I examine descriptivist theories and causal-historical theories of reference in light of empirical findings by experimental philosophers (namely Papineau, Mallon, Machery, Nichols, Stich, Devitt) which appear to fundamentally undermine them. Date: 2018-10-19 Location: University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

1. Implications of Experimental
Philosophy On Reference &
Ontology
Seong-Young Her

2. Arguments from Reference
● Arguments that depend on the particularities of a term and its reference or
lack thereof
○ E.g. the eliminativist argument against the existence of belief based on the fact that the term
‘belief’ does not seem to refer

3. Arguments from Reference
1. ‘Philosophers implicitly or explicitly adopt a substantive theory of the
reference of a term t (or of a class of terms T, such as theoretical terms)’

4. Arguments from Reference
1. ‘Philosophers implicitly or explicitly adopt a substantive theory of the
reference of a term t (or of a class of terms T, such as theoretical terms)’
2. They claim that the reference of t or of members of T has some specific
properties

5. Arguments from Reference
1. ‘Philosophers implicitly or explicitly adopt a substantive theory of the
reference of a term t (or of a class of terms T, such as theoretical terms)’
2. They claim that the reference of t or of members of T has some specific
properties
○ E.g. success or failure of reference

6. Arguments from Reference
1. ‘Philosophers implicitly or explicitly adopt a substantive theory of the
reference of a term t (or of a class of terms T, such as theoretical terms)’
2. They claim that the reference of t or of members of T has some specific
properties
○ E.g. success or failure of reference
■ On some accounts, ‘empty’ reference implies the absence of the would-be referent
entities

7. Arguments from Reference
1. ‘Philosophers implicitly or explicitly adopt a substantive theory of the
reference of a term t (or of a class of terms T, such as theoretical terms)’
2. They claim that the reference of t or of members of T has some specific
properties
○ E.g. success or failure of reference
■ On some accounts, ‘empty’ reference implies the absence of the would-be referent
entities
3. Philosophically significant conclusion is drawn
(Mallon et al., 2009)

8. ‘Philosophically Significant Conclusions’
● Ontological debates about what exists
○ E.g. does t really exist?
● Metaphysical debates about the nature of what exists
● Epistemological debates about what we do, or can, know
○ E.g. what can be known about t given its reference?

9. The Two Dominant Theories of Reference
● Descriptivist Theories
● Causal-Historical Theories

10. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
“Descriptivist theories are naturally construed strongly as theories of meaning: the
meaning of a proper name is expressed by the description that competent
speakers associate with the name, a description that identifies the referent...”
(Devitt, 2011)

11. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
“Descriptivist theories are naturally construed strongly as theories of meaning: the
meaning of a proper name is expressed by the description that competent
speakers associate with the name, a description that identifies the referent [or
weaker: a name identifies the referent]” (Devitt, 2011)

12. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
● A strong theory of descriptivism: competent speakers determine the meaning
of a name by associating it with description and a referent

13. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
● A strong theory of descriptivism: competent speakers determine the meaning
of a name by associating it with description and a referent
● A weak theory of descriptivism: competent speakers determine the referent of
a name

14. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
D1. Competent speakers associate a description with every proper name. This
description specifies a set of properties.

15. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
D1. Competent speakers associate a description with every proper name. This
description specifies a set of properties.
D2. An individual is the referent of a proper name if and only if it uniquely or best
satisfies the description associated with it. An individual uniquely satisfies a
description when the description is true of it and only it. If no individual entirely
satisfies the description, many philosophers claim that the proper name refers to
the individual that best satisfies the description. If the description is not satisfied at
all or if many individuals satisfy it to the same extent, the name does not refer.
(Machery, 2011)

16. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
D1. Competent speakers associate a description with every proper name. This
description specifies a set of properties.
D2. An individual is the referent of a proper name if and only if it uniquely or best
satisfies the description associated with it. An individual uniquely satisfies a
description when the description is true of it and only it. If no individual entirely
satisfies the description, many philosophers claim that the proper name refers to
the individual that best satisfies the description. If the description is not satisfied at
all or if many individuals satisfy it to the same extent, the name does not refer.
(Machery, 2011)

17. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
● According to descriptivism, a term is empty if no entity satisfying the
description exists

18. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
● According to descriptivism, a term is empty if no entity satisfying the
description exists
○ E.g. eliminativists reject that beliefs and desires exist since no entity satisfying the
(folkpsychological) description of either exist

19. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
● According to descriptivism, a term is empty if no entity satisfying the
description exists
○ E.g. eliminativists reject that beliefs and desires exist since no entity satisfying the
(folkpsychological) description of either exist
■ The terms ‘belief’ and ‘desires’ do not refer (i.e. are empty)

20. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
● According to descriptivism, a term is empty if no entity satisfying the
description exists
○ E.g. eliminativists reject that beliefs and desires exist since no entity satisfying the
(folkpsychological) description of either exist
■ The terms ‘belief’ and ‘desires’ do not refer (i.e. are empty)
■ Therefore, beliefs and desires do not exist

21. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
● According to descriptivism, a term is empty if no entity satisfying the
description exists
○ E.g. eliminativists reject that beliefs and desires exist since no entity satisfying the
(folkpsychological) description of either exist
■ The terms ‘belief’ and ‘desires’ do not refer (i.e. are empty)
■ Therefore, beliefs and desires do not exist
○ Seems reasonable and commonsensical

22. Descriptivist Theories of Reference
● According to descriptivism, a term is empty if no entity satisfying the
description exists
○ E.g. eliminativists reject that beliefs and desires exist since no entity satisfying the
(folkpsychological) description of either exist
■ The terms ‘belief’ and ‘desires’ do not refer (i.e. are empty)
■ Therefore, beliefs and desires do not exist
○ Seems reasonable and commonsensical
■ Are there any issues with it?

23. Kripke’s Critique of Descriptivist Theories
● Why did Kripke identify a need for an alternative theory of reference in the
first place, when philosophers were fairly content with the descriptivist theory
before?

24. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Ignorance and Error
● Unwanted Necessity
● Lost Rigidity

25. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Ignorance and Error

26. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Ignorance and Error
○ Descriptivism requires that users provide descriptions of the referents alongside the terms they
use to refer to them with

27. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Ignorance and Error
○ Descriptivism requires that users provide descriptions of the referents alongside the terms they
use to refer to them with
○ Kripke points out that most users of names, such as ‘Einstein’ or ‘Columbus’, are ‘too ignorant
to give identifying descriptions’

28. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Ignorance and Error
○ Descriptivism requires that users provide descriptions of the referents alongside the terms they
use to refer to them with
○ Kripke points out that most users of names, such as ‘Einstein’ or ‘Columbus’, are ‘too ignorant
to give identifying descriptions’
○ Kripke's Gödel case: 'we simply are not [referring to Schmidt]'

30. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Ignorance and Error
○ Descriptivism requires that users provide descriptions of the referents alongside the terms they
use to refer to them with
○ Kripke points out that most users of names, such as ‘Einstein’ or ‘Columbus’, are ‘too ignorant
to give identifying descriptions’
○ Kripke's Gödel case: 'we simply are not [referring to Schmidt]'
■ ‘We simply are not’: a paradigmatic example of an argument from intuition

31. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Ignorance and Error
○ Descriptivism requires that users provide descriptions of the referents alongside the terms they
use to refer to them with
○ Kripke points out that most users of names, such as ‘Einstein’ or ‘Columbus’, are ‘too ignorant
to give identifying descriptions’
○ Kripke's Gödel case: 'we simply are not [referring to Schmidt]'
■ ‘We simply are not’: a paradigmatic example of an argument from intuition
■ Kripke’s intuitive conclusion is that insufficient and counterfactual descriptors
nonetheless successfully designate individuals being named

32. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Ignorance and Error
○ Descriptivism requires that users provide descriptions of the referents alongside the terms they
use to refer to them with
○ Kripke points out that most users of names, such as ‘Einstein’ or ‘Columbus’, are ‘too ignorant
to give identifying descriptions’
○ Kripke's Gödel case: 'we simply are not [referring to Schmidt]'
■ ‘We simply are not’: a paradigmatic example of an argument from intuition
■ Kripke’s intuitive conclusion is that insufficient and counterfactual descriptors
nonetheless successfully designate individuals being named
● Therefore, reference does not depend on description

33. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Unwanted Necessity

34. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Unwanted Necessity
○ Searle: modern cluster version of descriptivist theory of reference has it that the descriptor of
an individual is the sum of the properties associated with him

35. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Unwanted Necessity
○ Searle: modern cluster version of descriptivist theory of reference has it that the descriptor of
an individual is the sum of the properties associated with him
■ ‘It is a necessary fact that Aristotle has the logical sum, inclusive disjunction, of
properties commonly attributed to him’ (Searle, 1958)

36. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Unwanted Necessity
○ Searle: modern cluster version of descriptivist theory of reference has it that the descriptor of
an individual is the sum of the properties associated with him
■ ‘It is a necessary fact that Aristotle has the logical sum, inclusive disjunction, of
properties commonly attributed to him’ (Searle, 1958)
● Kripkean response: there are too many things commonly attributed to Aristotle that
are things that Aristotle might not have done

37. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Unwanted Necessity
○ Searle: modern cluster version of descriptivist theory of reference has it that the descriptor of
an individual is the sum of the properties associated with him
■ ‘It is a necessary fact that Aristotle has the logical sum, inclusive disjunction, of
properties commonly attributed to him’ (Searle, 1958)
● Kripkean response: there are too many things commonly attributed to Aristotle that
are things that Aristotle might not have done
● According to Kripke, even if Aristotle would still be Aristotle even if he were missing
any number of such properties

38. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Lost Rigidity

39. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Lost Rigidity
○ ‘A term is ‘rigid iff it designates the same object in every possible world in which that object
exists’

40. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Lost Rigidity
○ ‘A term is ‘rigid iff it designates the same object in every possible world in which that object
exists’
○ Names are rigid but descriptors are not

41. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Lost Rigidity
○ ‘A term is ‘rigid iff it designates the same object in every possible world in which that object
exists’
○ Names are rigid but descriptors are not: descriptivist theories of meaning do not hold, since
descriptions do not refer invariantly in all possible worlds

42. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Lost Rigidity
○ ‘A term is ‘rigid iff it designates the same object in every possible world in which that object
exists’
○ Names are rigid but descriptors are not: descriptivist theories of meaning do not hold, since
descriptions do not refer invariantly in all possible worlds
○ (A) ‘no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon’ is true

43. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Lost Rigidity
○ ‘A term is ‘rigid iff it designates the same object in every possible world in which that object
exists’
○ Names are rigid but descriptors are not: descriptivist theories of meaning do not hold, since
descriptions do not refer invariantly in all possible worlds
○ (A) ‘no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon’ is true
○ (B) ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is true, but ‘the planet seen in the evening is the planet seen in
the morning’ is false

44. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Lost Rigidity
○ ‘A term is ‘rigid iff it designates the same object in every possible world in which that object
exists’
○ Names are rigid but descriptors are not: descriptivist theories of meaning do not hold, since
descriptions do not refer invariantly in all possible worlds
○ (A) ‘no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon’ is true
○ (B) ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is true, but ‘the planet seen in the evening is the planet seen in
the morning’ is false
○ (C) Scope ambiguity in modal sentences

45. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Lost Rigidity
○ ‘A term is ‘rigid iff it designates the same object in every possible world in which that object
exists’
○ Names are rigid but descriptors are not: descriptivist theories of meaning do not hold, since
descriptions do not refer invariantly in all possible worlds
○ (A) ‘no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon’ is true
○ (B) ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is true, but ‘the planet seen in the evening is the planet seen in
the morning’ is false
○ (C) Scope ambiguity in modal sentences

46. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Ignorance and Error
● Unwanted Necessity
● Lost Rigidity

47. Scope ambiguity in modal sentences
● (a) it might have been the case that the last great philosopher of antiquity was
not a philosopher
● (b) it might have been the case that Aristotle was not a philosopher

48. Scope ambiguity in modal sentences
● (a) it might have been the case that the last great philosopher of antiquity was
not a philosopher
● (b) it might have been the case that Aristotle was not a philosopher
● Had Aristotle not been the last great philosopher of antiquity, Aristotle could
not replace the last great philosopher of antiquity without changing the
meaning of the sentence

