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EN BANC
G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
PUNO, J.:
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated
January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents that:
1.The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive
ambit of authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the TRO may be construed as
trenching on that sphere of executive authority;
2.The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous precedent as there will
never be an end to litigation because there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a
law.
3.Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever
question may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress within the
6-month period given by this Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated upon . .
.
4.Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the
judge looks at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power
of judicial review.
5.At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the
repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit:
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the
death penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and
that of Senator Pimentel.

2. In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of
House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the
House of Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-
imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of
the House of Representative on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to
immediately implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113)
congressman.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is within the scope of judicial power
and duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this
Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental
matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) public respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's
jurisdiction; and (5) there is no certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified
until Congress convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not incidents in G.R.
No. 117472, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this
Court. The instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177
(Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this reason,
the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R.
Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she
has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly
represented by the Solicitor General.
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.
I
First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its
jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously,
public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the
principle that "it is just as important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin
litigation." 1 To start with, the Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate to
examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision of this Court that became final. These metes and
bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-entitled case was
filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare
the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but
GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared
INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19
fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the
Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential, hence
unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict and counsel.
Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic
Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended,
revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and executory and is hereby recorded
in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
Manila, Philippine.

3. Clerk of Court
By: (SGD) TERESITA G.
DIMAISIP
Acting Chief
Judicial Records Office
The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin
Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and
Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary
Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused the publication of the said Amended
Rules and Regulations as required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this Court
that became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17
and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be
enforced and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177
are amended. It is also daylight clear that this Decision was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the
submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction
to execute and enforce the same judgment. Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established
jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: 2
xxx xxx xxx
the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By the
finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.
Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce
it. 3 There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has
become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment
becomes final. 4 . . . For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire
which can render the execution unjust or impossible. 5
In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court. As aptly pointed out by
the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of
First Instance, 6 viz:
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute
jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced
and the period for reopening the same cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction
has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for
execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in
issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of
the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by
having then passed completely to the Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which
are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are
absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the
person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a
capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be
requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at
the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the
common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2)
by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this
principle of the common law to render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after the
convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the
facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is

4. acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the
general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the
execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the
execution, and there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a
postponement. Then the question arises as to whom the application for postponing the
execution ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under investigation and so to who
has jurisdiction to make the investigation.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject
of substantial subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation, whether civil or
criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the
parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because
of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary
power of control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. 8 For this purpose,
Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or
officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by
law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable
to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution
of its own Decision to give it reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as
alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law
enacted by Congress.1âwphi1.nêt
The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction
to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the
implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final
decisions. In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure which, among others, spelled out the rules on execution of judgments. These rules are
all predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary and incidental power to control and
supervise the process of execution of their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of
judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed that the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to
enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts
will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." 9 Hence, our
Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935
Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was
granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to
repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed
as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter
and modify the same. The Congress have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface. In In re
Cunanan 10Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to
the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a passing grade, the average of
70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This
Court struck down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that " . . . the disputed
law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years
affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even
now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive
department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these department would be a clear usurpation of its

5. function, as is the case with the law in question." 12The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore,
that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law
passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the
minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of
Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution
reiterated the power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, . . . which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More
completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and
the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed,
altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights.
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by
giving to it the additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar. 13
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced
the rule making power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts
and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies.
But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. If the manifest
intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public
respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power
conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial.
To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this Court to control and
supervise the implementation of its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and

6. executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no
less than the Secretary of Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent
Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide
him ". . . a certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated
execution day of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof,
particularly the execution date fixed by such trial court to the public when requested." The relevant portions of
the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the
appropriate relief" state:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation however,
herein respondent is submitting the instant Manifestation and Motion (a) to
stress, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein
respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his statutory
powers, as well as renders nugatory the constitutional guarantee that
recognizes the people's right to information of public concern, and (b) to ask
this Honorable Court to provide the appropriate relief.
6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of
vital information necessary for the exercise of his power of supervision and
control over the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8, Book
IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of such
Administrative Code, insofar as the enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and
the Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 is
concerned and for the discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that laws and
rules relative to the execution of sentence are faithfully observed.
7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about the
precise day of execution limits the exercise by the President of executive
clemency powers pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Executive Department) of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, which provides that the death sentence shall be carried out "without
prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive powers at all times."
(Emphasis supplied) For instance, the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e.,
postpone the execution of a sentence to a day certain (People v. Vera, 65 Phil.
56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise date to reckon with. The exercise of
such clemency power, at this time, might even work to the prejudice of the
convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution and the applicable statute as
when the date at execution set by the President would be earlier than that
designated by the court.
8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the date of
execution to herein respondent and the public violates Section 7, Article III (Bill
of Rights) and Section 28, Article II (Declaration of Principles and State
Policies) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which read:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development shall, be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving
public interest.
9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies "the rules
by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise
on the Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing the right and

7. mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the
fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the
ratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary act of the
Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are
reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which
must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II,
Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may
be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III, Sec. 7
have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New
Charter." (Decision of the Supreme Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535 [1987].
The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed
by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to due process and the
public's right to information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, did not oppose
petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of
Echegaray. This Court granted the relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by the counsel of the
petitioner in its Resolution of December 15, 1998. There was not a whimper of protest from the public
respondents and they are now estopped from contending that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said
relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the convenience of litigants.
II
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the "decision in this case having become
final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department . . .. By
granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive
function." 14 Public respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the
Constitution which reads:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested by the public respondents. The
provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and
remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to
grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress. The provision, however,
cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their
finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment still possesses collateral rights and these
rights can be claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become insane after his final
conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. 15 As observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally
assumed that due process of law will prevent the government from executing the death sentence upon a person
who is insane at the time of execution." 16 The suspension of such a death sentence is undisputably an exercise
of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve though its effects is the same —
the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot be denied that
Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The
effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can
the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a violation of the power of the
President to commute final sentences of conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no
higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even been enacted
expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality has been
upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the President to grant reprieves. For the public
respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his
final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our
government.

8. III
Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner must be put in its proper
perspective as it has been grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts.
Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He
invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b)
that members of Congress had either sought for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law
authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's resolution asking that clemency be
granted to the petitioner and that capital punishment be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13) other
senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they
would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul Roco has also sought the repeal of capital
punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other congressmen are
demanding review of the same law.
When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional recess and would only resume
session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session
on January 4, 1991 17 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five
(5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult
problem of resolving whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or amend the
Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To the Court's majority, there were good reasons why the
Court should not immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They noted
that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under oath and were widely publicized in the print and
broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has no less than
one hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital punishment are still unexpressed. The present
Congress is therefore different from the Congress that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the
Lethal Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt that petitioner's allegations lacked
clear factual bases. There was hardly a time to verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m.
And verification from Congress was impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these constraints, the
Court's majority did not rush to judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining
the execution of petitioner. The suspension was temporary — "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the
constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress, unless it sooner becomes certain that no
repeal or modification of the law is going to be made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled,
among others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of the petitioner will
preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. As life was at, stake, the Court refused to
constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that
the legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and equitable considerations
demand no less before allowing the State to take the life of one its citizens.
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result, i.e., the crystallization of the
issue whether Congress is disposed to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor
General, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the
death penalty law. He names these supervening events as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
a.The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death
penalty involving heinous crimes.
b.The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;
c.The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of
Senator Pimentel.18
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General cited House
Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided for the reimposition of death
penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of
Representative on this matter and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately
implement the death penalty law." The Golez resolution was signed by 113 congressman as of January 11, 1999.
In a marathon session yesterday that extended up 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of Representative with

9. minor, the House of Representative with minor amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by an
overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that the House ". . . does not desire at this
time to review Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has stated that he will not request Congress to
ratify the Second Protocol in review of the prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these
developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal and humanitarian purpose.
A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the question of capital punishment had
been the subject of endless discussion and will probably never be settled so long as men believe in
punishment." 19 In our clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal
and moral predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by emotionalism because of the
unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To be
sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a democracy. But when the
debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of words that wound, when anger threatens to turn the
majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights
to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the very purpose of the Constitution — and
particularly the Bill of Rights — to declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary
political majorities." 20 Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the courts. It is a hatchery
where justice will bloom only when we can prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage.
The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the mother of
unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus test only when
they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most hated by society. 21
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued
in its Resolution of January 4, 1999.
The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A. Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, Branch 104) to set anew the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable
provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without further delay.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo, JJ.,
concur.
Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., Please see Separate Opinion.
Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes
the death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by the Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the
Court, who hold similarly, have consistently expressed this stand in the affirmance by the Court of death
sentences imposed by Regional Trial Courts.
In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the above-numbered petition a temporary
restraining order ("TRO") because, among other things, of what had been stated to be indications that
Congress would re-examine the death penalty law. It was principally out of respect and comity to a co-equal
branch of the government, i.e., to reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded, that motivated the
Court to grant, after deliberation, a limited time for the purpose.
The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby reconsider its judgment convicting the

10. accused or recall the imposition of the death penalty.
The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes final and executory, nothing else is
further done except to see to its compliance since for the Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end to
litigations The rule notwithstanding, the Court retains control over the case until the full satisfaction of the
final judgment conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of the
petition assailing before it the use of lethal injection by the State to carry out the death sentence. In any event,
jurisprudence teaches that the rule of immutability of final and executory judgments admits of settled
exceptions. Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the execution of a final judgment when it
becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. 1 Certainly, this
extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might be his station, whose right to life is the issue at
stake. The pronouncement in Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite, 2 should be instructive.
Thus —
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute
jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced
and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court can not change or after its
judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio suo, according to the classical
phrase. When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in
the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the
proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court
with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then
passed completely to the executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly
not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under
the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the
convict except to provide for carrying out the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a
capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be
requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that,
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at
the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the
common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2)
by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this
principle of the common law to render impossible the assertion in absolute terms that after the
convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the
facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is
acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the
general rule that after the Court of First Instance has performed its ministerial duty of
ordering the execution, functus est officio suo, and its part is ended, if however a circumstance
arises that ought to delay the execution, there is an imperative duty to investigate the
emergency and to order a postponement . . ..
In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final judgment, the power of the
President to grant pardon, commutation or reprieve, and the prerogative of Congress to repeal or modify the
law that could benefit the convicted accused are not essentially preclusive of one another nor constitutionally
incompatible and may each be exercised within their respective spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of
execution issued by the Court would not prevent either the President from exercising his pardoning power or
Congress from enacting a measure that may be advantageous to the adjudged offender.
The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted even before its expiry date of 15 June 1999, "coeval
with the duration of the present regular session of Congress," if it "sooner becomes certain that no repeal or
modification of the law is going to be made." The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General states that as of the moment, "certain circumstances/supervening events (have) transpired
to the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil . . .." If, indeed, it
would be futile to yet expect any chance for a timely 3 re-examination by Congress of the death penalty law,
then I can appreciate why the majority of the Justices on the Court feel rightly bound even now to lift the TRO.
I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear to undertaking a most thorough and

