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1. ARISTOTE
TRADUCTIONS ET ÉTUDES
ARISTOTLE: METAPHYSICS AND
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF ENRICO BERTI
EDITED BY
CARLO NATALI
ÉDITIONS PEETERS
LOUVAIN-LA-NEUVE – PARIS – WALPOLE, MA
2011

2. INDICE
Carlo NATALI, Prefazione. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Enrico BERTI, Cinquant’anni di ricerca: problemi e metodi . . . . . 5
Enrico BERTI, Selected bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Pierre AUBENQUE, De ‘Socrate assis’ à l’homme nouveau: péripétie
et catastrophe dans la pensée grecque. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Jonathan BARNES, The primary sort of science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Tomás CALVO-MARTÍNEZ, Sobre la sabiduría como ciencia rectora
(ârxikß) en Metaph. A 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
T.H. IRWIN, From essence to form: Metaphysics 1029b1-14 (in
that order) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Alejandro G. VIGO, Naturalismo trascendental. Una interpretación
de la fundamentación aristotélica de la ética . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
G. SEEL, E’ misurabile la felicità secondo Aristotele? . . . . . . . . . . 143
Jaap MANSFELD, Nicomachean Ethics 1145b2-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
Pierre PELLEGRIN, Parties de la cité, parties de la constitution . . . 177

3. 1
Informative overview in Seminara (2002), p. 23-47; the extensive account of
Voigtländer (1980), p. 432-515, with its numerous references to Aristotle’s writings and
to earlier literature is still quite useful.
2
See Cooper (1988, repr. 1999), p. 285, summarizing Barnes (1980), on opinions
that «have some credibility because of their standing antecedent to any philosophical
inquiry». The rendering ‘reputable’, proposed by Barnes (1980), has become reputable
and is accepted by many, the last I have seen being Kraut (2006b), p. 77. In the Analytics
the meaning may come close to ‘credible’, e.g. 62a 12-9 on deduction per impossibile;
70b 5-6, on what is not only true but also credible. Seminara (2002), actualizing all of
Aristotle’s possibilities, focuses on endoxa ‘di diritto’ in the treatises.
3
Top. 100b 21-3, 104a 8-12, 105a 34-b 1 (text not wholly certain). Galen knew this
definition, Diff. Puls. VIII 579. 10-12 K.
4
E.g. Brunschwig (2000), p. 116.
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1145B 2-6.
Jaap MANSFELD
Much has been written about the role of endoxa in Aristotle’s philoso-
phy: in the arts of dialectic and rhetoric (a bit less in analytics), in disci-
plines such as physics and ethics, and in relation to first philosophy. The
denotation and connotation of the term too have of course been discussed
in various ways. The subject is impossible to deal with in required detail
when one is not writing a monograph or Forschungsbericht1
.
A person who is ∑ndozoˇ is ‘famous’, ‘eminent’, ‘illustrious’; a celeb-
rity; a member of an elite; someone well-known for being well-known.
For the neuter substantive ∑ndozon I suggest the interpretation ‘what
possesses authority’, or ‘status’2
. Aristotle lists the varieties of endoxa in
the first book of Topics3
: views — irrespective of their contents — have
authority when they are shared (a) by everybody or (b) by the majority
of people or (c) by the wise, and where these wise men are concerned
when shared (a´) by all or (b´) the majority or (c´) the most well-known
among them, as long as these latter views do not (as a rule) conflict with
those held by all or most people. There are degrees of authority, then4
— so, some status. It seems to be implied that the views of everybody

