12. The information gained from the analysis of pollen
and spore evidence has many possible uses. It can
link a suspect or object to the crime scene or the
victim, prove or disprove a suspect’s alibi, include
or exclude suspects, track the previous
whereabouts of some item or suspect, or indicate
the geographical origin of some item.
PowerPoint PresentationPhysical EvidencePurpose of
Examining Physical EvidenceIdentificationCommon Types of
IdentificationComparisonThe Forensic Comparison
ProcedureRole of ProbabilityClassifying
CharacteristicsIndividual CharacteristicsClass
CharacteristicsClass EvidenceValue of Class EvidenceValue of
Class EvidenceValue of Class EvidenceCrossing OverNatural
vs. Evidential LimitsForensic DatabasesSlide 19Slide
20Forensic Palynology
ASIAN POLITICAL THOUGHT
TIMOTHY J. LOMPERIS
Saint Louis University
S cholars of Westem political thought have .not dis-puted the
fact that there is a rich body of political thought in Asia. They
lmve just not bothered to
incorporate it into their corpus. This chapter seeks to pro-
vide long-overdue recognition to this body of thought by
calling attention to the fact that despite its heavy religious
content (until modern times), the encounter with political
ideas in Asia is just as profound as it is in the West. In fact,
since these ideas in Asia are heavily fertilized by their
Western colonial legacy, the West has much to learn about
13. itself from these Asian borders to the West's material and
intellectual reach.
In this presentation of Asian political thought, what will
emerge is that the such central ideas as democracy,ji-eedom,
and equality were forn1ed in a historical context different
from the West. In the West, these ideas were expressed and
then refined through a prism of small city-states in Greece,
the universal empire of Rome, the subsequent collapse of this
imperium politically but its persistence intellectually in the
Thomist medieval synthesis, the smashing fem1ent (both
intellectually and institutionally) of the Renaissance and the
Reformation, and the birth of the modern nation-state in
the twin crucibles of the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648) and
the French Revolution (1789-1795).
In Asia, these same ideas have been definitionally fil -
tered through a different historical stage in a play of three
acts. The first act is the traditional or classical era before
the Westem contact. We will see what from this period
endures as a mark today of"Asianness." The second act is
560
a scrutiny of the trauma of the colonial expericm:e. l Ji.,c
vast majority of Asian societies, either directly or mth,
rectly, came under Western eolonial eonlrol ur unikJ
spheres of Western influence. Ilow to react to thi:. in1m.:,;,11n1
precipitated a major ctisis but also resulted in a rid1 1md,
lectuaI fennent that produced the first articulu!il ,,i,. ,•I•
Asia's nationalisms. The third act is the modern t'-Cn<"'I
from the end of World War II to the present, when Asi,l ,,.,,,,.
set free on its own independent course. This has raised the
question, Whither modern Asia? Is Asia no dilforcnl lh•.m
a common globalizing world, or docs something llbtut.:,
tively Asian remain about its political thought'!
14. In these three acts, we will examine Asian conct.•p!s tiflhc
state and of statecraft, as well as or military grand s1m1cg1e:"'
and views on social equity and gender as they relate Ill th1..""'
three concepts. The focus will be on India um! Chinn
because these two ancient polities form the foundalillm1l p1J,
lam of Asia. Japan will also be given considerable atlcntiun.
along with some references to Korea. Southeast Asia will be
considered not so much as individual countries but us a
region tl1at has always been a tempestuous battleground
between Indian and Chinese ideas and institutions.
Theoretical Approach
Insofar as the political thought of Asia crune to the atten~
tion of Western political theorists, it tended to be painted.in
the broad brushes of overgeneralization. Karl Marx, In
outlining the global stages to his class struggle, wrote ol' an
"Asiatic mode of production" (quoted in Tucker, 1972,
p. 5), which he chanu.:terizcd as a labtir-inlcnsivc agricul-
tural society. Writing in this tradition, Karl Wlltfogcl
(1957) spelled this out as a form of "Oriental despotism"
ari::dng from the need to secure the necessary c()rvcc lnbor
to support the rice culture of what he termed "hydrau I ie soci -
ety." Taking a more cultural perspective, F. 8. ( •. Nm1hrnp
(l 946) distinguished Asia as having a more aesthetic
weltanschuuung than the scientific West. Ruther than the
clear subject object divide in the West, Asia, Northrop
contended, charted rculity along a mme l'lisctl aesllwtk
continuum, thereby creating different logics aml perel!p·
tions about the world.
More recuntly, such politit.:al scientists .is Lucian Pye
15. (1985) nml Duniel Bell (2000) have rl!nmrked on thu <lit:.
fcrent conceptions Asians bring to politics. To both, these
differencus require dcmocruey, in pnrticu lur. ltl undergo
considemble modiliculion for uny sm:ccssful transplanta-
tion to Asia. For Pye, the dwnges will have to allow for
a more dependent and paternal understunding (and accep-
tance) of pnwer. And ftir Bell, for Asia to be 1:0111fortable
with dcmocmcy, democracy will have tll give a special
place to knowledge over and above mere de111ucmtk
egalitarianism.
This is because idem; of <lcniocrncy, lh.:cdt1111, and
equality have developed llUt 01'11 historical context dillcr -
ent frnm the West':-. This conh:xt has led to cnndusions nn
the grnunding or these idl!as that are also ditforcnt from the
conclusions or the West. Put simply. We!itcrn pulitkal
thought is grounded in the individual as Liu: hash.: unit nf
politics, and in equality, in stm1c liirm, as the al·t·cptcd
basis for human relations ,md pnlitiL'al ruk. In the Asian
context, political thtiu~ht came lo h1: tn1t11Hk•d in the
group, not the individual. and in hicmn:hy. nut cqual1ty. As
shall be dear from the dL1scrir1tio11 ol' thi.: Ctlltcxt nr thn:L·
historical nets. the contact or the idem; ot' dcnwL·mcy. fret.··
dom, and equality with Asia calls liir some rcformulatiun.
In line, thi:; elrnpter explains that in 1assing these ll1rcL~
ideas lhrnugh an Asian histurical t:ncmmtcr. rnlL' L',111 ant n•
at l'icbl.!1 nmlticulturnl dcliliitions of sul'h scl'n1111~ly
11111-
versal political ideas.
Classical Asia
Asia has provided an arena for all the wnrld's value sys-
tems. Hinduism is the oldest. Its earliest forms wcrc
similar to the religion and idt:us or the ancient tircck:i.
Perhaps the Indo-Aryan invaders llf the lndiun subcun-
16. ti nent effaced the smne Triple Cfoddess m errun by
Jason and his Greek Argon11uts in the Black Seu city of
Colchis. In any case. Hinduism emerged in the first mil·
Jenni um BCE as 11 religion and political culture of conquest.
Buddhism amse later as a sort of L.utl1eran relbnnation to
Hinduism. ll held distinctly gentler political ideas. This
gentler failh, however, was literally obliterated by Muslim
Asian Political Tlumgllt • 561
invasions inlo the subcontinent that began in the 8th cen-
tury CE. (Buddhism went on lo thrive in China, Japan,
Korea, and Southeast Asia.) These new invaders oscil -
lated between two upproaches in !heir new dominions.
One was lo extenninule opposition and fon:c Islam by the
sword. The other wai; to cooperate with local power
groups and rule by accommodation. As it spread to
Southensl Asia, Islam became more modcrule and diffuse
in its ideas uml practices.
In ( 'hina around the 6th century llCE, Confucianism
devdopcd its own order among society, nature, and the
cosmos. This onlcring ririnciple, ul' the dual forces of yin
and ynng, was nn early portrait or u hisloricul dialectic sim-
ilar to that in the writings or I leraclitus, l Jegcl, und Marx.
Whill! ( 'onl'udanism prnpoundcd a rigidly hiernrchicul
sociopnlitkal order, the "turning or the wheel" from
I h1ddhism .ind the "rt.:version or the Dao" from Daoism
i1HrmluL:ed the idea or redprndty. Mencius politicized the
mlc or the emperor by entrusting him with the Mm1datc of
I leaven, but in tying this mandate lo rcciprodty, Mencius
also gave the pt.!nplc lhe right of revolution. Daoism aducd
the 111ystic:il and th! mugical to this mix. For all its order,
this ancient C 'hine:-.c system g.iw hirth lo II rom:111cc or
prntcst, with sage-knights :11.:ting as Robin I lomls. These
liilk hemes later inspired modern revolutionaries such ns
17. Man Zi..•dung ( Sehwarl/, I t>H5).
In this Asim1 tlranm. us in Europe. !here has been a grad-
ual gnmch ll( sl!cularism. But motkrn seculari:m1 has
lll'l.'I' been ,umplctcly succcssfiil in lndiu, and religion has
never d11:d III C 'hi1111. ln India, religion rl!prcsc11ts ll com-
pktL' ,alue system. This llca:ily religious value system,
hmn.' er. did nut predutk lengthy and systl!mmic trcal-
1111.•111 or p111iti17;d qucsti1111s. Tiu: cpk M11//ahh,m11a
eon-
1.1111, lung 11nhtiL'al t!ssa;·s 1111 st,ltl.'cra Ii, kingship. and
n11 ll1,1ry sllalcg~. One .mdcnt text. Kautilya 's :lrtlwshustm.
mtrndun::, all Mm:hiavdli's i,kas ;ibmu puliticul sur,,ivtd
nH11~· th,111 a lhm1sand yl!:11s carlii:r than The flrifl<'<'
cBasham. I ll~<lJ. < 'hma ,lc111t111stratcd a 1111)rc rnhust
tradi-
111111 111' sc·ularism, partly bc,·imsc tinnu:ianism never
r,•ally addn:s~cd the ,111est11m ti!' ( iud. Buddhism lilied this
~.:ap 1111: I i:}lahsrs a11cmptl.'d t11 plan' law as a hight'r
prin-
dpk of stil'.1al urdcnllJ! than cosntiL' rhytluns uf yin and
yan~i Bui d;,n;1stic mkrs prd~m:d the mnhiguitics or the
,:m,rnus to th1: l'.i1ncrch: l'Ullstraints ur the law. ln C 'hina,
11111, as tn ;111 Asia, r1.•ligion stayed on lop, li1: -i11g
society
am.I pulitks tu thL' sum:lity. sam:tiuns. und politicul pmtcc-
lltHI ur the ~.mb ( Schw.ir11. I tJX5 ).