11. dispassionate re-examination of the law not so much for its questioned wisdom as for the need to have a second
look at the conditions sine qua non prescribed by the Constitution in the imposition of the death penalty.
In People vs. Masalihit, 4 in urging, with all due respect, Congress to consider a prompt re-examination of the
death penalty law, I have said:
The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in the initial instance, with the
law-making authority, the Congress of the Philippines, subject to the conditions that the
Constitution itself has set forth; viz: (1) That there must be compelling reasons to justify the
imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That the capital offense must involve a heinous crime.
It appears that the fundamental law did not contemplate a simple 'reimposition' of the death
penalty to offenses theretofore already provided in the Revised Penal Code or, let alone, just
because of it. The term 'compelling reasons' would indicate to me that there must first be a
marked change in the milieu from that which has prevailed at the time of adoption of the 1987
Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at the enactment of the statute prescribing
the death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it distinctively inexorable to allow the
re-imposition of the death penalty. Most importantly, the circumstances that would
characterize the 'heinous nature' of the crime and make it so exceptionally offensive as to
warrant the death penalty must be spelled out with great clarity in the law, albeit without
necessarily precluding the Court from exercising its power of judicial review given the
circumstances of each case. To venture, in the case of murder, the crime would become
'heinous' within the Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify, the victim is unnecessarily
subjected to a painful and excruciating death or, in the crime of rape, when the offended party
is callously humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused. The indiscriminate imposition of
the death penalty could somehow constrain courts to apply, perhaps without consciously
meaning to, stringent standards for conviction, not too unlikely beyond what might normally be
required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in undue exculpation of offenders to the
great prejudice of victims and society.
Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of the Constitution are clearly met as so
hereinabove expressed, I will have to disagree, most respectfully, with my colleagues in the majority who
continue to hold the presently structured Republic Act No. 7659 to be in accord with the Constitution, an issue
that is fundamental, constant and inextricably linked to the imposition each time of the death penalty and, like
the instant petition, to the legal incidents pertinent thereto.
Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the Court even as I, like everyone else,
however, must respect and be held bound by the ruling of the majority.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;
I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has jurisdiction to issue the disputed
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on January 4, 1999. I will not repeat its well-reasoned disquisition. I
write only to explain my vote in the context of the larger issue of the death penalty.
Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not repeal or amend RA 7659 during its current
session which ends on June 15, 1999 and that, in any event, the President will veto any such repeal or
amendment, the TRO should by its own terms be deemed lifted now. However, my objections to the imposition
of the death penalty transcend the TRO and permeate its juridical essence.
I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof
prescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with the requirements of "heinousness" and "compelling
reasons" prescribed by the Constitution of the Philippines. * This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting
Opinion in various death cases decided by the Court, as well as during the Court's deliberation on this matter
on January 4, 1999. For easy reference, I hereby attach a copy of my Dissent promulgated on February 7, 1997.
Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would mean the upholding and enforcement of
law (or the relevant portions thereof) which, I submit with all due respect, is unconstitutional and therefore
legally nonexistent. I also reiterate that, in my humble opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise
unconstitutional since it merely prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 ( the Death Penalty Law) is to

12. implemented.
Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and will abide by the ruling of the Court that
both RA 7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional and that death penalty should, by majority vote, be implemented
by means of lethal injection.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's Motion for Reconsideration.
G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
SEPARATE OPINION
Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional
In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22, 1996 filed by his newly-retained
counsel, 2 the accused raises for the first time a very crucial ground for his defense: that Republic Act. No.
7659, the law reimposing the death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original Motion for
Reconsideration filed by his previous counsel, 3 this transcendental issue was nor brought up. Hence, it was not
passed upon by this Court in its Decision affirming the trial court's sentence of death. 4
The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty
Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling
reasons involving heinouscrimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)
The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or
even in the 1986 "Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the imposition 5 of the death penalty "unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty
already imposed" to reclusion perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future
imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive one (it reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty of
imprisonment).
This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely suspend the imposition of the
death penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the statute books. The automatic commutation or
reduction to reclusion perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly
recognizes that, while the conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to
exist in our penal laws and thus may longer be carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our
Constitution. As Comm. Bernas ex-claimed, 6 "(t)he majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty."
Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the
non-imposition of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute
books of the death penalty. This became the intent of the frames of the Constitution when they approved the
provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights." With such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof
becomes an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an exception and thus in derogation of the
Constitution, it must then be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the people. 8 In this
light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of constitutionality.
The Constitution Strictly Limits
Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death
To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty from the then existing
statutes but (2) authorized Congress to restore it at some future time to enable or empower courts to reimpose
it on condition that it (Congress) 9 finds "compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of the

