Discussion paper written in 2000

1. 1
DEVELOPING THE
GEOSPATIAL
ENVIRONMENT:
From maps to a virtual world1
Dr R.J.Williams
2000
The knowledge of the environment and infrastructure and their impact on military
operations has long been viewed as fundamental. Traditionally, paper maps and
charts have been the means to represent the environment and infrastructure and,
therefore, the means on which to plan and conduct military operations.
We are living in a rapidly changing world. Increasingly, more complex decisions are
needed to be made at many levels of authority and these decisions are increasingly
being demanded in shorter timeframes. This changing environment will create a
rapidly increasing dependence on comprehensive on comprehensive and smart
geospatial information.
With the advent of small, affordable and powerful computer systems it has become
possible for military decision-makers to utilise richer representations of the
environment. The key issue confronting the Australian Defence Organisation (ADO)
is that of creating and maintaining digital geospatial information and distributing
relevant information that meets the planning and operational needs of the defence
community for effective decision-making.
Therefore, it is imperative that we develop a strategy by which we can logically and
realistically develop our capability; a capability that within twenty years will consist
of a virtual world which will provide the foundation for the future digital battlespace.
This paper provides a vision and a strategy that advances the capability of the ADO
from the current state through to a virtual world.
1 The Technical Report written by Dr Bob Williams in April 2000. The purpose was to inform
Defence’s capability development process.

2. 2
DEFENDING AUSTRALIA – ACQUIRING THE KNOWLEDGE EDGE
The key policy document that establishes the
future direction for Australian defence planning into
the 21st century is titled Australia’s Strategic
Policy and is referred to as ASP97 [1].
This key document defines the three basic tasks,
which would require the Australian Defence Force
(ADF) to undertake combat operations. These
tasks are:
Defeating attacks on Australia,
Defending Australia’s regional interests,
and
Supporting Australia’s global interests.
ASP97 describes Australia’s strategic environment and details force structure
development priorities. ASP97 lists Priority One as acquiring the knowledge
edge asserting that “in modern warfare, the business of winning will
increasingly begin by knowing as much as possible about an adversary and
their intentions. Our highest capability development priority therefore is the
knowledge edge, that is, the effective exploitation of information technologies
to allow us to use our relatively small force to maximum effectiveness”.
ASP97 further states that “Australian forces will always be small relative to the
large areas they need to cover and the demands we make on them.
Information technology applied to the command, positioning and targeting of
our forces will enable us to use our forces to maximum effect, and get most
value from each unit”.
In summary, ASP97 suggests that the information revolution, or the so-called
Revolution in Military affairs, is changing the nature of warfare all over the
world. The goal is to obtain information superiority over any adversary.
Information Superiority
Information superiority is the key to success in economic, diplomatic, and
military ventures. Working for peace, opportunity, and durable democratic
systems in complex political, social, and cultural systems and stressed
physical environments requires a full range of reliable information tools.
Diplomacy must be grounded in social, political, economic, military, and
geographic understanding. Information superiority is the pre-condition to a full
C3ISTAR (Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance,
Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) capability [2].
No negotiations can be conducted,
no forces can move,
no weapons can be brought to bear,
no forces can be protected, and
no support and supplies can move

3. 3
without a sense of location,
an understanding of the surroundings, and
an understanding of the influence of mission space on the operation2
.
Contemporary operations demand an information environment in which the
national security decision-maker and the soldier can spatially relate friendly
and threat situations in the context of the mission space. It is now technically
feasible to co-register what had been separate views of mission space,
bringing everything to a common geometry established within a geospatial
framework (Figure 1).
Figure 1: An integrated view of the mission space (modified from a figure in [2])
Geographic information in the context of military applications
The knowledge of the environment and infrastructure (components of
geography) and its impact on military operations has long been viewed as
fundamental. The environment includes the natural phenomena of the land,
sea and air, while the infrastructure includes man-made features and
administrative delineation.
Geographic information is used at all levels of operation and is particularly
important in the following areas of military application:
• Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance;
• Targeting and weapons employment;
2 (US NIMA (National Imagery & mapping Agency) Geospatial Information Infrastructure
Master Plan, 1997).

