot No. 3783-E is covered by a road lot.
While petitioners correctly argue that certain requirements must be
observed before encumbrances, in this case the condition of the
lot’s registration as being subject to the law, may be discharged and
before road lots may be appropriated26 gratuity assuming that the
lot in question was indeed one, TCT Nos. 247778-R and 269758-R
enjoy the presumption of regularity27 and the legal requirements for
the removal of the memorandum annotated on TCT No. 185702-R
are presumed to have been followed.28
At all events, given the following factual observations of the trial
court after conducting an ocular inspection of Lot 3783-E, viz:
x x x The ocular inspection showed that [petitioners] will not lose
access to their residences. As a matter of fact, lot 3783-E is not

being used as an access road to their residences and there is an
existing secondary road within St. Benedict Subdivision that serves
as the main access road to the highway.29With respect to the
blocking of ventilation and light of the residence of the Sps. Castro,
suffice it to state that they are not deprived of light and ventilation.
The perimeter wall of the defendants is situated on the left side of
the garage and its front entrance is still open and freely accessible,30
and the absence of a showing that petitioners have an urgent and
paramount need for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to
prevent irreparable damage, they are not entitled to such writ.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. 157494 December 10, 2004 BACOLOD CITY WATER
DISTRICT, petitioner,
vs. THE HON. EMMA C. LABAYEN, Presiding Judge, RTC of
Bacolod City, Br. 46 and the City of Bacolod,respondents. D E C I
S I O N PUNO, J.:
First, the chronology of facts. Petitioner Bacolod City Water District
(BACIWA) is a water district established pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 198 as a government-owned and controlled corporation
with original charter. It is in the business of providing safe and
potable water to Bacolod City.
Public respondent City of Bacolod is a municipal corporation created
by Commonwealth Act No. 326, otherwise known as the Charter of
Bacolod.
On March 26, 1999, respondent City filed a case for Injunction With
a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction against petitioner in the sala of public
respondent judge. The petition stated that on January 15, 1999,
BACIWA published in the Visayan Daily Star,1 a local paper of
general circulation, a Schedule of Automatic Water Rates
Adjustments for the years 1999, 2000 and 2001. The rates were
supposed to take effect seven (7) days after its posting in the local
papers or on January 22, 1999. The increase was aborted after
petitioner unilaterally suspended the January 22, 1999 scheduled
implementation. On March 15, 1999, however, petitioner announced
that the rate hike will be implemented on April 1, 1999. 2
Respondent City opposed. It alleged that the proposed water rates
would violate due process as they were to be imposed without the
public hearing required under Letter of Instructions No. 7003 and
Presidential Decree No. 1479.4 Hence, it prayed that before the
hearing of the main case, a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction be issued.5
On March 30, 1999, the court a quo issued an Order6 summoning
the parties with their counsels to attend the preliminary hearing for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary
mandatory injunction. On April 8, 1999, it required the parties to
simultaneously submit their respective memoranda on whether it
had jurisdiction over the case and whether a public hearing was
conducted re the proposed increase in water rates.7
Petitioner filed its Position Paper dated April 15, 1999. It attached
documents evidencing the conduct of extensive and lengthy public
hearings in fifty-eight (58) of the sixty-one (61) barangays of
Bacolod City. It opined that original jurisdiction over cases on rate
review is vested in the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA);
appellate jurisdiction is vested in the National Water Resources

[Board] (NWRB) whose decisions shall be appealable to the Office of
the President.8
On May 5, 1999, petitioner also filed a Motion to Dismiss. In an
Order9 dated May 7, 1999, the court directed respondent City to file
its Opposition to petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss within fifteen (15)
days.
On June 17, 1999, respondent City filed a Motion to Set [for]
Hearing10 its application for a temporary restraining order or
preliminary mandatory injunction. It alleged that the parties had
already submitted their respective memoranda and it has already
submitted its Opposition to petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss. It also
alleged that petitioner had already effected the water rates increase
and collection, hence, causing irreparable injury to the public.