13. Constitution is emphatic (even if "awkward" 10): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute.
Rather, it is strictly limited:
1.by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became effective; and
2.to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as "heinous."
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the existence of "compelling
reasons" and of defining what crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making prerogative to
restore the death penalty. For clarity's sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by law; prescribes the death
penalty on certain crimes; and courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.
In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA 7659 11 to "provide for it" (the death
penalty) (1) by amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code; 12 (2) by incorporating a new article
therein; 13and (3) by amending certain special laws. 14
But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special
laws. It merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble, which was
cast in general terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more sever sanction, either collectively for all the
offenses or individually for each of them.
Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death penalty had been imposed
until February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital
offense; and (2) the commission of which was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by
mitigating circumstances.
The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited authority granted it by the
Constitution? More legally put: It reviving the death penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion
or in excess of the very limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I
respectfully submit, is YES.
Heinous Crimes
To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the death penalty ONLY to
"heinous" crimes, it did not define or characterize the meaning of "heinous". Neither did Congress. As already
stated, RA 7659 itself merely selected some existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable
penalty. It did not give a standard or a characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the
heinousness of a crime. I concede that Congress was only too well aware of its constitutionally limited power. In
deference thereto, it included a paragraph in the preambular or "whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:
WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards
and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.
In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient definition or characterization of
what a heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain crimes to be "heinous" without adequately
justifying its bases therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which the
presence of heinousness can be determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not a
substitute for an objective juridical definition. Neither is the description "inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity." Describing blood as blue does not detract from its being crimson in fact;
and renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with thorns.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or
purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. 15 In
this case, it cannot be the authoritative source to show compliance with the Constitution.
As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to prescribe death as the maximum imposable
penalty once the court appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances. 16
In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which were already punishable with death

14. prior to the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. With the possible exception of plunder and qualified
bribery, 17 no new crimes were introduced by RA 7659. The offenses punished by death under said law were
already to punishable by the Revised Penal Code 18 and by special laws.
During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA 7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question
of Sen. Ernesto Maceda, wryly said: 19
So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President, and from existing special
laws which, before abolition of the death penalty, had already death as the maximum penalty.
By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes which were already penalized with death
prior to the charter's effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled its specific and positive constitutional duty.
If the Constitutional Commission intended merely to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very same
crimes, it would not have written Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law. But the stubborn fact is it did.
Verily, the intention to 1) delete the death penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make its restoration possible
only under and subject to stringent conditions is evident not only from the language of the Constitution but also
from the charter debates on this matter.
The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" was an amendment introduced by
Comm. Christian Monsod. In explaining what possible crimes could qualify as heinous, he and Comm. Jose
Suarez agreed on "organized murder" or "brutal murder of a rape victim". 20 Note that the honorable
commissioners did not just say "murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal murder of a rape
victim. While the debates were admittedly rather scanty, I believe that the available information shows that,
when deliberating on "heinousness", the Constitutional Commission did not have in mind the offenses already
existing and already penalized with death. I also believe that the heinousness clause requires that:
1.the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have an inherent quality,
degree or level of perversity, depravity or viciousness unheard of until then; or
2.even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient like "organized" or
"brutal" is added to show their utter perversity, odiousness or malevolence; or
3.the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried out evinces a degree
or magnitude of extreme violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to demonstrate its
heinousness.21
For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of circumstances to qualify the crime as "heinous",
in the same manner that the presence of treachery in a homicide aggravates the crime to murder for which a
heavier penalty is prescribed.
Compelling Reasons
Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the Constitution also directs Congress to
determine "compelling reasons" for the revival of the capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the
preamble of RA 7659 22 made some attempt at meeting this requirement. But such effort was at best feeble and
inconsequential. It should be remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should
never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and the
characterization of heinousness cannot be done wholesale but must shown for each and every crime,
individually and separately.
The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, "in
the future, circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today . . . and that the conditions and the
situation (during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific reasons"
requiring the return of the constitutionally-abhorred penalty.
In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA 7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in
answer to questions raised by Representative Edcel Lagman tried to explain these compelling reasons: 23
MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr. Speaker? . . .
MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in the country, Mr. Speaker. That
is one.

15. MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished sponsor would like to justify
or serve as an anchor for the justification of the reimposition of the death penalty is the alleged
worsening peace and order situation. The Gentleman claims that is one the compelling reasons.
But before we dissent this particular "compelling reason," may we know what are the other
compelling reasons, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could the Gentleman kindly
elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a compelling reason as if justice was not obtained at
the time the Constitution abolished the death penalty? Any compelling reason should be a
supervening circumstances after 1987.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and again that if one lives in an
organized society governed by law, justice demands that crime be punished and that the
penalty imposed be commensurate with the offense committed.
MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the Constitution speaks of the
compelling reasons to justify the reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons which would
supervene or come after the approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is he submitting that justice, in
his own concept of a commensurate penalty for the offense committed, was not obtained in
1987 when the Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people ratified it?
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now, under present conditions,
because of the seriousness of the offenses being committed at this time, justice demands that the
appropriate penalty must be meted out for those who have committed heinous crimes.
xxx xxx xxx
In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of "worsening peace and order" and
"justice". With all due respect I submit that these grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify the revival of
state-decreed deaths. In fact, I dare say that these "reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the
Philippine National Police show that the crime volume and crime rate particularly on those legislated capital
offenses did not worsen but in fact declined between 1987, the date when the Constitution took effect, and 1993,
the year when RA 7659 was enacted. Witness the following debate 24 also between Representatives Garcia and
Lagman:
MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.
Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us the volume of the crime of
murder in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is 12,305.
MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker, could the distinguished chairman inform us
the volume of murder in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in 1988. Correspondingly,
the crime rate in the very year after the abolition of the death penalty was reduced from 21 percent
to 18 percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the statistics supplied by the PC.
MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution abolished the death
penalty? May we know from the distinguished Gentleman the volume of robbery in 1987?

16. MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm it.
MR. LAGMAN. No, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was 40 percent.
MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the abolition of the death penalty. Could
the Gentleman tell us the volume of robbery cases in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with me. Mr. Speaker that the volume of
robbery cases declined from 22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to 16,926 or a crime rate of
29 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say, I understand we are reading now from the
same document.
MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870 or a crime rate of 22
percent. The volume in 1988 was 11,132 or a crime rate of 19 percent. Would the Gentleman
confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the same document and I
would not want to say that the Gentleman is misreading the document that I have here.
MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself.
When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave some figures on the number of persons
arrested in regard to drug-related offenses in the year 1987 as compared to 1991: 25
Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.
In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was
abolished — the persons arrested in drug-related cases were 3,062, and the figure dropped to
2,686 in 1988.
By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this report.
From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to 2,862 in 1989. It still
decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and it increased again to 2,862 in 1991.
But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the drug-related cases are
concerned, the figure continued a downward trend, and there was no death penalty in this time
from, 1988 to 1991.
In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the death penalty argue that its
reimposition "would pose as an effective deterrent against heinous crimes." 26 However no statistical data, no
sufficient proof, empirical or otherwise, have been submitted to show with any conclusiveness the relationship
between the prescription of the death penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-commission
thereof. This is a theory that can be debated on and on, 27 in the same manner that another proposition — that
the real deterrent to crime is the certainty of immediate arrest, prosecution and conviction of the culprit without
unnecessary risk, expense and inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or his witnesses — can be argued
indefinitely. 28 This debate can last till the academics grow weary of the spoken word, but it would not lessen
the constitutionally-imposed burden of Congress to act within the "heinousness" and "compelling reasons"
limits of its death-prescribing power.
Other Constitutional Rights
Militate Against RA 7659
It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death penalty is included in our Bill of Rights.
As such, it should — like any other guarantee in favor of the accused — be zealously protected, 29 and any
exception thereto meticulously screened. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the people, particularly
where the right pertains to persons accused of crimes. 30 Here the issue is not just crimes — but capital crimes!

17. So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 31 This primary right of the people to
enjoy life — life at its fullest, life in dignity and honor — is not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact
fortified by its other pro-life and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the Constitution values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights, 32 expressly prohibits any form of
torture 33 which is arguably a lesser penalty than death, emphasizes the individual right to life by giving
protection to the life of the mother and the unborn from the moment of conception 34 and establishes the
people's rights to health, a balanced ecology and education. 35
This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property for people more than the state, and for
life more than mere existence augurs well for the strict application of the constitutional limits against the
revival of death penalty as the final and irreversible exaction of society against its perceived enemies.
Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free speech. assembly and even religion. But the
most basic and most important of these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other rights cease in their
enjoyment, utility and expression.
This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching fact that the death penalty militates
against the poor, the powerless and the marginalized. The "Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts" submitted by
the Free Legal Assistance Group 36 highlights this sad fact:
1.Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186 persons 37 have been sentenced to death. At the
end of 1994, there were 24 death penalty convicts, at the end of 1995, the number rose to 90; an
average of seven (7) convicts per month; double the monthly average of capital sentences imposed
the prior year. From January to June 1996, the number of death penalty convicts reached 72, an
average of 12 convicts per month, almost double the monthly average of capital sentences imposed
in 1995.
2.Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one percent (21%) earn between P200 to
P2,900 monthly; while approximately twenty seven percent (27%) earn between P3,000 to
P3,999 monthly. Those earning above P4,000 monthly are exceedingly few: seven percent (7%)
earn between P4,000 to P4,999, four percent (4%) earn between P5,000 to P5,999, seven percent
(7%) earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those earning between P7,000 to P15,000 comprise only
four percent (4%), those earning P15,000 and above only one percent (1%). Approximately
thirteen percent (13%) earn nothing at all, while approximately two percent (2%) earn
subsistence wages with another five percent (5%) earning variable income. Approximately nine
percent (9%) do not know how much they earn in a month.
3.Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about 112 of them, earn below the
government-mandated minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these earn below the
official poverty line set by government. Twenty six (26) earn between P4,500.00 and
P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong to the middle class; only one (1) earns P30.000.00
monthly. Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on a percentage or allowance basis;
fifteen (15) convicts do not know or are unsure of their monthly income. Twenty two (22)
convicts earn nothing at all.
4.In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one percent (21%) are agricultural workers or
workers in animal husbandry; of these thirty (30), or almost one-fifth thereof, are farmers.
Thirty five percent (35%) are in the transport and construction industry, with thirty one (31)
construction workers or workers in allied fields (carpentry, painting, welding) while twenty
seven (27) are transport workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic, tire man, truck helper) with
sixteen (16) of them drivers. Eighteen percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and service industries,
with fourteen (14) sales workers (engaged in buy and sell or fish, cigarette or rice vendors),
twelve (12) service workers (butchers, beauticians, security guards, shoemakers, tour guides,
computer programmers, radio technicians) and four (4) clerks (janitors, MERALCO employee
and clerk) About four percent (4%) are government workers, with six (6) persons belonging to
the armed services (AFP, PNP and even CAFGU). Professionals, administrative employee and
executives comprise only three percent (3%), nine percent (9%) are unemployed.
5.None of the DRC's use English as their medium of communication. About forty four percent

