1. 1
‘Endoxa’
in
Aristotle’s
Philosophical
Method
By:
James
Shortly

2. 2
Contents
I.
Introduction
3
II.I
G.
E.
L.
Owen’s
‘Endoxic
Method’
Interpretation
4
II.II
Evidence
for
Owen’s
Interpretation
5
III.I
Nussbaum’s
Expansion
of
the
‘Endoxic’
Interpretation
7
III.II
Nussbaum’s
‘Preservation
of
Appearances’
Interpretation
of
Aristotle’s
Methodology
8
IV.
Advantages
of
an
‘Endoxic’
Interpretation
10
V.I
Frede’s
Criticism
of
the
“Endoxic
Method”
Interpretation
11
V.II
Another
Non
‘Endoxic
Method’
Reason
for
‘Laying
Down
Appearances’
13
V.III
A
Problem
With
Rejecting
an
‘Endoxic
Method’
Interpretation
of
7.1
14
VI.
The
Puzzle
15
VII.I
Proposed
Solution
15
VII.II
Examining
the
Rhetoric
Quote
In
Depth
18
VII.III
Advantages
of
this
Interpretation
17
VIII.
Further
Evidence
for
This
Interpretation
of
Aristotle’s
Philosophical
Method
20
IX.
Conclusion
23
Work
Cited
24

3. 3
I.
Introduction
In
book
7,
chapter
1
of
the
Nicomachean
Ethics1,
Aristotle
seems
to
establish
rules
for
his
methodology
of
philosophical
analysis,
stating
that
one
must
first
investigate
what
is
‘commonly
reported’
(endoxa)
about
the
subject
under
investigation,
and
then
strive
to
maintain
as
many
of
these
common
reports
as
possible
in
one’s
final
logos.
Some
scholars,
like
Owen
and
Nussbaum,
have
interpreted
this
section
as
revealing
a
deep
philosophical
commitment
that
Aristotle
holds
towards
the
role
of
philosophy
as
working
within
the
confines
of
our
common
ways
of
speaking,
which
is
referred
to
as
the
‘endoxic
method’
thesis.
However
others,
such
as
Frede,
have
criticized
this
interpretation
as
drawing
too
grand
a
conclusion
from
one
small
section
of
Aristotle’s
corpus,
as
he,
in
fact,
does
not
always
take
into
account
what
is
‘commonly
reported’
when
engaging
in
philosophical
analysis.
She
further
argues
that
when
he
does,
he
often
does
not
do
so
for
the
reasons
suggested
by
the
kind
of
‘endoxic’
interpretation
offered
by
Owen
and
Nussbaum.
In
my
paper,
I
propose
that
we
can
resolve
this
tension
by
closely
examining
some
remarks
that
Aristotle
makes
in
the
Rhetoric,
in
which
he
notes
that
there
is
a
strong
correlation
between
what
is
commonly
believed,
and
what
is
true.
My
thesis
is
that
Aristotle
did
not
wish
to
preserve
appearances
because
of
some
special
weight
that
they
hold
for
the
epistemic
status
of
the
matter
being
discussed,
but
that
Aristotle
thinks
it
is
methodologically
effective
to
attempt
to
preserve
appearances
1
Nicomachean
Ethics
1145b1-­‐7

4. 4
in
your
logos
due
to
the
fact
that
there
is
strong
predictive
success
that
beliefs
that
are
commonly
held
also
turn
out
to
be
true
upon
critical
reflection.
I
will
support
my
thesis
by
showing
how
it
allows
us
to
accurately
characterize
7.1
and
how
it
relates
to
the
rest
of
Aristotle’s
corpus,
while
avoiding
the
criticisms
leveled
by
Frede
against
the
‘endoxic
method’
thesis.
For
by
interpreting
Aristotle
as
holding
that
one
ought
to
preserve
endoxa
in
your
logos
due
to
the
pragmatic
success
that
such
a
strategy
has
in
producing
true
logos,
rather
than
some
overarching
epistemological
commitment
to
preserving
endoxa
itself,
we
can
better
make
sense
of
why
he
would
establish
a
methodology
in
7.1,
yet
frequently
depart
from
it
in
other
parts
of
his
corpus.
For
on
my
characterization,
we
just
commit
Aristotle
to
holding
a
general
guideline
about
how
to
affectively
engage
in
philosophical
investigations,
and
hence
in
situations
where
Aristotle
has
good
reason
to
oppose
what
is
commonly
reported
in
his
final
logos,
Aristotle
would
not
contradict
his
methodology
by
doing
so2.
II.I
G.
E.
L.
Owen’s
‘Endoxic
Method’
Interpretation
The
starting
point
of
this
discussion
about
an
‘endoxic
method’
comes
from
some
brief
remarks
Aristotle
makes
in
book
7,
chapter
1
of
the
Nicomachean
Ethics:
“Here,
as
in
other
cases
we
must
set
down
the
phainomena
and
begin
by
considering
the
difficulties,
and
so
go
on
to
vindicate
if
possible
all
the
endoxa
about
these
states
of
mind,
or
at
any
rate
most
of
them
and
the
most
important”
(ENVII
1,
1145b2-­‐6).
2
Topics
104b19-­‐28

