153314793 civil-law-assigned-cases-1st-meeting

1
Get Homework
Done
Homeworkping.
com
Homework Help
https://www.homeworkping.com/
Research Paper help
Online Tutoring
click here for freelancing tutoring
sites
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6339 April 20, 1954
MANUEL LARA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PETRONILO DEL ROSARIO, JR., defendant-appellee.
Manansala and Manansala for appellants.
Ramon L. Resurreccion for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
In 1950 defendant Petronilo del Rosario, Jr., owner of
twenty-five taxi cabs or cars, operated a taxi business
under the name of "Waval Taxi." He employed among
others three mechanics and 49 chauffeurs or drivers,
the latter having worked for periods ranging from 2 to
37 months. On September 4, 1950, without giving said
mechanics and chauffeurs 30 days advance notice, Del
Rosario sold his 25 units or cabs to La Mallorca, a
transportation company, as a result of which,
according to the mechanics and chauffeurs above-
mentioned they lost their jobs because the La Mallorca
failed to continue them in their employment. They
brought this action against Del Rosario to recover
compensation for overtime work rendered beyond
eight hours and on Sundays and legal holidays, and
one month salary (mesada) provided for in article 302
of the Code of Commerce because the failure of their
former employer to give them one month notice.
Subsequently, the three mechanics unconditionally
withdrew their claims. So only the 49 drivers remained
as plaintiffs. The defendant filed a motion for dismissal
of the complaint on the ground that it stated no cause
of action and the trial court for the time being denied
the motion saying that it will be considered when the
case was heard on the merits. After trial the complaint
was dismissed. Plaintiffs appealed from the order of
dismissal to the Court of Appeals which Tribunal after
finding only questions of law are involved, certified the
case to us.
The parties are agreed that the plaintiffs as chauffeurs
received no fixed compensation based on the hours or
the period of time that they worked. Rather, they were
paid on the commission basis, that is to say, each
driver received 20 per cent of the gross returns or
earnings from the operation of his taxi cab. Plaintiffs
claim that as a rule, each drive operated a taxi 12
hours a day with gross earnings ranging from P20 to
P25, receiving therefrom the corresponding 20 per
cent share ranging from P4 to P5, and that in some
cases, especially during Saturdays, Sundays, and
holidays when a driver worked 24 hours a day he
grossed from P40 to P50, thereby receiving a share of
from P8 to P10 for the period of twenty-four hours.
The reason given by the trial court in dismissing the
complaint is that the defendant being engaged in the
taxi or transportation business which is a public utility,
came under the exception provided by the Eight-Hour
Labor Law (Commonwealth Act No. 444); and because
plaintiffs did not work on a salary basis, that is to say,
they had no fixed or regular salary or remuneration
other than the 20 per cent of their gross earnings
"their situation was therefore practically similar to
piece workers and hence, outside the ambit of article
302 of the Code of Commerce."

2
For purposes of reference we are reproducing the
pertinent provisions of the Eight-Hour Labor Law,
namely, sections 1 to 4.
SECTION 1. The legal working day for any person
employed by another shall not be more than eight
hours daily. When the work is not continuous, the time
during which the laborer is not working and can leave
his working place and can rest completely shall not be
counted.
SEC. 2. This Act shall apply to all persons employed in
any industry or occupation, whether public or private,
with the exception of farm laborers, laborers who
prefer to be paid on piece work basis, domestic
servants and persons in the personal service of
another and members of the family of the employer
working for him.
SEC. 3. Work may be performed beyond eight hours a
day in case of actual or impending emergencies,
caused by serious accidents, fire flood, typhoon,
earthquakes, epidemic, or other disaster or calamity in
order to prevent loss of life and property or imminent
danger to public safety; or in case of urgent work to be
performed on the machines, equipment, or
installations in order to avoid a serious loss which the
employer would otherwise suffer, or some other just
cause of a similar nature; but in all cases the laborers
and the employees shall be entitled to receive
compensation for the overtime work performed at the
same rate as their regular wages or salary, plus at
least twenty-five per centum additional.
In case of national emergency the Government is
empowered to establish rules and regulations for the
operation of the plants and factories and to determine
the wages to be paid the laborers.
SEC. 4. No person, firm, or corporation, business
establishment or place or center of work shall compel
an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and
legal holidays, unless he is paid an additional sum of at
least twenty-five per centum of his regular
remuneration: Provided however, That this prohibition
shall not apply to public utilities performing some
public service such as supplying gas, electricity, power,
water, or providing means of transportation or
communication.
Under section 4, as a public utility, the defendant could
have his chauffeurs work on Sundays and legal
holidays without paying them an additional sum of at
least 25 per cent of their regular remuneration: but
that with reference only to work performed on Sundays
and holidays. If the work done on such days exceeds 8
hours a day, then the Eight-Hour Labor Law would
operate, provided of course that plaintiffs came under
section 2 of the said law. So that the question to be
decided here is whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to
extra compensation for work performed in excess of 8
hours a day, Sundays and holidays included.
It will be noticed that the last part of section 3 of
Commonwealth Act 444 provides for extra
compensation for over-time work "at the same rate as
their regular wages or salary, plus at least twenty-five
per centum additional'" and that section 2 of the same
act excludes application thereof laborers who preferred
to be on piece work basis. This connotes that a laborer
or employee with no fixed salary, wages or
remuneration but receiving as compensation from his
employer uncertain and variable amount depending
upon the work done or the result of said work (piece
work) irrespective of the amount of time employed, is
not covered by the Eight-Hour Labor Law and is not
entitled to extra compensation should he work in
excess of 8 hours a day. And this seems to be the
condition of employment of the plaintiffs. A driver in
the taxi business of the defendant, like the plaintiffs, in
one day could operate his taxi cab eight hours, or less
than eight hours or in excess of 8 hours, or even 24
hours on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, with no
limit or restriction other than his desire, inclination and
state of health and physical endurance. He could drive
continuously or intermittently, systematically or
haphazardly, fast or slow, etc. depending upon his
exclusive wish or inclination. One day when he feels
strong, active and enthusiastic he works long,
continuously, with diligence and industry and makes
considerable gross returns and receives as much as his
20 per cent commission. Another day when he feels
despondent, run down, weak or lazy and wants to rest
between trips and works for less number of hours, his
gross returns are less and so is his commission. In
other words, his compensation for the day depends
upon the result of his work, which in turn depends on
the amount of industry, intelligence and experience
applied to it, rather than the period of time employed.
In short, he has no fixed salary or wages. In this we
agree with the learned trial court presided by Judge
Felicisimo Ocampo which makes the following findings
and observations of this point.
. . . As already stated, their earnings were in the form
of commission based on the gross receipts of the day.
Their participation in most cases depended upon their
own industry. So much so that the more hours they
stayed on the road, the greater the gross returns and
the higher their commissions. They have no fixed
hours of labor. They can retire at pleasure, they not
being paid a fixed salary on the hourly, daily, weekly
or monthly basis.
It results that the working hours of the plaintiffs as taxi
drivers were entirely characterized by its irregularity,
as distinguished from the specific regular remuneration
predicated on specific and regular hours of work of
factories and commercial employees.
In the case of the plaintiffs, it is the result of their
labor, not the labor itself, which determines their
commissions. They worked under no compulsion of
turning a fixed income for each given day. . . ..

3
In an opinion dated June 1, 1939 (Opinion No. 115)
modified by Opinion No. 22, series 1940, dated June
11, 1940, the Secretary of Justice held that chauffeurs
of the Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. who "observed in a
loose way certain working hours daily," and "the time
they report for work as well as the time they leave
work was left to their discretion.," receiving no fixed
salary but only 20 per cent of their gross earnings,
may be considered as piece workers and therefore not
covered by the provisions of the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
The Wage Administration Service of the Department of
Labor in its Interpretative Bulletin No. 2 dated May 28,
1953, under "Overtime Compensation," in section 3
thereof entitled Coverage, says:
The provisions of this bulletin on overtime
compensation shall apply to all persons employed in
any industry or occupation, whether public or private,
with the exception of farm laborers, non-agricultural
laborers or employees who are paid on piece work,
contract, pakiao, task or commission basis, domestic
servants and persons in the personal service of
another and members of the family of the employer
working for him.
From all this, to us it is clear that the claim of the
plaintiffs-appellants for overtime compensation under
the Eight-Hour Labor Law has no valid support.
As to the month pay (mesada) under article 302 of the
Code of Commerce, article 2270 of the new Civil Code
(Republic Act 386) appears to have repealed said
Article 302 when it repealed the provisions of the Code
of Commerce governing Agency. This repeal took place
on August 30, 1950, when the new Civil Code went
into effect, that is, one year after its publication in
the Official Gazette. The alleged termination of
services of the plaintiffs by the defendant took place
according to the complaint on September 4, 1950, that
is to say, after the repeal of Article 302 which they
invoke. Moreover, said Article 302 of the Code of
Commerce, assuming that it were still in force speaks
of "salary corresponding to said month." commonly
known as "mesada." If the plaintiffs herein had no
fixed salary either by the day, week or month, then
computation of the month's salary payable would be
impossible. Article 302 refers to employees receiving a
fixed salary. Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino in his book
entitled "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the
Commercial Laws of the Philippines," Vol. 1, 4th
edition, p. 160, says that article 302 is not applicable
to employees without fixed salary. We quote —
Employees not entitled to indemnity. — This article
refers only to those who are engaged under salary
basis, and not to those who only receive compensation
equivalent to whatever service they may render. (1
Malagarriga 314, citing decision of Argentina Court of
Appeals on Commercial Matters.)
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, Concepcion, and Diokno, JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., concurs in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6705 December 23, 1954
PATROCINIO RAYMUNDO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DOROTEO PEÑAS, defendant-appellee.
Augusto Francisco for appellant.
Doroteo Penas in his own behalf.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Patrocinio Raymundo has brought up this case by
direct appeal on points of law against a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Manila (case No. 1169),
denying her petition for a decree of divorce under Act
2710.
The facts are clear and not disputed. Appellant
Raymundo and appellee Doroteo Peñas were validly
married to each other in Manila on March 29, 1941.
The spouses lived together until 1949, but had no
children, nor acquired conjugal property. Sometime in
July 1949, the husband Doroteo Peñas abandoned his
wife, appellant herein, and during August and
September, 1949, lived maritally with another woman,
Carmen Paredes. At the instance of the deserted wife,
an information for concubinage was filed on October 3,
1949 (Criminal Case No. 11140). The husband, Peñas,
was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by the
Court of First Instance of Manila on May 5, 1950.
Pending his appeal, on July 14, 1950, the wife
instituted the present proceedings, praying for a
decree of absolute divorce. The conviction of Doroteo
Peñas was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on October
31, 1951.
The Court below found that the acts of concubinage
that gave rise to the action, as well as the judgment of
conviction rendered by the Court of First Instance,
took place before the repeal of Act 2710 by the new
Civil Code, (which becomes effective on August 30,
1950, as held by this Court in Lara vs. Del Rosario, 94
Phil., 778 ,50 Off. Gaz., p. 1975).
Nevertheless, the Court a quo dismissed the complaint
on the ground that the appellant had acquired no right
to a divorce that the Court bound to recognize after
the effectivity of the New Civil Code. The Court
reasoned out as follows:
Counsel's argument in support of the alleged right of
the plaintiff would be indisputable if (it were ) not for

