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Introduction
                                            Advantages
                                     Skype Supernodes
                                                Botnet
                                             Our Model
                                               Features
                                 Communication protocol
                                           Experiments
                                            Limitations
                                      Countermeasures




   Take a deep breath: a Stealthy, Resilient and
        Cost-Effective Botnet Using Skype

        Antonio Nappa - Universit` degli studi di Milano
                                    a
        Aristide Fattori - Universit` degli studi di Milano
                                    a
      Marco Balduzzi - Eurecom, Sophia-Antipolis, France
     Matteo Dell’Amico - Eurecom, Sophia-Antipolis, France
Lorenzo Cavallaro - Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Nederlands




A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro   A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
Introduction
                                                 Advantages
                                          Skype Supernodes
                                                     Botnet
                                                  Our Model
                                                    Features
                                      Communication protocol
                                                Experiments
                                                 Limitations
                                           Countermeasures



Introduction



        Botnets are something that spreads along with “social software”
        (IRC, MSN, Skype, P2P clients, Facebook, Twitter).
        We observed the evolution of the botnet phenomenon and we
        individuate Skype as a possibile target to easily create a new botnet
        command and control channel.




     A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro   A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
Introduction
                                                Advantages
                                         Skype Supernodes
                                                    Botnet
                                                 Our Model
                                                   Features
                                     Communication protocol
                                               Experiments
                                                Limitations
                                          Countermeasures



Why Skype?


       We choose Skype because it is a widespread application, it has
       about 400 million of registered users and a daily presence of 50
       million of users. Furthermore we choose it because it has a lot of
       appealing functionalities (bypass NAT and firewalls, encrypted
       communications).
       We wanted to proof that is cost-effective and fast to build a botnet
       with this application API in order to validate our model.




    A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro   A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
Introduction
                                                 Advantages
                                          Skype Supernodes
                                                     Botnet
                                                  Our Model
                                                    Features
                                      Communication protocol
                                                Experiments
                                                 Limitations
                                           Countermeasures



Advantages

  Our solution is cost-effective because it is easy to deploy and has a lot of
  good functionalities (NAT and firewall passthrough, P2P structure)
        Botnet traffic indistiguishable from ordinary traffic
        No bottlenecks nor single point of failure
        Resiliency as the loss of one or many bots influences the
        infrastructure only slightly.
        Dynamic and transparent routing based on the Skype’s Usernames.
        We take advantage of Skype’s protection measures and P2P routing
        algorithms.



     A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro   A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
Introduction
                                                Advantages
                                         Skype Supernodes
                                                    Botnet
                                                 Our Model
                                                   Features
                                     Communication protocol
                                               Experiments
                                                Limitations
                                          Countermeasures



Supernodes




    A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro   A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
Introduction
                                                Advantages
                                         Skype Supernodes
                                                    Botnet
                                                 Our Model
                                                   Features
                                     Communication protocol
                                               Experiments
                                                Limitations
                                          Countermeasures



Botnet




  We propose a novel botnet model that exploits an overlay network such
  as Skype to build a parasitic overlay.




    A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro   A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
Introduction
                                                 Advantages
                                          Skype Supernodes
                                                     Botnet
                                                  Our Model
                                                    Features
                                      Communication protocol
                                                Experiments
                                                 Limitations
                                           Countermeasures



Our Model
  The parasitic overlay model is a botnet built on top of an instant
  messaging infrastructure using its features for non-standard operations.




  Our model is generic and can be shaped on different applications that
  support instant messaging.
     A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro   A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
Introduction
                                                 Advantages
                                          Skype Supernodes
                                                     Botnet
                                                  Our Model
                                                    Features
                                      Communication protocol
                                                Experiments
                                                 Limitations
                                           Countermeasures



Features



        it is hard to set bots and regular Skype traffic apart
        the lack of hierarchical structure allows to use any controlled node
        as an entry point for the master
        the policy adopted for registering new nodes makes it
        cost-unattractive to obtain a comprhensive list of all the bots.




     A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro   A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
Introduction
                                                 Advantages
                                          Skype Supernodes
                                                     Botnet
                                                  Our Model
                                                    Features
                                      Communication protocol
                                                Experiments
                                                 Limitations
                                           Countermeasures



Communication protocol


        To bootstrap each infected node sends a startup messages to its
        Gate Nodes embedded in the binary.
        The Gate Nodes are in contact with other nodes and the Master.
        The startup messages flows through the Gate Nodes and reach the
        Master.
        The Master answers to the infected node with a new set of
        neighbors.
        When the infected node has its new set of neighbors is able to
        communicate.