5. 5
To
understand
what
is
meant
by
an
‘endoxic
method'
interpretation
of
these
remarks,
it
is
important
to
understand
how
Owen
chooses
to
translate
a
few
key
terms.
While
‘phainomena’,
as
used
by
Aristotle
in
scientific
works
such
as
Physics,
often
carries
the
connotation
of
sensory
phenomena,
i.e.
how
the
world
appears
to
our
senses,
Owen
argues
that
in
this
passage
Aristotle
also
uses
this
word
to
designate
what
Owen
refers
to
as
‘linguistic
phenomena’,
i.e.
how
the
world
appears
to
us
through
the
way
we
commonly
talk
about
it.
On
this
interpretation,
we
would
also
translate
endoxa,
which
can
mean
‘reputable
opinion’
or
‘of
high
repute’,
as
something
like
‘generally
admitted’,
or
as
he
puts
it
in
his
paper,
‘common
conceptions’.
Therefore, in translating these terms thusly, Owen characterizes Aristotle as
establishing an ‘endoxic method’ for how to conduct a philosophical analysis of a
subject, stipulating that we must begin by examining what is commonly said
about that subject under investigation, and then strive to maintain as many of
them as possible in our final logos.
II.II Evidence for Owen’s Interpretation
With
respect
to
his
translation
of
phainomena,
Owen
argues
that
it
would
be
incorrect
to
translate
this
as
‘observed
facts’.
For
later
on
when
discussing
Socrates’
account
of
incontinence,
Aristotle
does
not
criticize
it
on
the
basis
that
it
conflicts
with
the
‘observed
facts’,
as
Aristotle
also
derives
a
similar
conclusion
that
men
act
out
of
ignorance
when
incontinent3,
but
criticizes
the
kind
of
ignorance
that
3
Nicomachean
Ethics
1147b14-­‐5

6. 6
Socrates
ascribes
to
the
incontinent4.
Hence,
translating
phainomena
as
‘common
conceptions’
reconciles
this
issue,
and
reveals
Aristotle’s
motivation
for
criticizing
Socrates’
account;
for
Aristotle
ultimately
shares
some
of
Socrates
views,
but
“is
anxious,
unlike
Socrates,
to
leave
a
use
for
the
expression
‘knowing
what
is
right
but
doing
what
is
wrong’”5.
Thus,
because
Aristotle
makes
a
distinction
with
respect
to
the
kind
of
knowledge
that
is
related
to
incontinence
in
order
to
synthesize
what
is
commonly
said
about
the
subject
of
incontinence
with
Socrates’
arguments
and
observations,
Owen
takes
this
as
evidence
for
his
interpretation
of
7.1
as
establishing
Aristotle’s
‘endoxic
method’
for
engaging
in
philosophical
analysis.
With
respect
to
his
translation
of
endoxa,
Owen
supports
this
by
pointing
out
that
immediately
after
the
section
quoted
above,
Aristotle
does
not
go
on
to
list
the
opinions
of
the
wise
or
reputable,
but
those
that
are
commonly
held,
concluding
this
survey
by
stating
that
“these
are
the
things
said”6.
Furthermore,
even
if
‘endoxa’
is
taken
to
refer
to
reputable
opinions,
it
is
not
necessarily
clear
that
this
would
be
a
problem
for
an
‘endoxic
method’
interpretation.
For
in
the
Topics,
Aristotle
states
“those
opinions
are
reputable
which
are
accepted
by
everyone
or
by
the
majority
or
by
the
wise”7.
Hence,
since
‘reputable
opinions’
evidently
includes
the
opinions
of
the
many,
and
Aristotle,
immediately
after
saying
this,
lists
the
common
opinions
of
the
many,
this
translation
is
by
no
means
unreasonable.
4
Nicomachean
Ethics
1145b28-­‐29
5
Owen
241
6
Nicomachean
Ethics
1145b20
7
Topics
100b21-­‐22

7. 7
III.I
Nussbaum’s
Expansion
of
the
‘Endoxic’
Interpretation
Before
explicating
how
Nussbaum
expands
on
Owen’s
‘endoxic’
account,
I
shall
first
explicate
the
aspects
of
Owen’s
choice
of
translation
that
she
follows,
and
how
she
provides
further
support
for
their
validity.
First,
she
follows
Owen
by
translating
phainomena
as
referring
to
both
perceptual
appearances
and
common
conceptions,
and
supports
this
by
observing
that
in
the
sections
of
chapter
VII
of
the
Nicomachean
Ethics
discussed
by
Owen,
Aristotle
initially
talks
about
setting
down
the
phainomena
in
7.1,
before
switching
that
term
with
endoxa
which,
also
following
Owen,
she
defines
as
“common
conceptions
or
beliefs
on
the
subject”8.
Hence,
the
argument
goes
that
Aristotle
cannot
have
meant
just
sense
perception,
or
‘observed
facts’,
by
phainomena;
for
it
would
not
have
made
sense
why
he
would
have
immediately
collecting
and
examining
common
conceptions
when
following
the
methodological
commitments
established
in
section
7.1.
Upon
critically
examining
Owen’s
‘endoxic’
account,
Nussbaum
makes
the
observation
that
Owen,
in
arguing
that
Aristotle
takes
phainomena
to
refer
to
both
‘sense
appearances’
and
‘common
conceptions’,
leaves
us
with
the
interpretation
that
Aristotle
had
“two
distinct
methods”
for
philosophical
investigation,
one
which
involves
collecting
and
examining
sense
perception,
the
other
collecting
and
examining
what
is
commonly
said
about
subjects.
In
contrast
to
this,
Nussbaum
argues
that
Aristotle
ultimately
has
only
one
methodological
commitment
to
“preserve
appearances”
when
undertaking
philosophical
analysis.
Hence,
whether
Aristotle
is
trying
to
preserve
sense
appearances
by
rejecting
an
account
of
matter
8
Nussbaum
272