Mme than 1m lop. lhc Y.um1111 cl.Ill in .htpan proclaimed
thl'llh,dH:s to he g.utls. In their :-;uccc:;s, they lmvc provided
Jupan with the lungcst single line nfldngs in world history
irnd 11 scnsL~ uf natkmalis111 and ethnic ic.lt::ntity thut runs
very dccf1. Although "divinely" rnled, the Japanese never
!MIW themselves us holding lhc gntewuy ttl heaven. They
were. then, nut averse tCl btim1wing, and they k1oked to
C'onfuchmism and Buddhism to order their slate and mean•
18. ing system. lronfo:nlly, integn1ting this borrowing into
indigenuus Shinto belie£.. became men's work. The further
562 • POLITICAL THOUGHT
development of Japanese culture-its novels, ceremonies,
and haiku poetry-was left to the creative talents of
women. Although gods reigned, warriors m led and warred
in Japan. A strong knightly code of Bushido steeled the rul-
ing samurai class in the political culture of the warrior-
ruler-knights (Yuzan, 1941).
Meanwhile, great kingdoms arose in Southeast Asia,
mostly on borrowed Hindu ideas transmitted by Theravada
Buddhism from Sri Lanka (Ceylon). There was the
Kingdom ofTen Thousand Elephants in Laos, Borobuddur
and Bali in Indonesia, and the Khmer empire in Cambodia.
The latter's capitol, Angkor Wat, is still the largest reli -
gious building complex ever built. Political ideas and insti -
tutions in this porous, vulnerable region were mostly
Indian (the Chinese influences in Vietnam were the notable
exception), but the societies of much of Southeast Asia
were ethnically Malay and were held together mainly by
their customa1y adat, or customs. These customs set up
three social classes (a ruling aristocracy, free land holders,
and slaves) bound together in a network of mutual obliga-
tions and responsibilities. In this adat, property and author -
ity could be held and inherited just as easily by women as
by men. When the Muslims came to Southeast Asia in the
13th and 14th centuries, they had about run out their polit-
ical tether and lacked the vehemence that they displayed in
India. They superimposed the veneer of their sultanates
on Malaya and Indonesia but were content to have the
sultanates upheld by Hindu and Buddhist political princi -
19. ples and by tl1e Malay social adat (Tambiah, 1976).
In classical Asia, then, politics were decidedly authori -
tarian, and more specifically tegal, rather than democratic.
In India, nevertheless, besides just guaranteeing order, or
danda, kings were obliged to promote the welfare of the
people. In China, this promotion extended to the principle
of reciprocity and even to tl1e right of the people to rebel.
Nevertheless, freedom in classical Asia was more of a reli -
gious goal than a political right: freedom from the cycle of
rebirths in India and in the cultivation of an inner peace of
the soul in China. Thus, in both societies, freedom was a
private preserve separate from the crush of public (com-
munal, religious, and political) responsibilities and duties.
ln these feudal systems of Asia, these responsibilities were
mainly to hierarchically ordered groups. Equality, then,
was a relative value and was tied to the status and position
of one's group compared with others. Any equivalence to
modem Western ideas of equality could be procured only
within one's group (and primarily for one's family), not
outside it.
Colonial Asia
The conquests of Western imperialism shattered this order.
Most of Asia was directly colonized. Even those who
escaped direct rule--like the Japanese, Koreans, Chinese,
and Thai-were still pulled into an international political
and economic system dominated by Western imperial
powers. Because Asian polities had unbroken insliluti<mal
histories for two millennia (in some cases), punclmllcd hy
their own moments of glory, the question ol' how to h<1th
accommodate and account for this Western imposi1inn
and superiority provoked deep soul-scan:hing among
Asians.
20. Nowhere was this more deeply felt than in India, which
became the crown jewel of the British Empire ur 50
colonies worldwide. Some Indians embraced Western civ·
ilization. The British Viceroy, Lord Thomas Macuulay,
was pa1tial1y successful in creating "a class of pen.tin!>,
Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinion.
in morals, and in intellect" (Spear, 1961, p. 257). L,ucr.
these scions were called "Brown Sahibs." In lllrtl1emncc uf
this strategy, the British invested in a modern u11ivcr:s1ly
system for India. A proud accompl ishmenl or tit is sysl~m
was the Nobel Prize for Literature in I 9 l3 won hy the
Bengali intellectual Rubindranath Tagore, writing in the
King's English (Metcalf~ 200 l ).
Following in the wake of the British nti were legions l!f
Christian missionaries who preached their "good news" nnrd
practiced their social gospel with institutions tif Slll.'.utl
reform. Beyond a nationwide network of sclmols, !he) :-11.*l
up hospitals, orphanages, homes for widows, lcpru:owm·
ums, demonstration farms for peasant laborers, and s<l('1;1I
services for outcasts. Many Hindus, nlthough leery tif Ill<
"good news," eagerly took up this cause or social rcfnrm
and, in the Bmhmo Samaj of the 19th century. launched
their own social gospel of reform or some or the ills ,md
neglects of Hinduism. Muslims displayed a split rc.ic1nin
to the Empire. Since they were lndia's previous ruler,..,
some resisted, and they went down to defeat in the Mulm~
of 1857. Others, such as Sir Sayccc.l Ahmntl Khan. anii.:u,
lated a path of accommodation with the British, insisun~
that Islam had no objections to at least the polith!ul culturlZ
of the West. Indeed, as a monotheistic "religion ur thi:
Book," Islam was the more naturnl ally of this culture th;m
was polytheistic Hinduism. Still othern were nol so ~ur~
of either the Hindus or the British {Pye, 19K5). It ~;1,
Mohammed Iqbal--poet, theologian, aml political thcmbt
21. who gave eloquent voice to a separate destiny !hr Mm,hm~
in the subcontinent (Malik, 1971 ).
Although never a directly ruled colony, the reacliun m
China was equally intense. Tiananmen Square in Bcijini
was an architectural declaration that it wus the gateway h1
Heaven. British gunboats brought a string of military
humiliations that shattered this gateway. A man who
dreamed that he was the younger brother of Jesus Chri~t
proclaimed a new portal and led the biwrre Taipinl:l,
Rebellion of the 1850s and 1860s. The movement also
preached equality for women and, at first, democracy. In
its suppression, it might have been dismissed as one of
those oddities of history, were it not for tho subsequent
influence the rebellion had on Mao Zedong and other rev-
olutionary modernizers (Ogden, 2002).
Meanwhile, the Qing Dynasty, Chinn 's last, made
earnest attempts at rcthnn. Western education replaced
classical texts for imperial civil service examinations.
Principles of constitutional democracy and parliamentary
elections were introdul!cd, as were modern railroads, mili~
tary academies, and financial institutionH. ln 1911, the
mixture of protest and reform exploded into a nationalist
revolution and a nearly 40-ycar interregnum of ehaos.
Intellectually, the boiling cuuldron of this ferment was
known ns the Muy Fourth Movement. In I.he lrnmilintion of
the demands of the upstart .lapuncse for the Shamlong
Peninsula al the Peace Conlcrcncc at Vcrsail lcs in May
1919, Chinese intellectuals dcspcralcly cast about for :1
prescription for modern power: in the prnginalism and lib-
eralism of John Dewey and the United States, in the mi li-
tarism from Germany und Japan, in language rel'nrm and
mass education, in physical culture and the cmtmdpalion
22. of women, in the assassirrntions und eomnurncs ol' mwr-
chism, and even in the communism of Karl Marx and the
Bolshevism or Russia (Zhou, I %0).
Then: was ferment in Southeast Asia as wdl. Pemmnts,
in a series of protests a Iler World Wnl' I. decried the col -
lapse of 11 trnditional social and political order guaranteed
by a royalty and l'cudal rctuincrs lhut used to sali!guard
their livelihoods and provide a sense of place anti security
by the Mandate ol' lh:avcn (in Vietnam), tile will tif Alluh
(in Malaya and lndoncsiu), the mandalu pallcm t1f pnlitks
and international relations ( in Thailand und Camhmlia ),
and u transl'ernl or mcril from Buddha (in Burma anti
Laos). Arter an initial. if reluctunt, uccommodatiun with
Western power and political institutions, these peasants
and emerging intcllcctuuls searched for thdr own h:rms nf
modern survival. The Cao Dai sect in Vietnam, whkh wnr-
shippcd nn all-seeing cosmic eye as interpreted hy Vklor
Hugo, Jesus Christ, Confucius, l.no Till, and foan uf An:.
il!ustrntcd this perplexity. The mood of rcsil,!nation lo thl'sc
confusing, but powerllil, outside forces was captmcd h~
the popult11· J tJth-century cpk pnl"m in Vietnam. K.mr nm
Kie11. This poem was a creative remake of :rn oltl ( 'him:sc
stmy nf n liliu I daughter who slays lrnc !ti her 1mtk:scn inµ
folhcr in a lire of untold sulforing but stcmlfosl ticvnlmn.