4. 166 J. MANSFELD
5
Esp. in physics cf. Voigtländer (1980), p. 604, and metaphysics.
6
Argued by Owen (1961), p. 85-91, whose seminal and well-known contribution is
the extension of the application of phainomena in the sense of ‘things said’, or ‘beliefs’,
to physics qua philosophical discipline. Followed by many, e.g. Barnes (1980), p. 494;
Berti (1990), p. 38; Fait (1992), n. 7. Well formulated by Cooper (1988 repr. 1999),
p. 281: «Aristotle, as is well known, makes the beliefs of ‘the many and the wise’, and
thus the way things ‘appear’, fundamental as the starting point for and, in some sense, a
basic control on, philosophical inquiry in any area». See Berti (1989), p. 113-52, (1990),
p. 38; Natali (1990a), p. 196, (1990b), p. 59, (1997), p. 250: same methodology in prac-
tical philosophy as in physics and metaphysics; Obbink (1992), p. 196 n. 11: endoxa
are «fundamental for Aristotle’s methodology». Commenting on EN 1145b 2-7, Denyer
(1991), p. 206, says «as our passage […] itself makes clear, the method is of quite general
applicability». Voigtländer (1980), p. 429-32, is less sure, and Barnes (1991), p. 113, still
less. For a different approach to the argument of the EN see now the pioneering article
of Natali (2007).
7
For this view of endoxa see Voigtländer (1980), p. 638; Berti (1996b), p. 114,
(2000/1 repr. (2004), p. 326, of phainomena Berti (1997 repr. 2004), p. 237. Owen (1961),
p. 84-5, argued that endoxa and phainomena are equivalent; see also Barnes (1980),
p. 500, «∂ndoza are dokoÕnta or ƒainómena»; similarly Pritzl (1994), Kraut (2006),
p. 78. Barnes (1991), p. 113, appears to have changed his mind, for he says «Les ∏ndoza
sont ce à quoi nous aboutissons, et non pas ce à partir de quoi on argumente». See also
Hintikka (1993), p. 225.
and those of a few famous experts may possess equal significance. The
listing as a whole, moreover, extending from the many to the few, or
(literally) from ‘everybody’ to the ‘most illustrious of the wise’, covers
a broad spectrum of experience and competence. One should of course
realize that expert opinions exist about subjects on which (the majority
of) ordinary people have no views at all, and that men in general may be
wrong while some, or even one, of the experts may be right5
.
Endoxa play a noteworthy part in ethics. It has famously been claimed
that the method of inquiry involving endoxa is applied throughout the
corpus6
. Not only in ethics but also in physics, views having or acquiring
some status or other are cited, formulated, tested, rejected, revised, or
accepted. True enough. In my view, however, it is doubtful whether this
endoxic method, or approach, applies to each field of inquiry to the same
degree. It is also doubtful whether the further claim can be right that the
terms phainomena and dokoûnta (meaning ‘what appears’, or ‘what is
believed’ or ‘thought’), which are not only found in connection with the
term endoxa but also often enough in contexts where this term fails to
appear, are equivalent to endoxa. I think (and am not alone) that they are
not. Phainomena and dokoûnta are sometimes used interchangeably, but
endoxa may be no more than a subclass of what appears or is believed7
.

5. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1145B 2-6 167
8
Thus already Grant (1885), p. 2.194, who translates tà ƒainómena as ‘existing
ideas’, and by Joachim (1951), p. 218: ‘tà ƒainómena or tà ∏ndoza (common opin-
ion)’; see Dirlmeier (1956), p. 477.
9
The interpretation of Owen (1961) has been criticized by many, most rewardingly
by Algra (1995), p. 153-81 (= 1988), p. 112-34, a contribution which unfortunately
has been ignored by scholars writing on Aristotle’s dialectic. See ibid. Algra’s excel-
lent analysis of the argument about ‘place’ in Physics Book IV, the other pillar sup-
porting Owen’s overall interpretation. Barnes (1991), and Smith (1993), (1995),
p. 57-62, are also quite radical critics. Owen (1991), a short later piece in French not
included in his collected papers (I have never seen it referred to), briefly reiterates the
point of view of his earlier paper, adds that in EN Book I Aristotle seems to include
‘un argument très a priori’ on the function of man, defends his earlier interpretation by
pointing out that the dialectician may quote the views of experts, but admits that the
contrasting arguments in EN I are not so easily explained by a reference to dialectic
methodology.
10
EN VII 1-2, 1145b 2-29.
11
Dirlmeier (1956), p. 142; Owen (1961), p. 85; Barnes (1984), p. 1809; Rowe in
Broadie & Rowe (2002), p. 190; Kraut (2006), p. 77.
12
Nieuwenburg (1999).
13
See e.g. De Cael. 297a 15, béltion dè tiqénai tâljqév.
14
See Pritzl (1994), p. 42, who however somewhat spoils his argument by identifying
endoxa with non-perceptual phainomena, and conversely.
Phainomena moreover is not an unambiguous term, because it refers to
beliefs as well as to perceptions8
.
A complicated passage belonging with the argument about incon-
tinence in Book VII chs. i-x of Nicomachean Ethics, much discussed
since Owen put the expression tithenai ta phainomena in the limelight9
,
is explicit about the role of endoxa in ethical arguments concerned with
emotions10
. The formula in the text is tiqéntav tà ƒainómena, unavoid-
ably translated and interpreted in various ways by scholars. Dirlmeier,
for instance, has «die gängigen Ansichten zugrunde zu legen», Owen
«set down the phainomena», the Revised Oxford Translation «set the
phenomena before us», Rowe «set out what appears to be true about our
subjects», and Kraut «set out what seems to be the case»11
. Nieuwen-
burg, comparing Aristotelian references to the positing of principles by
earlier thinkers, not implausibly contends that the verb here may mean
‘to assume’12
. Having looked myself at a number of passages where
Aristotle uses forms of the verb, I prefer the somewhat blander rendering
‘to keep to’13
. I believe that the phainomena referred to in this passage
have a criterial function14
.
As to the arguments at issue here one should emphasize the word
ethical, for the ‘other cases’ mentioned at the beginning of the