4
the following provision of Article 2254 of the new Civil
Code.
'Art. 2254. No vested or acquired right can raise from
acts or omissions which are against the law or which
infringe upon the rights of others.'
The above quoted provisions is entirely new, not found
in the old Civil Code. Evidently it is designed to meet
situations like the present. Under its explicit and
unequivocal terms no acquired or vested right can rise
from offenses or acts which infringe upon the rights of
others. It follows therefore that the acts of
concubinage of the defendant, which are not only
against the law, but infringe upon the rights of his
wife, could not and did not give rise to o a vested right
in favor of the plaintiff which would entitle her to
secure a divorce from her husband, the defendant
herein. Under Article 97 of the new Civil Code the most
that the wife is now entitled to in case of concubinage
on the part of the husband is to secure a legal
separation. (Rec. on Appeal, p. 14.
In our opinion, the judgment appealed from is
incorrect. It should be apparent, upon reflection, that
the prohibition of Article 2254 must be directed at the
offender, not the offended party who is in no way
responsible for the violation of legal duty. The
interpretation adopted by the Court below results in
depriving a victim of any redress because of the very
acts that injured him. The protection of vested rights is
but a consequence of the constitutional guaranty
against deprivation of property can in no way
constitute such due process.
Our view of the true import of Article 2254 is
supported by the Report of Code Commission
submitted to the Legislature in explanation of the
motives behind the innovations of the proposed Civil
Code. Speaking of Article 2274 of the draft (now Art.
2254 of the Code), the Report states:
It is evident that no one can validly claim any vested
or acquired right if the same is founded upon his
having violated the law or invaded the rights of others.
It follows that Article 2254 can not militate against the
right of appellant to secure an absolute divorce as a
result of the concubinage of her husband. Despite the
change in legislation, plaintiff-appellant is protected by
Article 2253 of the new Civil Code:
Art. 2253. The Civil Code of 1889 and other previous
laws shall govern rights originating, under said laws,
from acts done or events which took place under the
regime, even though this Code may regulate them in a
different manner, or may not recognize
them.lawphil.net
Conceding that there can not be a vested right in the
continuation of a law recognizing absolute divorce
(Grant vs. Grant, 32 Am. Rep. 506), still , the terms of
Article 2253 are sufficiently broad to protect the rights
of the appellant to a remedy against her husband's
infidelity in conformity with the terms of the old
legislation. True that the new Civil Code does not
recognize absolute divorce, but only legal separation
(Articles 97 to 108), thereby impliedly repealing Act
2710; but other provisions of the Code clearly
safeguard rights and actions arising under the
preceding law. Its Article 4 expresses the well
established principle that "laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided"; and
Article 2258 plainly indicates that rights and actions
already existing (and a fortiori, actions already
initiated) should be governed by the prior legislation.
Art. 2258. Actions and rights which came into being
but were not exercised before the effectivity of this
Code, shall remain in full force in conformity with the
old legislation; but their exercise, duration and the
procedure to enforce them shall be regulated by this
Code and by the Rules of Court. If the exercise of the
right or of the action was commenced under the old
laws, but is pending on the date this Code takes effect,
and the procedure was different from that established
in this new body of laws, the parties concerned may
choose which methods or course to pursue.
Further, Article 2267 explicitly enumerates the articles
that are to apply to actions pending (like the present)
when the new Civil Code became effective, and Articles
97 to 108 on legal separation are not included therein.
Art. 2267. The following provisions shall apply not only
to future cases but also to those pending on the date
this Code becomes effective:
(1) Article 29, relative to criminal prosecutions wherein
the accused is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt;.
(2) Article 33, concerning cases of defamation, fraud,
and physical injuries.
The plain implication of these provisions is that the
Code did not intend its provisions on legal separation
to apply retroactively; and that the change from
absolute divorce to legal separation was not designed
to affect at the time the reform was introduced.
Thus the present case is readily distinguished from the
case of divorce proceedings instituted under Executive
Order No. 141 of the Japanese occupation Executive
Commission, and which were pending at the liberation
of the Islands. We ruled in Peña de Luz vs. Court of
First Instance of Leyte, 43 Off. Gaz., p. 4102, that
such pending divorce proceedings must be dismissed
because the occupation divorce law ceased to be in
force and effect upon liberation of the national
territory, and because the proclamation of General
McArthur in Leyte on October 23, 1944, had abrogated
all occupation legislation absolutely and without
qualification. The repeal of Act 2710 by the new Civil
Code is in a different position, since the transitional

5
provisions of the latter law expressly prescribe, as we
have seen, the subsistence of rights derived from acts
that took place under the prior legislation.
It is of no comment that the conviction of the husband
only became final after the new Civil Code, denying
absolute divorce, came into effect, for their Court has
already ruled in Chereau vs. Fuentebellla (43 Phil.,
220) that section 8 of Act 2710 1is only evidentiary in
character, since it merely has reference, of course, to
the species of proof required to establish the basal fact
on which the right to the divorce rests; and the
circumstance that this fact is not so proved in no wise
impairs the jurisdiction of the Court.".
The decision appealed from is reversed, and a new
judgment shall be entered granting a decree of
absolute divorce as prayed for. Without costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor,
Reyes, A., and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 A divorce shall not be granted without the guilt of
the defendant being established by final sentence in a
criminal action. Sec. 8, Act 2710.
AZNAR ET AL VS GARCIA
FACTS: Edward Christensen is a citizen of the State
of California and domiciled in the Philippines. He
executed in his will acknowledging his natural daughter
Maria Lucy Christensen as sole heir but left a legacy of
some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who
is declared by the Supreme Court in its decision as
acknowledged natural daughter of Edward C. Counsel
of Helen asserts that her claim must be increased in
view of the successional rights of illegitimate children
under Phil. law. Counsel of Maria insists that Art. 16
(2) provides that the NATIONAL LAW OF THE PERSON
applies in intestate and testamentary successions and
since Edward C. is a citizen of CA, its law should be
applied. Lower court ruled that CA law should be
applied thus this petition for review.
Issue:
What law should be applicable – Philippine or California
Law?
Ruling:
The court refers to Art. 16 (2) providing that intestate
and testamentary successions with respect to order of
succession and amt. of successional right is regulated
by the NATIONAL LAW OF THE PERSON.
California Probate Code provides that a testator may
dispose of his property in the form and manner he
desires.
Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California provides that if
no law on the contrary, the place where the personal
property is situated is deemed to follow the person of
its owner and is governed by the LAW OF HIS
DOMICILE.
These provisions are cases when the Doctrine of
Renvoi may be applied where the question of validity
of the testamentary provision in question is referred
back to the decedent’s domicile – the Philippines.
S.C. noted the California law provides 2 sets of laws
for its citizens: One for residents therein as provided
by the CA Probate Code and another for citizens
domiciled in other countries as provided by Art. 946 of
the Civil Code of California.
The conflicts of law rule in CA (Art. 946) authorize the
return of question of law to the testator’s domicile. The
court must apply its own rule in the Philippines as
directed in the conflicts of law rule in CA, otherwise the
case/issue will not be resolved if the issue is referred
back and forth between 2 states.
The SC reversed the lower court’s decision and
remanded the case back to it for decision with
an instruction that partition be made applying
the Philippine law.
Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
FACTS: Invoking the people’s right to be informed on
matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section
6, Article IV of the 1973 constitution, petitioners seek
a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette, of various presidential decrees, letters
of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders. The
respondents would have this case dismissed on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality to
bring this petition. Petitioners maintain that since the
subject of the petition concerns a public right and its
object is to compel public duty, they need not show
any specific interest. Respondents further contend that
publication in the OG is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official
Gazatte is an indispensable requirement for the
effectivity of the PDs, LOIs, general orders, EOs, etc.
where the laws themselves provide for
their own effectivity dates.
RULING: Yes. It is the people’s right to be informed on
matters of public concern and corollarily access to
official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, shall be afforded the citizens subject to