4. 4
• Command, control and communication;
• Navigation and guidance;
• Health and survival; and
• Mobility and manoeuvre3
The success, or otherwise, of military operations depends on how well
geographic information can be presented to the user for the planning and
conduct of operations.
A CHANGING GEOSPATIAL ENVIRONMENT4
Geographic (or geospatial) information, maps and charts, surveyed data, and
the like, are up until now, and always have been, fundamental in not only the
planning and conduct of military operations, but, more broadly, in the
management of our nation and its interests.
Maps and charts as we have known them in the past, however, are the issue
of the past. The real issue is that of creating and maintaining digital geospatial
information and distributing relevant information that meets the planning and
operational needs of the defence community for effective decision making.
So what is geospatial information and why do we need it?
Geospatial Information
Geospatial information is any data that has associated with it some contextual
and temporal attributes keyed to an accepted Earth referenced coordinate
system. There is a geospatial perspective that supports a broad range of
national security decision-makers, planners, and operational units in the
execution of their missions. A comprehensive and accurate geospatial
perspective supports global response through information superiority in the
face of rapidly changing expectations.
The Military Geographic Information (or MGI as it is currently known)
capability is an enduring commitment and encompasses the acquisition,
compilation and production, management through maintenance and revision,
and dissemination of infrastructure, topographic, hydrographic, aeronautical,
oceanographic, meteorological, and geodetic information and imagery
(combined referred to as MGI) that supports the planning and conduct of
military operations.
3 These areas of application were noted in the Terms of Reference for the Environmental and
Geographic Information Capability Study [EGICS]. The Phase One Report of the EGICS
received out-of-session endorsement from the CCC (Concepts and Capabilities Committee);
confirmed in CCC Secretarial Note No. 37/1996 “Environmental and Geographic Information
Capability Study [EGICS] – Phase One Report” dated 22 October 1996.
4 Information Environment – The information environment is the sum of information
management, information systems, information technology and communications, and the
associated strategies, architectures, policies, processes and tools of the organisation. It
includes all of the information owned by the organisation

5. 5
The MGI Capability
The MGI capability can be defined as the ability of the Australian Defence
Organisation’s (ADO’s) resources to:
• Provide MGI products and services covering the geographic extent
determined through analysis of concepts of operation,
o From base facilities and/or deployable units or assets,
o Within a specific degree of notice being the lead-time for
production and distribution, and to
• Maintain that effort for a given period of time through update and
revision of the products and services.
To provide MGI products and services implies data collection, data processing
and production, data maintenance, data dissemination, data access, data
transfer and exchange. Services also include analytical geospatial
functionality and geospatial reasoning tools.
The MGI Capability (or Military Geospatial Environment)5
includes the
collection of people, doctrine, policies, architectures, standards, and
technologies necessary to create, maintain, and utilise a shared framework of
geospatial information and services. It provides capabilities such as
requirements analysis, source data acquisition, data modelling, information
compilation and production, information management, and dissemination. The
environment must support the development of interoperable applications to
assist users in exploiting the information and achieving an integrated view of
the mission space.
The MGI capability can be considered a system-of-systems.
The evolution of mapping, charting and geodesy in Defence
The ADF has accepted, adopted and initiated innovative methods when it
comes to surveying, mapping and charting. Army units have used electronic
distance measuring techniques (both ground based and airborne) since the
1960s. Army first used air profile recording techniques to acquire elevation
data in the early 1970s. Their system was designed and developed by the
Weapons Research Establishment (WRE at the time and now DSTO). This
system was later adapted for hydrographic surveying. The system is marketed
as LADS (Laser Airborne Depth Sounder).
When it comes to the automation of the mapping and charting processes,
Army’s Survey Regiment and Navy’s Hydrographic Office have been world
leaders in their respective fields. Analytical survey adjustments were first
performed in the late 1960s. The digitisation of map grids and graticules
followed soon after. Army installed its first computer assisted mapping system
(Automap 1) in 1976 and Navy their first system in 1978. Army’s primary
method involved photogrammetric techniques from the inception of digital
methodologies. This practice has been the case ever since. Army’s Automap
2 system, installed in 1984, featured numerous innovations (shown to be
5 The terms MGI Capability, Military Geospatial Environment and Geospatial Information
Infrastructure (GII) [discussed later] can be used interchangeably when the complete
definition of the term capability (as endorsed by the CCC) is used.