8. 8
which
posits
entities
that
do
not
appear
to
our
sense
perception,
such
as
the
claim
that
surfaces
are
composed
of
triangles9,
or,
as
we
saw
above,
when
he
rejects
an
account
of
incontinence
because
it
conflicts
with
“how
the
world
appears
to
us”,
as
revealed
in
our
common
practice
of
talking
about
incontinent
people
as
“knowing
what
is
right
but
doing
what
is
wrong”,
they
are
actually
just
two
different
instances
of
the
same
methodological
commitment10.
III.II
Nussbaum’s
‘Preservation
of
Appearances’
Interpretation
of
Aristotle’s
Methodology
What,
then,
does
this
‘preservation
of
appearances’
methodology
consist
in?
With
respect
to
‘common
conceptions’,
she
argues
that
this
first
involves
studying
both
ordinary
beliefs,
and
those
of
the
wise,
such
as
those
who
offer
scientific
or
philosophical
examinations11.
She
further
argues
that
this
survey
is
to
be
restricted
only
to
those
who
share
similar
“general
features
of
a
way
of
life”,
which
we
can
think
of
as
meaning
those
who
belong
to
similar
cultural
groups.
Nussbaum
argues
that
Aristotle
holds
this
commitment
by
citing
that,
in
Politics
I,
Aristotle
holds
a
similar
commitment
when
examining
how
ethical
conceptions
arise
and
apply
to
individuals,
stating
that
they
only
make
sense
within
the
context
of
a
shared
way
of
life,
and
hence
are
not
applicable
to
“bestial
beings”12.
Furthermore,
another
reason
why
it
would
make
sense
for
Aristotle
to
hold
this
view
is
that
if,
as
the
‘endoxic’
interpretation
contends,
Aristotle
holds
that
our
9
On
the
Heavens
306a5,
293a27
10
Nussbaum
273-­‐74
11
Topics
100b21,
104a8-­‐12
12
Nussbaum
275

9. 9
beliefs
often
originate
in
the
way
we
are
accustomed
to
speaking,
and
the
way
we
are
accustomed
to
speaking
is
the
result
of
the
particular
cultural
group
we
are
in,
it
only
makes
sense
that,
in
attempting
to
locate
common
beliefs
about
a
subject
by
examining
ways
we
are
accustomed
to
speaking,
we
would
restrict
it
to
the
cultural
groups
which
brought
about
these
ways
of
speaking.
For
we
can
only
ask
a
group
about
their
conception
of
‘F’
if
they
have
this
conception
of
‘F’,
and
this
shared
conception
could
only
come
about
if
they
share
the
similar
features
of
our
way
of
life
that
brought
about
our
conception
of
‘F’13.
Nussbaum
then
argues
that,
after
collecting
data
from
ones
cultural
group,
the
next
task
is
to
examine
whether
there
are
any
puzzles
with
respect
to
these
various
views,
i.e.
whether
they
are
confused,
contradictory
with
each
other,
etc..
In
response
to
any
found
contradiction,
we
must
strive
to
offer
a
consistent
account,
while
not
simply
disregarding
the
conflicting
view
of
some,
but
finding
a
way
to
harmonize
them,
or
at
the
very
least,
“the
greatest
number
and
the
most
basic”14.
The
procedure
by
which
we
produce
an
account
that
harmonizes
with
some
appearances
rather
than
others
varies
depending
on
“the
subject
matter
and
the
problem”.
First,
Aristotle
holds
that
what
is
universally
believed
is
rarely
rejected15,
and
while
he
does
not
explain
in
detail
why
this
should
be
so,
it
stands
to
reason
that
if
a
particular
belief
has
universal
acceptance,
this
fact
alone
strongly
guides
our
intuitions
towards
accepting
this
belief,
and
hence
to
reject
this
would,
at
least,
require
a
very
strong
argument
or
demonstration
to
the
contrary.
Second,
she
also
13
Nussbaum
275-­‐276
14
Nussbaum
276-­‐277
15
Nussbaum
278

10. 10
argues
that
Aristotle
claims
the
source
of
arbitration
between
various
appearances
is
revealed
through
examining
our
cultural
practices;
for
some
of
these
disputes
can
be
reconciled
by
appealing
to
a
judge
who
renders
a
verdict16.
For
example,
in
evaluating
appearances
related
to
health,
Aristotle
thinks
it
reasonable
that
we
would
value
the
views
of
a
doctor
more
than
those
of
an
ignorant
man17,
and
that
the
selection
of
these
judges
does
not
require
further
justification,
as
Aristotle
begins
from
practices
that
already
are
in
place,
rather
than
trying
to
develop
new
practices
or
methodologies18.
IV.
Advantages
of
an
‘Endoxic’
Interpretation
In
reviewing
these
two
interpretations,
I
have
identified
three
distinct
advantages
to
interpreting
7.1
in
this
fashion.
First,
it
accurately
reflects
what
Aristotle
says
in
7.1;
for
there
he
seems
to
be
explicitly
outlining
some
kind
of
methodological
commitment,
even
if
the
scope
of
this
commitment
is
not
made
fully
explicit.
Second,
it
allows
us
to
make
sense
of
the
passage
in
7.1
immediately
following
the
section
quoted
above;
for
there
Aristotle
does
review
‘what
is
commonly
said’
about
the
subject
matter.
And
third,
it
makes
sense
of
why
Aristotle
seems
to
give
epistemic
weight
to
‘what
is
commonly
reported’
throughout
the
rest
of
his
corpus;
for
it
outlines
the
methodological
framework
in
which
it
would
make
sense
to
appeal
to
‘what
is
commonly
said’
about
a
subject
in
trying
to
establish
a
good
logos
of
that
subject.
16
Nussbaum
278
17
Metaphysics
1010b3-­‐14
18
Metaphysics
1011a3