These r,casant protests, then. grew out ol' lh1:-.tr;itinns 1i 1.•r
their dcvoli(lll lo u traditional structure that could no lunger
i;ccnre this order ( Kershaw, 200 I),
In Japan in IX53. the conuncrciid viiiit or the ll.S,
naval communder ( 'ommodurc Matthew Purry found the
Japanese nt a moment in their history when they were
ready for an opening frorn the outsil.le. Their mature lcu-
dal order had reached a point of stugnutitm. A knightly
class of samurai undergirded an aristocracy that hdli the
emperor ho::.tage, even a:. this monarchy as an insliluticm
23. provided continuity, identity, and n sense of co::.mic pluce
for all Japanese. In the name or restoring the emperor to
real power (somwjoi), aristCJcratic modernizers overthrew
this samurai-dominated regime in what was called 1he
Meiji Restoration. The Meiji Constitution established a
Asian Political Thm1gltt • 563
liberal parliamentary system in the name of the c11111cror.
But for all this constilutiomdism, the fapancse actually
modcrnizcc.l through a military path of war with China
lirsl ( 1895) uml then Russia ( 1905; Gluck, 1985 ). Along
with these impressive manilestations of modem power,
the continued hold of samumi vnlucs, for all this Mcij i
"liberalism," wus nurtured by the.: education of all
Japuncse school children in rne Stm:v <!l tlw 47 Ronin, in
which linal loyalty was still given to extreme profossinns
of honor, in the nmnc of the cmpcrur. It was u path that
tumbled Japan into World Wur [I, its grculcst national
disaster (Bcncdict, 1946).
The fonnent touched off by European imperialism in
Asia was uot exclusively one wny. Eumpcans who had
prolonged coutad with Asian srn.:ictics were ol'tcn sur-
prised at what they saw. Despite their political wcuknusscs,
thc:;c sm:ictics revealed sophisticated and well-articulated
cultures. A lwst or scholars called "Oricnlnl ists," muny of
whom had served us colonial mlministrutors, begun to
trm1sl:rte hack for Eumpcun m1dicnces the ''pearls of the
Orient": thc philnsophk Upam):lwcls und the twin epics,
lite Me1lwhlwratll und the Ramaymw. from India, and tl1c
Analects 11( C1111/iwiu.~ nnd the J.>cw d<• Jing of Luo Dzc
( Lao Tzu) from C'hinn. Thc 111,ist mnbiti11us ,1 l' these rro-
jccts wai; thl.' I 11lh-ccntury "Ooldcn Bough" i,;crics of trans-
lations into Fnµlisl1. sponsm·cd by I lnrvard University, of
nwsl of' Asi,1 's linesl truditional work$. Thb impact, hnw -
24. evcr, was nmrc llum just inlhrmntivc. tdcas Ihm, these
trnnslatinns wor'ked their way into the transl:cntlcntulism
of the New Fn~land liM·ati (particularly on Ralph Waldo
Fmcrsun "m,crsntil"), us well us into lhc philosophic
syst~·ms o!' Martin l lcidcggcr and Fl'icdrich Nictzscl1c
and cwn into the 1111vcl:,; of' I krman flcssc, among others
tUarkc, PN7J.
l ln/<Htunatcly, some uf this nunantic "llricntulism"
tumi.nl p·ncrsc. ln thi:-. disc1wcry ,11'thc deep 1.:ulll1ral
ronls
,11' Asta. so1111.: Wcstcm sdmlars. partirnl.irly Uennau,
bt:g.111 h1 s1.•c llwmsclvl.'s ,ls dc!>ccndants or an elite lndo-
Ary,111 hru1h1:rhoud thal 1.•xtcmlcd from lhl.' Indus River hi
tht• Rhme ( M ulkr, It) 19 t ( icnnan natitmal sncinlism sub-
scqmmtly appr,1priatcll th!.' andeut I lrndu symhnl li.1r uni-
versal hrnthcrhnnd ns the i:cntcrptcL·e lo iii; !lag, !he
s,~ astil-.a
At lirst lfollcrcd by this ,11tcnlio11, mrnlcrn Asi,1n inkl -
kduals for their part hi.'.gun to resist this drnrnctcrizutiun
of a si:p.iwtc t1ric111albm us 1ant:111m11nt to u
i.:ivilizutimrnl
dismiss,11 similar tn the "sep,1rntc but cquul" kg:il <lm:trine
in the t Jnitcd States lhut scrvcll In perpchmlc racinl dis-
crimination. Whether intdlcdual trnditions prnduuc cul-
turally distinct idem, nr whether universal ideas fhrm uml
recllmbinc tlu~mselvcs 11rnuml different inlellectual tnu.Ji -
tions is II pervasive isi.ue of cpisternolt1gy. For the !ltudy of
political though! in Ash1, however, the unfortunate effect
of c,ricn1ali:.m has been to dismiss pol itic11I Lhllughl in Asia
as being lou cfosely Lied to religious constructiuns to be
worthy of secular analytical scrutiny.
25. 564 • POLITICAL THOUGHT
Modern Asia
World War II (1939-1945) brought disaster to Europe.
Even in victory, the power of Britain and France collapsed,
and, with that collapse, their empires unraveled and their
hold over Asia ended. In independence, not always easily
gained, Asia was now free to find itself and define politics
in ways authentic to a free Asia and to the particular set of
traditional legacies and aspirations of each of its societies.
In this mix of the traditional and the colonial, what set of
political ideas and institutions would serve independent
Asian nations still having to fend for themselves in an
international system of Western creation and continued
dominance? In Asia's postwar trajecto1y of growing eco-
nomic prosperity and rising global political influence,
answers to this question have produced rich and innovative
contributions to the ongoing development of political
thought per se.
After World War II, all of Asia wanted to regain what
Asian counh·ies saw as their lost importance in the world.
Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of India,
expressed these hopes for all Asians when, in his exultant
Independence Day speech on August 15, 194 7, he
declared, "Long years ago, we made a tryst with destiny,
and now the time comes when we shall redeem our
pledge" (cited in Hardgrave & Kochanek, 2000, p. 53).
Colonialism, he argued, had drained the wealth and ener-
gies of Asia, and now it would just flow back (Nehm,
1959). Although it certainly did not flow back right away,
in the opening years of the 21st centu1y, this tryst with a
recaptured Asian global importance seems well within
reach.
26. The Indian subcontinent, however, has been plagued by
serious differences both as to how to attain an independent
India and as to what it would look like. The towering fig-
ures in this agony were Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi.
Gandhi was the moral father of modem India. After travel-
ing around India for 4 years after his return from South
Africa at the age of 41 in 1915, Gandhi discovered his
three themes of poverty, unity, and indepe11dence. As he
made the continuation of British rule untenable, he won-ied
about an India "in pursuit of Lakshmi" (wealth), freed
from the moderating restraints of religion. Thus, even as he
dete1mined to entrust the future course of India to Nehru,
he was troubled by the younger man's Hamlet-like agnos-
ticism (Gandhi, 1957),
Nehru epitomized Macaulay's "Brown Sahib," and
Nehru's highly cerebral autobiography, The Discovery of
India (1946/1959), was really an m1iculation of his own
divided soul. His professed admiration for the ancient
Hindu scriptures and epics was profoundly philosophical
and somewhat idealized. He prefen·ed to highlight the
moments of unity and power and gloss over the divisions
and wars oflndia's past. He could not bring himself to take
this philosophical appreciation to a spiritual awakening.
For Nehru, the influences of a secular English liberalism
were too strong for this. To him, the best (ll' India lay in ii,
moments of unity around a clwkravarti11, or unh·cr::;.;tj
emperor, such as Ashoka, Harsha, or Akbar. lkcatbC or
India's deep religious and social divides, Nchm felt that
this unity could come, in modern times, only under a ~c,
ular India united by Western principles of lihcrnl <lcmoc~
racy. The Congress Party was rounded with this as its cor~
credo. Unfortunately, Nehru dulled his ccom1mks h~
embracing the socialism of the British Fuhi:ms 11nd lh~
Russian Bolsheviks (he expressed a continual admimtii1ri
27. for the accomplishments of the 5-year pluns of the Smil.'!t
Union). Under Nehru's lcadcrshi11 as prime 1m1w,ter
(l 947-1964), Lakshmi, the goddess or wt:ullh, rcmainql
aloof (Nehru, 1946/1959).
Although Gandhi and Nehru were the gi,mh, ,•1111:r
voices arose in the subcontinent. lronknlly cm111f.!h.