6
such limitation as may be provided by law (Sec. 6 Art.
IV, 1973 Constitution). Laws, to be valid and
enforceable, must be published in the OG or otherwise
effectively promulgated. The fact that a PD or LOI
states its date of effectivity does not preclude their
publication in the OG as they constitute important
legislative acts. The publication of presidential
issuances “of public nature” or “of general applicability”
is a requirement of due process. Before a person may
be bound by law, he must first be officially informed of
its contents.
Important Point: It illustrates how decrees and
issuances issued by one man—Marcos—are in fact laws
of general application and provide for penalties. The
constitution afforded Marcos both executive and
legislative powers. The generality of law (Civil Code,
Art. 14) will never work without constructive notice.
The ruling of this case provides the publication
constitutes the necessary constructive notice and is
thus the cure for ignorance as an excuse. Ignorance
will not even mitigate the crime.
YAO KEE VS SY-GONZALES
F: Sy-Kiat, a Chinese national, died in 1977 in
Kaloocan City, where he was residing, leaving behind
substantial real and personal properties here in the
Phils. Petition for letters of administration filed by his
natural children, was opposed on the ground that Sy
Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee, in Fookien, China
on 1/13/31 and that the oppositors are the legitimate
children. The probate court rendered judgment in favor
of the oppositors; this was modified and set aside by
the CA w/c held that both sets of children were
acknowledged natural children. Both parties moved for
partial reconsideration.
HELD: For failure to prove the foreign law or custom,
and consequently, the validity of the marriage in
accordance w/ said law or custom, the marriage
between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in
this jurisdiction. In the case at bar, petitioners did not
present any competent evidence relative to the law
and customs of China on marriage. The testimonies of
Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of
China's law or custom on marriage not only bec. they
are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there
is no showing that they are competent to testify on the
subject matter.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by
repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a
social rule, legally binding and obligatory." The law
requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence." On this score the
Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a
source of right can not be considered by a court of
justice unless such custom is properly established by
competent evidence like any other fact." The same
evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be
required of a foreign custom.
_________________________________________
G.R. No. L-25265 May 9, 1978
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
SOCORRO C. RAMOS, defendant-appellee, PHOENIX
PUBLISHING HOUSE INC., intervenor.
G.R. No. L-25644 May 9, 1978
SOCORRO C. RAMOS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PLACIDO RAMOS, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Branch III, CFI, Manila; and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by State Prosecutor DELIA
P. MEDINA, respondents.
Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
General Pacifica P. de Castro and Solicitor Sumilang V.
Bernardo for People of the Philippines.
Florence D. Regalado for Socorro C. Ramos.
Sevilla & Aquino Law Office for Intervenor.
SANTOS, J.:
The above-entitled cases — the first an appeal and the
second a special civil action — are decided jointly
because they raise a common — issue which arose
from the prosecution of a common defendant, Socorro
C. Ramos, for alleged violations of the copyright law —
viz, whether or not the extra day in the leap year,
1964 should be taken into consideration in the
computation of the two-year period of prescription
provided in Section 24 of the copyright law.
The factual and procedural antecedents follow.
On September 3, 1965, two criminal cases — No.
80006 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
III, and No. 80007 also of the same Court, Branch
XIV— identical in every respect, except for the fact
that they pertain to different editions of the same
textbook, were filed against Socorro C. Ramos, for
alleged violations of Act 3134, otherwise known as the
Copyright Law, as amended. The information in
Criminal Case No. 80007 alleged —

7
That on or about July to September, 1963, in the City
of Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, as the proprietor aid general
manager of the National Book Store, as enterprise
engaged in the business of publishing, selling and
distributing books, did then and there, wilfully and
illegaly sell and distribute spurious and pirated copies
of the high school textbook, entitled General Science
Today for Philippine School, First Year, by Gilam, Van
Houten and Cornista, said accused knowing that said
book was duly copyrighted by the Phoenix Publishing
House, Inc., and was being distributed exclusively by
its sister corporation, Alemar's or Sibal and Sons,
Inc. 1
On September 7, 1965, identical motions to
quash 2 were filed by accused Ramos on the ground of
prescription, alleging therein, inter alia, that:
xxx xxx xxx
Consequently, the delivery of the alleged offense was
made as early as July 17, 1963 and all subsequent
knowledge or discoveries of posterior sales and
possession of said books by the respondents, including
that involved in the police search of September 4,
1963 were only confirmatory of the first. Under 91 of
the Revised Penal Code and in the light of the afore-
quoted ruling announced in the Pangasinan Trans. Co.
case, supra; the prescriptive period, therefore,
commenced to run on the day after such discovery on
July 17, 1963 and, accordingly, the offense has long
since prescribed since under the Copyright Law, Act
3134:
Sec. 24. All actions, suits, or proceedings arising under
this Act shall be originally cognizable by the Court of
First Instance of the Philippine Islands and shall
prescribe after two years from the time the cause of
action arose.
Assuming arguendo, that the last actual sale should be
the starting point of computation, again the offense
charged has prescribed, since, as already pointed out,
the documented evidence on this point shows that the
last sale was made on August 30, 1963.
The prosecution, also in both cases, filed its Opposition
to the Motion to Quash 3 raising two issues, to wit:
1. That the issue of prescription in this case can be
resolved only after the presentation of evidence and
hence, it is premature to raise that issue before trial
2. That, as the violation committed by the defendant
was a continuing offense, the two-year prescriptive
period may be counted from September 3, 1963, or
one day before the search in defendants' premises ,
which confirmed her possession of spurious and
pirated copies of the textbook in question.
The prosecution's theory is that "(T)he crime being a
continuing offense, the statute of limitations begins to
run from the completion of the last act or series of acts
which constitute the offense, " and this last act was
committed on September 3, 1963. Therefore when the
information was filed on September 3, 1965, it was
filed within the two-year period, albeit the last day of
the prescriptive period.
Again, in both the accused filed a "Reply to Opposition
to Motion to Quash." 4 She alleged that even assuming
that the crime is a continuing offense, the prescriptive
period should start from August 30, 1963, the date of
the last invoiced sale, and not September 3, 1963, as
there was no indubitable proof that she had sold copies
of the questioned book on that date. Nonetheless,
accused contended that even if the prescriptive period
should start from September 3, 1963, as proposed by
the prosecution, the two-year period was tolled on
September 2, 1965. She pointed out that two years
mean a period of 730 days in accordance with Article
13 of the New Civil Code, and 1964, being a leap year
consisting of 366 days, the 730th day fell on
September 2, 1965. Hence, "... . when the information
was filed on September 3, 1965, the offense, if any,
had already prescribed. "
The prosecution filed a Rejoinder 5 in both cases
alleging as follow:
l. That February 28, and 29, 1964, should be regarded
as one day only, and consequently, the two-year
period commencing on September 3, 1963 would end
on September 3, 1965;
2. That under Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period
was interrupted by the filing of the proceedings in the
fiscal's office;
3. That prescription would not lie in this case because
the complainant never waived the right to prosecute
the defendant.
Accused Ramos, also in cases, filed an Urgent Motion
to Strike the Rejoinder, 6 on the ground that it was
filed after the case had been submitted for resolution.
She prayed that "in the event that the same should at
all be considered and allowed, that the accused be
notified thereof and granted reasonable opportunity to
file a surrejoinder...".
It appears that the Rejoinder was admitted by both
trial courts, but a Surrejoinder 7 was filed only in
Criminal Case No. 80006. Here, the accused traversed
the prosecution's contentions in the Rejoinder, thus:
1. Under applicable and specific provisions of Philippine
law, the two-year period of prescription commencing
on September 3, 1963 ended on September 2, 1965
...;
2. The filing (of) proceedings in the Office of the City
Fiscal of Manila did not interrupt the prescriptive
period.
In Criminal Case No. 80007, Hon. Jesus De Veyra
granted the motion to quash by an order dated

8
October 7, 1965. 8 Pertinent portion of his order
reads:
. . . . And now to the main issue - whether the crime
has prescribed. In the Opposition to the Motion to
Quash, the Prosecution, in its insistence on the theory
of a continuing crime, admits that the two-year
prescriptive period should run from September 3,
1963. This case was filed on September 3, 1965 -one
day too late. Article 13, CCP provides that year shall
mean a period of 365 days. This had been applied to
criminal cases (People v. del Rosario, 51 O.G., 2686).
1964 was a leap year so that when this case was
filed, it was filed one day too late.
The Motion to Quash is, therefore, granted and this
case dismissed on the ground that the crime has
already prescribed. (Emphasis supplied.)
The prosecution appealed the above order to this Court
on October 15, 1965. 9
Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 80006, the motion to
quash was not resolved until December 23, 1965. On
this date, Hon. Placido Ramos denied the motion to
quash, and set the arraignment of the accused on
January 12, 1966, thus —
Wherefore, finding the information to have been filed
well within the statutory period of two years from the
date of the last offense committed by the accused the
Court denies the motion to quash.
The arraignment of the accused is hereby set on
January 12, 1966 at 8:30 A.M.
The trial court refused to accept the prosecution's view
that the prescriptive period should run from September
3, held instead, that the same should commence on
September 4, 1963.
xxx xxx xxx
The evidence shows that on September 4, 1963, the
Manila Police by virtue of a search warrant procured by
the offended party, seized, among other articles, 69
copies of General Science Today for Philippine
Schools, First Year, by Gilman, Van Houten and
Cornista and one copy of the same textbook for
Second Year (Exhibit 5). The evidence likewise shows
that on September 3, 1963, the National Book Store,
run and managed by the accused, sold one said
textbook, Exhibit 'D' and Exhibit '2'. The mere
possession by the accused on September 4, 1963 of
several copies of this textbook which is the textbook
alleged to be spurious and pirated, indicates that said
accused was distributing or selling said textbook on
September 4, 1963 . . . This being the case, it follows
of necessity that the period of prescription commenced
to run from September 4, 1963 and two years from
this date, by excluding the first and including the last,
would expire on September 4, 1965 and hence, the
action, which was instituted on September 3, 1965 is
well within the prescriptive period.
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, the trial court ignored the accused's
theory on leap year:
Even if the last sale of said textbook could be
considered to have taken place on September 3, 1963,
Exhibits 'D' and '2', the Court is also of the opinion that
the two-year period would expire September 3, 1965.
The argument that inasmuch as 1964 is a leap year
the two-year period must contain 731 days, as
contemplated by Article 13 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, is, in the opinion of the Court, without
merits for this particular legal provision that a year is
understood to be of 365 days each is applicable only in
determining the number of days a year must legally
contain but not for the purpose of ascertaining the
period of prescription based on years. In the
computation of the period of prescription, a year
should be construed as the calendar year comprising
the whole period from January 1 to December 31,
regardless of the number of days it contains.
Consequently, in this particular case, if it is considered
that the last sale took place on September 3, 1963,
the two-year period, following the rule exclude the-
first-and-include-the-last, will expire on September 3,
1965.
The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 10 Two
more pleadings were filed, 11 after which, the trial
court finally denied said motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit, 12 and reset the arraignment of the
accused on February 24, 1966 at 8:30 A.M.
The accused thus filed with this Court this petition
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, 13 with the
following prayer:
(a) Forthwith issue, upon filing by petitioner of a bond
in such amount as this Honorable Court may fix, a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction restraining, enjoining and
prohibiting respondents from further proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 80006 of the Court of First instance
of Manila, Branch III, daring the pendency of this
Action:
(b) After due hearing, to render judgment in favor of
petitioner and against respondents —
(1) Annulling and setting aside the Orders of the
respondent Judge of December 23, 1965 (Annex 'G')
denying petitioner's motion to quash, and of January
20, 1966 (Annex 'K') denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration;
(2) Ordering respondent Judge to dismiss Criminal
Case No. 80006 aforesaid; and
(3) Making the writ of preliminary injunction hereafter
La be issued permanent and final.
This Court on February 11, 1966, issued a writ of
preliminary injunction restraining the trial Court from