11. 11
V.I
Frede’s
Criticism
of
the
“Endoxic
Method”
Interpretation
In
contrast
to
these
two
interpretations,
some
scholars,
such
as
Dorothea
Frede,
have
been
hesitant
to
accept
this
characterization
of
Aristotle’s
methodology.
In
her
paper
“The
Endoxon
Mystique:
What
Endoxa
Are
and
What
They
Are
Not”,
she
declares
her
intent
to
“deflate”
the
kind
of
account
offered
by
Nussbaum
and
Owen.
What
she
means
by
this
is
that,
while
she
generally
agrees
with
the
claim
that
Aristotle
gives
epistemic
weight
to
“what
people
generally
think
or
say”
when
conducting
philosophical
analysis,
she
is
hesitant
to
describe
his
overall
methodology
as
‘endoxic’,
where
that
is
taken
to
mean
that
all
investigations
must
either
begin
with
consideration
of
common
conceptions,
or
sense
perception.
As
such,
she
argues
that
the
kind
of
methodology
that
Aristotle
appears
to
outline
in
7.1,
and
follows
within
that
chapter,
is
to
be
treated
as
an
exception
to
his
overall
methodological
commitments,
rather
than
an
integral
part
of
its
foundation19.
To
substantiate
this
concern,
she
begins
by
claiming
that
no
other
section
in
Aristotle’s
corpus
follows
an
‘endoxic’
methodology
as
closely
as
7.1;
for
Aristotle
very
rarely
“lays
down
the
appearances”
when
engaging
in
philosophical
analysis20.
Conversely,
Frede
argues
that
a
lot
of
the
time,
he
just
begins
with
his
own
argumentation21.
Additionally,
if
he
does
appear
to
lay
down
appearances
beforehand,
often
times
there
are
significant
discrepancies
between
what
he
says
in
7.1,
and
how
he
actually
‘lays
down
appearances’
in
other
sections,
that
would
hence
19
Frede
186-­‐7
20
Frede
190
21
Frede
201-­‐202,
212

12. 12
make
it
problematic
to
cite
these
passages
as
examples
where
Aristotle
follows
the
methodology
established
in
7.1.
For
example,
while
7.11-­‐14
of
the
Nicomachean
Ethics,
which
deal
with
pleasure,
appears
to
follow
the
‘endoxic
method’,
as
there
Aristotle
begins
by
offering
different
views
of
pleasure
and
concludes
with
the
phrase
“these,
then,
are
the
things
said”22,
upon
closer
inspection
a
few
relevant
features
emerge
that
show
his
approach
to
this
topic
diverges
from
what
the
tenets
of
an
‘endoxic
method’
would
demand.
First,
not
all
‘endoxa’
of
pleasure
are
surveyed,
but
rather,
his
survey
is
limited
only
to
those
related
to
“the
Platonist
contention
that
pleasure
is
a
genesis
in
the
sense
of
filling
of
a
lack
or
the
restoration
of
an
equilibrium,
which
is
by
no
means
a
common
view”23.
Furthermore,
having
“set
down
the
appearances”,
Aristotle
does
not
go
on
to
attempt
to
preserve
all
or
most
of
them,
but
to
refute
them
all,
and
then
introduce
his
own
concept
of
pleasure,
that
of
‘unimpeded
activity’.
It
should
also
be
noted
that
this
view
is
neither
derived
from
these
views,
nor
is
any
effort
made
to
harmonize
it
with
them24.
To
offer
another
example,
while
in
the
Metaphysics
Aristotle
does
consider
the
views
that
his
predecessors
had
with
respect
to
first
causes25,
this
is
not
to
be
taken
as
following
an
‘endoxic
method’;
for
he
does
this
not
in
order
to
later
go
on
to
preserve
them
in
his
final
account,
but
in
order
to
demonstrate
the
“necessity
and
the
superiority
of
his
own
canon
of
four
causes”26.
22
Nicomachean
Ethics
1152b23
23
Frede
191
24
Frede
191
25
Metaphysics
983a33-­‐b4
26
Frede
192-­‐193