18. (44%), or slightly less than half speak and understand Tagalog; twenty six percent (26%), or
about one-fourth, speak and understand Cebuano. The rest speak and understand Bicolano,
Ilocano, Ilonggo, Kapampangan, Pangasinense and Waray. One (1) convict is a foreign national
and speaks and understand Niponggo.
6.Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from college, about forty seven percent
(47%) finished varying levels of elementary education with twenty seven (27) graduating from
elementary. About thirty five percent (35%), fifty eight (58) convicts, finished varying levels of
high school, with more than half of them graduating from high school. Two (2) convicts finished
vocational education; nine (9) convicts did not study at all.
The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA
7659 has militated against the poor and the powerless in society — those who cannot afford the legal services
necessary in capital crimes, where extensive preparation, investigation, research and presentation are required.
The best example to shoe the sad plight of the underprivileged is this very case where the crucial issue of
constitutionality was woefully omitted in the proceedings in the trial court and even before this Court until the
Free legal Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex and written in a strange, incomprehensible
language. Worse still, judicial proceedings are themselves complicated, intimidating and damning. The net
effect of having a death penalty that is imposed more often than not upon the impecunious is to engender in the
minds of the latter, a sense — unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy nevertheless — of the unequal balance of
the scales of justice.
Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments, and in particular, the statistics above-cited,
are in a very real sense prone to be misleading, and that regardless of the socio-economic profile of the DRCs,
the law reviving capital punishment does not in any way single out or discriminate against the poor, the
unlettered or the underprivileged. To put it in another way, as far as the disadvantaged are concerned, the law
would still be complex and written in a strange and incomprehensible language, and judicial proceedings
complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect
of the whole controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by law, it seems to me that there will always be
certain class or classes of people in our society who, by reason of their poverty, lack of educational attainment
and employment opportunities, are consequently confined to living, working and subsisting in less-than-ideal
environments, amidst less-than-genteel neighbors similarly situated as themselves, and are therefore inherently
more prone to be involved (as victims or perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that perspective,
the law reviving the death penalty neither improves nor worsens their lot substantially. Or, to be more precise,
such law may even be said to help improve their situation (at least in theory) by posing a much stronger
deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.
However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences that exist in the situations of the poor and
the non-poor. Precisely because the underprivileged are what they are, they require and deserve a greater
degree of protection and assistance from our laws and Constitution, and from the courts and the State, so that
in spite of themselves, they can be empowered to rise above themselves and their situation. The basic postulates
for such a position are, I think, simply that everyone ultimately wants to better himself and that we cannot
better ourselves individually to any significant degree if we are unable to advance as an entire people and
nation. All the pro-poor provisions of the Constitution point in this direction. Yet we are faced with this law that
effectively inflicts the ultimate punishment on none other than the poor and disadvantaged in the greater
majority of cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and so irreversibly permanent, erases all hope of
reform, of change for the better. This law, I submit, has no place in our legal, judicial and constitutional
firmament.
Epilogue
In sum, I respectfully submit that:
(1) The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute books. It did not merely suspend or
prohibit its imposition.
(2) The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitution right against the death penalty, which is really
a species of the right to life.

19. (3) Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused because such a stature denigrates the Constitution, impinges on a basic right and tends to deny equal
justice to the underprivileged.
(4) Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or
brushed aside.
(5) Congressional power death is severely limited by two concurrent requirements:
a.First, Congress must provide a set of attendant circumstances which the prosecution must
prove beyond reasonable doubt, apart from the elements of the crime and itself. Congress must
explain why and how these circumstances define or characterize the crime as "heinous".
b.Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific reasons which arose after
the effectivity of the Constitution compelling the enactment of the law. It bears repeating that
these requirements are inseparable. They must both be present in view of the specific
constitutional mandate — "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." The compelling
reason must flow from the heinous nature of the offense.
(6) In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and compelling reasons must be set out for each
and every crime, and not just for all crimes generally and collectively.
"Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians, as well as to the rest of the "sovereign
Filipino people" who believe in Almighty God. 38 While the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority of our
people belong, acknowledges the power of public authorities to prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits
such prerogative only to "cases of extreme
gravity." 39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium Vitae (A Hymn to Life), 40 "punishment
must be carefully evaluated and decided upon, and ought not to go to the extreme of executing the offender
except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society . . .
(which is) very rare, if not practically non-existent."
Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the Church indubitably abhor the death penalty.
Both are pro-people and pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life over and above even the
state which man created precisely to protect, cherish and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows
capital punishment only for "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes" just as the Church grudgingly
permits it only reasons of "absolute necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity", which are very rare and
practically non-existent.
In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its
constitutional burden of proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to prescribe death against well-defined
"heinous" crimes?
I respectfully submit it has not.
WHEREFORE, the premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant partially the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration and to modify the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court by deleting the words
"DEATH", as provided for under RA 7659," and substitute therefore reclusion perpetua.
I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes
mentioned in its text.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes
the death penalty, falls short of the strict norm set forth by the Constitution. I and some of my brethren on the
Court, who hold similarly, have consistently expressed this stand in the affirmance by the Court of death
sentences imposed by Regional Trial Courts.
In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the above-numbered petition a temporary
restraining order ("TRO") because, among other things, of what had been stated to be indications that
Congress would re-examine the death penalty law. It was principally out of respect and comity to a co-equal