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the father or mmh:rn P.iJ..1,tiln.
shared Nehru's secularism cwn as he insislcd utt .1 ""r-t-
rate Muslim state. 01hers in Pakistan ct1llcd for thi., ,1a1c !11
be subservient lo the Jslmnh: Shari'a. This tlni~Ml h;t~
brought the country to the brink of im11lnsiu11 o',;:f the
never-healing sore ol' Kashmir and the recent rc.:rhtr.1.
tions of Islamic radicalism lhm1 Al'glmnishm ,md d•.:.
where in the Muslim wmld. There huvc 1-»!cll ~t,nl
voices in Hinduism a.s well. The terrorism c"~m,<J
B. K. Tilak heforc World Wur I and the foi.l.'.bm ul :,iubt,Jt,
Chandra Bose in World War II round exprc,,u,n 111
Hindu commtmalism or !-;anlar Vullahhhlmi fl,itd, S<ltni
co-prime minister in tht: lirst 2 yc.ir.. ol' imkf"Cltt!,;rt;,;,t
Patel died of u heaii attack, but these :-;c·cral d1 MH"
~,~i1~.h
collected into the I lindu nationalism or Mr .. l . :tlur,,i
the Bharaliyu Janata Prniy, whkh is now a crn:,10,1! 11,~,i,,,i,
•• r
rival to the secular Congn.:ss Party, J ndia :md l',1!..1~tu1
confront each other us nuclear powl.'r,. ;m~I ,a,1,,>f-h,;r.
chnkrnvartin, in this lcnxe sube~intinent. b n,• h~~.: i:i
(Mehta, 1996).
ln China. the lirst coherent voit:I..' tu nrlt:'11t1t· ..;i
modernization out or the swirling slt;1ml, nl
Fourth Movcnicnl was Sun Y,ll·scn, ht1 ,hl1.,i,,,.l1c~£ 1
min cl111yi (thrnc people's prindplci.l tit' l"'-'''l'k',.
hoot!, people's rule, aml pcopk:'s na1i111rnli"m lh.:
to uphold China's traditional Mandatc ul' lk.1'l'.!I lt,i:
28. was translated into rural lil'c as "lm1d tu the U!lt·11"
1,H:~0;r:..:
that the communists later tried to cull their 1m nl t
second principle, tkmocrm;y, Sun culkd l!if ;1
to constitutional democracy in ('hinu th1,•uih 1IM:i,i
stages of tutelage. In pructic<!, Sun's p-ohtn;;:il
Gumnindang, could not pull it utl It hin.::b'l;d
between the Christian sucial gospel of the Nt'iil
Movement and an Italian-like fascism or Bill(;' ShtJ1
pline, all the while continuing in a reluclJUlOI: •~
power. Even as Sun's ideology tailed in ChtnL rl
the basis for the subsequent ecunomic mime:le <m
It also desctibes the long path taken by South
economic prosperity and a lagged followint4, of
perity to full democracy (Wells, 200 I),
r
I
Another failure was the Hu Shih liberals, who
embraced linguistic reform and lJ.S."style demrn.:rac y. This
faction was discredited by President Woodrow Wilson's
treachery at the Treaty of Versailles (in acquiescing to
granting the Concession of lhe Slrnndong Peninsula lo
Japan, mther than his public promise that it would he
returned to China), even us it went on to discredit itself
domestically by joining with the left-wing branch of the
Guomindang in the strategic historical error of siding with
the Japanese in their puppet stnlc of Manchukuo.
The communists were the ultimate victors in holh the
civil war with the Guomindang um] in the articulation of
modern China. Although the form or government came
straight from Lenin, Mm1 Zedong; frirmulaled u 110vel strat-
29. egy of revolution-e•people's war an<l introdw.:ed :;cveral
innovative political projects and organizations, most or
them disastrous. It was Deng Xiao Ping. the architect ol"
China's unprccl.!denled current economic gmwth, who
reintroduced to China a pragmatism worthy or both
Machiavelli and Adam Smith. This was reflected in his
legendary question about the importance of the color oflhe
cal as long as it could cutch mice. The credit !hr this prag-
matism, however, lay in the Four Modernizations of
Deng's earlier protector, Zhou Enlai, who quietly made a
career of fixing many of the excesses or Mao ·s zeal. It was
an uneasy Gandhi-Nehru-like relationship. and China st!I'..
fored for it- -but might have suffered more without it
(Goldman, 1994).
The truly novel definition or modernity in Asia came
from Japan. Utterly dcl'catcd in World War 11 and under
foreign occupation afterwurds { l 945 1952) fnr the lirst
lime in its history, Japan, in Article IX or its new constitu-
tion, outlawed war as an instn11nent ur li.ireign policy and
forbade the country to have a11ything hut a minimal "Sdr-
Defensc Force" as a militury institution. ls a sovereign
state, in what was called the Yoshida Dm:trine, Japan
placed its security in the hands of the llnitcd States and
dedicated its own energies exclusively toward Cl'Olllllllil.'
prosperity. Si nee then, in tile era alkr the ,.:old war, scwral
intcllcctuul and political voices have gmwn rcstin.' umler
this nrrungement. One popular political writer. a limnl.'r
mayor of Tokyo, titled his recent hook • .lust ,'11y .'11 lo
the United States. Others question the concept orrmtional·
ity us an unwekomc Western transplant even us they mlil··
ulate a distinctive identity and place for Japan (Sakai, de
Bary, & Toshio, 2005 ).
Southeast Asia has continued to lament its strategic
weakness. For nearly all Southeast Asian natkms. modem·
30. ization has been :iccompanied by ou!bursls o!' imlig.cnous
violence. It was convulsive in Indonesia in I 965 und again
in 1998-1999. Burma, Thailand, Philippim:s, Mu layu,
Vietnam, Cambodia, an<l Laos ull were wracked by immr-
gencies. Except for Malaya, the United States intervened
in all ofthem, massively so in Vietnam. In these struggle:;,
each country sought lo define its own modem national
identity in attempts to fashion integnitive polities that
Asf1111 P<Jlititx,l Tlwug!,t • 565
coul<l overeome the separatist groups and ideologies fuel -
ing lhc insurgencies. With most of these convulsions over
by the start of the new millennium (2000 ), these countries
have now endeavored to integrnte regionally. Their organi-
zation, the Association of Soulh!.!ast Asian Nations, repre-
sents an interesting institutional countcrpt1ise in intcniational
!'elations lo the more developed European Union.
Conclusion: Cultural
Grounding of Concepts
This considcmtion of the politicnl thought of Asia as it has
responded to the three contextual challenges of the classi -
cal. colnuial, and nrndcrn pcriods brings us to the question
or an Asian distinctiveness regarding nwdcrn Asian con-
ccplinns nl' denwcracy and its emnpaninn ideas of li·ccdom
and equality. illlmugh the constitutions ol' many Asian
slates, those ol' l11diu and Jap:m in particular, hear the
imprint of Western ideas and institutions, lite sources or
these idem; emerge from dillbrent cultures and hi:,;torical
cxpcriern.:cs. Asian ones. tt rnol, although there is nothing
in Asian experience or culture to preclude democracy
itself: what may require ~lill'crcnl institutional expression
of rhis 1irim:iple is the fundnmcntal di ffercncc hclwcen
Asitt and the West over the balance between the individual
31. uml !he family. In ull Asian countries. fornily anti its tics to
the stnh.• and its loyalties come before the freedom lo churl
individual destinies. In the West, on the other hand, indi -
viduals arc cm.:ourngcd to cut loose from family tics lo
frcdy chart their individual fi.irlm11.:s with mi inequalities in
status dtlwr wilhin the thrnily or in the larger sncicly (nl
11.:ast in tlwnry l. This di ffcrcnl hahml'C calls for a dillcn:nt
ddinitiunal rl•l:11innship uf freedom an,I etJuulity tn
dclllol·ral·y. Nt1 rnic hus made this dislinctilln more clear
titan I.cc Kw.in Yew, the former prillll' minister of
Sinµaplln.'. wlw hils insisted that dcnu11:racy in Asia must
still hi.' ~11h111dinah.· to fomily tlisl·iplinc and lhcrcliirc
lllalk no apnloµics for authori1inµ the: p11blk caning or
Western ;alnlcst:cnts for vandalism in the streets nfhis city
(lkll. ~(J(l(I)
J fcnt:l'. to dtsrnss dcmrn:r.11:y 111 Asia. Wl' need to bring
utl11:r words aml Clllll'Cpls inl11 play. Jh:ally, dl·moerncy in
Asia should he .i:l in a disl'Ussilln of :-.talcnafl and politi·
cal authority. llu:st: bsucs. in Asia, were fticuscd on creat-
ing order a11d preserving sol.'ial hiL·1-.irchy. altlmugh nil
Asian polith:al li;ts!crns rccu1,1ni1cd that statccrun and
political authority were he~! scrn:d hy reciprocity and the
legitinmting nf 1hcir uctions in ways that earni!d public
supr,ori. untl uppmval. There ,m..' cuntcxtuul gmunds, then,
for th.:mocniL:y in A:.iu, but not on the sumc cguli!uriun
friundations us in the Wt:st. Pye ( l lJX:'i). for example, tulks
nt'dcmocracy in Asia us best urising out of u hishirical con-
tcx;l of paternal authority and what he culls 11 politics <f
de/H!lltlt•m·,•. Hell (2000) has pmposed an Asian bicameral
legislature, willl one house bused cm popular egnlilarian
566 • POLITICAL THOUGHT
32. representation and the other on knowledge, a "House of
Scholars." Parenthetically, this notion brings us around the
intellectual circle to Plato's insistence on ultimate rule by
philosopher-kings (Lomperis, 1984).