6. 6
leading edge by any measure). Since then, unfortunately, there has been a
progression of reviews, studies and project delays. Consequently the next
generation of systems is only now being acquired.
In summary, over the past quarter of a century, development of the surveying
and mapping (or MGI) capability in the ADO has been spasmodic. As a
consequence, the legacy issue is complex. Key legacies include significant
capability deficiencies. Appendix A describes “the real capability deficiency”.
As can be seen the challenges are daunting.
Nevertheless, the foundations are established to bring into service systems
well adapted to meet some of the contemporary needs of geographic
information systems, decision support systems, and so on.
DEVELOPING THE DEFENCE GEOSPATIAL ENVIRONMENT
From maps and charts towards a virtual world and a digital battlespace
The sciences of astronomy, geodesy, surveying and cartography (now known
by the contemporary term geomatics) have been fundamental in describing
our environment. The illustration in Figure 2 shows the origin of the scientific
discipline of cartography. The illustration also provides a vision: “to represent
in picture the whole known world together with the phenomena which are
contained therein”(after Ptolemy).
More recently, Dr Annette Krygiel, former Director of the US Central Imagery
Office, made the statement that “on the modern day battlefield, everything is
spatially related, and if you don’t understand the spatial relationships you will
never win the war!”
6
Ptolemy’s view and Krygiel’s view are little different. Indeed, both present a
vision for the future: a future, from a defence perspective, of creating a virtual
world and having information dominance in a digital battlespace (Figure 3).
But how do we evolve to a capability that will include immersion
characteristics whereby users are surrounded by virtual reality? How do we
develop future systems that will probably be scenario-driven with users being
given real-time options along with costs and risks and how do we develop
future systems that will need to address the requirements of the cyber
warrior?
Clearly, the leap to this visionary capability cannot be done in one
developmental phase. Therefore, a strategy needs to be put in place and the
comprehensive set of issues related to such development needs to be
scoped. One such strategy might be to establish a development path as
shown in Figure 4.
The developmental path shows four key developmental points:
6 Dr Krygiel made the comment at a meeting in Canberra on 10 October 1995.

7. 7
Figure 2: The origin of the scientific discipline of cartography
Figure 3: The future – an integrated view of the mission battlespace (modified from a figure in
[2])

8. 8
Figure 4: From the current legacy to the virtual world

9. 9
• The 2000 goal state – single service/agency systems;
• The 2005 goal state – a geospatial information infrastructure;
• The 2010 goal state – knowledge-based systems as an integral part
of the command and control process; and
• The 2020 vision of a virtual world and digital battlespace.
Before briefly describing the characteristics of each of these developmental
points, it is important to introduce the concept of a Geospatial Information
Infrastructure (GII). Components of the developmental phases can then be
related to the GII.
Towards a Geospatial Information Infrastructure (GII)
The term Geospatial Information Infrastructure (GII) is described in detail in
References [2], [9] and [10]. The term has been adopted by major US
agencies and endorsed at government level. “The GII is proposed as a new
enabling infrastructure to meet the needs of the community for geospatial
information. The infrastructure is the collection of people, doctrine, policies,
architecture, standards, and technologies necessary to create, maintain, and
utilise a shared geospatial framework” [2].
The GII:
• Establishes a framework for acquiring, producing, managing, and
disseminating geospatial information;
• Provides the supporting services needed to ensure information content
meets user needs, is easily accessible, and can readily be applied to
support operational information requirements; and
• Ensures the supporting infrastructure components (including policy,
doctrine, training and force structure) are in place to optimise the use of
the geospatial information, products and services provided.
An operational architecture needed to achieve the GII is shown in Figure 5.

10. 10
Figure 5: An operational architecture to achieve a Geospatial Information
Infrastructure

11. 11
The 2000 Goal State
By 2000, Defence will have in place a number of the building blocks to
facilitate the evolution to the 2005 vision and the GII. These building blocks
will include:
• the introduction into service of digital mapping and charting systems
(based on geospatial databases) by key Defence agencies;
• the inclusion of geospatial information processing capabilities within
key command support systems and some mission planning
systems, and
• the availability of prototypes to distribute user services and
catalogues.
Key data production systems, such as JP42 (Project Parare) Phases 1 and
2A, Project JP2064 and Project SEA 1430 Phase 1, have been developed
and designed over a number of years. There is significant evidence to show
that the design of these systems is equal to any similar system in the world.
There are, however, significant limitations with what the systems will provide
and what is assumed they will provide. The size of the limitations can only be
determined after a post-acceptance system's analysis of the systems.
Functionally, these systems are components of the information production
segment of the GII. Policy and doctrine and ‘needs assessment’ are only
moderately well developed to capitalise on the system capabilities. Policy and
doctrine are components of the requirements management component of the
GII. The functions are logically managed by a number of ‘directorates’ within
Defence7
. The systems, and their management, although still narrowly
focused do fit logically within the GII.
Project Johnson is a data fusion and dissemination system and functionally
fits within the information management and dissemination component of the
GII.
DSTO’s EXC3ITE Project, including its components IMAD and GSS, are
research and development projects. These initiatives may provide guidance to
the next phase – the Geospatial Information Infrastructure.
Data acquisition projects, such as the Laser Airborne Depth Sounding System
(LADS), are innovative and proving to be effective; whilst other data
acquisition projects, such as DSTO’s Ingara SAR system, show potential but
are yet to be considered operationally within the overall MGI capability.
In summary, the 2000 state of the MGI capability will be a mix of legacy
issues, major capability deficiency and modern systems. Overall capability is
also characterised by the lack of overall control of the capability that results in
7 The GRPC (Geographic Requirements and Planning Committee) has the role to provide
high level guidance, but has not been fully effective to date (as was its predecessor the
Geographic Requirements Committee).