6. 168 J. MANSFELD
15
Denyer (1991), p. 206, translating ‘in this case, as in the others’, appears to take the
‘other cases’ to mean all other cases, in whatever inquiry, but see e.g. Barnes (1991), p.
113; Fait (1992), p. 5 n. 7. Numerous parallels for êpì t¬n ãll¬n in a restricted sense,
e.g. EN 1099a 20, 1108a 18, 1108b 26, 1134a 23, EE 1237b 21, etc.
16
EN 1145b 13 hai epithumiai, b 20 thumou (cf. below, n. 25).
17
Natali refers to our passage (1990b), p. 59 n. 20, and ibid. p. 59, argues that one has
to «stabilire quali sono i phainomena (ciò che sembra vero ai più, o agli esperti, o ai più
numerosi e famosi degli esperti)». He thus in some sense comes close to the interpreta-
tion argued above.
passage, which involve first positing the phainomena and then a testing
of endoxa, are by no means all other cases whatsoever irrespective of
the discipline concerned, but similar or comparable cases; here: other
affections or emotions, involving pleasure and pain15
. Although also
in physics views having or acquiring some status or other are cited,
tested, rejected, or revised, one should therefore not, on the basis of
this sole passage in the Ethics, argue that ‘the’ endoxic method (what-
ever its actual capacity) is valid for physics in the same way as for
(parts of) ethics.
One such parallel affection (not specified by Aristotle) is philia, ‘love’
and/or ‘friendship’; emotions specified in the present chapter are desire
and anger16
.
I quote the first few lines:
«We must, as in other cases, keep to the phainomena and, after first dis-
cussing the difficulties, go on to demonstrate: by preference all the endoxa
pertaining to these affections, or (failing this) the majority, and the most
important. For if the difficulties are resolved and the endoxa remain in
place the demonstration will have been sufficient».
To what does the formula ‘the’ endoxa refer? It has not been noticed,
it seems to me, that the phrase «all the endoxa pertaining to these affec-
tions, or the majority, and the most important» lists three categories of
endoxa also found in the explanation of the term found in several pas-
sages in the first book of Topics cited above.
I take it that ‘all the endoxa’ is short for ‘endoxa appearing to all peo-
ple’, that ‘the majority’ stands for those appearing to most people, and
the ‘most important’ or ‘most authoritative’ for those appearing to (the
majority of, or the most eminent among) the wise17
. Arranged in double
columns:

7. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1145B 2-6 169
18
See Joachim (1951), p. 219; Voigtländer (1980), p. 638; Hintikka (1987 repr.
2004), p. 213; Smith (1993), p. 351; Pritzl (1994), p. 44, 48. Brunschwig (1990), p.
245-52, discusses contrasting endoxa; at (2000), p. 116-8, he argues that according to
the point of view of Topics there can be no ‘conflit entre ∂ndoza’, but also maintains
that «le texte de l’Ethique admet implicitement qu’il puisse exister des conflicts entre
∂ndoza». Berti (1996a repr. 2004), p. 326, sticks to the position that there is no conflict
among endoxa at all already argued by him (1989), p. 126-32, (1990), p. 37, 39, 41-2,
(«gli endoxa […] sono ciò alla luce di cui le opinioni vengono esaminate»). But Natali
(1997), p. 252, points out that Aristotle wishes to find a philosophical way «di fondare
quanto c’è di vero nelle opinioni diffuse e autorevoli», i.e. among the endoxa. Note that
according to Top. 162b 27 endoxic premises can be false; see e.g. Fait (1992), p. 13-4,
quoting SE 182b 37-8; Pritzl (1994), p. 43.
19
Pace Barnes (1980), p. 492, who argues that the «largest consistent subset of the
initial ∂ndoza» is to be preserved, «subject to the proviso that it must include ‘the most
important’ (kuriÉtata) members of that original set». He hypothesizes that the most
important may be «those most widely held, or those which have been embraced after
sustained reflection, or those whose content is most abstract or most general». He is
followed e.g. by Smith (1997), p. xix, who speaks of a largest possible number of views
that should be retained, and by Brunschwig (2000), p. 118, who suggests that only the
smallest possible portion of endoxa is to be sacrificed.
endoxa
of all all the endoxa
of the majority the majority of endoxa
of the wise the most important endoxa
of all the wise
of the best known of the wise
of the majority of the wise
Those endoxa which are left when the difficulties have been resolved,
that is to say when some among them have been eliminated and others
revised18
, may belong to all these categories (the views of everybody
including both those of the majority and of the experts), or to two of
them, perhaps even to one only — this will depend on the issue at issue.
Anyhow, opinions are always opinions of some class or group of people,
or of someone.
This interpretation liberates us from the obligation of saving what-
ever endoxa are left as if they were a sort of data worth saving in
toto. One need not worry about the vexing question whether the great-
est possible number of endoxa should be maintained, or not19
. Nor, I
believe, need we think any longer of a large subset of mutually com-
patible and objectively true endoxa encompassing much or even most

8. 170 J. MANSFELD
20
This, if I am not mistaken, is the position stated by Irwin (1988), p. 14-5, 176, 311;
for similar views see the overview at Fait (1992), p. 8-9, and Pritzl (1993), p. 248. Reeve
(1998), p. 241, speaks of endoxa as «deeply unproblematic beliefs — beliefs to which
there is simply no worthwhile opposition of any sort» (his italics). Difficulties concerned
with this kind of interpretation are examined by Taylor (1990), p. 131-5; Barnes (1991),
p. 113-5.
21
Cp. the presentation without names of ‘what is affirmed’ about pleasure at EN VII
xi and, largely anonymous, X i-iii.
22
1145b 14-5, «the temperate man (they call) continent and disposed to endurance»,
recalls Alcibiades’ comment after the famous seduction scene (Plato, Symp. 219d-e).
23
1145b 20. The same phrase GC 323b 15-6, virtually the same EN 1152b 23-4,
similar 1174a 11-2.
24
For these two (interrelated) sides of the semantic field of the term see Algra (1995),
p. 168-9 = (1988), p. 122-3.
of reality20
, or of experience, as ghostly doubles of Platonic Forms.
Maintaining an opinio communis is merely preferable. But preserv-
ing the views of the majority and (or even: or) of the most authorita-
tive luminaries will do as well. Again, this will depend on the issue
involved.
We discard endoxic views (or aspects of such views) when they cause
difficulties that can only be resolved by rejecting them. But it is not the
case that such endoxic views as remain achieve an epistemic status on a
par with propositions that have been proved scientifically.
In the part of the text that follows, six or maybe even more than
six endoxa pertaining to incontinence are briefly cited — anony-
mously21
. Some among these may belong to all or most people, others
(also) to eminent wise men; Aristotle is not explicit22
. These views,
Aristotle tells us after they have been listed, are ta legomena, ‘what
is affirmed’23
. Owen in the paper cited above argued that the phaino-
mena mentioned at the beginning must be precisely these (six or
more) points of view on incontinence. To be sure, in an ethical set-
ting phainomena can hardly mean anything but beliefs, or things one
knows from one’s experience as a human being, or qua being a citi-
zen24
. But the endoxa listed here are instances of such phainomena,
so the denotation of the term is not restricted to what is found in the
present passage.
I cite two of these endoxa, viz. those most pertinent to what immedi-
ately follows in Aristotle: (a) the incontinent person knows that what he
is doing is wrong but does it all the same, in passion — this looks like
a popular view one could share, but is also well attested in the work of

9. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1145B 2-6 171
25
Think of the famous lines Eur. Med. 1078-9, cited Broadie & Rowe (2002), p. 386,
which not only illustrate the general point but also and in particular EN 1145b 19-20, the
concluding legomenon about people «said to be incontinent in the face of anger». Also
cf. Eur. Hipp. 380-5, fr. 841 3
N (from the Chrysippus) e.g. ap. Alcin. Did. p. 177.10-1 H.
Pl. Lg. 869a akrateis thumou (maybe a reminiscence of the Euripidean lines as well) is
cited by Tricot (1947), p. 320 n. 1, ad loc.
26
Different interpretation at Cooper (1988 repr. 1999), p. 285-6.
27
See Giannantoni (1990), p. 321-3.
28
1145b 26-7.
29
1145b 27-9.
30
1147b 14-7; cf. 1144b 20-1. See Giannantoni (1990), p. 323-4, Cooper (1998),
p. 286-7.
a sophos, viz. Euripides, an author often quoted by Aristotle25
. Or (b):
they sometimes say the man of wisdom cannot be incontinent — this
resembles a famous paradox of Socrates.
Aristotle next picks up the issue by being puzzled about ‘how some-
one having the right assumption could behave incontinently’. This for-
mula blends the two endoxic views just cited, for the person having
the right assumption recalls (b), the man of wisdom who according to
‘some’ cannot behave incontinently, while the possibility that he would
nevertheless do so reminds us of (a), the person who knows that what he
is doing is wrong. Thus, this phrase reveals to what extent some of the
preceding views are in conflict26
.
Therefore one need not be puzzled on finding Aristotle in what follows
discussing Socrates’ paradox that one cannot act wrongly as long as one
knows what is right27
. Some care is taken to present this view not as an indi-
vidual or idiosyncratic idea but as one shared by others who remain anony-
mous (tines). Socrates is cited as its major representative: he believed it is
impossible that someone’s knowledge can be overruled by something else.
Accordingly, arguing there is no such thing as incontinence, he opposed
the ‘view that had been stated [sc. by others]’. «For no one having (the
right) assumption acts against what (he knows to be) best; he does so out
of ignorance»28
(i.e. because he does not know what is best).
Socrates’ argument, Aristotle in his turn points out, «is clearly at odds
with the phainomena»; ignorance may therefore well, and still, be the
cause of this wrong behaviour. What manner of ignorance is involved,
however, remains to be seen29
. As a result of further inquiry Socrates’
tenet becomes acceptable in a revised form, after the difficulties have
been thoroughly rehearsed. It is reformulated in a way which agrees with
Aristotle’s own conclusion about what constitutes incontinence30
.

10. 172 J. MANSFELD
31
EE 1216b 27-8, «using the phainomena [sc. of all men, or at least of all men in
some way] as testimonies and models». See Eucken (1872), p. 1-3, 12-3, and Le Blond
(1939 = 1970), p. 252, on Aristotle’s attitude towards tradition and experience; followed
by e.g. Verdenius (1960), p. 56. Düring (1966), p. 60: «allerlei Daten, die man aus Büch-
ern oder aus der ganzen Erfahrung sammelt». Nussbaum (1986), p. 240-63, exaggerates
the relevance of this personal involvement, and her application of the notion of ‘internal
realism’ is awkward, see Cooper (1988 repr. 1999), p. 284-5. But her suggestion that
phainomena pertain to ‘us’ is not entirely false: sometimes they do. Giannantoni (1990),
p. 323, oddly believes that Aristotle’s claim that Socrates’ view is in conflict with the
phainomena «non è un’obiezione persuasiva».
What are the phainomena the Socratic paradox is at odds with? They
cannot be all the six or eight legomena, or endoxa, cited previously,
because as we have seen a view much resembling that of Socrates is
found among them. On the other hand, insofar as he denies that inconti-
nence exists Socrates effectively contradicts most of these legomena. But
Aristotle clearly believes that (in its unrevised form) the paradox contra-
dicts the phainomena. I therefore suggest that phainomena loosely refers
to something like the general experiences of humanity (some examples of
which have been enumerated in the list of legomena), experiences to some
extent shared by, or familiar to, Aristotle31
. The term therefore has the
same meaning here as at the beginning of the methodological excursus.
During a Symposium Aristotelicum (I do not recall exactly which one)
an interpretation of a familiar Aristotelian doctrine was proposed which
at a first glance was rather strange. I ventured to make a critical remark
about this suggestion to Enrico Berti, believing he would fully agree.
But no. What he said is «è sempre interessante incontrare interpretazioni
nuove». This experience has encouraged me to submit the outrageous
interpretation of the first chapter of Nicomachean Ethics VII argued
above to the editors of this great scholar’s Festschrift, in the hope that, as
always, I shall learn much from his argument against. Ad multos annos!
Utrecht
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