Petitioner opposed the Motion. On July 20, 1999, respondent City
filed its Reply to Opposition and reiterated that the application for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary
mandatory injunction be heard since petitioner continued to violate
the right of the public to due process and it might take time before
the case would be finally resolved.11 On the same date, petitioner
filed a Manifestation and Motion12 stating that the hearing may no
longer be necessary as the respective positions of both parties have
already been presented and amplified in their pleadings and
memoranda.
On July 22, 1999, respondent trial court issued an Order13 stating
that there was no more need to hear the caseon the merits14 as
both parties have already submitted their position papers and
documents to prove their respective allegations.
On July 23, 1999, petitioner filed its Reply15 to respondent City’s
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss reiterating that petitioner
failed to exhaust administrative remedies provided by law hence the
petition be dismissed for utter lack of merit.
After a hiatus of nearly seven (7) months, or on February 18, 2000,
respondent City filed an Urgent Motion for the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order And[/]Or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction16 praying that the case be set for hearing on February 24,
2000. On the same date requested, respondent court heard
respondent’s application for temporary restraining order and issued
an Order17 commanding petitioner to stop, desist and refrain from
implementing the proposed water rates for the year 2000 which
were then supposed to take effect on March 1, 2000.
On March 7, 2000, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and Dissolution of the Temporary Restraining
Order.18 Respondent court a quo issued on March 10, 2000 an
Order19 directing respondent City to file an Opposition to the
Urgent Motion. In its Opposition, respondent City20 contended that
the temporary restraining order issued was not infirmed with
procedural and substantive defects. It also averred that respondent
court has jurisdiction over the case since the sole question of the
lack of public hearing does not require the special knowledge or
expertise of an administrative agency and may be resolved by
respondent court, hence the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does
not apply.
Respondent court continued with the proceedings by receiving the
evidence of petitioner in support of its Motion for Reconsideration
and Dissolution of Temporary Restraining Order. It further issued
Orders dated March 17, 200021 and March 20, 2000.22
On April 6, 2000, respondent court issued an Order23 finding
petitioner’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Dissolution of
Temporary Restraining Order moot and academic considering
petitioner’s compliance of said temporary restraining order.
Four (4) days after, in an Order24 dated April 10, 2000, it denied
petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of merit.
On April 19, 2000, respondent City filed a Manifestation praying that
respondent trial court issue a writ of preliminary injunction against
petitioner, stating thus:
A Temporary Restraining Order was issued against the
respondents which, however, expired before the parties
were able to finish the presentation of their respective
witnesses and evidences;
The instant case was submitted for resolution and decision
of this Honorable Court during the last week of March but
while awaiting the decision of this Honorable Court,
several complaints had reached the petitioner that the
respondents had already reflected in the water billings for
the month of April the new water rates for the year 2000;
x x x 25
Petitioner, for its part, filed a Motion for Reconsideration26 of
respondent trial court’s Order denying its Motion to Dismiss.
Respondent City filed an Opposition to [the] Motion for
Reconsideration27 on June 1, 2000.
Respondent court did not act upon petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration until respondent City filed an [Ex Parte] Motion for
Speedy Resolution28 of the case on October 6, 2000 praying that the
case be resolved before the year 2000 ends in order to prevent the
implementation of the water rates increase for the year 2001 which
was to be imposed allegedly without the benefit of a public hearing.

On December 21, 2000, respondent court issued the assailed
Decision29 granting the final injunction which allegedly confirmed
the previous preliminary injunction.
Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration30 of the assailed
Decision on January 11, 2001 asserting, among others, that the case
was not yet ripe for decision when the court granted the final
injunction, the petitioner having had no opportunity to file its
answer, avail of the mandatory pre-trial conference and have the
case tried on the merits.