12. 12
a complex flow of information, services and direction (as shown
diagrammatically in Figure 68
).
Of importance though, is that by 2000 Defence should have in place a formal
mechanism in the Defence Outputs process to conduct capability assessment
from a Defence-wide perspective. Hopefully, this process will assist in
identifying capability shortfalls as well as facilitating the development of
projects that will respond to the 2005, 2010 and 2020 visions.
Benefits to the ADO. By 2000 ADO users should see improvement in MGI
services including:
• Greater coverage of maps, charts and supplements;
• Provision of standard digital products;
• Availability of GIS (Geographic Information System)
functionality; and
• Increase in dissemination of digital products via Defence
networks and the World Wide Web.
Figure 6: The 2000 state
The 2005 Goal – Towards a Geospatial Information Infrastructure
The next phase of development of the MGI Capability should be to progress
towards establishing a Geospatial Information Infrastructure (GII). In addition
to addressing the key Defence deficiencies of direction, production and
dissemination, the GII needs to be developed in cognisance of the broader
8 Figure 6 should be viewed as a guide rather than as authoritative.

13. 13
Australian Spatial Data Infrastructure (ASDI) and be cognisant of capability
being developed by coalition partners.
The challenges in transitioning to the GII state include, not only the
implementation of an information dissemination architecture, but also
mechanisms to redress control deficiencies of the overall MGI capability and
capability deficiencies as detailed in Appendix A. The challenges confronting
the “capability development” process are significant. Key components of
capability development include:
• Improvement of command and control of MGI capability;
• Implementation of electronic dissemination of MGI;
• Improvement in availability of foundation geospatial information;
• Improvement of user services;
• Improvement in deployable capabilities;
• Development of new products and services; and
• Improvement of management of archives.
These key components are included in Figure 7 and discussed briefly below.
Figure 7: The 2005 goal – A Geospatial Information Infrastructure architecture
Improvement of command and control of MGI capability. Although there
has been a significant improvement in overall command and control of the
MGI capability since the Defence Efficiency Review / Defence Reform
Program, there is still no one single point-of-contact (as is shown
diagrammatically in Figure 6).

14. 14
It is acknowledged that organisational changes are currently occurring within
the ADO. However, it should be an aim within this phase of development that
command and control issues are addressed through formal delegation of
responsibility and promulgation of specific areas of responsibility.
In particular, processes need to be developed to address Defence planning
and operational needs encompassing strategic, operational and tactical levels
of activity. This activity includes the development of Joint Doctrine that reflects
the shift to an information based operational environment.
Implementation of electronic dissemination of MGI. The second key
component is to develop a web-based architecture to facilitate access to a
shared view of Defence’s geospatial information databases. Supporting
components include:
• The development of the data models, standards, and interfaces
needed to ensure interoperability across various military
applications;
• Provision of a single user interface or clearinghouse to promote the
discovery, browsing, ordering, and retrieval of geospatial
information and a range of electronic services; and
• The establishment of user profiles needed to exploit advances in
profile driven smart information push/pull technologies while
protecting access.
Improvement in availability of foundation geospatial information.
Defence has a major collection and production capability deficiency made up
of:
A limitation in the ability to produce, maintain and revise its current range
of digital map and chart products;
A lack of capability to produce and maintain (through update and
revision) its current range of hard copy and digital map and chart
products over non-sovereign areas;
An inability to produce, as a matter of routine, contemporary digital
products and services as produced by major allies both over Australia
and over non-sovereign areas;
A limited knowledge of the technical details of emerging digital products
and services; and
Insufficient mechanisms and funding in place to acquire products and
services that meet Defence specifications from organisations external
to Defence (ie through National Support).
A number of projects currently in acquisition are designed to address some of
the deficiencies. There will remain, however, a significant deficiency for which
a number of options need considering. These include, but are not inclusive of:

15. 15
Review activities that could be appropriately defined as being in the
national interest (National Support) and allocate those capabilities to
other government agencies as parts of the Australian Spatial Data
Infrastructure (ASDI);
Improve access to information held and managed by other departments
contributing to the ASDI;
Enhance the use of commercial support through offering long term
contracts to accredited companies;
Examine the feasibility of using alternate data sources and techniques
(such as those associated with synthetic aperture radar, hyperspectral
imagery and other sources); and
Other (yet to be determined) options.
Improvement of user services. The need to get information to the right user,
in the right format and in the right time is of paramount importance. Topics
associated with the concepts of spatial data warehouses, data
clearinghouses, and ‘gateway services’ will address issues associated with
various databases managed by Defence agencies. There are, it seems, two
specialist functions and a training function that should be considered within
this phase. These are:
The provision of an electronic library. This capability would include
electronic copies of products that have been vetted (to appropriate
levels of release restriction) for ready access to users. The library could
include digitised maps, standard products and services, directories,
and so on.
The provision of scientific advice covering the domain of the geomatics
sciences and technologies, various initiatives and interfaces with other
sources of information.
Enhancement of training facilities including provision of 'distance
learning' services and electronic 'help desks'.
Improvement in deployable capabilities. The demands of modern
command support systems and weapon systems for current and more
accurate geospatial information (both in position and description) means that
the capabilities of the ADO's deployable assets will need to be enhanced.
Surveying, data (including imagery) acquisition, and analytical processing
capabilities will need to be enhanced.
Development of new products and services. There have been numerous
attempts over the past couple of decades to elicit user needs and develop
new products and services. For one reason, or another, the various initiatives
have been less that adequate. A better method must be found to scope the
geospatial information requirement.

16. 16
The challenge is to develop a methodology to elicit information needs from
Military Response Options (MROs), contingency plans as well as the various
command support, navigation, weapons, and simulation systems.
Improvement of management of archives. One area that continues to be
poorly managed is that associated with storage and maintenance of archival
information (as shown in Figure 8). This is an extremely complex issue and
needs some sort of analysis to assess the scope and complexity of the issue.
As an example, one component might include design and development of an
electronic archive9
that includes, but is not inclusive of, geodetic control,
image control, photogrammetric adjustment reports, photo interpretation
guides and so on.
Benefits to the ADO. If all seven components of this phase are addressed
then the ADO will have in place a Geospatial Information Infrastructure that
will provide significant benefit to the ADO's planning and operational
capabilities.
Figure 9: US DCI statement on the Belgrade Chinese Embassy bombing
The information will:
• Provide regional, accurate, precise and current spatially co-
referenced information about the area of defence military interest.
• Use standard data exchange formats to ensure geospatial
interoperability for command support systems, mission planning
systems, navigation systems, and so on.
9 This information will become progressively important as Defence embraces coordinate-
based referencing for targeting and precise navigation. This activity might provide an
important mechanism to deal with legacy data and legacy systems.

17. 17
• Support measurement, mapping, visualisation, monitoring,
modelling, terrain evaluation, and spatial reasoning applications.
The services will:
• Deliver the right information at the right time through electronic data
transfers and deployable MGI desktops.
• Offer responsive technical guidance through analytical tools,
improved requirements identification and electronic training.
• Certify new technological capabilities and manage value-adding
strategies.
• Support multi-level electronic gateway interfaces and bulletin board
access.
The overall benefit will be:
• Interoperability through the use of consistent geospatial data across
operational units.
• Flexibility through diverse uses of the same data for analysis,
presentation, modelling, planning, rehearsal and operation.
• Currency of value-adding policies for diverse and remote data
updates by others in a timely manner.
• Speed through on-line delivery for high priority data and update
information.
The 2010 Goal – An Integral Part of the C
2
Process
With a Geospatial Information Infrastructure in place, the next major
developmental phase is to place the GII in context with the overarching
Command and Control capability. Geospatial information should be an
integral part of the C
2
process. The knowledge of the environment along with
detailed descriptions and relations should be pervasive and transparent to the
user (Figure 9).
Structures and analytical processes should permit realistic planing and
rehearsal of operations. Components should be customised so that the C
2
system is event-driven. That is, as one example, given a request to respond
to a situation, automatic processes would allocate the appropriate asset, plan
the route to the site and issue directives10
.
In order to achieve this state, a comprehensive study of the C
2
capability
(surveillance, intelligence, resource and asset management, and command
support) needs to occur. This process is complex: with the complexity
(perhaps) explained by considering the process within a cube (as shown in
Figure 10).
The figure shows an axis that represents military activity, an axis that
represents an MGI operation and an axis that shows a timeline for the
capability development process in general.
10 This type of functionality already exists in ‘high-end’ emergency management systems and
dispatch management systems.