9
further proceedings in Criminal Case No.
80006. 14 Also on the same date, the two cases, G.R.
No. L-25265 and G.R. No. L-25644, were consolidated.
1. In G.R. No. L-25265, the appeal, then Solicitor
General Arturo Alafriz filed a four-page brief dated
December 21, 1965 15 wherein he recommended
affirmance of the order of 'Judge De Veyra quashing
the information, and the dismissal of the appeal, for
the simple reason that "the order appealed from is in
accordance with law." Accused, now appellee Ramos,
filed a brief dated January 21, 1966 16 reiterating her
previous allegations in the lower court.
The Phoenix Publishing House, Inc., the offended
party, filed a motion to intervene in this appeal, on the
following grounds:
a) That the Solicitor General, instead of prosecuting
the appeal, recommended its dismissal
b) That, to protect its interest, it is necessary that the
movant be allowed to intervene and to submit
memorandum to sustain its view that the criminal
action against the accused had not yet prescribed. 17
Over the opposition of the accused-appellee, this Court
granted the same. 18 Accordingly, the Phoenix
Publishing House, Inc. filed its
Memorandum 19 wherein it alleged that the trial court
erred
I. IN ACTING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH
WITHOUT REQUIRING THE PRESENTATION OF
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE PLEA OF
PRESCRIPTION.
II. IN NOT APPLYING TO THIS CASE THE FOUR-YEAR
PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD PROVIDED FOR IN ACT NO.
3326.
III. IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION PROCEEDINGS IN THE MANILA CITY
FISCAL'S OFFICE AND IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE INTERRUPTED PRESCRIPTION.
IV. IN NOT CONSIDERING FEBRUARY 28 AND 29,
1964, AS ONE DAY FOR PURPOSES OF PRESCRIPTION.
Accused-appellee, Ramos, filed a Reply
Memorandum 20 refuting intervenor's assignment of
errors. Subsequent pleadings 21 focused on whether
February 28, and 29 of a leap year should be counted
as one day or separate days in computing the period of
prescription.
2. In G.R. No. L-25644-the special civil action — the
issues raised in the foregoing assignment of errors
were relied upon in respondent People's
Answer. 22 And, following respondent Judge Ramos'
reasoning, it was contended that the period of
prescription should start from September 4, 1963, and
not September 3, 1963, as originally proposed by the
prosecution. Furthermore, as an affirmative defense, it
was alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus since Judge
Ramos did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to quash the information. Respondent
contended that the "(P)etitioner's remedy is to appeal
the judgment of conviction rendered after a trial on the
merits. " This allegation was opposed by petitioner
Ramos; 23 she insisted that she had a cause of action
for certiorari prohibition and mandamus. Respondent
People filed a Reply Memorandum 24 disputing
petitioner's allegations.
We are, thus, faced with conflicting orders of two
different Branches of the Court of First Instance of
Manila-one holding that the crime has prescribed, the
other that it has not.
1. Now to resolve the preliminary issues:
a. On the propriety of the special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition.
We find for petitioner. As We had occasion to hold
in Quizon vs. Baltazar, 76 SCRA 559:
As to the contention of respondents that the denial of a
motion to quash is not a ground for certiorari and
prohibition, suffice it to state that to allow an accused
to undergo the ordeals of trial and conviction when the
information or complaint against him is patently
defective or the offense charged therein has been
indisputably shown to have already prescribed is unfair
and unjust for which reason, procedurally, the ordinary
remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate.
As to mandamus, We are incline to agree with
respondent's allegation that "petitioner has no cause of
action for mandamus which is a writ intended to
control the exercise of a purely ministerial function. To
quash an information is not a ministerial
function," 25 However, mandamus as a remedy is a
superfluity here, considering that petitioner can obtain
full relief thru certiorari and prohibition.
b. On the applicability of the four-year prescriptive
period provided in Act No. 3326. 26
The same is not applicable. Said Act provides:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts
shall unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe
in accordance with the following rules: (a)........... (b)
after four years for those punished by imprisonment
for more than one month, but less than two years; ...
(Emphasis supplied.)
Act No. 3326 applies only if the special act does not
provide for its own prescriptive period. It has no
application here, where the Copyright Law provides for
its own prescriptive period, viz:
Section 24. All actions, suits, or proceedings arising
under this Act shall be originally cognizable by the
Courts of First Instance of the Philippines and shall

10
prescribe after two years from the time the cause of
action arose.
2. Now on the main issue of prescription. The question
to be resolved is the proper computation of the two-
year period of prescription from September 3, 1963.
Resolution of this issue hinges, in turn, on whether
February 28, and 29 of a leap year, 1964, should be
counted as one day, as proposed by the prosecution;
or as separate days, as alleged by the defense.
This issue which was in 1965 still undetermined is now
a settled matter. It was held in 1969 in Namarco vs.
Tuazon27 that February 28 and 29 of a leap year
should be counted as separate days in computing
periods of prescription. Thus, this Court, speaking thru
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that
where the prescriptive period was supposed to
commence on December 21, 1955, the filing of the
action on December 21, 1965, was done after the ten-
year period has lapsed — since 1960 and 1964 were
both leap years and the case was thus filed two (2)
days too late. Since this case was filed on September
3, 1965, it was filed one day too late; considering that
the 730th day fell on September 2, 1965 — the year
1964 being a leap year.
In explaining the rationale for its holding, the Court
took pains to trace the antecedent decisional and
statutory bases for its conclusion, thus —
Prior to the approval of the Civil Code of Spain, the
Supreme Court thereof held, on March 30, 1887, that,
when the law spoke of months, it meant a 'natural'
month or 'solar' month, in the absence of express
provision to the contrary. Such provision was
incorporated into the Civil Code of Spain, subsequently
promulgated. Hence, the same Supreme Court
declared that, pursuant to Article 7 of said Code,
'whenever months are referred to in the law. it shall be
understood that months are of 30 days,' not the
'natural', 'solar' or 'calendar' months, unless they are
'designated by name,' in which case, 'they shall be
computed by the actual number of days they have.'
This concept was, later, modified in the Philippines, by
Section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code,
pursuant to which 'month shall be understood to refer
to a calendar month.' With the approval of the Civil
Code of the Philippines (RA 386) we have reverted to
the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code in accordance
with which a month is to be considered as the regular
30-month and not the solar or civil month with the
particularity that, whereas the Spanish Civil Code
merely mentioned 'months, days or nights,' ours has
added thereto the term 'years' and explicitly ordains in
Article 13 that it shall be understood that years are of
three hundred sixty-five days. 28
With respect to the opinion of some members of the
Court that Article 13 of the Civil Code is unrealistic, the
Court adverted to the proper remedy thus —
Although some justices of the Supreme Court are
inclined to think that Article 13 of the Civil Code
defining 'years' to mean 365 days is not realistic, the
remedy is not judicial legislation. If public interest
demands a reversion to the policy embodied in the
Revised Administrative Code, this may be done
through legislative process, not by judicial decree. 29
Finally, there is no merit in the allegation that the
reckoning of the prescriptive period should start from
September 4, 1963. This was the date when the police
authorities discovered several pirated books in
accused's store. But the accused was charged, in both
Criminal Cases Nos. 80006 and 80007, with having
allegedly sold anddistributed spurious and pirated
copies of the textbook in question, not of illegal
possession of the same. The prosecution's claim that
the preliminary investigation proceedings in the Manila
City Fiscal's Office and in the prosecution Division of
the Department of Justice interrupted the running of
the prescriptive period, is also without merit. We held
in People vs. Tayco 30 that the running of the period of
prescription is interrupted not by the act of the
offended party in reporting the offense to the final but
the filing of the complaint or information in court.
WHEREFORE, the order dated October 7, 1965 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila Branch XIV in Criminal
Case No. 80007 dismissing the case on the ground of
prescription, is AFFIRMED. The order dated December
23, 1965 of the same court, Branch III, in Criminal
Case No. 80006, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
case is DISMISSED, on the ground that the crime
charged therein had already prescribed. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
VELAYO VS SHELL CO
100 Phil 168
Torts and Damages – Obligations arising from human
relations
Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k
(abt. $79k) to Shell and CAL offered its C-54 plane as
payment to Shell Company (the plane was in
California) but Shell at that time declined as it thought
CALI had sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948
however, CALI was going bankrupt so it called upon an
informal meeting of its creditors. In that meeting, the
creditors agreed to appoint representatives to a
working committee that would determine the order of
preference as to how each creditor should be paid.
They also agreed not to file suit against CALI but CALI
did reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings
should its assets be not enough to pay them up. Shell
Company was represented by a certain Fitzgerald to
the three man working committee. Later, the working
committee convened to discuss how CALI’s asset
should be divided amongst the creditors but while such
was pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to
Shell USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is
assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount of $79k,