Similarly, the Westem centerpiece, freedom, needs to
be recast in Asia as well Rather than all the human rights
guaranteed to individuals in the West through a constitu-
tional Bill of Rights and the like, freedom in Asia has been
differently defined in at least three ways. First, in Asia,
freedom is more of a group concept than an individual
one. Indians could pursue swanlj (self-rule) against the
British, but to its greatest champion, Gandhi, for indi-
viduals swaraj meant more communal responsibilities to
autonomous little communities (ashrams), not more indi-
vidual human rights.
Thus, second, freedom for the individual boils down to
relative degrees of autonomy from the multilayered oblig-
ations of these all-encompassing social structures. The
overarching value here is responsibility. Freedom is the
leftover. Daoist knights-errant and Hindu kshatriya war-
riors had the freedom of battle and of strategy, but only
within the parameters of their larger duties to the Heavenly
Mandate in China and the cosmic dharma (duties) of their
souls in India. In the Indian epic Mahabharata, the hero
Arjuna was not allowed the freedom to be a pacifist and
opt out of the cosmic baitle at Kurekshetra because the
duty of his kshatriya caste compelled his martial service to
uphold order. For women, duties were equally stark. In
China, the vittues of high-class women were secured by
footbinding. High-caste widows in ancient India had the
"freedom" of avoiding the dejected status of widowhood
or humiliating pollution of remarriage by committing
suttce (self-immolation on a funeral pyre).
33. Third, the fullest expression of freedom in Asia is reli -
gious. In China, Buddhism offered release, or nirvana,
from the world and its politics. Daoism cultivated a free-
dom of the soul within the external responsibilities and
rituals of Confucianism. And in India, the householder
(the responsible citizen, in Western pal'!ance) could hon-
orably flee to the forests, after discharging his many
social and political duties, and seek moksha, the release
that comes from enlightenment. Until the insertion of
Western politics and ideas, freedom, in Asia, did not lie
in politics.
Finally, the overarching Western ethos of equality has
had a strong impact on all Asian societies. Indeed, this idea
became the linchpin to undennining the Western imperium
itself. But even with this wave of Western egalitarianism,
Asian societies retain an even more profound rootedness in
hierarchy. Western ideas of equal treatment and equal
dignity have woven their way into the fabric of all Asian
societies. But the "rightness" of hierarchy remains
(Dumont, 1970). Gandhi, for example, called members of
the "untouchable" caste haxijans, or "children of God," but
still supported the moral virtue of the hierarchical caste
system itself. Echoes of the old Confucian hierarchy
remain strong in China, as do patterns of the samurai ritual
and hierarchical obligations in Japan, particularly in its
unique corporate culture. Thus, equalily in Asia, with lhis
hierarchical persistence, is better rendered as equity. which
is a word that gives more mom for social laddern in a for -
mulation of fairness and justice.
Illustratively, then, in passing these three universal
political concepts of democracy, freedom, and equality
through the analytical prism of the historical context of
Asia, we find that all Asians persist in holding onto two
34. anchors. First, Asians retain a strong rrelcrence for groups,
particularly the extended family, over individunls ns the
primary unit of society. Second, in this preforcncc lbr
groups, Asitms continue to choose a hierarchicnl ordering
of these groups over any comrrehcnsive notions of l'ull
social equality. The persistent hold (lf these two tinclmrs
necessitates an Asian rcfonnulation or these corn.:cpt:,;,
which have heretofore been defined only l'rom a Western
context. Thus, the expression of individual lhicdmn or
rights from the West must in Asia be tcmpcrcll by a greater
consideration for group rcsronsibilities so lhat freedom in
Asia is merely a relative autonomy from them. Similarly,
the penchant for hierarchy in Asia imposes equity as an
appropriate expression of fairness, rather than equality.
Tuming to politics from these two reformulations, ,kmoc~
racy in Asia, therefore, will need lo be constrw.:tecl and
expressed in political arrangements that value groups aml
legitimate hierarchy. Thus, the cultural scllings of such
seemingly universal politicul conccpls as dcmocrncy. free-
dom, and equality achieve richer meaning and nmmcc
when analyzed comparatively through their cvt1lutiun in
other cultures, including those in Asia.
References and Further Readings
Basham, A. J. ( 1959). 111e 11·wult>r 1lw1 11·a.· l11di<1.
New Yurk:
Grove Press.
Bell, D. A. (2000). Eas/ nwt'lx IVi•st. Prineewn, NJ: Prim:~h•n
University Press.
Benedict, R. (1946). 711e cl11:v.w111tlw11111111 11111/ tit,'
.rnw.l:
Patterns 11f'Japa11t'se c11/t11re. Bostrni: l loughton MHllm.
35. Brown, D. M. ( 1954). Tlw wltitl' 11111/irc/lv: l11dlm1
puliltn1/
thought from Mwm to Ga11dlti. Berkeley: Uni•crsi1y of
California Press.
Brown, D. M. ( 1965). The 1wlimw/is/ 1t10'e111e111: lucliw,
1ml1t11·<1/
thought jiw11 Remade to Bltaw. Berkeley: University 111'
Califomiu Press.
Clarke, J. J. ( l 997). Oricmlul e11lighte11111e111: 71,e
i'lll't1U11ta
between Asian and Westem thought. New York: Routh:dgc.
Dallmayr, F. R. (Ed.). ( 1996). Beyo11d orienla/ism: fa,c(RI' ,m
n-r;,u-
cultural encou11te1: Albany: SUNY Press.
DeBary, W. T. (1983). The liberal tradition in China. New
Yurk:
Columbia University Press.
DeBary, W. T., & Weiming, T. (Eds.). ( 1999). Cmifuci,mism
t111d
human rights. New York: Columbia University Press.
Dumont, L. ( 1970). Homo hierarchic11s: The caste system and
i/.v
implications. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Gandhi, M. K. ( 1957). An autohiogmphy: The story r1/'111y
cxper-
imem.1· with tnnh. Boston: Bi.:uctm Press.
36. Gluck, C. ( l 985) . .Japan:~ modem myths: Ideology in t/1('
luJc•
Me(ji period. Princeton, NJ: Princcto11 U11ivcr:d1y Press.
Goldman, M. ( 1994 ). Sowing the .1'el•ds r!f' demo(.'l'lll'.V i11
( 'hi11a:
Political reJbrm in the Deng Xi110pi11g ern. Camhridgc, MA:
Harvurtl l)nivcrsity Press.
Hall, D. L., & /mes, R. T. ( l 999), 171,• de11werac:v of' th('
d(•ad:
Dewey, Co11/i1d11s, al/Cl the hop<' Jiir tlc11101·1·ac:F in
C'l,ilw.
Lt1sullc, IL: Open Court.
Hardgrove, R. L., & Km:hunek, S. /. (2000). Indio:
Uow,·11111<•111
mu! polilic.1· in a dewlopi11g 1wlio11. Fort Worth, TX:
Harcourt Brace.
Jansen, M. B. ( 1995) . . Japan 1111d ifs worltl. Princeton. NJ:
PrinccU1n University Press. (Original work published 1975)
Johnston, /. (1998). 01/t11ral realism: Strat,•gh' c11/111r,• am/
grand strategy in Chim•s1• ltistm:v. Princeton, NJ: Prim:elon
University Press.
Kelley, D .• & Reid, A. (Eds.). (1998 ). Asitm/i·cet!oms: 1111'
id,·a
q/' .fi',•1•do111: Hast 1111d So11th<•ust .•lsia. { 'amhridge, l
JK:
Cambridge University Press.
Kcrshnw, R. (2001 ). Mo11arehy i11 Srmth Hast A.1·ia: 711,·
/ia·,·.1· 11/
tradition ill 11w1.1·itim1. Nt.·w York: R1,utlcdg;c.
37. Levenson, J. R. ( 195H l %ll ). ( '011/i1cic111 ( 'hina wit! it.,·
lll!iclcm
.fc1te (Vols. I 3 J. Berkeley: University or ( 'nli fornia Press.
Lompcris, T. J. ( 1984). lli11d11 i11flut.•11c,• !ill G1i•t•k
11hi/os1111hr:
7'/,c• m(vssc:1• o( tlw soul .fhm1 tltt• Upm1isliml, 10 l'/<lro.
Culculla, lmlia: Minerva. (Rcpuhlish1.:d I.Ill the lntern,:t hy
hlealndia.Com, 2007.)
Malik, H. (Ed.). ( 1971 ). Ic1h11/: Pwt-philo.Wfl/lL'I' of
/'a/..ist1111
New Yol'k: Columbiu University Press.
Murshull. S. J. (2002). '!11t• 11w11da/t• o(hca1•,•11: !Jidtl,•11
ltiwur1· i11
1!1t• I Chi111;. New York: Columbia l lniwrsi1y Pre~,.
Mchln, V. R. ( J9W1). /.'oumlalitm.v oflndiw, f'Olirii·ul
thnuglu: Au
i11i<'l'/ll'd11tio11 (/i'lim ,Wwm ro tlw pn•s1•11t dar/. (
'olmnhia,
MO: South Asia Books.
Meteull~ T. R. (2001 ). lde11/ogh•s o/1/1(' ll11j l'mnhridµc.
PK:
Cambridge I lnivcrsity Press.
Asian Political Tlwugltt • 567
Muller, M. ( J 9 I 1)). /11tli11: What cw1 it Wach ll.1'?
London: Longmans,
Orccn.