18. 18
Effectively, the military activity axis represents requirements based on
needs and responsiveness of a range of military activities.
The geospatial information needs, including such criteria as availability,
responsiveness and so on, will be determined through a combination of
analysis of users (military staff, policy makers, planners, system needs of
weapons and platforms) and through analysis of contemporary military
capabilities such as the following.
• Interoperable command and control. Geospatial information is
used to provide a common framework, or spatial point of reference,
for all forces engaged in the mission space. With this common
framework, joint and coalition partners can communicate and
operate from the same information, thereby avoiding confusion, lost
opportunities, or even mission failure.

19. 19
Figure 9: The 2010 goal – Geographic Information within the C
2
capability
Figure 10: The 2010 goal – Capability development

20. 20
• Navigation and guidance. Accurate and up-to-date geospatial
information is the key to supporting accurate land, air and sea
navigation systems with a level of precision consistent with GPS
technologies employed by our forces.
• Mission planning and rehearsal are critical missions that are
heavily reliant on the rapid availability of geospatial information.
Elevation data, flight safety information, precise waypoints and
digital maps are essential components of the automated mission
planning systems currently in acquisition. The capability of these
systems is being extended to provide realistic mission rehearsal
functionality that simulates not only mission activities, but mission
environments as well.
• Battlefield visualisation is the next logical step beyond mission
rehearsal. The ability of the commander to visit the battlefield in a
virtual manner before ever putting troops on the ground will
measurably enhance mission success while mitigating dangers to
his force. The realistic three-dimensional fly-throughs and analytical
assessment capabilities inherent in this process are totally
dependent on the timely availability of high resolution geospatial
information.
• Precision force. The extremely accurate nature of geospatial
information underlies the capability to destroy targets selectively
while limiting collateral damage to the fullest extent possible. It is
the essential ingredient for employing the next generation of GPS
and sensor guided precision weapons.
• Modelling, simulation and analysis constitutes a vital, if often
overlooked, function that is heavily reliant on geospatial information.
While the information may never be visually displayed in a classical
map view of the environment, the interactive and addressable
nature of the data is key to running the analytical routines which can
rapidly model such battlefield problems as mobility, intervisibility
and concealment. It is also a vital component for conducting the
area limitation analysis needed to track and locate high value
mobile targets such as tactical missiles.
These military capabilities could then be related to a range of activities as
shown in Figure 11. Therefore, the military activity axis could be viewed as a
set of axes.
The MGI operation axis represents key functionality within the surveying and
mapping disciplines. The functionality includes surveying activities,
mapping/cartography activities, management support functions, and
dissemination activities.
The capability development axis acknowledges that the process is always in
a state of evolution. This means that analysis needs to scope the spectrum
from legacy systems through to future warfare concepts.

21. 21
Figure 11: The 2010 goal – Capability development – Military activities
The 2020 Goal – The Virtual World
By 2020 we should have reached an era where we have truly intelligent
systems. The basic dictionary meaning of the word intelligence refers to
having knowledge, understanding and awareness. This suggests that systems
may have the ability to learn or understand from experience. They might have
the ability to acquire and retain knowledge. They should have the ability to
respond quickly and successfully to a new situation.
Spatial and temporal reasoning will be based on knowledge of the full
spectrum of environmental and infrastructure information at various levels of
resolution and relevance. Geospatial information will include administrative
and legislative information, demographic information, the fundamental
infrastructure (ports and harbours, road and transportation systems and the
airspace), assets (facilities, industry, commerce), natural resources, and the
environment including the atmosphere and oceans.
There is probably little doubt that 2020 systems will include immersion
characteristics whereby users are surrounded by virtual reality. 2020 systems
will probably be scenario-driven with users being given real-time options along
with costs and risks. 2020 systems will most probably be components of the
cyber warrior.
The future geospatial environment by 2020 should resemble a virtual world
(Figure 12) with capabilities determined through a full implementation of the

22. 22
Figure 12: The Virtual World
phases transitioned through (as described previously). The challenges to
reach this state are many and varied. The benefits to Defence and to the
nation are immense. Not only will technology provide Defence with the
knowledge edge but benefits will be gained in better management of our
nation and its infrastructure: benefits that would include, amongst others,
precision navigation in a truly multi-dimensional space, and optimised
management of the nation's infrastructure.
CONCLUSION
The knowledge of the environment and infrastructure and their impact on
military operations has long been viewed as fundamental. Up until relatively
recently, maps and charts have been the means to represent the environment
and infrastructure and, therefore, the means with which to plan and conduct
military operations.
Maps and charts as we have known them in the past, however, are the issue
of the past. The real issue is that of creating and maintaining digital geospatial
information and distributing relevant information that meets the planning and
operational needs of the defence community for effective decision-making.
We are experiencing a changing geospatial environment. As our environment
changes, the dependence on comprehensive and smart geospatial
information will increase exponentially. Therefore, we need a strategy by