13. 13
Thus,
Frede
concludes
that
when
Aristotle
does
“lay
down
the
appearances”,
this
can
often
be
interpreted
as
more
of
a
compositional
technique
that
allows
him
to
more
smoothly
transition
into
his
own
arguments.
She
concludes
on
the
basis
of
this
that
it
is
more
accurate
to
interpret
Aristotle
as
holding
that
his
own
argumentation
is
really
what
does
the
work
of
supporting
his
account
of
a
particular
subject
matter,
rather
than
whether
the
account
conforms
to
what
is
commonly
said27.
V.II
Another
Non
‘Endoxic
Method’
Reason
for
‘Laying
Down
Appearances’
The
second
stage
of
her
deflation
is
to
argue
that
when
Aristotle
does
“lay
down
the
appearances”,
often
they
function
more
as
a
tool
in
dialectical
exercises,
which
are
not
necessarily
undertaken
for
the
purpose
of
uncovering
truth,
rather
than
as
an
integral
part
of
some
‘truth
finding’
methodology.
To
substantiate
this
claim,
she
first
observes
that
Aristotle
rarely
uses
the
word
‘endoxa’
outside
of
the
context
of
Topics,
and
that,
in
that
work,
Aristotle
argues
that
endoxic
premises
occupy
a
middle
position
as
the
starting
point
of
a
dialectical
exercise28;
neither
obviously
false
(like
eristic
premises),
nor
obviously
true
(like
demonstrative
premises
used
in
scientific
syllogisms),
but
(on
the
surface)
have
the
potential
to
be
either29.
Hence,
using
what
is
commonly
accepted
as
the
starting
point
of
dialectical
analysis
is
useful;
for
in
order
for
one
to
have
a
fruitful
dialectic,
what
is
being
discussed
must
seem
plausible
to
both
participants
30.
Thus,
Frede
argues
that
Aristotle’s
interest
in
‘what
is
commonly
said’
for
dialectics
is
not
necessarily
27
Frede
192
28
Topics
100b23-­‐31
29
Frede
194
30
Frede
194-­‐195

14. 14
motivated
by
any
special
weight
that
it
holds
for
the
epistemic
status
of
the
matter
being
discussed,
which
is
the
kind
of
conclusion
an
‘endoxic
method’
interpretation
of
these
sections
might
conclude,
but
has
preference
for
them
because
of
their
usefulness
in
playing
an
“intellectual
game”,
which
does
not
necessarily
aim
at
the
acquisition
of
some
wider
truth
about
the
subject
matter
being
discussed31.
V.III
A
Problem
With
Rejecting
an
‘Endoxic
Method’
Interpretation
of
7.1
While
Frede
makes
a
strong
case
for
her
criticism
of
the
endoxic
method
thesis,
her
characterization
of
7.1
as
an
exception
to
Aristotle’s
overall
methodology
might
not
strike
one
as
being
very
satisfying,
as
it
does
not
really
make
sense
of
why
Aristotle
would
clearly
introduce
a
methodological
constraint
only
to
disregard
it
in
all
his
other
works.
To
attempt
to
resolve
this
tension,
she
offers
another
possible
interpretation
of
how
this
section
relates
to
the
rest
of
Aristotle’s
corpus.
She
argues
that
we
can
regard
7.1
as
just
being
a
remnant
of
the
Eudemian
Ethics
that
no
longer
serves
a
function
within
the
Nicomachean
Ethics,
and
hence,
does
not
have
a
place
within
his
overall
methodology
due
to
it
simply
being
an
earlier
view
he
later
abandoned.
Frede
supports
this
interpretation
by
referencing
Cooper,
who
argues
that,
in
contrast
to
the
Nicomahean
Ethics’
“smooth
and
puzzle
free
exposition”,
the
Eudemian
Ethics’
preference
for
“aporetic
treatment
of
problems”
is
more
consistent
with
what
is
said
in
section
7.132.
31
Frede
195
32
Frede
207-­‐208

15. 15
VI.
The
Puzzle
In
reviewing
the
advantages
of
either
accepting
or
rejecting
the
‘endoxic
method’
thesis,
outlined
in
sections
IV
and
VI,
we
are
faced
with
a
puzzle.
While
the
‘endoxic
method’
thesis
allows
us
to
make
sense
of
what
Aristotle
explicitly
says
in
7.1,
it
has
the
unfortunate
consequence
of
ascribing
to
him
a
methodology
he
evidently
does
not
always
(or
often)
follow.
However,
while
rejecting
the
‘endoxic
method’
thesis
seems
on
the
surface
to
be
more
promising,
as
it
allows
us
to
characterize
Aristotle
in
a
way
that
more
accurately
reflects
how
he
goes
about
engaging
in
philosophical
analysis
throughout
the
rest
of
his
corpus,
we
are
still
left
with
the
lingering
issue
of
how
to
make
sense
of
7.1,
and
how
to
situate
its
significance
within
Aristotle’s
corpus.
While
Frede
does
suggest
we
can
resolve
this
tension
by
regarding
it
as
just
a
vestigial
left
over
from
the
Eudemian
Ethics,
this
argument
is
very
speculative,
and
as
such
a
more
robust
explanation
-­‐
one
supported
by
textual
references
that
go
beyond
observations
about
a
purported
lack
of
continuity
with
respect
to
style
–
is
to
be
preferred.
VII.I
Proposed
Solution
As
a
response
to
this
puzzle,
I
offer
a
third
interpretation
of
7.1
and
how
it
relates
to
the
rest
of
Aristotle’s
corpus,
which
forms
as
its
nucleus
a
quote
from
the
Rhetoric.
For
there,
Aristotle
observes
that
humans
have
“a
sufficient
natural
instinct
for
what