Nehru. J. ( 1959). 11ic di.1·cm1my c!f' India. Garden City, NY:
38. Doubleday. (Originul wmk published 1946)
Nm1hro1l, F. S. C'. ( 1946 ). Tlw llll'l.!WIJ.! q(East and Wi.•st,
m1 inqui1y
c1>11ct•r11i11g wor/c/ wulel'stmuli11g. Ni.:w York:
Mucmillan.
Ogden. S. (2002). /J1W11gs c!f' dr11wcral'.V ill China.
Cambridge,
MA: llarvanl University Press.
PC'!TY, E. J. (2001 ). Clwll1.i11gi11g the mamlate o/'heave11.
Armonk,
NY: M. Ii, Sharpe.
Pye. l,. W. ( l 985). Asian tmW(!I' and politic.I'. Cmnbridgc,
MA:
Belknap.
Radhakrishm111. S .• & Mrnirll, C. /. (Eds.). ( 1957). A
srmn•ebook
in /11di1111 1il1iloso1,h.1•. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University
Press.
Sakai. N., de Bary. B., & Tm,hio, I. (lids.). (2005).
/)econstmcti11g
11111io11ali(i: Ithaca, NY: Corndl University Press.
Schwan1., ll. I. ( l 9H!'i}. TIil' 11·odd ,,( thot1}{/I( ill a11dent
C/Ji1111.
t'amhridgc. MA: Ilmvanl University Press.
Sci'<'II mili1r1r1· df/.1·.,·h ·s o(andem ( 'l,i11a. 77/('. ( 1993 ).
(R. D. Sawyer,
Trans .. with tvl.-c. I .. Sawyer). Boulder, ('O: Wustvicw
39. Pn:ss.
SpL•;u·. P. ( 1 % I). /11tlia: A 11111dt•n1 histm:1•. Ann Arbm:
University
of' Mkhi~an Press .
Tarnhiah. S . .I. ( t •l7(1 ). IViirld Ctl//Cfll<'ml' 1111d world
1t•1w1111nu·: 11
.,111,fr 1i/llmldhis111 am/ J'olily in Tlwilaml. Cambridge, UK:
Camhridµc llnivcrsily Press.
Tudu:r. R. ( ·. ( 1:t1. ). ( 1972). 77w Marx-/:'11gd.1· 1i•adt•1:
New York:
W W. Nmtnn.
Wells. A. I 2110 l ). T/tt' 110/itiml t/wug/11 r!(S1111 lilt-
St>11. New York:
l'aliiravc.
Wit!liigcl. K. A. t I '1!'i7). Orit•111,,i dt•.vp11fi.1·m. New
lluvi:n, CT:
Yak U11iv1crsity Press.
Yu1.m. !). 11 11.11 }. fht· rm/t• 11/lht• .v1111111mi ( A. 1..
Sudler. Trans.).
Rull.ind, VT: Charles I:. Tulllc.
/hm1. ( 'c11111ii. I l '1(1(1). TIit' Mai· l·'u11nh IIIO't'lllt'!I(:
/111el/{'ct1111/
r,·rnl11t11111 ill mml,•m ( 'hiua. Stauford. ( 'A: Stanford
I iniwrsi1y Pre~,,
40. 71
2. The KURUKAN FUGA Charter: An example of an
Endogenous Governance
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, by Mr. Mangoné NIANG,
Director of CELTHO/UA.
One of the first known texts on municipal organization in our
sub-region, the Kurukan Fuga
Charter, is being rediscovered today not only by those who
work in the field of oral
tradition, but also by those who want to go back to the origins
of political thought in Africa.
The researchers interested in this text included, first of all,
historians (and also the Jelis, or
scholars of tradition, who are experts trained in western history
of traditional); followed by
text theorists, jurists, environmentalists, and even
philosophers††, although as an art of
thinking inherited from Greek culture. Our special interest in
this document is not based on
the fact that it has drawn the attention of many experts: we all
know that an oral text is a
complete text or, as those who are responsible for
conceptualizing it say, a holistic text. We
generally find in it not only a global vision and an esthetic
quality, but also methods of
managing nature as well as a legal code to guide relations
between communities and their
members. Oral tradition also has many texts that convey
medical procedures for relieving
human physical suffering. The exception is in the fact that the
Charter is a major document
for traditional mediation, thereby underscoring, and perhaps
that is what makes it
41. contemporary for us, a legislating spirit in African societies of
the 13th century. Consequently,
one could ask an ethical and practical question: If Africans of
that period sought to settle
disputes through negotiation, why not us?
This question also tends to dismiss some objections rising here
and there to the validity
(breaking down myth and reality) of the Charter today. If indeed
the Charter can have serve
some purpose in our lives today, then it would be absurd not to
draw from the document.
Africa is frantically looking for solutions that can best resolve
its crises. This is a practical
argument that should convince all schools of thought. As for the
other aspects, which are
certainly more profound, they concern our desire to develop our
own historical awareness,
as well as the destiny we want to choose for ourselves.
Preserving our historical memory
helps restore meaning; this is what people all over the world are
asking today.
Epistemological works have finally shown that the caesura
between tradition and modernity
is difficult to establish (and this is based on the simple fact that
one exists in the other) and
that we are free not to accept, in Nietzsche’s demystifying
word, illusions intended to fool
our lucidity.
Another of the Charter’s values is that it has been able to be
interpreted by all ages, through
memories, despite the instability of an oral text (although if
presented and repeated, some
oral texts eventually take on stable forms, and the only aspects
42. that change are those which
depend on the Jeli’s performance). This means that the Charter
exists:
• within the enormous Manding corpus: there are as many
versions as presented by
Jelis throughout the centuries; it is a text among others, which
all represent what
could be preserved, within this pluralist space, as memory,
stories or ways of life;
†† A Professor of Cheikh Anta Diop University in Dakar has
included the Charter in his Political
Philosophy course.
72
• in Prof. D. T. Niane’s work, which has today become a classic,
“Soundiata ou
l’épopée manding”‡‡. One of the last chapters is entitled
“Kurukan Fuga or
sharing the world”. We know that the work is a written version
of the narrative
provided by a Jeli to the eminent Guinean historian. (It is not by
accident that this
book, commended by all and translated into several languages,
is a major work.
As it supports the saying that one can sing well only on the
branches of his own
genealogy, it launches the break of post-independence African
43. historians by
introducing other types of testimony, shows what the Jelis think
of their own
stories, and brings the text as close as possible to reality, a
problem that would
resurface in debate, initiated by African philosophers, on
“ethno-philosophy”) ;
and
• in various surveys conducted by researchers of all generations
(in particular
Youssouf T. Cissé, A. O. Konaré, S. Kouyaté, Fodé M. Sidibé,
etc§§.
This is all that some of us knew about the Kurukan Fuga Charter
before the meeting between
the Kankan’s traditional and modern communicators. During
this meeting, Jelis from several
African countries each presented the provisions of the Charter
and subsequently agreed on a
final version. This is the version that was collected and
recorded in the digital data bank of
the Niamey Centre***.
It should be noted, however, that the Kurukan Fuga Charter was
not created, ready for use,
by those who in 1236 participated in the meeting in Kangaba
(current Mali). It was created
after a bloody war between populations, who finally became
very close. It is also the result of
a process, begun with “Mandé Kalikan” (The Mande Oath) that
governed hunters’ way of
life at that time. The Kurukan Fuga Act, which came at the
44. height of Sundiata’s power, was
the celebration of a legal code, broadened and more detailed,
which from that moment had
the force of law for all the community groups of Mandé. The
provisions of the Act concern
the municipal organization, as well as property management and
nature. While some of
them are in contradiction with our current principles (for
example, provision 15 : “Never
beat a married woman unless you have tried unsuccessfully tried
to get her husband to
intervene”, or provision 17 : “Lies that have been told for 40
years should be considered as
truths” or again provision 41 : “Kill your enemy, do not
humiliate him”); there are others (for
example, provision 5 : “Every person has the right to life and to
preserve his physical
integrity… “) that are consistent with current concerns. Once
again, the text should be
understood within the context that it was conceived: wars of all
types, lack of human dignity
‡‡ Djibril Tam sir Niane : Soundiata ou l’épopée m anding,
Editions Présence Africaine, Paris 1960
(English translation: D. T. Niane, Sundiata : An Epic of O ld M
ali, translated by G . D. Pickett,
Longm ans, London, 1965).
§§ M ost of the works of Y. T. Cissé have been published in
Editions Karthala, in Paris; A. O .
Konaré, « La notion de pouvoir dans l’Afrique traditionnelle et
l’aire culturelle m anden en
particulier », Le concept de pouvoir en Afrique, col. «
Introduction à la culture africaine », n° 4,
45. Editions UNESCO , Paris 1981; S. Kouyaté, Le cousinage à
plaisanterie, notre héritage com m un,
Editions G anndal, Conakry 2003. The works of F. M . Sidibé
will be published soon.