20. branch of the government, i.e., to reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded, that motivated the
Court to grant, after deliberation, a limited time for the purpose.
The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby reconsider its judgment convicting the
accused or recall the imposition of the death penalty.
The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes final and executory, nothing else is
further done except to see to its compliance since for the Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no end to
litigations The rule notwithstanding, the Court retains control over the case until the full satisfaction of the
final judgment conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the Court has taken cognizance of the
petition assailing before it the use of lethal injection by the State to carry out the death sentence. In any event,
jurisprudence teaches that the rule of immutability of final and executory judgments admits of settled
exceptions. Concededly, the Court may, for instance, suspend the execution of a final judgment when it
becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. 1 Certainly, this
extraordinary relief cannot be denied any man, whatever might be his station, whose right to life is the issue at
stake. The pronouncement in Director of Prisons vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite, 2 should be instructive.
Thus —
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute
jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced
and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court can not change or after its
judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio suo, according to the classical
phrase. When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in
the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the
proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court
with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then
passed completely to the executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly
not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under
the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the
convict except to provide for carrying out the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a
capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be
requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that,
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at
the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the
common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2)
by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this
principle of the common law to render impossible the assertion in absolute terms that after the
convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the
facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is
acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the
general rule that after the Court of First Instance has performed its ministerial duty of
ordering the execution, functus est officio suo, and its part is ended, if however a circumstance
arises that ought to delay the execution, there is an imperative duty to investigate the
emergency and to order a postponement . . ..
In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its final judgment, the power of the
President to grant pardon, commutation or reprieve, and the prerogative of Congress to repeal or modify the
law that could benefit the convicted accused are not essentially preclusive of one another nor constitutionally
incompatible and may each be exercised within their respective spheres and confines. Thus, the stay of
execution issued by the Court would not prevent either the President from exercising his pardoning power or
Congress from enacting a measure that may be advantageous to the adjudged offender.
The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted even before its expiry date of 15 June 1999, "coeval
with the duration of the present regular session of Congress," if it "sooner becomes certain that no repeal or
modification of the law is going to be made." The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General states that as of the moment, "certain circumstances/supervening events (have) transpired
to the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil . . .." If, indeed, it

21. would be futile to yet expect any chance for a timely 3 re-examination by Congress of the death penalty law,
then I can appreciate why the majority of the Justices on the Court feel rightly bound even now to lift the TRO.
I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear to undertaking a most thorough and
dispassionate re-examination of the law not so much for its questioned wisdom as for the need to have a second
look at the conditions sine qua non prescribed by the Constitution in the imposition of the death penalty.
In People vs. Masalihit, 4 in urging, with all due respect, Congress to consider a prompt re-examination of the
death penalty law, I have said:
The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in the initial instance, with the
law-making authority, the Congress of the Philippines, subject to the conditions that the
Constitution itself has set forth; viz: (1) That there must be compelling reasons to justify the
imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That the capital offense must involve a heinous crime.
It appears that the fundamental law did not contemplate a simple 'reimposition' of the death
penalty to offenses theretofore already provided in the Revised Penal Code or, let alone, just
because of it. The term 'compelling reasons' would indicate to me that there must first be a
marked change in the milieu from that which has prevailed at the time of adoption of the 1987
Constitution, on the one hand, to that which exists at the enactment of the statute prescribing
the death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it distinctively inexorable to allow the
re-imposition of the death penalty. Most importantly, the circumstances that would
characterize the 'heinous nature' of the crime and make it so exceptionally offensive as to
warrant the death penalty must be spelled out with great clarity in the law, albeit without
necessarily precluding the Court from exercising its power of judicial review given the
circumstances of each case. To venture, in the case of murder, the crime would become
'heinous' within the Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify, the victim is unnecessarily
subjected to a painful and excruciating death or, in the crime of rape, when the offended party
is callously humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused. The indiscriminate imposition of
the death penalty could somehow constrain courts to apply, perhaps without consciously
meaning to, stringent standards for conviction, not too unlikely beyond what might normally be
required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in undue exculpation of offenders to the
great prejudice of victims and society.
Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of the Constitution are clearly met as so
hereinabove expressed, I will have to disagree, most respectfully, with my colleagues in the majority who
continue to hold the presently structured Republic Act No. 7659 to be in accord with the Constitution, an issue
that is fundamental, constant and inextricably linked to the imposition each time of the death penalty and, like
the instant petition, to the legal incidents pertinent thereto.
Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the Court even as I, like everyone else,
however, must respect and be held bound by the ruling of the majority.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;
I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has jurisdiction to issue the disputed
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on January 4, 1999. I will not repeat its well-reasoned disquisition. I
write only to explain my vote in the context of the larger issue of the death penalty.
Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not repeal or amend RA 7659 during its current
session which ends on June 15, 1999 and that, in any event, the President will veto any such repeal or
amendment, the TRO should by its own terms be deemed lifted now. However, my objections to the imposition
of the death penalty transcend the TRO and permeate its juridical essence.
I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof
prescribing the capital penalty fail to comply with the requirements of "heinousness" and "compelling
reasons" prescribed by the Constitution of the Philippines. * This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting
Opinion in various death cases decided by the Court, as well as during the Court's deliberation on this matter
on January 4, 1999. For easy reference, I hereby attach a copy of my Dissent promulgated on February 7, 1997.

22. Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would mean the upholding and enforcement of
law (or the relevant portions thereof) which, I submit with all due respect, is unconstitutional and therefore
legally nonexistent. I also reiterate that, in my humble opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise
unconstitutional since it merely prescribes the manner in which RA 7659 ( the Death Penalty Law) is to
implemented.
Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and will abide by the ruling of the Court that
both RA 7659 and RA 8177 are constitutional and that death penalty should, by majority vote, be implemented
by means of lethal injection.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's Motion for Reconsideration.
G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
SEPARATE OPINION
Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional
In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22, 1996 filed by his newly-retained
counsel, 2 the accused raises for the first time a very crucial ground for his defense: that Republic Act. No.
7659, the law reimposing the death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the Brief and (original Motion for
Reconsideration filed by his previous counsel, 3 this transcendental issue was nor brought up. Hence, it was not
passed upon by this Court in its Decision affirming the trial court's sentence of death. 4
The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty
Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling
reasons involving heinouscrimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)
The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or
even in the 1986 "Freedom Constitution." They proscribe the imposition 5 of the death penalty "unless for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty
already imposed" to reclusion perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it bars the future
imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive one (it reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty of
imprisonment).
This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did not merely suspend the imposition of the
death penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the statute books. The automatic commutation or
reduction to reclusion perpetua of any death penalty extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly
recognizes that, while the conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to
exist in our penal laws and thus may longer be carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our
Constitution. As Comm. Bernas ex-claimed, 6 "(t)he majority voted for the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty."
Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the provision regarding the
non-imposition of the death penalty, what he had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute
books of the death penalty. This became the intent of the frames of the Constitution when they approved the
provision and made it a part of the Bill of Rights." With such abolition as a premise, restoration thereof
becomes an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an exception and thus in derogation of the
Constitution, it must then be strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the people. 8 In this
light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of constitutionality.
The Constitution Strictly Limits

23. Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death
To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the death penalty from the then existing
statutes but (2) authorized Congress to restore it at some future time to enable or empower courts to reimpose
it on condition that it (Congress) 9 finds "compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of the
Constitution is emphatic (even if "awkward" 10): the authority of Congress to "provide for it" is not absolute.
Rather, it is strictly limited:
1.by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the Constitution became effective; and
2.to crimes which Congress should identify or define or characterize as "heinous."
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of determining the existence of "compelling
reasons" and of defining what crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making prerogative to
restore the death penalty. For clarity's sake, may I emphasize that Congress, by law; prescribes the death
penalty on certain crimes; and courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual offenders found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing said crimes.
In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA
7659 11 to "provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by amending certain provisions of the Revised Penal
Code; 12(2) by incorporating a new article therein; 13 and (3) by amending certain special laws. 14
But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes stated in the Penal Code and in the special
laws. It merely made the penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other than the preamble, which was
cast in general terms) discuss or justify the reasons for the more sever sanction, either collectively for all the
offenses or individually for each of them.
Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by which the death penalty had been imposed
until February 2, 1987, when the Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted of a capital
offense; and (2) the commission of which was accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by
mitigating circumstances.
The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress exceed the limited authority granted it by the
Constitution? More legally put: It reviving the death penalty, did Congress act with grave abuse of discretion
or in excess of the very limited power or jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I
respectfully submit, is YES.
Heinous Crimes
To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to prescribe the death penalty ONLY to
"heinous" crimes, it did not define or characterize the meaning of "heinous". Neither did Congress. As already
stated, RA 7659 itself merely selected some existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable
penalty. It did not give a standard or a characterization by which courts may be able to appreciate the
heinousness of a crime. I concede that Congress was only too well aware of its constitutionally limited power. In
deference thereto, it included a paragraph in the preambular or "whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:
WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous,
odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards
and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.
In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an insufficient definition or characterization of
what a heinous crime is. It simply and gratuitously declared certain crimes to be "heinous" without adequately
justifying its bases therefor. It supplies no useful, workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which the
presence of heinousness can be determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious and hateful" is not a
substitute for an objective juridical definition. Neither is the description "inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity." Describing blood as blue does not detract from its being crimson in fact;
and renaming gumamela as rose will not arm it with thorns.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or
purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation, much less prevail over its text. 15 In