11
thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the entire
indebtedness of CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA
got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54 plane is
California and so Shell USA petitioned before a
California court to have the plane be the subject of a
writ of attachment which was granted.
Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of
the assignment of credit made by Shell Philippines to
Shell USA and they went on to approve the sale of
CALI’s asset to the Philippine Airlines. In September
1948, the other creditors learned of the assignment
made by Shell. This prompted these other creditors to
file their own complaint of attachment against CALI’s
assets. CALI then filed for insolvency proceedings to
protect its assets in the Philippines from being
attached. Velayo’s appointment as CALI’s assignee was
approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding. In order
for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed
for a writ of injunction against Shell Philippines in order
for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding
with the attachment and in the alternative that
judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages
double the amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54 plane
was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not
liable for damages because there is nothing in the law
which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it
being a common practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages
considering that it did not violate any law.
HELD: Yes. The basis of such liability, in the absence of
law, is Article 21 of the Civil Code which states:
“Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage”.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is
approved (as it was approved), would vouchsafe
adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight
to provide for specifically in the statutes. A moral
wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a
violation of a statute law, should be compensated by
damages. Moral damages (Art. 2217) may be
recovered (Art. 2219). In Article 20, the liability for
damages arises from a willful or negligent act contrary
to law. In this article, the act is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy.
SEA COMMERCIAL COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, JAMANDRE
INDUSTRIES, INC. and TIRSO JAMANDRE,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
In this petition for review by certiorari, SEA
Commercial Company, Inc. (SEACOM) assails the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV NO.
31263 affirming in toto the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5, in Civil Case No.
122391, in favor of Jamandre Industries, Inc. (JII) et
al., the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the defendant and against the plaintiff, ordering the
plaintiff:
1) To pay defendant the sum of P66,156.15 (minus
18,843.85) with legal interest thereon, from the date
of the filing of the counterclaim until fully paid;
2) To pay defendant P2,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages;
3) To pay attorney’s fees in the sum of P10,000.00;
and
4) To pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.”
SEACOM is a corporation engaged in the business of
selling and distributing agricultural machinery,
products and equipment. On September 20, 1966,
SEACOM and JII entered into a dealership agreement
whereby SEACOM appointed JII as its exclusive dealer
in the City and Province of Iloilo[1] Tirso Jamandre
executed a suretyship agreement binding himself
jointly and severally with JII to pay for all obligations
of JII to SEACOM[2]. The agreement was subsequently
amended to include Capiz in the territorial coverage
and to make the dealership agreement on a non-
exclusive basis[3]. In the course of the business
relationship arising from the dealership agreement, JII
allegedly incurred a balance of P18,843.85 for unpaid
deliveries, and SEACOM brought action to recover said
amount plus interest and attorney’s fees.
JII filed an Answer denying the obligation and
interposing a counterclaim for damages representing
unrealized profits when JII sold to the Farm System
Development Corporation (FSDC) twenty one (21)
units of Mitsubishi power tillers. In the counterclaim,
JII alleged that as a dealer in Capiz, JII contracted to
sell in 1977 twenty-four (24) units of Mitsubishi power
tillers to a group of farmers to be financed by said
corporation, which fact JII allegedly made known to
petitioner, but the latter taking advantage of said
information and in bad faith, went directly to FSDC and
dealt with it and sold twenty one (21) units of said
tractors, thereby depriving JII of unrealized profit of
eighty-five thousand four hundred fifteen and 61/100
pesos (P85,415.61).
The trial court rendered its decision on January 24,
1990 ordering JII to pay SEACOM the amount of
Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Three and
85/100 (P18,843.85) representing its outstanding
obligation. The trial court likewise granted JII’s
counterclaim for unrealized profits, and for moral and

12
exemplary damages and attorney’ fees as above
quoted.
SEACOM appealed the decision on the counterclaim.
The Court of Appeals held that while there exists no
agency relationship between SEACOM and JII, SEACOM
is liable for damages and unrealized profits to JII.
“This Court, however, is convinced that with or without
the existence of an agency relationship between
appellant SEACOM and appellee JII and
notwithstanding the error committed by the lower
court in finding that an agency relationship existed
between appellant and defendant corporation the
former is liable for the unrealized profits which the
latter could have gained had not appellant unjustly
stepped in and in bad faith unethically intervened.
It should be emphasized that the very purpose of the
dealership agreement is for SEACOM to have JII as its
dealer to sell its products in the provinces of Capiz and
Iloilo. In view of this agreement, the second assigned
error that the lower court erred in holding that
appellant learned of the FSDC transaction from
defendant JII is clearly immaterial and devoid of
merit. The fact that the dealership is on a non-
exclusive basis does not entitle appellant SEACOM to
join the fray as against its dealer. To do so, is to
violate the norms of conduct enjoined by Art. 19 of the
Civil Code. By virtue of such agreement, the
competition in the market as regards the sale of farm
equipment shall be between JII, as the dealer of
SEACOM and other companies, not as against SEACOM
itself. However, SEACOM, not satisfied with the
presence of its dealer JII in the market, joined the
competition even as the against the latter and,
therefore, changed the scenario of the competition
thereby rendering inutile the dealership agreement
which they entered into the manifest prejudice of
JII. Hence, the trial court was correct when it applied
Art. 19 of the Civil Code in the case at bar in that
appellant SEACOM acted in bad faith when it competed
with its own dealer as regards the sale of farm
machineries, thereby depriving appellee JII of the
opportunity to gain a clear profit of P85,000.00.”
and affirmed the judgment appealed from in toto.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari, which
submits the following reasons for the allowance
thereof:
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED
QUESTIONS OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE,
CONSIDERING THAT:
A
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS LIABLE TO
PAY DAMAGES AND UNREALIZED PROFITS TO THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DESPITE THE FACT THAT NO
AGENCY RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN THEM.
B
ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER ACTED IN BAD
FAITH AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT
CORPORATION DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID RULING
IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
C
ERRED IN RULING THAT THE NON-EXCLUSIVITY
CLAUSE IN THE DEALERSHIP AGREEMENT EXECUTED
BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT CORPORATION PRECLUDES THE
PETITIONER FROM COMPETING WITH THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT CORPORATION.
D
ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS
ENTITLED TO UNREALIZED PROFITS, MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES.[4]
Petitioner SEACOM disputes the conclusion of the Court
of Appeals that despite the fact that no agency
relationship existed between the parties, the SEACOM
is still liable in damages and unrealized profits for the
reason that it acted in bad faith. Petitioner SEACOM
invokes the non-exclusivity clause in the dealership
agreement and claims that the transaction with FSDC
was concluded pursuant to a public bidding and not on
the basis of alleged information it received from
private respondent Tirso Jamandre. Moreover,
petitioner SEACOM claims that it did not underprice its
products during the public bidding wherein both
SEACOM and JII participated. Petitioner also disputes
the award of moral damages to JII which is a
corporation, in the absence of any evidence that the
said corporation had a good reputation which was
debased.
Private respondents in their comment, contends that
the four assigned errors raise mixed questions of fact
and law and are therefore beyond the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court which may take cognizance of only
questions of law. The assigned errors were also
refuted to secure affirmance of the appealed
decision. JII maintains that the bidding set by FSDC
on March 24, 1997 was scheduled after the
demonstration conducted by JII, and after JII informed
SEACOM about the preference of the farmers to buy
Mitsubishi tillers. JII further rebuts the SEACOM’s
contention that the transaction with FSDC was
pursuant to a public bidding with full disclosure to the
public and private respondent JII considering that JII
had nothing to do with the list of 37 bidders and
cannot be bound by the listing made by SEACOM’s
employee; moreover, JII did not participate in the
bidding not having been informed about