*** cf. site du Bureau UA-CELHTO de Niam ey : www.africa-
orale.org
73
and values, slavery, etc. And, in this fragmented world, there
was a strong desire for law and
order, with long and tremendous effort to create a new
conciliatory and legislative spirit –
the same effort then and today – that would strike a balance
between differences through
social negotiation. Provision 7 introduced the sanankuya
(known today as “kinship of
pleasantry”, “joking cousinship” or “congenial relationship”)
among the members that
formed the Mandé communities. Very early on, various works
identified the “sanankuya” in
most African societies. As a mechanism for dispelling disputes
by miming or dramatizing
them, the sanankuya is still very much alive in many of our
countries today. An African
writer recently gave it a literary dimension: story of the Peulhs
narrated by Sérères†††. It
exists among surnames, ethnic groups, age groups, families,
villages and, through
correspondence of surnames, between countries. Although we
46. know little about it, the
sanankuya played a key role, through the mediation by Sorry
Kandia Kouyaté
(commissioned by the Guinean Head of State at that time), in
resolving the conflict between
Mali and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) in 1975.
“What built up Mandé? War! What broke down Mandé? War!” -
this is what Jelis of
Mandingue tradition continue to proclaim today. It is with this
idea that societies have said,
and said again, and repeated once more, we need to seek the
origins of this founding
document, the Kurukan Fuga Charter, or to echo Mr. Foucault’s
idea of the document as a
monument.
††† T. M onénem bo, Peuls, Editions du Seuil, Paris 2004.
74
ANNEX 1 : THE CHARTER OF KURUKAN FUGA
The Charter of Kurukan Fuga, re-published here, is a version
collected in Guinea at the end of
a concerting regional workshop between traditional and modern
communicators (Kankan: 3-
12 March 1998). The traditionists are those who declined the
text; then it has been transcribed
and translated, with the help of Guinea linguists and under the
supervision of Mr. Siriman
47. Kouyaté – Magistrate and traditionist (his family is guardian of
the Sosobala, in Niagasole,
Guinea). Afterwards S. Kouyaté structured The Charter, without
falsifying the essential
point, talking here about the modern juridical texts with a view
to make it readable for
contemporaries (the original text in Malinke is available on the
digital data bank ARTO).
The text of the Charter is followed by explanatory notes (Annex
2) prepared by Mr. Siriman
Kouyaté.
People who took part in the meeting in Kankan:
1. Traditional communicators :
• Siaka Kouyaté, Niagassola, Siguiri (Guinea)
• Lamine Kouyaté, Loïla, Mandiana (Guinea)
• Damissa Sékou Diabaté, Siguiri (Guinea)
• Koulako Touré, Faranah (Guinea)
• Mamady Kante dit Konkoba, Dinguiraye (Guinea)
• Old Koita, Kérouané (Guinea)
• Sekouba Condé, Dabola (Guinea)
• E. Oumar Camara, Kankan (Guinea)
• Abdoulaye Kanouté, Tambakounda (Senegal)
• Siriman Kouyaté, Niagassola, Siguiri (Guinea)
2. Other communicators and participants:
• Alpha Kabiné Keïta, General Director of Rural Radio (Guinea)
• Mamady Kanté, Journalist, Rural Radio of Kankan (Guinea)
• Mamadou Lamine Doumbia, Journalist, Radio of Tambacounda
48. (Senegal)
• Saa Bédou Touré, Journalist, Rural Radio of Kankan (Guinea)
• Louis Millogo, Professor, Université de Ouagadougou
(Burkina Faso)
• Fatoumata Bamba, Journalist, Rural Radio of Kankan (Guinea)
• Bernard Feller, Director, Intermédia Consultants, S.A. Berne
(Switzerland)
• Lansana Condé, Professor, Université J. Nyerere, Kankan
(Guinea)
• Souleyman Condé, Journalist, Rural Radio of Kankan (Guinea)
• Amadou Baba Karambiri, Journalist, Rural Radio of Bobo-
Dioulasso (Burkina Faso)
• Mangoné Niang, Director, UA-CELHTO, Niamey (Niger)
• Cheikh Oumar Camara, Journalist, ORTG, Conakry (Guinea)
• Neguedougou Sanogo, Educationist, School Radio, Bamako
(Mali)
75
THE CHARTER OF KURUKAN FUGA
1. The Great Mande Society is divided into sixteen clans of
quiver carriers, five clans of
marabouts, four groups of “nyamakalas” and one group of
slaves. Each one has a specific
activity and role.
2. The “nyamakalas” have to devote themselves to tell the truth
to the chiefs, to be their
49. counsellors and to defend by the speech the established rulers
and the order upon the whole
territory.
3. The Morinkanda Lolu (the five clans of marabouts) are our
masters and our educators in
Islam. Everyone has to hold them in respect and consideration.
4. The society is divided into age groups. At the head of each a
chief is elected. Belong to the
some age-group the people (men or women) who are born
during a period of three years in
succession.
The Kangbès (members of the intermediary class between young
and old people) should be
invited to take part in taking important decisions concerning the
society.
5. Everybody has a right to life and to the preservation of its
physical integrity. Accordingly,
any attempt to deprive one’s fellow being of life is punished
with death.
6. To win the battle of prosperity, the Kön¨gbèn Wölo (the
general system of supervision) has
been established in order to fight against laziness and idleness.
7. It has been established among the Mandenkas, the
50. sanankunya (joking relationship) and the
tanamanyöya (blood pact). Consequently any contention that
occurs among these groups
should not degenerate, the respect for one another being the
rule. Between brothers-in-law
and sisters-in-law, between grandparents and grand-children,
tolerance and rag should be the
principle.
8. The Keïta’s family is nominated reigning family upon the
empire.
9. The children’s education behoves the entire society. The
paternal authority in consequence
falls to everyone.
10. We should offer condolences mutually.
11. When your wife or your child runs away stop running after
her/him in the neighbour’s house.
12. The succession being patrilineary, do never give up the
power to a son when one of his fathers
is still alive. Do never give up the power to a minor just
because he has goods.
13. Do never offend the Nyaras.
14. Do never offend women, our mothers.
51. 76
15. Do never beat a married woman before having her husband
interfere unsuccessfully.
16. Women, apart from their everyday occupations, should be
associated with all our
managements.
17. Lies that have lived for 40 years should be considered like
truths.
18. We should respect the law of primogeniture.
19. Any man has two parents-in-law: the parents of the girl we
failed to have and the speech we
deliver without any constraint. We have to hold them in respect
and consideration.
20. Do not ill treat the slaves. You should allow them to rest
one day per week and to end their
working day at a reasonable time. You are the master of the
slaves but not of the bag they
carry.
52. 21. Do not follow up with your constant attentions the wives of
the chief, of the neighbour, of the
marabout, of the priest, of the friend and of the partner.
22. Vanity if the token of weakness and humility is the one of
nobility.
23. Do never betray one another. Respect your word of honour.
24. Never do wrong to foreigners.
25. The ambassador does not risk anything in Mande.
26. The bull confided to your care should not lead the cattle-
pen.
27. The young woman may be eligible to marry as soon as she
reaches puberty no matter her age.
Her parents' choice must be respected no matter the number of
candidates.
28. The young man can get married from 20 years old.
29. The amount of the dowry is 3 bovines: one for the girl, two
for her father and mother.
53. 30. In Mande, the divorce is tolerated for one of the following
reasons: the impotence of the
husband, the madness of one of the spouses, the husband’s
incapability of assuming the
obligations due to the marriage. The divorce should occur out of
the village.
31. We should help those who are in need.
32. There are five ways to acquire the property: the buying, the
donation, the exchange, the work
and the inheriting. Any other form without convincing
testimony is doubtful.
33. Any object found without known owner becomes common
property only after four years.
77
34. The fourth bringing forth of a heifer confided is the
property of the guardian.
One egg out of four is the property of the guardian of the
laying hen.
35. One bovine should be exchanged for four sheep or four
goats.
36. To satisfy one’s hunger is not a robbery if you don’t take
away anything in your bag or your
54. pocket.
37. Fakombè is nominated chief of hunters. He is responsible
for conserving the bush and its
inhabitants for everyone's well-being.
38. Before setting fire to the bush, don’t look at the ground, rise
your head in the direction of the
top of the trees to see if they don’t bear fruits or flowers.
39. Domestic animals should be tied up during cultivation and
can be let loose after the harvest.
The dog, the cat, the duck and the poultry are not bound by the
measure.
40. Respect the kinship, the marriage and the neighbourhood.
41. You can kill the enemy, but not humiliate him.
42. In big assemblies, be satisfied with your lawful
representatives and respect one another.
43. Balla Fassèkè Kouyaté is nominated big chief of ceremonies
and main mediator in Mande. He
is allowed to joke with all groups, in priority with the royal
family.
55. 44. All those who will transgress these rules will be punished.
Everyone is bound to make
effective their implementation.
78
ANNEX 2 : EXPLANATORY NOTES
I - About the social organization
The classification of the Mandingue society is worth some
explanation. The stratification
established by the Charter is nothing more or less than the work
division among the different
components of the society. This division far from being
arbitrary has rather institutionalized
a State as a matter of fact in precising may be a bit more the
roles and attributes.
The Charter has divided Mandingue society into two big
categories: the free men and the
slaves.
A - The free men “horon”
They are subdivided into:
1 - Sixteen (16) clans of quiver carriers or “ton ta jon”: they are
those who carry bows and
arrows. The warriors who should defend the territorial integrity
56. of the Empire were
recruited in this group which is composed of the following
clans: Traoré, Condé, Camara,
Kourouma, Kamissoko, Magassouba, Diawara, Sako, Fofana,
Koïta, Dansouba, Diaby, Diallo,
Diakité, Sidibé and Sangaré.
2 - Four (4) princely clans which are: Koulibaly, Douno or
Soumano or Danhou or Somono,
Konaté and Keïta. Even if the Keïta were entrusted with the
destiny the Empire, the other
clans which have with them blood ties, are considered as
princely.