23. 23
which we can logically and realistically develop our capability: a capability that
within twenty years will consist of a virtual world which will provide the
foundation for the future digital battlespace.
This paper provides a vision and a strategy that advances capability from the
current state through to a virtual world.
COMMENTS AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This document is unashamedly visionary in style and content. As such, it is
difficult to achieve a truly objective review, and assessment, of the pertinent
issues within the document. Having said that it is appropriate to make some
comments and acknowledge a number of visionaries.
The reference to Ptolemy on page 6 might, at first, seem irrelevant or
inappropriate. The reference is included to raise two key issues. The first
issue is that knowledge can be seen as having a scientific foundation, while
the second issue sets a vision for modelling the environment in which we live.
The second visionary that deserves comment is the American futurist Ben
Bova11
. Bova gave a keynote presentation at conference (that I attended) in
Washington, DC circa 1989. He gave a presentation on life on the moon in
2030, what the scientific challenges were, what disasters occurred in reaching
that state and what the successes were. Bova has been quoted as saying "I
don't think of what I do as science fiction, I think of it as historical reports of
events that haven't happened yet". The point here is that proposals aimed
well into the future need to be based on a sound scientific base supported by
historical evidence and enhanced by lateral thinking.
This report might not compare with those of the notable persons cited above
but it does conform to the criteria noted. For example, the EGICS Reports (12
parts – 1000+ pages) describe Defence's 'environmental and geographic
information capability'. The reports include chapters that describe the
capability from the earliest days of settlement in Australia out to trends and
directions applicable to the near future. There are one hundred and sixty four
direct references to developments in the surveying and mapping capability
and policy decisions associated with the capability development, and a
number of acknowledgments.
Included in the acknowledgments are details of US DoD strategies and
comments obtained through personal conversations with Mr Irv Buck. Mr Buck
was the leader of an Integrated Product Team responsible for producing the
[US NIMA] Geospatial Information Infrastructure Master Plan [2]. This
technical report logically follows on from the EGICS report and
recommendations (of both EGICS and NIMA GI Master Plan) by extending
the vision out twenty years.
The issue of personal contact with recognised leaders in a domain area is
important. This sort of relationship allows experience to be gained. At this
11 Ben Bova worked with the American space program since its very beginnings. He is an
impassioned futurist and now a leading writer of science-fiction and non-fiction technology
books.

24. 24
point it is worth acknowledging a number of 'leaders' (that I have had personal
contact with over the years) in the surveying and mapping field.
The disciplines of surveying and mapping have long been noted as pro-active
disciplines that push technology barriers. They relate with the need and desire
to explore. The need to address surveying and mapping challenges in order to
explore is almost a prerequisite. From my personal point of view, I
acknowledge two Australian Army officers (then) Majors Frank Bryant and
John Cattell. Frank Bryant pushed the bounds of (applied) photogrammetry in
the late 1960s introducing analytical (computer based) techniques12
. John
Cattell challenged existing cartographic practices in the early 1970s. It is quite
possible, that without these progressive professionals, that it might not have
been possible to map countries like Papua New Guinea right up until now.
Ten years later (then) Major Bruce Harrison was the Project Director of the
Automap 2 project. His project pushed the technology barrier quite
significantly. Ideas associated with development of high-end photogrammetric
workstations have now been implemented and are mandatory tools in the
intelligence analysts' capability.
Over the years close contact has been maintained with people in the major
MC&G (Mapping, Charting and Geodesy) agencies of our allies. In the mid-
1980s, Major Graham Kennedy-Smith of UK Military Survey addressed the
vexed issue of designing complex geospatial (multi-product) databases. Dr
Richard Ley of UK Military Survey and Mr Dave McKellar of National Defense
Canada were (possibly) the two key people pushing the technology edge for
the Digital Chart of the World Project and activities within the DGIWG (Digital
Geographic Information Working Group). Capabilities within ESRI's Arcview
software package (one of the most commonly used packages in the GIS
community) and aspects of the OpenGIS Consortium might not be as
advanced as they have without Ley and McKellar.
It is my personal view that the evolutionary development outlined in this report
should 'stress' the research and development community, and the capability
development and acquisition processes. Only by taking a strategy like the one
proposed will we actually gain the knowledge-edge.
REFERENCES
[1] Australia’s Strategic Policy, Department of Defence, Canberra,
Australia, 1997
[2] Geospatial Information Infrastructure Master Plan, Volume 1,
Overview, Version 1.0, US National Imagery and Mapping Agency, 17
October 1997.
12 This activity predates any other similar activity at a major 'production facility' anywhere in
the world.