13
it. Furthermore, the price at which SEACOM sold to
FSDC was lower than the price it gave to JII. Also,
even if the dealership agreement was not exclusive, it
was breached when petitioner in bad faith sold directly
to FSDC with whom JII had previously offered the
subject farm equipment. With respect to the awards of
moral and exemplary damages, JII seeks an
affirmation of the ruling of the Court of Appeals
justifying the awards.
SEACOM filed Reply defending the jurisdiction of this
Court over the instant petition since the decision of the
Court of Appeals was “based on a misapprehension of
facts”. SEACOM insists that FSDC’s purchase was
made pursuant to a public bidding, and even if
SEACOM did not participate thereon, JII would not
necessarily have closed the deal since thirty seven
(37) bidders participated. SEACOM contends that no
evidence was presented to prove that the bidding was
a fraudulent scheme of SEACOM and FSDC. SEACOM
further controverts JII’s contention that JII did not
take part in the bidding as Tirso Jamandre was one of
the bidders and that SEACOM underpriced its products
to entice FSDC to buy directly from it. In fine, JII is
not entitled to the award of unrealized profits and
damages.
In its Rejoinder, private respondents insist that there is
an agency relationship, citing the evidence showing
that credit memos and not cash vouchers were issued
to JII by SEACOM for every delivery from November
26, 1976 to December 24, 1978. Private respondents
maintain that SEACOM “torpedoed the emerging deal
between JII and FSDC after being informed about it by
JII by dealing directly with FSDC at a lower price” and
after betraying JII, SEACOM would cover up the deceit
by conniving with FSDC to post up a “sham public
bidding.”
SEACOM’s sur-rejoinder contains basically a reiteration
of its contention in previous pleadings. Additionally, it
is contended that private respondents are barred from
questioning in their Rejoinder, the finding of the Court
of Appeals that there is no agency relationship
between the parties since this matter was not raised as
error in their comment.
The core issue is whether SEACOM acted in bad faith
when it competed with its own dealer as regards the
sale of farm machineries to FSDC.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held
affirmatively; the trial court found that JII was an
agent of SEACOM and the act of SEACOM in dealing
directly with FSDC was unfair and unjust to its agent,
and that there was fraud in the transaction between
FSDC and SEACOM to the prejudice of JII. On the
other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that there was
no agency relationship between the parties but
SEACOM is nevertheless liable in damages for having
acted in bad faith when it competed with its own
dealer in the sale of the farm machineries to
FSDC. Both courts invoke as basis for the award
Article 19 of the Civil Code which reads as follows:
"Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty
and good faith.”
The principle of abuse of rights stated in the above
article, departs from the classical theory that “he who
uses a right injures no one”. The modern tendency is
to depart from the classical and traditional theory, and
to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is
an abuse of rights, even when the act is not illicit.[5]
Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.[6] If
mere fault or negligence in one’s acts can make him
liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with
more reason should abuse or bad faith make him
liable. The absence of good faith is essential to abuse
of right. Good faith is an honest intention to abstain
from taking any unconscientious advantage of another,
even through the forms or technicalities of the law,
together with an absence of all information or belief of
fact which would render the transaction
unconscientious. In business relations, it means good
faith as understood by men of affairs.[7]
While Article 19 may have been intended as a mere
declaration of principle[8], the “cardinal law on human
conduct” expressed in said article has given rise to
certain rules, e.g. that where a person exercises his
rights but does so arbitrarily or unjustly or performs
his duties in a manner that is not in keeping with
honesty and good faith, he opens himself to
liability.[9] The elements of an abuse of rights under
Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2)
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent
of prejudicing or injuring another.[10]
The issue whether JII is “entitled to recovery on its
counterclaim for unrealized profit in the twenty one
(21) units of Mitsubishi power tillers sold by SEACOM
to FSDC” was resolved by the trial court in favor of JII
on the basis of documentary evidence[11] showing
that (1) JII has informed SEACOM as early as February
1977 of the promotions undertaken by JII for the sale
of 24 contracted units to FSDC and in connection
therewith, requested a 50% discount to make the price
competitive, and to increase the warranty period for
eight months to one year. In said letter Jamandre
clarified that they were not amenable to SEACOM’s
offering directly to FSDC” and to be only given the
usual overriding commission as “we have considerable
investments on this transaction”. (2) In response, the
general sales manager of SEACOM declined to give the
requested 50% discount and offered a “less 30% less
10% up to end March xxx on cash before delivery
basis”, granted the requested extension of the
warranty period and stated that “we are glad to note

14
that you have quite a number of units pending with the
FSDC.”
The trial court ruled that with said information,
SEACOM dealt directly with FSDC and offered its units
at a lower price, leaving FSDC “no choice but to accept
the said offer of (SEACOM)”.
In affirming the judgment of the of the trial court, the
Court of Appeals held that by virtue of the dealership
agreement the competition in the market as regards
the sale of farm equipment shall be between JII, as the
dealer of SEACOM, and other companies, not as
against SEACOM itself, the Court stated:
“However, SEACOM not satisfied with the presence of
its dealer JII in the market, joined the competition
even as against the latter, and thereby changed the
scenario of the competition thereby rendering inutile
the dealership agreement which they entered into to
the manifest prejudice of JII. Hence the trial court trial
court was correct when it applied Art. 19 of the Civil
Code in the case at bar in that appellant SEACOM
acted in bad faith when it competed with its own
dealer as regards the sale of farm machineries,
thereby depriving appellee JII of the opportunity to
gain a clear profit of P85,000.00.”
We find no cogent reason to overturn the factual
finding of the two courts that SEACOM joined the
bidding for the sale of the farm equipment after it was
informed that JII was already promoting the sales of
said equipment to the FSDC. Moreover, the conclusion
of the trial court that the SEACOM offered FSDC a
lower price than the price offered by JII to FSDC is
supported by the evidence: the price offered by JII to
FSDC is P27,167 per unit[12] but the prices at which
SEACOM sold to FSDC were at P22,867.00 for Model
CT 83-2, P21,093.50 for model CT 83-E, and
P18,979.25 for model CT 534. The fact that SEACOM
may have offered to JII, in lieu of a requested 50%
discount, a discount effectively translating to 37% of
the list price and actually sold to FSDC at 35% less
than the list price[13] does not detract from the fact
that by participating in the bidding of FSDC, it actually
competed with its own dealer who had earlier
conducted demonstrations and promoted its own
products for the sale of the very same equipment, Exh.
“N” for the plaintiff confirms that both SEACOM and
Jamandre participated in the bidding.[14] However,
the SEACOM was awarded the contract directly from
Manila.[15] The testimony of Tirso Jamandre that JII
was the sole representative of SEACOM in the local
demonstrations to convince the farmers and
cooperative officers to accept the Mitsubishi brand of
equipment in preference to other brands, was
unrebutted by SEACOM.
Clearly, the bad faith of SEACOM was established. By
appointing as a dealer of its agricultural equipment,
SEACOM recognized the role and undertaking of JII to
promote and sell said equipment. Under the
dealership agreement, JII was to act as a middleman
to sell SEACOM’s products, in its area of operations,
i.e. Iloilo and Capiz provinces, to the exclusion of other
places,[16] to send its men to Manila for training on
repair, servicing and installation of the items to be
handled by it, and to comply with other personnel and
vehicle requirements intended for the benefit of the
dealership.[17] After being informed of the
demonstrations JII had conducted to promote the sales
of SEACOM equipment, including the operations at JII’s
expense conducted for five months, and the approval
of its facilities (service and parts) by
FSDC,[18] SEACOM participated in the bidding for the
said equipment at a lower price, placing itself in direct
competition with its own dealer. The actuations of
SEACOM are tainted by bad faith.
Even if the dealership agreement was amended to
make it on a non-exclusive basis,[19] SEACOM may
not exercise its right unjustly or in a manner that is
not in keeping with honesty or good faith; otherwise it
opens itself to liability under the abuse of right rule
embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code above-
quoted. This provision, together with the succeeding
article on human relation, was intended to embody
certain basic principles “that are to be observed for the
rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order.”[20] What is sought to be
written into the law is the pervading principle of equity
and justice above strict legalism.[21]
We accordingly resolve to affirm the award for
unrealized profits. The Court of Appeals noted that the
trial court failed to specify to which the two appellees
the award for moral and exemplary damages is
granted. However, in view of the fact that moral
damages are not as a general rule granted to a
corporation, and that Tirso Jamandre was the one who
testified on his feeling very aggrieved and on his
mental anguish and sleepless nights thinking of how
SEACOM “dealt with us behind (our) backs”,[22] the
award should go to defendant Jamandre, President of
JII.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
AFFIRMED with the modification that the award
of P2,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages shall be
paid to defendant Tirso Jamandre.
Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima,
JJ., concur.
ABS CBN Broadcasting Corporation vs. CA [301 SCRA
572 (Jan 21 1999)]
Power of the Board of Directors
Delegation to Executive Committee
Facts: In 1990, ABS CBN and Viva executed a Film
Exhibition Agreement whereby Viva gave ABS CBN an
exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films. Said