Respondent court denied the Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit in an Order31 dated January 24, 2001. Petitioner then filed a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in the Court of
Appeals. It alleged that public respondent judge acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave and patent abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
issued the final injunction in disregard of petitioner’s basic right to
due process.32
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review on certiorari,
ratiocinating thus:
In the case at bar, the [O]rder of public respondent dated
24 February 2000, though termed by BACIWA as a
temporary restraining order, is in fact a preliminary
injunction. The period of the restraint was not limited. By
its wordings, it can be safely inferred that the increased
water rates must not be effected until final disposition of
the main case. This note of semi-permanence simply
cannot issue from a mere temporary restraining order. It
must be further noted that the temporary restraining
order has been elevated to the same level as the
preliminary injunction in the procedure, grounds and
requirements of its obtention by S[ection] 4, Rule 58. Thus,
to set [a] distinction, the present practice is to
categorically refer to it as a temporary restraining order. In
which case, the omission by the public respondent in
referring to the 24 February 2000 order as a temporary
restraining order could not have been a mere oversight
but deliberate.33
Resorting to this Court, petitioner raises the following issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
FAILED AND REFUSED TO RULE THAT RESPONDENT
COURT HAD ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AND/OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION FOR ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY
RENDERING A DECISION PURPORTING TO ISSUE A FINAL
INJUNCTION AND CONFIRMING ITS ALLEGED
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, DESPITE THE FACT THAT:
A. NO PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION HAD BEEN
ISSUED;
B. THE RESPONDENT LOWER COURT DID NOT
RESOLVE HEREIN PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER DENYING
PETITIONER’S MOTION TO DISMISS;
C. THE HEREIN PETITIONER HAD NOT YET FILED
ITS ANSWER TO THE PETITION;
D. THERE WAS STILL NO JOINDER OF THE
ISSUES SINCE NO ANSWER HAD YET BEEN
FILED;
E. THE MANDATORY PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE
WAS NOT YET CONDUCTED;
F. THERE WAS NO TRIAL ON THE MERITS FOR
THE MAIN CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
INSISTED THAT THE 24 FEBRUARY 2000 ORDER (ANNEX R)
ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS A PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION WHEN THE RECORDS CLEARLY AND
INDUBITABLY SHOW THAT IT WAS A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO).
III
BY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, THE
COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
EFFECTIVELY PREVENTED PETITIONER FROM FULLY
VENTILATING ITS CASE IN THE MAIN ACTION DUE TO
THE IRREGULAR AND CONFUSED PROCEEDINGS
CONDUCTED BY THE RESPONDENT COURT.34
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The initial issue is the proper characterization of the Order dated
February 24, 2000.
The sequence of events and the proceedings that transpired in the
trial court make a clear conclusion that the Order issued was a
temporary restraining order and not a preliminary injunction.

First. We quote the pertinent parts of the questioned Order:
x x x
When this motion was called for hearing wherein both
parties have argued exhaustedly their respective sides, this
court denied the ten (10) days extension for further
amplification of the arguments of the respondent to
oppose the said motion for issuance of a temporary
restraining order.
It appearing therefore, that the acts of the defendant will
actually affect the plaintiff before the decision of this court
can be rendered and in order to afford the court to pass
on the issues without the same becoming moot and
academic and considering the urgency of the matter that
immediate action should be taken, and pursuant to
Administrative Circular No. 6, Paragraph 4 and sub-
paragraph 15 and The Interim Rules and Guidelines [set
forth] by the Rules of Court, this court hereby orders the
respondent[,] its agents, representatives or any person
acting in his behalf to stop, desist and refrain from
implementing in their billings the new water rate
increase which will start on March 1, 2000. The Deputy
Provincial Sheriff of this court is hereby ordered to furnish
copy of this order to the respondent Bacolod City Water
District as well as to its agents or representatives acting
[o]n his behalf.