16. 16
is
true,
and
usually
do
arrive
at
the
truth.
Hence
the
man
who
makes
a
good
guess
at
truth
is
likely
to
make
a
good
guess
at
what
is
reputable"33.
In
the
following
sections,
I
will
show
that
we
have
good
reasons
to
believe
that
Aristotle’s
belief
in
a
strong
correlation
between
what
is
commonly
believed
and
what
is
true
offers
both
a
fruitful
interpretation
of
7.1,
and
its
relationship
to
the
rest
of
Aristotle’s
corpus,
while
avoiding
the
problems
that
Frede
convincingly
demonstrated
exist
with
the
‘endoxic
method’
interpretation
of
7.1.
I
will
accomplish
this
by
showing
that
interpreting
7.1
in
light
of
this
belief
does
not
force
us
to
commit
Aristotle
to
the
view
that
a
necessary
condition
of
a
logos
being
‘good’
is
that
it
must
take
into
account,
and
harmonize
with,
either
common
conceptions
or
sense
perception,
like
in
Nussbaum
and
Owen’s
formulation
of
the
‘endoxic
method’
thesis.
Rather,
because
Aristotle
held
that
there
is
a
strong
correlation
between
the
common
beliefs
of
people,
and
true
beliefs,
his
frequent
appeals
to
‘endoxa’
are
just
the
result
of
Aristotle’s
recognition
that
it
follows
from
this
strong
correlation
that
those
who
wish
to
get
at
the
truth
would
be
wise
to
be
guided
by
the
beliefs
of
the
many;
for
the
predictive
success
afforded
by
this
correlation
justifies
our
use
of
‘endoxa’
as
a
guide
towards
producing
true
logos.
Hence,
on
my
account
7.1
is
to
be
interpreted
as
expressing
a
pragmatic
guideline
towards
pursuing
the
truth,
rather
than
some
wider,
epistemological
commitment
about
the
nature
of
truth
as
inherently
requiring
the
preservation
of
‘endoxa’.
33
Topics
1355a17

17. 17
VII.II
Examining
the
Rhetoric
Quote
In
Depth
“Man
has
a
sufficient
natural
instinct
for
what
is
true,
and
usually
do
arrive
at
the
truth.
Hence
the
man
who
makes
a
good
guess
at
truth
is
likely
to
make
a
good
guess
at
what
is
reputable”
-­‐
Topics
1355a17
Let
us
now
examine
more
precisely
the
meaning
of
this
statement,
how
it
makes
sense
of
7.1,
and
how
it
accurately
situates
its
importance
within
Aristotle’s
wider
corpus
while
avoiding
Frede’s
criticisms
of
the
‘endoxic
method’
thesis.
To
offer
context,
Aristotle
is
here
speculating
about
why
it
is
that
groups
of
people
come
to
uncritically
believe
the
same
thing
about
the
world,
and
why
it
is
that,
even
though
they
lack
the
critical
investigative
tools
of
the
philosopher
or
scientist
to
understand
that
what
they
believe
is
true
and
why
it
is
true,
they
still
often
happen
to
stumble
upon
the
truth
in
their
beliefs
about
the
world.
How
can
people,
on
mass,
acquire
true
beliefs
so
frequently
when
they
lack
the
critical
tools
to
do
so?
To
account
for
this
phenomenon,
Aristotle
posits
that
humans
have
a
natural
instinct
towards
apprehending
the
truth,
which
he
thinks
guides
how
we
think
about
the
world
towards
truthful
conceptualizations
of
it.
Thus,
it
is
clear
from
this
why
Aristotle
would
stress
the
need
to
examine
common
beliefs
when
attempting
to
produce
true
logos
in
7.1.
For
while
he
does
not
think
that
something
is
true
because
it
is
reputable,
as
he
makes
clear
in
the
Posterior
Analytics34,
and
hence
does
not
hold
that
true
logos
are
true
because
they
preserves
endoxa,
nonetheless
since
he
observes
that
there
is
a
strong
correlation
between
endoxa
and
true
logos,
assuming
34
Posterior
Analytics
81b20

18. 18
this
is
true
Aristotle
has
good
reason
to
regard
endoxa
as
instrumentally
useful
in
acquiring
true
logos.
For
if
it
just
so
happens
that
the
common
beliefs
often
happen
to
be
true,
even
if
it
they
are
not
always
true
since
“the
man
who
makes
a
good
guess
at
truth
is
likely
to
make
a
good
guess
at
what
is
reputable”
due
to
the
predictive
success
that
adhering
to
endoxa
has
towards
acquiring
the
truth,
being
aware
of
the
endoxa
and
attempting
to
avoid
transgressing
them
in
your
logos
serves
as
a
useful
guideline
for
how
to
carry
out
philosophical
investigations
in
a
way
that
is
conductive
to
producing
true
logos.
To
summarize
what
has
been
established
so
far,
my
interpretation
departs
from
the
‘endoxic
method’
thesis
in
that
it
neither
interprets
7.1,
nor
Aristotle’s
use
of
endoxa
in
producing
logos
throughout
his
corpus,
as
revealing
an
epistemological
commitment
that
correct
reasoning
intrinsically
involves
adhering
to
endoxa
–
that
true
logos
are
true
because
they
preserve
endoxa.
Rather,
I
wish
to
suggest
that
his
preference
is
motivated
by
his
belief
that
there
is
a
strong
correlation
between
what
is
generally
believed
and
what
is
true,
which
affords
those
who
do
not
contradict
endoxa
in
their
logos
greater
predictive
success
in
producing
true
logos
than
those
that
contradict
endoxa.
VII.III
Advantages
of
this
Interpretation
The
advantages
of
this
interpretation
are
clear;
for
it
is
able
to
render
an
account
of
Aristotle’s
philosophical
method
that
explains
what
Aristotle
says
in
7.1
and
why
he
frequently
uses
endoxa
in
producing
logos
throughout
his
corpus,
while
simultaneously
avoiding
the
criticisms
that
Frede
brings
up
against
committing