15
agreement contained a stipulation that ABS shall have
the right of first refusal to the next 24 Viva films for TV
telecast, provided that such right shall be exercised by
ABS from the actual offer in writing.
Hence, through this agreement, Viva offered ABS a list
of 36 films from which ABS may exercise its right of
first refusal. ABS however, through VP Concio, did not
accept the list since she could only tick off 10 films.
This rejection was embodied in a letter.
In 1992, Viva again approached ABS with a list
consisting of 52 original films where Viva proposed to
sell these airing rights for P60M.
Viva’s Vic del Rosario and ABS’ general manager
Eugenio Lopez III met at the Tamarind Grill to discuss
this package proposal. What transcribed at that
meeting was subject to conflicting versions.
According to Lopez, he and del Rosario agreed that
ABS was granted exclusive film rights to 14 films for
P36M, and that this was put in writing in a napkin,
signed by Lopez and given to del Rosario. On the
other hand, del Rosario denied the existence of the
napkin in which Lopez wrote something, and insisted
that what he and Lopez discussed was Viva’s film
package of the 52 original films for P60M stated above,
and that Lopez refused said offer, allegedly signifying
his intent to send a counter proposal. When the
counter proposal arrived, Viva’s BoD rejected it, hence,
he sold the rights to the 52 original films to RBS.
Thus, ABS filed before RTC a complaint for specific
performance with prayer for TRO against RBS and
Viva. RTC issued the TRO enjoining the airing of the
films subject of controversy. After hearing, RTC
rendered its decision in favor of RBS and Viva
contending that there was no meeting of minds on the
price and terms of the offer. The agreement between
Lopez and del Rosario was subject to Viva BoD
approval, and since this was rejected by the board,
then, there was no basis for ABS’ demand that a
contract was entered into between them. That the
1990 Agreement with the right of first refusal was
already exercised by Ms. Concio when it rejected the
offer, and such 1990 Agreement was an entirely new
contract other than the 1992 alleged agreement at the
Tamarind Grill. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition for
certiorari with SC.
Lopez claims that it had not fully exercised its right of
first refusal over 24 films since it only chose 10. He
insists that SC give credence to his testimony that he
and del Rosario discussed the airing of the remaining
14 films under the right of first refusal agreement in
Tamarind Grill where there was a contract written in
the alleged napkin.
Issue: Whether or not there was a perfected contract
between Lopez and del Rosario.
Held: NO. A contract is a meeting of minds between 2
persons whereby one binds himself to give something
or to render some service to another for a
consideration. There is no contract unless the
following requisites concur: (1) consent of the
contracting parties (2) object certain which is the
subject of the contract (3) cause of the obligation,
which is established.
Contracts that are consensual in nature are perfected
upon mere meeting of the minds. Once there is
concurrence between the offer and the acceptance
upon the subject matter, consideration, and terms of
payment, a contract is produced. The offer must be
certain. To convert the offer into a contract, the
acceptance must be absolute and must not qualify the
terms of the offer; it must be plain, unequivocal,
unconditional, and without variance of any sort from
the proposal. A qualified acceptance, or one that
involves a new proposal, constitutes a counter offer
and is a rejection of the original offer. Consequently,
when something is desired which is not exactly what is
proposed in the offer, such acceptance is not sufficient
to generate consent because any modification or
variation from the terms of the offer annuls the offer.
In the case at bar, when del Rosario met with Lopez at
the Tamarind Grill, the package of 52 films was Viva’s
offer to enter into a new Exhibition Agreement. But
ABS, through its counter proposal sent to Viva,
actually made a counter offer. Clearly, there was no
acceptance. The acceptance should be unqualified.
When Viva’s BoD rejected the counter proposal, then
no contract could have been executed. Assuming
arguendo that del Rosario did enter into a contract
with Lopez at Tamarind Grill, this acceptance did not
bind Viva since there was no proof whatsoever that del
Rosario had specific authority to do so. Under the
Corporation Code, unless otherwise provided by said
law, corporate powers, such as the power to enter into
contracts, are exercised by the BoD. However, the
board may delegate such powers to either an
executive committee or officials or contracted
managers. The delegation, except for the executive
committee, must be for specific purposes. Delegation
to officers makes the latter agents of the corporation,
and accordingly, the general rules of agency ad to the
binding effects of their acts would apply. For such
officers to be deemed fully clothed by the corporation
to exercise a power of the Board, the latter must
specially authorize them to do so. That del Rosario did
not have the authority to accept ABS’ counter offer
was best evidenced by his submission of the counter
proposal to Viva’s BoD for the latter’s approval. In any
event, there was no meeting of the minds between del
Rosario and Lopez.
The contention of Lopez that their meeting in Tamarind
Grill was a continuation of their right of first refusal
agreement over the remaining 14 films is untenable.
ABS’ right of first refusal had already been exercised
when Ms. Concio wrote to Viva choosing only 10 out of
the 36 films offered by del Rosario. It already refused
the 26 films.
RELLOSA vs. PELLOSIS
GR # 138964 Aug 9, 2001
FACTS:

16
Respondents were lessees of a panel of land owned by
Marta Reyes located at San Pascual St., Malate,
Manila. After the demise of Marta, Victor Reyes, her
son, inherited the land. Victor informed the
respondents that they would have a right of first
refusal to buy the land. In 1989, without the
knowledge of respondents, the land was sold to
petitioner Cynthia Ortega who was able to ultimately
secure title to the property in her name.
On May 25, 1989, Cynthia Ortega filed petition for
condemnation of the structures on the land. The office
of building Official issued a resolution ordering the
demolition of the houses of respondents on November
27, 1989. Copies were received by respondents on
December 7, 1989 and on December 12, the day
respondents filed an appeal contesting the order,
petitioners proceeded with the demolition of the house.
Respondents filed case before Manila RTC which was
dismissed. On appeal, CA reversed the decision and
ordered petitioners to pay respondents for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA ruling in favor of respondents tenable.
RULING:
The court rules for affirmance of the assailed decision.
A right to power, privilege or immunity guaranteed
under a constitution, statute or decisional law or
recognized as a result of long usage constitute of a
legally enforceable claim of one person against
another.
The decision of CA was MODIFIED by reducing the
awards for exemplary and moral damages to P20,000
to each respondent. The decision of the appellate court
is affirmed.
CASES ON PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
MERCED V. DIAZ [109 P 156 (1960)] –
Where the husband files a civil case for annulment of
the second marriage on the ground of lack of consent,
and the second wife subsequently files a criminal case
for bigamy against him, the civil case for annulment is
a prejudicial question to be determined before the
criminal case can proceed. Consent is an essential
element of a valid marriage. Without consent, the
marriage is void. But the question of invalidity cannot
ordinarily be decided in the criminal action for bigamy
but in a civil action for annulment. Since the validity of
the second marriage, subject of the action for bigamy,
cannot be determined in the criminal case, and since
prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless the
elements of the second marriage appear to exist, it is
necessary that a decision in a civil action to the effect
that the second marriage contains all the essentials of
a marriage must first be secured.
G.R. No. L-15315 August 26, 1960
ABUNDIO MERCED, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CLEMENTINO V. DIEZ, ETC. ET
AL., respondents.
Pedro A. Bandoquillo for petitioner.
Fulvio Pelaez for respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari with prohibition
to prohibit the judge presiding the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental, Hon. Clementino V. Diez,
from proceeding further in the Criminal Case No. V-
6520, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Abundio
Merced until after final termination of Civil Case No. R-
5387, for the annulment of the marriage of petitioner
Abundio Merced with Elizabeth Ceasar, also pending in
same court.
The record disclose the following proceedings in the
court a quo: On January 30, 1958, Abundio Merced
filed a complaint for annulment of his second marriage
with Elizabeth Ceasar. The complaint is docketed as
Civil Case No. R-5387. The complaint alleges that
defendant Elizabeth Ceasar and her relatives forced,
threatened and intimated him into signing an affidavit
to the effect that he and defendant had been living
together as husband and wife for over five years,
which is not true; that this affidavit was used by
defendant in securing their marriage of exceptional
character, without the need for marriage license; that
he was again forced, threatened and intimated by
defendant and her relatives into entering the marriage
with her on August 21, 1957 before Municipal Judge
Medardo A. Conde; that immediately after the
celebration of the marriage plaintiff left defendant and
never lived with her; that the defendant wrote him on
October 29, 1957, admitting that he was forced into
the marriage and asking him to go to Cebu to have the
marriage annulled, but he refused to go for fear he
may be forced into living with the defendant. Merced
prays for annulment of the marriage and for moral
damages in the amount of P2,000. On March 3, 1958,
Elizabeth Ceasar filed her answer to the complaint. In
her answer, she denies the material allegations of the
complaint and avers as affirmative defenses that
neither she nor her relatives know of plaintiff's
previous marriage to Eufrocina Tan; that sometime in
July, 1957, plaintiff asked her mother to intercede on
their behalf to secure her father's consent to their
marriage as plaintiff could not concentrate on his
studies without marrying Elizabeth, but that her
mother advised him to finish his studies first; that
sometime in April, 1957, defendant learned that
plaintiff was engaged to marry Eufrocina Tan, but
plaintiff, upon being confronted with such discovery,
showed her a letter which he wrote breaking off his
engagement with Tan. As a counterclaim defendant
asks P50,000 as moral damages for the deceit, fraud
and insidious machinations committed upon her by
plaintiff.

17
On February 19, 1958, after had filed Civil Case No. R-
5387 defendant Elizabeth Ceasar filed a criminal
complaint for bigamy 39 3 against plaintiff Abundio
Merced with the office of the City Fiscal of Cebu. On
April 7, 1958 the Assistant City Fiscal filed Criminal
Case No. V-6520, charging Merced with bigamy for the
second marriage. The information reads.
The undersigned Assistant Fiscal of City of
Cebu accuses Abundio Merced of the crime of
bigamy, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of August, 1957,
in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Abundio Merced, being previously
united in lawful marriage with Eufrocina Tan,
and without the said marriage having been
legally dissolved did then and there wilfully
unlawfully, feloniously contract a second
marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar.
Contrary to Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code. (Annex "2".)
Abundio Merced filed a motion to hold to trial of said
criminal case in abeyance until final termination of Civil
Case No. R- 5387. Reason alleged for the motion is
that the Civil Action involves facts which if proved will
determine the innocence of the accused. After an
opposition thereto was filed by the assistant provincial
fiscal, the court granted the motion. However, upon
motion for reconsideration filed by the fiscal, the order
was set aside and another entered denying the motion
of accused for suspension of the criminal proceedings,
which last order is the one sough herein to be
annulled. The court held in its last order that inasmuch
as by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Court in
the case of People vs. Mendoza, 95 Phil., 50 Off. Gaz.
[10], 4767, judicial declaration of nullity of a second
and bigamous marriage is not necessary, there is no
need in this case to decide the nullity of the second
marriage, or to determine and declare the existence of
the grounds for annulling the same, but that said
grounds should be used as a defense in the criminal
action. A motion to reconsider the second order of the
court having been denied, petition herein was filed.
When the petition for certiorari with prohibition was
filed, the petitioner secured from this Court a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin respondent judge from
proceeding further in the criminal case.
Before this Court the sole question raised is whether
an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial
question in a prosecution for bigamy.
The definition and the elements of a prejudicial
question have been set forth by us as follows:
Prejudicial question has been defined to be
that which arises in a case, the resolution of
which (question) is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved in said case, and the cognizance
of which pertains to another Tribunal (Cuestion
prejudicial, es 3o 3 la que surge en un pleito o
causa cuya resolucion sean antecedente logico
de la cuestion-objeto del pleito o causa y cuyo
conocimiento corresponda a los Tribunales de
otro orden o jurisdiccion. — Enciclopedia
Juridica Española, p. 228). The prejudicial
question must be determinative of the case
before the court; this is its first element.
Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged
in another tribunal; this is the second element.
In an action for bigamy for example, if the
accused claims that the first marriage is null
and void and the right to decide such validity is
vested in another tribunal, the civil action for
nullity must be first decided before the action
for bigamy can proceed, hence, the validity of
the first marriage is a prejudicial question.
(People vs. Aragon, 94 Phil., 357; 50 Off. Gaz.,
No. 10, 4863).
In order that a person may be held guilty of the crime
of bigamy, the second and subsequent marriage must
have all the essential elements of a valid marriage,
were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
This was the ruling of this Court in People vs. Dumpo,
62 Phil., 246, where we said:
It is an essential element of the crime of
bigamy that the alleged second marriage,
having all the essential requisites, would be
valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
marriage. It appearing that the marriage
alleged to have been contracted by the
accused with Sabdapal, her former marriage
with Hassan being undissolved, can not be
considered as such, according to Mohameddan
rites, there is no justification to hold her guilty
of the crime charged in the information.
(People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246).
One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is
that the consent thereto of the contracting parties
must be freely and voluntarily given. Without the
element of consent a marriage would be illegal and
void. (Section 29, Act No. 3613, otherwise known as
the Marriage Law.) But the question of invalidity can
not ordinarily be decided in the criminal action for
bigamy but in a civil action for annulment. Since the
validity of the second marriage, subject of the action
for bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case
and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless
the elements of the second marriage appear to exist, it
is necessary that a decision in a civil action to the
effect that the second marriage contains all the
essentials of a marriage must first be secured.