49. Scope ambiguity in modal sentences
● (a) it might have been the case that the last great philosopher of antiquity was
not a philosopher
● (b) it might have been the case that Aristotle was not a philosopher
● Had Aristotle not been the last great philosopher of antiquity, Aristotle could
not replace the last great philosopher of antiquity without changing the
meaning of the sentence
● The same is not the case in (b)

50. Scope ambiguity in modal sentences
● (a) it might have been the case that the last great philosopher of antiquity was
not a philosopher
● (b) it might have been the case that Aristotle was not a philosopher
● Had Aristotle not been the last great philosopher of antiquity, Aristotle could
not replace the last great philosopher of antiquity without changing the
meaning of the sentence
● The same is not the case in (b): thus, Aristotle is rigid unlike his description

51. Kripke’s Three Critiques of Descriptivism
● Lost Rigidity
○ ‘A term is ‘rigid iff it designates the same object in every possible world in which that object
exists’
○ Names are rigid but descriptors are not: descriptivist theories of meaning do not hold, since
descriptions do not refer invariantly in all possible worlds
○ (A) ‘no one other than Nixon might have been Nixon’ is true
○ (B) ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ is true, but ‘the planet seen in the evening is the planet seen in
the morning’ is false
○ (C) Scope ambiguity in modal sentences
○ (D) ‘Aristotle was fond of dogs’

52. ‘Aristotle was fond of dogs’
● The statement is only true if and only if Aristotle was the one to have liked
dogs

53. ‘Aristotle was fond of dogs’
● The statement is only true if and only if Aristotle was the one to have liked
dogs
○ Even had Aristotle not liked dogs, if he might have, it is the fact of Aristotle liking dogs that
makes the counterfactual statement true or false

54. ‘Aristotle was fond of dogs’
● The statement is only true if and only if Aristotle was the one to have liked
dogs
○ Even had Aristotle not liked dogs, if he might have, it is the fact of Aristotle liking dogs that
makes the counterfactual statement true or false
○ The important thing is that it is Aristotle who liked dogs in the counterfactual, and the fact of
liking or not liking dogs does not alter the reference of the name ‘Aristotle’ either way

55. Descriptivism In Trouble
● Even contradictory descriptions do not reliably modify the reference of a term

56. Descriptivism In Trouble
● Even contradictory descriptions do not reliably modify the reference of a term
● What is a viable alternative to descriptivism?

57. The Two Dominant Theories of Reference
● Descriptivist Theories
● Causal-Historical Theories

58. Causal-Historical Theories of Reference
● C1. A name is introduced into a linguistic community for the purpose of
referring to an individual. It continues to refer to that individual as long as its
uses are linked to the individual via a causal chain of successive users: Every
user of the name acquired it from another user, who acquired it in turn from
someone else, and so on, up to the first user who introduced the name to
refer to a specific individual.

59. Causal-Historical Theories of Reference
● C1. A name is introduced into a linguistic community for the purpose of
referring to an individual. It continues to refer to that individual as long as its
uses are linked to the individual via a causal chain of successive users: Every
user of the name acquired it from another user, who acquired it in turn from
someone else, and so on, up to the first user who introduced the name to
refer to a specific individual.
● C2. Speakers may associate descriptions with names. After a name is
introduced, the associated description does not play any role in the fixation of
the referent. The referent may entirely fail to satisfy the description.
(Machery, 2011)

60. Causal-Historical Theories of Reference
● Why prefer the causal-historical alternative?

61. Causal-Historical Theories of Reference
● Why prefer the causal-historical alternative?
○ Allows us to avoid the unsettling conclusion that familiar folkpsychological terms are empty
and therefore their referents do not exist

62. Causal-Historical Theories of Reference
● Why prefer the causal-historical alternative?
○ Allows us to avoid the unsettling conclusion that familiar folkpsychological terms are empty
and therefore their referents do not exist
○ Allows us to evade scientific antirealist attacks on the notion of scientific progress, based on
the fact that scientific terms undergo fundamental, descriptive modifications over time