19. 19
Aristotle
to
an
‘endoxic
method’.
For
having
accepted
Frede’s
contention
that
Aristotle
does
not
always
preserve
appearances
in
his
final
account,
my
interpretation
does
not
force
us
to
have
to
characterize
Aristotle
as
contradicting
himself,
as
it
interprets
7.1
as
merely
establishing
a
general
guideline
for
engaging
in
philosophical
analysis.
Hence,
Aristotle
does
not
need
to
preserve
endoxa
in
all
his
logos
for
it
to
still
stands
as
an
accurate
characterization
of
his
philosophical
method.
Additionally,
this
characterization
improves
on
Frede’s
attempt
to
explain
how
7.1
relates
to
Aristotle’s
philosophical
method;
for
it
does
not
force
us
to
disregard
what
is
said
in
7.1
as
just
an
exception
to
his
wider
practices,
nor
does
it
offer
a
speculative
reason
for
this
exception.
Rather,
it
situates
this
section
within
Aristotle’s
wider
corpus
as
one
guideline
he
offers
for
how
to
reason
effectively,
and
does
so
by
drawing
upon
what
he
explicitly
says
in
another
section
of
his
corpus.
Furthermore,
this
view
also
provides
a
reason
for
why
we
might
reasonably
think
that
logos
that
contradict
what
is
commonly
spoken
of
ought
to
be
met
with
skepticism,
and
require
more
persuasive
argumentation
to
be
accepted
as
true35.
This
is
greatly
advantageous,
as
it
allows
us
to
better
make
sense
of
Aristotle’s
criticisms
of
views
that
depart
from
how
the
world
is
ordinarily
experienced
or
spoken
about,
such
as
his
criticisms
of
atomism36;
for
my
interpretation
allows
us
to
understand
this
justification
on
pragmatic
grounds.
Otherwise,
it
is
not
prime
facia
clear
why
Aristotle
would
be
opposed
to
this
form
of
characterization,
and
have
an
35
Topics
104b19-­‐28
36
303a21-­‐22

20. 20
intrinsic
preference
for
preserving
endoxa
in
a
way
that
does
not
simply
beg
the
question.
VIII.
Further
Evidence
for
This
Interpretation
of
Aristotle’s
Philosophical
Method
One
might
argue
in
opposition
to
my
thesis
that
I
have
made
too
sweeping
a
characterization
of
Aristotle’s
corpus
based
on
one
short
quote
taken
from
one
his
works,
and
hence
may
have
fallen
into
a
similar
trap
that
Frede
accused
Nussbaum
and
other
proponents
of
the
‘endoxic
method’
thesis
of
having
fallen
into.
Thus,
to
avoid
these
kinds
of
accusations,
in
this
section
of
my
paper
I
shall
examine
a
few
instances
within
Aristotle’s
corpus
in
which
he
carries
out
his
philosophical
investigation
in
a
way
that
is
consistent
with,
and
show
signs
of,
an
adherence
to
a
philosophical
method
grounded
in
an
underlying
belief
in
a
strong
correlation
between
common
beliefs
and
true
beliefs.
One
instance
in
which
it
is
very
clear
that
he
is
drawing
upon
this
underlying
belief
can
be
found
in
Parts
of
Animals37;
for
he
observes
that
people
intuitively
(and
correctly)
divided
different
classes
of
birds
and
fish
without
knowing
the
specific
differentia
upon
which
they
made
their
divisions.
“We
must
attempt
to
recognize
the
natural
groups,
following
the
indications
afforded
by
the
instincts
of
mankind,
which
led
them
for
instance
to
form
the
class
of
Birds
and
the
class
of
Fishes,
each
of
which
groups
combines
a
multitude
of
differentiae,
and
is
not
defined
by
a
single
one
as
in
dichotomy.
The
method
of
dichotomy
is
either
impossible
(for
it
would
put
a
single
group
under
different
divisions
or
contrary
groups
37
643b10-­‐13

21. 21
under
the
same
division),
or
it
only
furnishes
a
single
differentia
for
each
species,
which
either
alone
or
in
combination
has
to
constitute
the
ultimate
species.”
–
Parts
of
Animals
643b10-­‐13
Here,
Aristotle
observes
both
that
a)
mankind
correctly
divided
different
classes
of
animals
without
critically
knowing
the
differentia
by
which
they
made
the
divisions
but
because
of
some
instinct,
and
b)
suggests
we
should
follow
these
instinctual
divisions
in
our
own,
more
critical
work.
Therefore,
it
is
clear
that
Aristotle
here
undertakes
his
investigation
in
a
way
that
is
consistent
with
my
characterization
of
7.1;
for
he
explicitly
states
we
must
preserve
appearances,
that
the
common
view
is
the
correct
one,
and
that
it
is
derived
from
instincts.
In
other
works
he
is
not
as
explicit
about
how
we
are
“following
the
indications
afforded
by
the
instincts
of
mankind”
when
preserving
appearances,
but
nonetheless
we
can
still
see
some
of
beliefs
that
are
expressed
in
Rhetoric
at
play
in
his
investigation.
For
example,
in
On
the
Heavens38
Aristotle
explicitly
mentions
that
believing
in
the
existence
of
gods
is
a
view
that
everyone
holds,
and
that
we
should
think
it
is
true
on
those
grounds,
but
we
can
also
be
independently
confirm
it
is
true
on
the
basis
of
sense
perception.
“Our
theory
seems
to
confirm
the
phenomena
and
to
be
confirmed
by
them.
For
all
men
have
some
conception
of
the
nature
of
the
gods,
and
all
who
believe
in
the
existence
of
gods
at
all,
whether
barbarian
or
Greek,
agree
in
allotting
the
highest
38
On
The
Heavens
270b4-­‐14