3 - Five (5) clans of marabouts, in charge of being the educators
and the teachers in the
teaching of the new religion. They are the Cissé, Bérété, Diané
and Sylla, or Koma.
4 - Four (4) groups of “nyamakala” : literally, nyamakala means
“who challenges all the
interdicts” ; “nyama” means maleficent occult power in
Mandingue language and “kala”
means in the present context wariness, limit, immunity,
antidote.
The nyamakala those who can challenge all the interdicts, are
divided like this:
a) The Jeli : they are depositaries of the traditions – archives,
the master of the word, the
counsellors of the kings, the artists and the musicians. They
have at their head the Kouyaté
and the Diabaté.
In the course of time, the jeli became a kind of congregation
57. which can be joined by everyone
who holds the rules in respect.
That is how nowadays; belong to this class Keïta, Condé, Kanté,
Kourouma, Koïta, Touré,
Diawara, etc.
b) - The Fina and Finè, other non musician librettists
specialized in the mediation. They are
especially the Camara.
79
- The Numun fin, working the iron and its derivatives to make
tools of any sorts. Their wives
make pottery.
- The Siaki, working precious metals, gold and silver to make
jewels.
- The Kule, working the wood to make art articles: for example
the sculptors.
c) The Numun or blacksmiths are essentially composed of the
clan of the Kanté, Camara,
Kourouma.
d) The Garanke are the masters of the leather and of the
weaving. The shoemakers and the
weavers are within this group. Some of them are specialized in
the making of the harness for
horses and of the cushions, they are “sake”.
The Garanke are essentially the Sylla. But other clans have
joined them.
58. As you can notice it, several clans find themselves in more than
one class. That is not
surprising when we know that as the ages go by particular
events can overturn so many
structures.
These four groups of nyamakala were much feared. They cannot
be reduced to captivity; the
other classes owed them circumspection, gifts and subsistence.
As Amadou Hampaté BA said it in his book “Amkoullel, the
Fulani Child” (1992 : 522):
“Each function corresponded to a specific initiatory way. To
keep their pureness, these groups formed
through the endogamy and certain sexual interdicts closed
hereditary groups. Here, there is not this
notion of untouchability or of inferiority that certain people
now show towards them”.
The twenty-nine classes, of which I have just made a succinct
description of the activities, are
the free men or “horon”.
B - The slaves:
Before the advent of the Empire, the slavery as a trade has
drained an important part of the
kinetic energies from the Mande. This practice is forbidden by
Soundiata, as well as the
conditions of the domestic slavery have been softened. There
were two categories of slaves:
1 - Free men and women captured during wars and reduced in
slavery, those who were
bought and who, because of that moved from one master to
another : mina jon (caught
59. slaves) and san jon (bought slaves).
2 - The offspring of the first ones, born in the master’s house:
they are the wossolo what
literally means : “of the house”.
The wolosso could only be employed or freed; the master could
not sell them. Most of them
assimilated themselves in the end and took the patronymic of
their masters.
The statement 20 of the Charter pointed out the condition of the
slaves by humanizing it.
80
The statement 4, in dividing the society into age-groups, has
brushed aside all the prejudices
associated to the conditions of the ones and the others.
Actually, are they quiver carriers,
princes, nyamakala, marabouts or slaves, all those who belong
to the same age-group should
observe the same rules without sex distinction.
Together they discussed their problems, each one playing the
role the society entrusted
him/her.
The Kangbès were the link class between the ancients who
managed the city and the
teenagers who were the secular arms of it. They took part in the
taking of big decisions and
then informed younger people.
60. The statement 6 has established a sort of general supervisors
who, at a certain time of the
day, checked in all the families in order to catch the idle and
lazy people and make them take
the way to the fields and the workshops. The contraveners were
denounced before the
ancients’ council. This practice has contributed effectively to
the prosperity of the Empire.
The “sanankunya” and the “tanamanyöya “ or joking
relationship which is the object in the
statement 7 of the Charter has been established among the
Mandenkas user friendly
relationships more or less strong according to the case, but
which all contribute to the culture
of tolerance and peaceful coexistence. The joking relationship,
as Mr. Raphaël N’Diaye
names it so eloquently, was not an invention of the Kurukan
Fuga, but the Charter has
institutionalized it.
II - Rights and Duties
At the statement 11, the respect neighbours owe to one another
has been almost considered
sacred. Whatever can be the mistake made by one of the
members of your family, since the
latter goes to find shelter in your neighbour’s house, you don’t
have any more the right to
punish him/her for this mistake. You should abandon and erase
from your memory the
offence made to you.
At the statement 13, we can read “Do never offend talented
men”. They belong to the
61. nyamakala, the jeli and the fina.
These masters of the word are the appointed mediators; any
offence should not be made
towards them in the accomplishment of their activities which
aim is nothing but the
extinguishing of conflicts and wars.
At the statement 17, it is a kind of prescription the society puts
to statements everybody
considers as true during a certain time and which cannot be
denounced any more after that
period fixed as at 40 years.
The law of primogeniture is in the African societies an
indefeasible right. We should owe
respect and obligations to someone older than we, whatever
his/her social status or his/her
wealth can be.
81
Within the family, this right is so strongly rooted that a
common saying states the following:
“we can be older than our father or our mother but never be
older than our elder brother”.
Understand by father and mother the uncles and the aunts
(statement 18).
The statement 21 reveals the adultery in general because in
moving aside the wives of the six
groups mentioned in the text, there are no more wives to pay
court to.
62. The statement 23 symbolizes the sense of honour and of the
dignity, values dear to the
Mandenka. Stabbing an enemy, using shilly-shallying instead of
taking a courageous
decision, not facing an occurrence, are considered as cowardice.
It is better to refuse, even if I
should stand the consequences, than accepting and betraying
after. From which the main
motto of the Almamy Samory Touré: “When the man refuses, he
says no”.
The statement 24 makes it an obligation for everyone not to do
wrong to foreigners. This
Article is included in the Charter in gratitude for the hospitality
Soundiata Keïta himself has
been offered during his exile for seventeen years.
So, the foreigner is like a king in Mande, he is tolerated,
protected and defended. Besides, it
is said that the foreigner has big eyes but he can’t see. That’s
the reason why certain mistakes
he makes are not attributable to him. He is supposed to ignore.
The statement 25 attaches immunity to the ambassador, who
only passes on a message of
which he is not the author. He should not be punished. This
notion is found in the Article 29
of the Vienna Convention dated 8 April 1961 which protects the
diplomats against penal actions
in the States they are accredited. By extension, the diplomatic
premises profit by the notion
of extraterritoriality therefore inviolable.
The statement 26 is a picture, a metaphor that protects the
foreigner. The entrusted bull is
63. unfamiliar to the cattle pen. In entrusting him to lead the cattle
pen, he can lead the herd to
the wrong place. In the same way, the foreigner should not be
appointed at the functions of
management of a locality but if so only after a long training
time.
The statement 30 deals with divorce. So, three peremptory
reasons are considered as being
able to motivate the divorce by the request of one of the
spouses:
• The impotence of the husband ;
• The madness of one of the spouses ;
• The incapacity of the husband to assume the obligations due to
the marriage.
These obligations are: food, dressing, care taking, the conjugal
duties and consideration due
to parents-in-law.
The Mandenka considered that the divorce is a situation so
serious so that it should be
pronounced far away from the city.
The statement 41 is not a formula inciting to the murder. It only
means that if you should
kill your enemy, kill him but it is absolutely forbidden to you to
humiliate him.
82
About goods:
64. The statement 36 deals with the fact of being in need as it is
stated on the penal right. In the
context of the Charter, are only concerned fruits pendent or
picked up, crops in the fields
which can be eaten. We can eat as much as we can but we
should not put some in our bag or
in our pocket, otherwise it would be a robbery.
About the preservation of the nature:
The statement 38 draws the attention on the flowers and the
fruits we can find on the top of
the trees. They should not be burnt.
Besides we should mention that bush fires were one of the
infringements still punished with
the sentence of death being anxious to preserve the nature the
way it is.
Final provisions:
The preponderant place acknowledged to Balla Fassèkè Kouyaté
and through him to all
talented men in the statement 43, is not fortuitous. It is
understandable fundamentally
through the role he played in the big events the Mande went
through. Balla Fassèkè Kouyaté
is the one who, with courage and determination, told Magan
Soundiata quite plainly what
other people thought deeply.
He was the one who, with the right words and tune, succeeded
to calm down the Emperor in
the difficult contexts, since life is not only made of lucky days.
65. The secret of the greatness of the Mande has been their
cohesion. This cohesion has been kept
in a large measure by men and women who, most of the time in
the anonymity, recalling the
Mandenka the principles that funded the Mandingue nation.
The immunity of speech given to Balla Fassèkè Kouyaté and to
his descendants enabled the
successive generations of tradition guardians to play their role
of conciliators and of
mediators in the society. Even now, if the data have changed the
substrate still remains,
deeply rooted in the values of Mandingue civilization.
Conclusion:
For all the statements of the Charter, the expressions: “do, do
not”, are style clauses which
restore as faithfully as possible the mind of the authors of the
text. But what is expressed in
the forty four statements is for and is imposed on all the
inhabitants of the Mande who are
responsible for their implementation.
Chapter 4:
Collection of
Crime Scene
Evidence
