My RQ: Does the Democracy Assistance Still Bear Fruit in the Post-Transition Ukraine? H 1: Since the OR the DA has quite a limited impact on the democracy development in Ukraine EV1: The quantity of the DA has dropped significantly after the OR – The Democracy Triumphed Syndrom EV2: The quality of the DA has dropped significantly after the OR
Methods: desk research and field research (interviews with donors and recipients/beneficiaries/stakeholders) – altogether 37 semi-structured interviews.
Ukraine is flooded by the donor aid. Main DA providers: USAID: by sector: in 2004-2007 22% decrease for DG and 11% for HR; by Objective Strengthening Citizens Participation (CS, Media, Election and PolParties) in2004-2007 decrease by 70% (significantly, by half after 2005); Good Governance (money mainly to the government sector, incl. parliament, local governments, judiciary). Increase by 59% with a 400% increase in 2005. Imbalance would be even greater when we add 45 mln dollars from MCA (Threshold Program) opened to Ukraine in 2006. 10 million went to the CS, while the rest to the government IRI, FH, NDI – closed or limited activities. Still US is very important donor. Works in all the sectors and especially focuses on political democracy assistance (strong and consistent in CS, Media, Parliament, new program on Rule of Law). EU: the amount of aid increased+new instruments within the ENPI. 30% forl democratic development and good governance funds, but they do not support political foundations of democracy, but rather effectiveness of public institutions in the areas of common interest (energy, trade, migration). Budget support -more than 70% - the Ukrainian government is not ready. Problem with legal procedure, !transparency, accountability, effective use, legitimate reform strategies. Too little funds are channelled to CS. Also burocracy, big sums – only big NGOs can participate. There are some improvements observed in 2008-2009. EU MS: Germany – the 3d largest. Mainly through political foundations: 2 new have come to UA after the OR. Within BMZ – democracy is not a priority. Exception: decentralisation project. UK – in 2008 DFIF left Ukraine. Now FCO SRF – important – parliament, parties. Change in 2005-2006 compared to the preOR – majority of the funds goes to the government. UNDP – the same, but now there are reversing. OSCE also want civil society programme. Very important private donors for CS- Soros, Mott. New DA donors: Visegrad states (CS, M, LG), Denmark (HR, CS, M)
Nations in Transit: improvements in the electoral process, CS and independent media International community of democratic states intervened at a deciding (??) moment for future of Ukraine ’ s democratic development (Youngs, 2006, p.101). US aid to electoral process, voter education, independent media support, NGO capacity building. EU financial support was less political, with two exceptions of Sweden and UK who did finance the exit polls. However, the EU provided the election observation and worked under the OSCE and the CoE scenes, but EU political intervention led by Kwasniewski, Solana and Adamkus has become crucial at the very moment of political conflict which was solved in favour of democracy. ((Youngs, 2006, p.109-111). Richard quoting Robert Cooper: the EU had in effect “done regime change in Ukraine”. US contribution – find a similar quote. USAID sponsored other implementing agencies actively supporting democratic consolidation in Ukraine, working directly with NDI, IRI, Freedom House, InterNews, and ABA/CEELI. The work of these groups in tandem with local activists and grassroots groups helped meet the demand of millions of Ukrainians for enhanced democracy and improved governance ( http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADE309.pdf ).
Internal: - Political instability (constant electoral campaign, blocked legislative, divided executive) - Lack of political will for reforms/National reform strategy is absent (Corporate interest prevails, corruption) Orange revolution was considered as a change in pace of reforms, but it is obvious that it takes longer at this level. Main problems appear in terms of government (governance). There has never been a cohesive reform strategy. Thus a non-questionable path is missing both at the side of institutions and donor face there is no coherent agreement on path of reforms. Government is exposed to very donor driven path of reform, donors are doing whatever they want and that does not always help. Unless there is a tripartisan consensus (does he mean government, CS and donors?) nothing can help much. Thus aid has limited impact. This situation is not unique fro Ukraine (Minakov) - Aid management (implementation the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness) External: - The a id effectiveness is often sacrificed to the donor safety (unwillingness to take risks, easy administration process). The DA providers have too formal approaches to aid (procedures, reporting), not always really follow up the aid impact Donors are not persistent is controlling the quality of the project implementation. They are more process than result oriented (Latsyba) Lack of flexibility on the part of donor (Marian) Strategic planning is absent: Project not process approach. - Irresponsible aid – when the aid feeds corruption, when the donors do not take any risks in case if there will be no result, no democratization, no commitments to the country
Crucial role in OR After OR: Brain drain ->Weakened capacity Donors ↓ aid (esp. ID), local resources – small New challenges: dialogue, impact on policy making, interest representation, financial sustainability Reversing trend –looking for local demand for reforms Good practices: capacity building, social mobilization+cooperation with local government (UNDP, US EEF), aid back-up (EU) 3 main problems: Financial stability Environment, legislation Partners for the public authorities and citizens. Dialogue and legitimacy
Building on the 14-year long experience of the Parliamentary Development Project of Ukraine (PDP), this three-year project, continues to provide technical assistance to Ukraine's Parliament and extends it to the Presidential Secretariat, the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and individual ministries. PDP-II focuses on efficient mechanisms of developing legislative policy and institutional capacity building of the legislative and executive branches of power. Objective 1: Raising the effectiveness and transparency of legislative and policy decision-making Objective 2: Greater interaction between power branches to institutionalize organizational development capacity Objective 3: Society will receive greater and more meaningful access to the legislative process The Parliamentary Internship Program was founded in 1995 and NED supported Yuth Alternative Students for Parliament since 1996 Має, але для цього має бути не короткотерміновим. Наш проект мало бюджетний за мірками USAID , 1 млн на рік. Важлива сталість, тривалість в часі.
Non-state actors (civil society, media) mention that very few opportunities exist for institutional capacity development. USAID mainly provides this type of support (UCAN, PACT). Other donor do not have purposeful activities. There was an effort of local Soros foundation. Mott, OSI Think Tank Fund and NED also provided some institutional grant, however, to a limited number of NGOs, basically those well developed and well trusted. Basically, what CSOs say that all the money they get from international donors are given to them as grants for their activities (research, events, publications). Moreover, donors are not very willing to put any administrative costs (salary costs, communal expenses) in these grants. Thus often CSOs has to make tricks to get money to pay, for example, for an accounting services.
1990s – support went for democratic pillars (civil society, media). This led to the influence of these two sectors on changes in 2004. After 2005 the support goes down considerably, but no influence at the public service. Everybody decided to give money to the government. As a result, the decrease of the support to the CS and media which now depend on the Ukrainian corporate sector. But there are a lack of credible media talking about the politics. The international aid goes in the wrong direction. There has been overestimation of the Orange revolution and underestimation of the civil society by the donors in Ukraine (Minakov). Майбутнє за місцевими фондами. Зміна буде коли, Фонд Ахметова буде давати гроші на те, на що дає Відродження.
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