63. Causal-Historical Theories of Reference
● Reference is determined by the history of a term as it is passed from one
person to another after initial introduction to a linguistic community

64. Causal-Historical Theories of Reference
● Reference is determined by the history of a term as it is passed from one
person to another after initial introduction to a linguistic community
● Descriptive associations may deviate from the original usage without effect on
the reference of the term

65. Causal-Historical Theories of Reference
● Reference is determined by the history of a term as it is passed from one
person to another after initial introduction to a linguistic community
● Descriptive associations may deviate from the original usage without effect on
the reference of the term

66. Causal-Historical Theories of Reference
● Reference is determined by the history of a term as it is passed from one
person to another after initial introduction to a linguistic community
● Descriptive associations may deviate from the original usage without effect on
the reference of the term
● Descriptive fit may likewise deviate without effect on the reference of the term

67. Causal-Historical Theories of Reference
● Reference is determined by the history of a term as it is passed from one
person to another after initial introduction to a linguistic community
● Descriptive associations may deviate from the original usage without effect on
the reference of the term
● Descriptive fit may likewise deviate without effect on the reference of the term
● Foolproof replacement for descriptivism?

68. Is That How Language Works?
‘Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a
completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly
and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory
limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or
characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance.’
(Chomsky, 1965)

69. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● Swampman
○ An atom-for-atom copy of a person sharing none of the
causal-historical link with the original

70. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● Swampman
○ if representational contents derive from past history, the lack of past history implies the lack of
representational contents

71. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● Swampman
○ if representational contents derive from past history, the lack of past history implies the lack of
representational contents
○ 'Swampman poses a challenge specifically to those accounts of representation that make
contents depend on history'

72. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● Swampman
○ if representational contents derive from past history, the lack of past history implies the lack of
representational contents
○ 'Swampman poses a challenge specifically to those accounts of representation that make
contents depend on history'
○ 'What Swampman lacks is his normal doppelganger's history. So he challenges any view that
makes the possession of certain kinds of contentful states depend on certain kinds of history.'

73. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● Swampman
○ if representational contents derive from past history, the lack of past history implies the lack of
representational contents
○ 'Swampman poses a challenge specifically to those accounts of representation that make
contents depend on history'
○ 'What Swampman lacks is his normal doppelganger's history. So he challenges any view that
makes the possession of certain kinds of contentful states depend on certain kinds of history.'
○ 'I see no reason to suppose that there is any timeless theory-independent set of intuitions
about Swampman... [intuitions in cases] are nearly always manifestations of implicit but
contestable philosophical assumptions'
(Papineau, 1996)

74. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● But the question is ultimately empirical

75. Experimental Philosophy

76. Empirical Findings from Experimental Philosophy
● Machery et al.: Kripke’s Gödel case doesn’t reliably evoke the same intuitive
responses as Kripke presumes in his arguments against descriptivism

77. Empirical Findings from Experimental Philosophy
● Machery et al.: Kripke’s Gödel case doesn’t reliably evoke the same intuitive
responses as Kripke presumes in his arguments against descriptivism
○ The intuitions that Kripke relies on to refute descriptivism are not uniform across and within
cultures

78. Empirical Findings from Experimental Philosophy
● Machery et al.: Kripke’s Gödel case doesn’t reliably evoke the same intuitive
responses as Kripke presumes in his arguments against descriptivism
○ The intuitions that Kripke relies on to refute descriptivism are not uniform across and within
cultures
○ Referential uniformity is threatened by the findings

79. Empirical Findings from Experimental Philosophy
● Machery et al.: Kripke’s Gödel case doesn’t reliably evoke the same intuitive
responses as Kripke presumes in his arguments against descriptivism
○ The intuitions that Kripke relies on to refute descriptivism are not uniform across and within
cultures
○ Referential uniformity is threatened by the findings
■ Some terms such as proper names and natural kind terms do not appear to be
definitively rigid

80. Empirical Findings from Experimental Philosophy
● Machery et al.: Kripke’s Gödel case doesn’t reliably evoke the same intuitive
responses as Kripke presumes in his arguments against descriptivism
○ The intuitions that Kripke relies on to refute descriptivism are not uniform across and within
cultures
○ Referential uniformity is threatened by the findings
■ Some terms such as proper names and natural kind terms do not appear to be
definitively rigid
● Intuitions cannot be relied upon to decide between descriptivism and
causalism-historicalism