x x x 35 (emphases supplied)
It can be gleaned from the afore-quoted Order that what the trial
court issued was a temporary restraining order and not a
preliminary injunction. The trial court has always referred to it as a
temporary restraining order in the succeeding Orders it issued on
March 10, 200036 and April 6, 2000.37
The parties, in their succeeding pleadings,38 also referred to the
assailed Order as a temporary restraining order. The petitioner filed
an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Dissolution
of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)39 on March 1, 2000. This
was opposed by respondent City itself in its Opposition to Motion
for Reconsideration and Dissolution of Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO)40 dated March 14, 2000. Further, respondent City, in its
Manifestation dated April 19, 2000 stated, viz:
x x x
A Temporary Restraining Order was issued against the
respondents which, however, expired before the parties
were able to finish the presentation of their respective
witnesses and evidences;
x x x
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that while
waiting for the decision and order of the Honorable
Court, a preliminary injunction as prayed for in the
petition be issued against the respondents.
x x x41 (emphases supplied)
It can be gleaned from the foregoing that both parties and
respondent trial court have consistently referred to the directive as a
temporary restraining order. It was only in the respondent court’s
assailed Decision that the Order was referred to as a preliminary
injunction, viz:
x x x
This Court therefore grants the final injunction prayed for
restraining the respondent from the commission of the act
complained of for the year 2001 and hereby confirming
the preliminary injunction previously ordered.
x x x 42 (emphasis supplied)
Again, it was only when petitioner expressed its vehement objection
on the ruling that the final injunction confirmed the preliminary
injunction previously issued, when the respondent City and the
respondent trial court started to insist that the questioned Order
was a preliminary injunction. Given the previous undeviating
references to it as a temporary restraining order, respondents
cannot now consider it as a preliminary injunction to justify the
validity of the assailed Decision. The attendant facts and
circumstances clearly show that the respondent trial court issued a
temporary restraining order.
Second. Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby
a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may
be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an
incident in the main action.43
The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or
ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist except
only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding.
As a matter of course, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary
remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory,
may issue. Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a
judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from, and
should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary

injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status
quo until the merits can be heard.44 A preliminary injunction is
granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the
termination of the action without the court issuing a final
injunction.45
A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve
the status quo until the hearing of the application for preliminary
injunction which cannot be issued ex parte. Under Rule 5846 of the
Rules of Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order with
a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If before the
expiration of the twenty (20)-day period the application for
preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary restraining order
would be deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by
the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within the
said twenty (20) days, the temporary restraining order
would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of
law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.47
Hence, in the case at bar, since no preliminary injunction was issued,
the temporary restraining order granted automatically expired after
twenty (20) days under the Rules. The fact that respondent court
merely ordered "the respondent[,] its agents, representatives or any
person acting in his behalf to stop, desist and refrain from
implementing in their billings the new water rate increase which will
start on March 1, 2000"48 without stating the period for the restraint
does not convert the temporary restraining order to a preliminary
injunction.
The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20)-day limited
period of effectivity of a temporary restraining order is absolute if
issued by a regional trial court. The failure of respondent court to fix
a period for the ordered restraint did not lend the temporary
restraining order a breath of semi-permanence which can only be
characteristic of a preliminary injunction. The twenty (20)-day period
provided by the Rules of Court should be deemed incorporated in
the Order where there is an omission to do so. It is because of this
rule on non-extendibility that respondent City was prompted to
move that hearings be set for its application of a preliminary
injunction. Respondent City cannot take advantage of this omission
by respondent trial court.
Third. Even if we assume that the issued Order was a preliminary
injunction, petitioner is correct in contending that the assailed
Decision is premature.
The records reveal that respondent court did not resolve petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying its Motion to
Dismiss before it issued the assailed Decision. Consequently, there
was no answer filed by petitioner, no joinder of issues, no
mandatory pre-trial conference, and no trial on the merits, yet, a
Decision was handed down by the respondent trial court.