22. 22
place
to
the
deity..the
mere
evidence
of
the
senses
is
enough
to
convince
us
of
(the
existence
of
gods),
at
least
with
human
certainty”
–
On
The
Heavens
270b4-­‐14
Here,
Aristotle
observes
both
that
a)
mankind
has
universally
adopted
the
view
that
gods
exist
and
that
they
occupy
the
highest
place
in
nature,
and
b)
that
we
can
critically
verify
the
truth
of
this
widespread
belief
through
examining
sense
perception.
Hence,
it
is
likewise
reasonable
to
take
this
passage
as
further
evidence
for
my
interpretation
of
7.1
given
that
Aristotle
explicitly
notes
something
that
is
commonly
believed,
points
to
this
fact
as
a
reason
for
thinking
it
is
true,
and
also
states
that
we
can
independently
verify
the
truth
of
this
belief
on
the
basis
of
critical
examination.
Therefore,
these
examples
stand
as
strong
evidence
that
the
views
he
expressed
in
the
Rhetoric
were
not
an
exception
to
his
wider
practices,
but
are
indicative
of
a
wider
commitment
he
held
about
how
to
effectively
engage
in
philosophical
analysis.
There
are
other
instances
as
well
throughout
Aristotle’s
corpus
where
he
similarly
adheres
to,
and
makes
explicit,
this
methodological
guideline39
40,
but
for
the
purposes
of
avoiding
redundancy,
an
extended
examination
of
them
shall
be
omitted.
39
On
The
Heavens
270b4-­‐14,
303a21-­‐22
40
Generation
and
Corruption
325a18-­‐22

23. 23
IX.
Conclusion
To
summarize,
my
paper
began
by
examining
a
puzzle
within
Aristotelian
scholarship
about
how
to
make
sense
of
some
statements
Aristotle
makes
in
7.1
of
the
Nicomachean
Ethics
about
the
need
to
preserve
endoxa
when
producing
a
logos.
I
first
examined
the
‘endoxic
method’
interpretation
offered
by
scholars
like
Nussbaum
and
Owen,
then
examined
Frede’s
critique
of
these
interpretations.
In
response
to
these
critiques,
I
then
offered
my
own
thesis,
which
drew
upon
a
statement
Aristotle
makes
in
the
Rhetoric
about
the
correlation
between
what
is
true,
and
what
is
commonly
believed.
My
thesis
commits
Aristotle
in
7.1
to
offering
a
guideline
for
how
to
effectively
engage
in
philosophical
investigations,
which
implores
that
those
who
wish
to
produce
true
logos
ought
to
examine
common
beliefs
given
that
what
is
commonly
believed
is
also
often
true.
I
then
went
on
to
show
why
this
interpretation
is
advantageous;
for
it
both
accounts
for
the
textual
references
that
the
‘endoxic
method’
thesis
attempts
to
explain,
while
avoiding
the
criticisms
Frede
levels
against
that
thesis
by
not
committing
Aristotle
to
some
sweeping
methodological
commitment
he
must
follow
in
all
investigation,
but
merely
a
general
guideline.
I
then
supported
this
characterization
by
examining
sections
of
Aristotle’s
corpus
in
which
he
makes
explicit
reference
to
this
correlation,
and
gave
evidence
that
such
an
interpretation
is
in
line
with
how
Aristotle
actually
goes
about
producing
logos
in
other
parts
of
his
corpus.

24. 24
Work
Cited
Aristotle.
The
Complete
Works
of
Aristotle.
Ed.
Jonathan
Barnes.
Vol
1-­‐2.
Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press,
1984.
Print.
Frede,
Dorothea.
“The
Endoxon
Mystique:
What
Endoxa
Are
And
What
They
Are
Not.
Oxford
Studies
in
Ancient
Philosophy,
Volume
43.
Ed.
Brad
Inwood.
Oxford:
Oxford
University
Press,
2012.
185-­‐215.
Print.
Nussbaum,
Martha.
“Saving
Aristotle’s
appearances”.
Language
and
Logos:
Studies
in
Ancient
Greek
Philosophy.
Ed.
Malcolm
Schofield
and
Martha
Craven
Nussbaum.
Cambridge:
Cambridge
University
Press,
1982.
267-­‐293.
Print.
Owen,
G.
E.
L.
“Tithenai
ta
Phainomena”.
Logic,
Science
and
Dialectic.
Ed.
Martha
Nussbaum.
Cornell:
Cornell
University
Press,
1986.
239-­‐251.
Print.