18
We have, therefore, in the case at bar, the issue of the
validity of the second marriage, which must be
determined before hand in the civil action, before the
criminal action can proceed. We have a situation where
the issue of the validity of the second marriage can be
determined or must be determined in the civil action
before the criminal action for bigamy can be
prosecuted. The question of the validity of the second
marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial question, because
determination of the validity of the second marriage is
determinable in the civil action and must precede the
criminal action for bigamy.
Spanish jurisprudence, from which the principle of
prejudicial question has been taken, requires that the
essential element determinative of the criminal action
must be cognizable by another court. This requirement
of a different court is demanded in Spanish
jurisprudence because Spanish courts are divided
according to their jurisdictions, some courts being
exclusively of civil jurisdiction, others of criminal
jurisdiction. In the Philippines, where our courts are
vested with both civil and criminal jurisdiction, the
principle of prejudicial question is to be applied even if
there is only one court before which the civil action
and the criminal action are to be litigated. But in this
case the court when exercising its jurisdiction over the
civil action for the annulment of marriage is considered
as a court distinct and different from itself when trying
the criminal action for bigamy.
Our conclusion that the determination of the validity of
the marriage in the civil action for annulment is a
prejudicial question, insofar as the criminal action for
bigamy is concerned, is supported by Mr. Justice
Moran in his dissenting opinion in De Leon vs.
Mabanag, 70 Phil., 207 thus:
La regla general es que cuando hay una
cuestion civil y otra criminal sobre un mismo
delito u ofensa, la segunda debe verse antes
que la primera, por la razon de que las formas
de un juicio criminal son las mas a proposito
para la averiguacion de un delito, y no las de
un juicio civil. Esta regla tiene, sin embargo,
una excepcion, y es la que se refiere a una
cueston civil prejudicial. Una cuestion civil es
de caracter prejudicial y debe resolverse antes
que una cuestion criminal, cuando versa
sonbre un hecho distinto y separado del delito,
pero tan intimamente ligado a el que
determina la culpabilidad o inocencia del
acusado. Por ejemplo, una accion criminal por
bigamia.
The majority decision in said case of De Leon vs.
Mabanag also sustains the theory that when a civil
action is pending in court, in which a validity of a
document claimed to be false and fictitious is in issue,
the fiscal may not prosecute the person who allegedly
executed the false document because the issue of the
validity of the instrument is sub judice and the
prosecuting officer should be ordered to suspend the
criminal action until the prejudicial question has been
finally determined. Thus the Court said"
Hablando en terminos generales la facultad del
Fiscal y su deber perseguir los delitos no deben
ser controlados ni coartados por los tribunales;
pero no hay duda que esa facultad puede ser
regulada para que no se abuse de ella. Cuando
un miembro del Ministerio Fiscal se desvia de
la ley y entorpece la recta administracion de
justicia procesando a una persona por hechos
constituvos de delito que se encuentran sub-
judice y de los cuales se propone una cuestion
prejudicial administrativa, es deber de los
tribunales llamarle la atencion y obligarle que
suspenda toda accion criminal hasta que la
cuestion prejudicial administrativa se haya
decidido finalmente. (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70
Phil., 207.)
The case of People vs. Mendoza, supra, upon which the
trial court and the respondents rely, presents a
different sets of facts from the case at bar. So is the
ruling therein as contained in the syllabus. In the case
of People vs. Mendoza, Mendoza was charged with and
convicted of bigamy for a marriage with one
Carmencita Panlilio, contracted in August, 1949.
Mendoza was married for the first time in 1946 with
Josefa de Asis; then married for the second time with
Olga Lema; and then married for the third time to
Panlilio in 1949. On February 2, 1943, Josefa de Asis
died. The court citing the provisions of Article 29 of the
marriage law, held that the second marriage of the
appellant Mendoza with Lema was operation of law null
and void, because at the time of the second marriage
in 1941, appellant's former wife Josefa de Asis was still
living. This marriage of appellant with Lema being null
and void at the time the appellant contracted the said
marriage, the impediment of the second marriage did
not exist. Hence the appellant was acquitted of bigamy
for the 1949 marriage because his previous marriage
with Lema in 1941, by operation of law, was void ab
initio.
In the case at bar, in order that the petitioner be held
guilty of the crime of bigamy, the marriage which she
contracted for the second time with Elizabeth Ceasar,
must first be declared valid. But its validity has been
questioned in the civil action. This civil action must be
decided before the prosecution for bigamy can
proceed.
For the foregoing considerations, the petition for the
issuance of a writ of certiorari and prohibition is hereby
granted. The order of the court denying the petition of
the herein petitioner to prohibit the Fiscal from
prosecuting the case for bigamy, criminal case no. V-
6520, entitled People vs. Abundio Merced, is hereby
set aside and the preliminary injunction issued by this
court to that effect is hereby made permanent. So
Ordered.

19
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Gutierrez
David, JJ.,concur.
G.R. No. L-14534 February 28, 1962
MERARDO L. ZAPANTA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, ETC., ET
AL., respondents.
Pedro M. Santos and Jorge C. Salonga for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General, Romulo L. Chua and
Dewey G. Soriano for respondents.
DIZON, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition filed by Merardo L.
Zapanta against the Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fernando A.
Cruz, Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, and Olimpia A. Yco,
to enjoin the former from proceeding with the trial of
Criminal Case No. 3405 pending the final
determination of Civil Case No. 1446 of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga.
Upon complaint filed by respondent Olimpia A. Yco on
May 20, 1958, an information for Bigamy was filed by
respondent Provincial Fiscal against petitioner in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Criminal Case No.
3405), alleging that the latter, having previously
married one Estrella Guarin, and without said marriage
having been dissolved, contracted a second marriage
with said complainant.
On June 16, 1958, petitioner filed in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga Civil Case No. 1446 against
respondent Olimpia A. Yco for the annulment of their
marriage on the ground of duress, force and
intimidation. On the 30th of the same month
respondent Yco, as defendant in said case, filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that
it stated no cause of action, but the same was denied
on July 7 of the same year. 1äwphï1.ñët
On September 2, 1958, petitioner, in turn, filed a
motion in Criminal Case No. 3405 to suspend
proceedings therein, on the ground that the
determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No.
1446 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga was a
prejudicial question. Respondent judge denied the
motion on September 20, 1958 as well as petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, and ordered his
arraignment. After entering a plea of not guilty,
petitioner filed the present action.
We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as
that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and
the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal
(People vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L-5930, February 17,
1954). The prejudicial question — we further said —
must be determinative of the case before the court,
and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in
another court (People vs. Aragon, supra). These
requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the
question for annulment of the second marriage
pending in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence,
petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of
duress, force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act
was involuntary and can not be the basis of his
conviction for the crime of bigamy with which he was
charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus,
the issue involved in the action for the annulment of
the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's
guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy. On the other
hand, there can be no question that the annulment of
petitioner's marriage with respondent Yco on the
grounds relied upon in the complaint filed in the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga is within the jurisdiction
of said court.
In the Aragon case already mentioned (supra) we held
that if the defendant in a case for bigamy claims that
the first marriage is void and the right to decide such
validity is vested in another court, the civil action for
annulment must first be decided before the action for
bigamy can proceed. There is no reason not to apply
the same rule when the contention of the accused is
that the second marriage is void on the ground that he
entered into it because of duress, force and
intimidation.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in the petition is
hereby granted. Without costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and De
Leon, JJ., concur.
LANDICHO V. RELOVA
Facts:
On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged
before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch
I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the
offense, of bigamy. It was alleged in the information
that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira
Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally
dissolved, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes
Pasia." On March 15, 1963, an action was filed before
the Court of First Instance of Batangas, likewise
presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia,
seeking to declare her marriage to petitioner as null
and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force,
threats and intimidation allegedly employed by

153314793 civil-law-assigned-cases-1st-meeting

153314793 civil-law-assigned-cases-1st-meeting

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (19)

Similar to 153314793 civil-law-assigned-cases-1st-meeting

Similar to 153314793 civil-law-assigned-cases-1st-meeting (20)

More from homeworkping4

More from homeworkping4 (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

153314793 civil-law-assigned-cases-1st-meeting