The short circuiting of the procedural process denied the petitioner
due process of law. It was not able to allege its defenses in an
answer and prove them in a hearing. The convoluted procedure
allowed by the respondent trial court and the pleadings filed by the
parties which are not models of clarity certainly created confusion.
But this confusion should not be seized as a reason to deny a party
the constitutional right to due process. Over and above every
desideratum in litigation is fairness. All doubts should be resolved in
favor of fairness.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated November 27, 2002 and
February 28, 2003, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.
BACOLOD CITY WATER DISTRICTv.LABAYEN
FACTS
Respondent City filed a case for Injunction with a Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Orderand/or Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction
(TRO and/or PMI for brevity)
against Petitioner for theimplementation of its new rates because it
was imposed without public hearing in violation of dueprocess. At
first, the complaint was dismissed for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. Later,Respondent City filed an Urgent
Motion for the Issuance of TRO and/or PMI praying that the case be
setfor hearing. The Court granted the TRO. The judge issued a final
injunction allegedly confirming theprevious preliminary injunction
which is in truth, the judge referring to is the TRO earlier
issued.Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising that it
issued a final injunction without thepetitioner being heard which
was denied. The petitioner filed a Petition for Review at the Court of
Appeals but was likewise, denied on the ground that the TRO earlier
issued has been elevated to thesame level as the preliminary
injunction in the procedure, grounds and requirements by Section 4,
Rule58 because the Judge has deliberately omitted to call it as TRO
in the latter orders.:
ISSUE
Whether or not there is a writ of preliminary injunction issued.:
HELD
NONE. It was clear that a TRO was clearly stated in the order. It was
only when Petitionerexpressed its vehement objection on the latter
Order when Respondents just wanted to construe theTRO as a
preliminary injunction to justify the validity of the final injunction. A
restraining order, is issuedto preserve the
status quo
until the hearing of the application for preliminary injunction which
cannotbe issued
ex parte
. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a
temporary restraining orderwith a limited life of twenty (20) days
from date of issue. If no action is taken by the judge on
theapplication for preliminary injunction within the said twenty (20)
days, the temporary restraining orderwould automatically vacated
and expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no
judicialdeclaration to that effect being necessary. The failure of
respondent court to fix a period for the orderedrestraint did not
lend the temporary restraining order a breath of semi-permanence
which can only becharacteristic of a preliminary injunction. The
twenty (20) day period provided by the Rules of Courtshould be
deemed incorporated in the Order where there is an omission to do
so. The court held that itis because of this rule on non-extendibility
that Respondent City was prompted to move that hearingsbe set for
its application of a preliminary injunction. Now, they cannot take
advantage of this omissionby respondent trial court.
G.R. No. 79128 June 16, 1988
ORTIGAS & COMPANY Limited Partnership, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS DALTON B. KING and CECILIA F.
KING, respondents.
YAP, C.J.:
Challenged in this petition is the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued by the respondent it Court of Appeals directing
the petitioner herein to reconnect and restore the electrical service
to Gondola Unit No. 8 of private respondent at the Greenhills
Shopping Center upon the filing by the latter of an injunction bond
in the amount of P15,000. The respondent court annulled and set
aside the order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila,
Branch 152, dated March 19, 1987 entitled "Dalton B. King, et al. vs.
Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership" dated March 19, 1987,
which denied plaintiffs application for preliminary mandatory
injunction.
We deal in this case only with the matter of the issuance of the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction to compel petitioners to
reconnect the electrical service to private respondents. We are not
called upon to review the merits of the case, for this has still to be
tried and decided by the court a quo.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a letter agreement dated October 28, 1983, Ortigas and
Company, Limited Partnership (Ortigas for brevity) through its
Greenhills Shopping Center (GSC) Manager, Manuel Lozano, Jr.,
leased to Wellington Syquiatco a unit in Gondola alley (Unit No. 8)
at Greenhills Shopping Center, San Juan, Metro Manila for a period
of ten (10) years at a monthly rental of P1,500.00 starting December

236279141 injunction-cases

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