81. Empirical Findings from Experimental Philosophy
● Machery et al.: Kripke’s Gödel case doesn’t reliably evoke the same intuitive
responses as Kripke presumes in his arguments against descriptivism
○ The intuitions that Kripke relies on to refute descriptivism are not uniform across and within
cultures
○ Referential uniformity is threatened by the findings
■ Some terms such as proper names and natural kind terms do not appear to be
definitively rigid
● Intuitions cannot be relied upon to decide between descriptivism and
causalism-historicalism
○ particular intuitions based on method of cases are not robust foundations for a theory of
reference

84. ‘Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style’
(I) Philosophical views about reference 'are assessed by consulting one's
intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations' (p. B1).

85. ‘Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style’
(I) Philosophical views about reference 'are assessed by consulting one's
intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations' (p. B1).
(II) Those particular cases are 'central' to Kripke's refutation (p. B1).

86. ‘Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style’
(I) Philosophical views about reference 'are assessed by consulting one's
intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations' (p. B1).
(II) Those particular cases are 'central' to Kripke's refutation (p. B1).
(III) These results [from the study of people's intuitions] raise serious doubts about
Kripke's refutation, which relies solely on the intuitions of Westerners

87. ‘Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style’
(I) Philosophical views about reference 'are assessed by consulting one's
intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations' (p. B1).
(II) Those particular cases are 'central' to Kripke's refutation (p. B1).
(III) These results [from the study of people's intuitions] raise serious doubts about
Kripke's refutation, which relies solely on the intuitions of Westerners
(IV) The fact of these cultural differences 'raises questions about the nature of the
philosophical enterprise of developing a theory of reference' (p. B1); it points to
'significant philosophical conclusions' (p. B8).
(Devitt, 2010)

89. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● Kripke’s Gödel case did not evoke the same intuitions uniformly

91. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● Kripke’s Gödel case did not evoke the same intuitions uniformly
○ Majority of westerners had causal-historical intuitions while majority of East-Asians had
descriptivist intuitions

92. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● Kripke’s Gödel case did not evoke the same intuitions uniformly
○ Majority of westerners had causal-historical intuitions while majority of East-Asians had
descriptivist intuitions
■ Large minority of either group had atypical intuitions

93. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● Kripke’s Gödel case did not evoke the same intuitions uniformly
○ Majority of westerners had causal-historical intuitions while majority of East-Asians had
descriptivist intuitions
■ Large minority of either group had atypical intuitions
○ Kripke’s refutation of descriptivism is based on faulty assumptions about intuitions

94. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● Kripke’s Gödel case did not evoke the same intuitions uniformly
○ Majority of westerners had causal-historical intuitions while majority of East-Asians had
descriptivist intuitions
■ Large minority of either group had atypical intuitions
○ Kripke’s refutation of descriptivism is based on faulty assumptions about intuitions
● The situation can be defused by accepting a pluralism about referential
intuitions

95. Against Causal-Historical Theories
● Kripke’s Gödel case did not evoke the same intuitions uniformly
○ Majority of westerners had causal-historical intuitions while majority of East-Asians had
descriptivist intuitions
■ Large minority of either group had atypical intuitions
○ Kripke’s refutation of descriptivism is based on faulty assumptions about intuitions
● The situation can be defused by accepting a pluralism about referential
intuitions
○ 'Alternatively, one could hold that words do not refer and that it is thus a mistake to attempt to
develop theories of reference' (Machery, 2011; Mallon et al., 2009)

96. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Give up on substantive theories of reference

97. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Give up on substantive theories of reference
○ No correct substantive theory of reference is likely

98. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Give up on substantive theories of reference
○ No correct substantive theory of reference is likely
○ Therefore, no arguments from reference either

99. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Give up on substantive theories of reference
○ No correct substantive theory of reference is likely
○ Therefore, no arguments from reference either
○ 'Arguments from reference begin with a theory of reference that is independently motivated,
and proceed to philosophically significant conclusions'

100. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Give up on substantive theories of reference
○ No correct substantive theory of reference is likely
○ Therefore, no arguments from reference either
○ 'Arguments from reference begin with a theory of reference that is independently motivated,
and proceed to philosophically significant conclusions'
■ Intuitions are the dominant independent motivator for a theory of reference in philosophy

101. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Give up on substantive theories of reference
○ No correct substantive theory of reference is likely
○ Therefore, no arguments from reference either
○ 'Arguments from reference begin with a theory of reference that is independently motivated,
and proceed to philosophically significant conclusions'
■ Intuitions are the dominant independent motivator for a theory of reference in philosophy
● This means the method of cases

102. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Give up on substantive theories of reference
○ No correct substantive theory of reference is likely
○ Therefore, no arguments from reference either
○ 'Arguments from reference begin with a theory of reference that is independently motivated,
and proceed to philosophically significant conclusions'
■ Intuitions are the dominant independent motivator for a theory of reference in philosophy
● This means the method of cases
■ But what alternatives do philosophers of language have?

103. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Give up on substantive theories of reference
○ No correct substantive theory of reference is likely
○ Therefore, no arguments from reference either
○ 'Arguments from reference begin with a theory of reference that is independently motivated,
and proceed to philosophically significant conclusions'
■ Intuitions are the dominant independent motivator for a theory of reference in philosophy
● This means the method of cases
■ But what alternatives do philosophers of language have?
● Linguistics, most likely

104. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Referential pluralism leads to referential relativism

105. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Referential pluralism leads to referential relativism
○ Intuition groups

106. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Referential pluralism leads to referential relativism
○ Intuition groups
■ Assuming universally acceptable intuitions is equivalent to assuming the existence of
only one intuition group

107. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Referential pluralism leads to referential relativism
○ Intuition groups
■ Assuming universally acceptable intuitions is equivalent to assuming the existence of
only one intuition group
● The empirical findings from experimental philosophers suggest otherwise

108. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Referential pluralism leads to referential relativism
○ Intuition groups
■ Assuming universally acceptable intuitions is equivalent to assuming the existence of
only one intuition group
● The empirical findings from experimental philosophers suggest otherwise
○ 'The pluralist method of cases: The correct theory of reference for a class of terms T employed
by members of intuition group G is the theory which is best supported by the intuitions that
competent members of G have about the reference of members of T across actual and
possible cases.

109. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Referential pluralism leads to referential relativism
○ Intuition groups
■ Assuming universally acceptable intuitions is equivalent to assuming the existence of
only one intuition group
● The empirical findings from experimental philosophers suggest otherwise
○ 'The pluralist method of cases: The correct theory of reference for a class of terms T employed
by members of intuition group G is the theory which is best supported by the intuitions that
competent members of G have about the reference of members of T across actual and
possible cases.
■ seems like a plausible and neat solution that saves both arguments from reference and
methods of cases by giving up referential uniformity

110. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Referential pluralism leads to referential relativism
○ Intuition groups
■ Assuming universally acceptable intuitions is equivalent to assuming the existence of
only one intuition group
● The empirical findings from experimental philosophers suggest otherwise
○ 'The pluralist method of cases: The correct theory of reference for a class of terms T employed
by members of intuition group G is the theory which is best supported by the intuitions that
competent members of G have about the reference of members of T across actual and
possible cases.
■ seems like a plausible and neat solution that saves both arguments from reference and
methods of cases by giving up referential uniformity

111. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences

112. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ A descriptivist saying 'beliefs do not exist' VS a causalist-historicalist saying 'beliefs exist': no
contradictions

113. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ A descriptivist saying 'beliefs do not exist' VS a causalist-historicalist saying 'beliefs exist': no
contradictions
■ genuine agreement or disagreement is only possible when the individuals in question
belong to the same intuition group

114. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ A descriptivist saying 'beliefs do not exist' VS a causalist-historicalist saying 'beliefs exist': no
contradictions
■ Genuine agreement or disagreement is only possible when the individuals in question
belong to the same intuition group
● But how can this be verified?

115. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ A descriptivist saying 'beliefs do not exist' VS a causalist-historicalist saying 'beliefs exist': no
contradictions
■ Genuine agreement or disagreement is only possible when the individuals in question
belong to the same intuition group
● But how can this be verified?
● It would seem that it's impossible to know for certain whether there are
disagreements or agreements

116. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ A descriptivist saying 'beliefs do not exist' VS a causalist-historicalist saying 'beliefs exist': no
contradictions
■ Genuine agreement or disagreement is only possible when the individuals in question
belong to the same intuition group
● But how can this be verified?
● It would seem that it's impossible to know for certain whether there are
disagreements or agreements
■ Ubiquity of Variation: such variation of intuitions is widespread and unpredictable

117. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ Auxiliary Assumptions

118. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ Auxiliary Assumptions
■ For example, causal-historical theorists must decide exactly what individual or thing is
picked out by the historical introduction of a term, and whether any ‘‘switching’’ to
another individual or thing has occurred along the way (Evans 1973).

119. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ Auxiliary Assumptions
■ For example, causal-historical theorists must decide exactly what individual or thing is
picked out by the historical introduction of a term, and whether any ‘‘switching’’ to
another individual or thing has occurred along the way (Evans 1973).
■ And descriptivists must decide on what the reference-fixing description is, and how
closely a thing must satisfy it in order to qualify as a referent.

120. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ Auxiliary Assumptions
■ For example, causal-historical theorists must decide exactly what individual or thing is
picked out by the historical introduction of a term, and whether any ‘‘switching’’ to
another individual or thing has occurred along the way (Evans 1973).
■ And descriptivists must decide on what the reference-fixing description is, and how
closely a thing must satisfy it in order to qualify as a referent. (Mallon et al., 2009)
■ both examples show intuitive assumptions being used to support theories of intuition
about reference

121. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ Limpidity Assumption

122. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ Limpidity Assumption
■ The referential pluralist would presumably demand philosophers clarify their positions
through numerous cases

123. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ Limpidity Assumption
■ The referential pluralist would presumably demand philosophers clarify their positions
through numerous cases
■ The referential pluralist would presumably assume that such self-identification reliably
demonstrates the actual intuitions of the philosophers

124. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ Limpidity Assumption
■ The referential pluralist would presumably demand philosophers clarify their positions
through numerous cases
■ The referential pluralist would presumably assume that such self-identification reliably
demonstrates the actual intuitions of the philosophers
■ The fact that philosophers seem to exhibit demographic variation of intuition group
membership without necessarily making their membership explicit seems to suggest that
this is unlikely

125. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● Pluralism has repugnant consequences
○ Limpidity Assumption
■ The referential pluralist would presumably demand philosophers clarify their positions
through numerous cases
■ The referential pluralist would presumably assume that such self-identification reliably
demonstrates the actual intuitions of the philosophers
■ The fact that philosophers seem to exhibit demographic variation of intuition group
membership without necessarily making their membership explicit seems to suggest that
this is unlikely
● The fact that philosophers guard their own intuitions and attempt to convince
others is an active denial of the limpidity assumption

126. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● We ought to give up reference altogether in order to avoid the consequences
of referential relativism

127. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● We ought to give up reference altogether in order to avoid the consequences
of referential relativism
○ What’s left?

128. Conclusions From Experimental Philosophers
● We ought to give up reference altogether in order to avoid the consequences
of referential relativism
○ What’s left?
○ Might the repugnant consequences of referential pluralism just a reflection of the absurdity of
communication and meaning?

129. Articles reviewed
Papineau (1996) - Doubtful Intuition
Ron Mallon, Edouard Machery, Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich (2009) - Against
Arguments from Reference
Michael Devitt (2011) - Experimental Semantics
Edouard Machery (2011) - Variations in Intuitions about Reference and
Ontological Disagreements

130. Final Thoughts
‘Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a
completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly
and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory
limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or
characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance.’
(Chomsky, 1965)

131. Final Thoughts
‘Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a
completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its language perfectly
and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory
limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or
characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance.’
(Chomsky, 1965)
'A theory that diverges totally from everyday thinking in its ascriptions of content
could scarcely be said to be a theory about everyday psychological states'
(Papineau, 1996)