25. 25
APPENDIX A:
THE REAL CAPABILITY DEFICIENCY
Whilst it might be relatively simple to identify the capability deficiency in terms
of technologies, such as GIS, and whilst there may be a temptation to
concentrate on a high profile technology such as satellite imagery (and its
acquisition), the real capability deficiency covers the full extent of capability13
.
The lack of awareness of the relevance and importance of MGI has been, and
continues to be, a major issue across the entire department. For example,
risk appears to be an accepted fact when conducting operations and
exercises. There seems to be little analysis of the suitability of MGI prior to
operations and exercises.
There is a reluctance to acknowledge that there are major paradigm changes
occurring. There is a tendency to hang on to existing practices and services.
This general reluctance to change exists across the entire portfolio. Many
believe other parts of the portfolio ought to change, but not their own.
There is a deficiency in command and control. Up until now the chain of
command has been convoluted: responsibility and authority for the various
activities are inadequately coordinated.
There is a deficiency in the force development process. This deficiency can
be demonstrated by looking at the history of development of the digital MGI
capability. Army first identified the need to develop a topographic database in
1976. Navy identified the need to develop a digital hydrographic database in
1977. Both these proposals have proven to be valid; yet there has been
continual, and continuous, delays in the force development process - right up
until today. Ill informed decisions in numerous committees, possibly resulting
from simplistic briefs being provided to principals, along with the effects of
numerous studies and reviews have set back capability development many
years. The Joint Working Party on the ADF GIS reported to ACOPS in 1989
that “RASVY has moved from being a world leader in the exploitation of digital
geographic applications, to lagging several years behind the civil community
and our principal ABCA allies”. The project earmarked to rectify this known
deficiency is only being introduced into service now.
There is a deficiency in research and development, and education and
training. In general, education and training is aligned to existing systems and
tasking. As such the delays in capability development, combined with tasking
of the conventional, traditional products and services has meant that
education and training has not advanced at the rate it should have. With
respect to research and development, much work has traditionally been
performed within the services. Army, in particular, either knowingly or
unknowingly, determined that R&D was not a core activity and staff positions
were lost. Organisations, such as DSTO, have, up until now, not recognised
nor taken up that lost capability. The overall result is that Defence has a
critical deficiency with respect to research and development and education
13 Capability is defined as the capacity to achieve a specific effect, in a nominated operating
environment or location, within a specific degree of notice, and to sustain that effort for a
given time. Capability, as a function of force structure, has as its components personnel,
training, equipment, organisation, structure, deployment, preparedness and doctrine.

26. 26
and training in the mapping sciences.
There is also a deficiency in what the services refer to as esprit de corps. This
characteristic embraces a ‘can do’ attitude: positiveness. Currently, there
appears to be a negative feeling throughout the department: we need to wait
till the next project is fielded, it’s not our responsibility, and the like!
Finally, there is the capacity issue. The capacity to collect, produce and
disseminate geospatial information that has already been identified through
ADF forums is a major issue of concern.
The capability/capacity deficiency (even only considering existing known
requirements) is of mammoth (almost unimaginable) proportions:
there has been dialogue in Senate as to whether it will take Navy 100 or
200 years to survey its area of responsibility;
in analysis for Project PARARE Phase 2A, it was determined that using
the current assets (including, the yet to be acquired, PARARE Phase
1) it would take 25-30 years just to convert existing analogue products
into digital products;
RAAF AIS has noted that the revision cycle of JOG (A) - 1 :250,000
scale planning chart - is 143 years; and so on!
Compounded by the capacity issue for conventional products and services
are capabilities that have yet to be fully determined. These include:
the population, maintenance and revision of multi-product databases;
the archiving of information;
the design and production of mission specific datasets;
the dissemination of information in multi-security environments;
issues involved with contingency planning and crisis support;
issues involved with non-sovereign areas within Australia’s area of
defence military interest;
issues involved with counter terrorism and special forces’ applications;
issues involved with asset management, facilities management and
logistics planning;
issues involved with modelling populations such as demographic
distribution, health aspects, and so on;
issues involved with environmental and meteorological information for a
large number of applications and purposes;
issues involved with simulation, mission planning, and rehearsal; and
many others.
The overall outcome is that Defence is confronted with considerable
challenges!