     A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro   A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
Introduction
                                                 Advantages
                                          Skype Supernodes
                                                     Botnet
                                                  Our Model
                                                    Features
                                      Communication protocol
                                                Experiments
                                                 Limitations
                                           Countermeasures



Communication protocol (2)



        In our botnet messages exchanged between bots and the master flow
        through the network as legitimate messages
        Usage of encryption to obtain unicast, multicast and broadcast
        communication
        Gnutella-like message passing procedure
        Ability to react in case of a total takeover of the Gate Nodes




     A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro   A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
Introduction
                                                 Advantages
                                          Skype Supernodes
                                                     Botnet
                                                  Our Model
                                                    Features
                                      Communication protocol
                                                Experiments
                                                 Limitations
                                           Countermeasures



Experiments
   We evaluated our model through accurate simulations recreating different
   botnet magnitudes and connectivity states (alive neighbors per node).




   The average distance between a node and the botmaster grows slowly
   with respect to the number of nodes in the botnet.
     A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro   A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
Introduction
                                                  Advantages
                                           Skype Supernodes
                                                      Botnet
                                                   Our Model
                                                     Features
                                       Communication protocol
                                                 Experiments
                                                  Limitations
                                            Countermeasures



Experiments (2) - Proof of Concept


   We created a small real-world scenario to verify our simulations results:
         PoC bot written in Python through Skype4Py libraries
         ∼ 40 hosts geographically distributed between France and Italy
         bootstrapping phase test, validation and measurements
         communication model test, validation and measurements
   We observed that the real-world scenario is compliant with the simulated
   one.




      A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro   A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
Introduction
                                                  Advantages
                                           Skype Supernodes
                                                      Botnet
                                                   Our Model
                                                     Features
                                       Communication protocol
                                                 Experiments
                                                  Limitations
                                            Countermeasures



Limitations


   One important limitation of our Skype botnet is the possibility of an
   external attacker to perpetrate a replay attack.
   This attack is done by repeatedly delivering announce messages to
   progressively obtain neighbor nodes lists during the bootstrap phase to
   obtain a map of the botnet.
   One possible mitigation is to limit the number of neighbor nodes sent to
   new bots within a defined temporal window.




      A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro   A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
Introduction
                                                  Advantages
                                           Skype Supernodes
                                                      Botnet
                                                   Our Model
                                                     Features
                                       Communication protocol
                                                 Experiments
                                                  Limitations
                                            Countermeasures



Discussion




   The availability of the API that can interact with Skype with full privilege
   raises security issues.




      A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro   A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
Introduction
                                                 Advantages
                                          Skype Supernodes
                                                     Botnet
                                                  Our Model
                                                    Features
                                      Communication protocol
                                                Experiments
                                                 Limitations
                                           Countermeasures



Countermeasures
  We developed a host-based countermeasure that intercepts the
  communications between the Skype API and a plugin, acting as a proxy.
  With this technique we are able to recognize every command issued by a
  plugin and we aim to find malicious command sequences. At the moment
  the rate of false positive is quite high. We are working on new heuristics
  to reduce this rate.




     A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro   A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
Introduction
                                                 Advantages
                                          Skype Supernodes
                                                     Botnet
                                                  Our Model
                                                    Features
                                      Communication protocol
                                                Experiments
                                                 Limitations
                                           Countermeasures



Questions




     A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro   A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype

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Skype Botnet Model Proposed

  • 1. Introduction Advantages Skype Supernodes Botnet Our Model Features Communication protocol Experiments Limitations Countermeasures Take a deep breath: a Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet Using Skype Antonio Nappa - Universit` degli studi di Milano a Aristide Fattori - Universit` degli studi di Milano a Marco Balduzzi - Eurecom, Sophia-Antipolis, France Matteo Dell’Amico - Eurecom, Sophia-Antipolis, France Lorenzo Cavallaro - Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Nederlands A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
  • 2. Introduction Advantages Skype Supernodes Botnet Our Model Features Communication protocol Experiments Limitations Countermeasures Introduction Botnets are something that spreads along with “social software” (IRC, MSN, Skype, P2P clients, Facebook, Twitter). We observed the evolution of the botnet phenomenon and we individuate Skype as a possibile target to easily create a new botnet command and control channel. A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
  • 3. Introduction Advantages Skype Supernodes Botnet Our Model Features Communication protocol Experiments Limitations Countermeasures Why Skype? We choose Skype because it is a widespread application, it has about 400 million of registered users and a daily presence of 50 million of users. Furthermore we choose it because it has a lot of appealing functionalities (bypass NAT and firewalls, encrypted communications). We wanted to proof that is cost-effective and fast to build a botnet with this application API in order to validate our model. A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
  • 4. Introduction Advantages Skype Supernodes Botnet Our Model Features Communication protocol Experiments Limitations Countermeasures Advantages Our solution is cost-effective because it is easy to deploy and has a lot of good functionalities (NAT and firewall passthrough, P2P structure) Botnet traffic indistiguishable from ordinary traffic No bottlenecks nor single point of failure Resiliency as the loss of one or many bots influences the infrastructure only slightly. Dynamic and transparent routing based on the Skype’s Usernames. We take advantage of Skype’s protection measures and P2P routing algorithms. A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
  • 5. Introduction Advantages Skype Supernodes Botnet Our Model Features Communication protocol Experiments Limitations Countermeasures Supernodes A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
  • 6. Introduction Advantages Skype Supernodes Botnet Our Model Features Communication protocol Experiments Limitations Countermeasures Botnet We propose a novel botnet model that exploits an overlay network such as Skype to build a parasitic overlay. A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
  • 7. Introduction Advantages Skype Supernodes Botnet Our Model Features Communication protocol Experiments Limitations Countermeasures Our Model The parasitic overlay model is a botnet built on top of an instant messaging infrastructure using its features for non-standard operations. Our model is generic and can be shaped on different applications that support instant messaging. A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
  • 8. Introduction Advantages Skype Supernodes Botnet Our Model Features Communication protocol Experiments Limitations Countermeasures Features it is hard to set bots and regular Skype traffic apart the lack of hierarchical structure allows to use any controlled node as an entry point for the master the policy adopted for registering new nodes makes it cost-unattractive to obtain a comprhensive list of all the bots. A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
  • 9. Introduction Advantages Skype Supernodes Botnet Our Model Features Communication protocol Experiments Limitations Countermeasures Communication protocol To bootstrap each infected node sends a startup messages to its Gate Nodes embedded in the binary. The Gate Nodes are in contact with other nodes and the Master. The startup messages flows through the Gate Nodes and reach the Master. The Master answers to the infected node with a new set of neighbors. When the infected node has its new set of neighbors is able to communicate. A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
  • 10. Introduction Advantages Skype Supernodes Botnet Our Model Features Communication protocol Experiments Limitations Countermeasures Communication protocol (2) In our botnet messages exchanged between bots and the master flow through the network as legitimate messages Usage of encryption to obtain unicast, multicast and broadcast communication Gnutella-like message passing procedure Ability to react in case of a total takeover of the Gate Nodes A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
  • 11. Introduction Advantages Skype Supernodes Botnet Our Model Features Communication protocol Experiments Limitations Countermeasures Experiments We evaluated our model through accurate simulations recreating different botnet magnitudes and connectivity states (alive neighbors per node). The average distance between a node and the botmaster grows slowly with respect to the number of nodes in the botnet. A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
  • 12. Introduction Advantages Skype Supernodes Botnet Our Model Features Communication protocol Experiments Limitations Countermeasures Experiments (2) - Proof of Concept We created a small real-world scenario to verify our simulations results: PoC bot written in Python through Skype4Py libraries ∼ 40 hosts geographically distributed between France and Italy bootstrapping phase test, validation and measurements communication model test, validation and measurements We observed that the real-world scenario is compliant with the simulated one. A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
  • 13. Introduction Advantages Skype Supernodes Botnet Our Model Features Communication protocol Experiments Limitations Countermeasures Limitations One important limitation of our Skype botnet is the possibility of an external attacker to perpetrate a replay attack. This attack is done by repeatedly delivering announce messages to progressively obtain neighbor nodes lists during the bootstrap phase to obtain a map of the botnet. One possible mitigation is to limit the number of neighbor nodes sent to new bots within a defined temporal window. A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
  • 14. Introduction Advantages Skype Supernodes Botnet Our Model Features Communication protocol Experiments Limitations Countermeasures Discussion The availability of the API that can interact with Skype with full privilege raises security issues. A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
  • 15. Introduction Advantages Skype Supernodes Botnet Our Model Features Communication protocol Experiments Limitations Countermeasures Countermeasures We developed a host-based countermeasure that intercepts the communications between the Skype API and a plugin, acting as a proxy. With this technique we are able to recognize every command issued by a plugin and we aim to find malicious command sequences. At the moment the rate of false positive is quite high. We are working on new heuristics to reduce this rate. A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype
  • 16. Introduction Advantages Skype Supernodes Botnet Our Model Features Communication protocol Experiments Limitations Countermeasures Questions A.Nappa, A.Fattori, M.Balduzzi, M.Dell’Amico, L.Cavallaro A Stealthy, Resilient and Cost-Effective Botnet using Skype