6742 Ch 11 PowerPoint

1. Fire Department Incident Safety
Officer
Third Edition
Chapter 11 — A Systematic Approach to the ISO Role

2. Knowledge Objectives (1 of 3)
‣ Describe the four steps that help an incident safety officer
(ISO) become integrated into an incident.
‣ Define the roles of an ISO at planned and unplanned
events.
‣ List the five ISO general duties applicable to all incident
types.
‣ Describe the incident scene conditions that are monitored
as part of an ongoing incident.

3. Knowledge Objectives (2 of 3)
‣ List the components that make up a firefighter safety
system.
‣ Describe the risk management criteria that would result in a
threat to firefighter survival being considered imminent.
‣ Describe methods used to ensure member accountability at
an incident scene.
‣ Identify the consequences and hazards that the lack of
accountability at an incident scene could create.

4. Knowledge Objectives (3 of 3)
‣ Identify hazardous incident conditions that would require
the establishment of a hazard control zone.
‣ Describe how hazard control zones can be identified and
communicated at an incident scene.
‣ Describe how entry into the hazard zone area can be
controlled.

5. Introduction: Getting Started (1 of 2)
‣ Typical ISO frustrations
‣ No clear starting places for ISO duties
‣ Existing ISO checklists are too short and/or too general
‣ Thinking that, once an item is checked off, it no longer
needs attention
‣ Not be sidetracked with details
‣ ISO needs to “see all” and “know all” to be effective
‣ Proactive/reactive opposing expectations

6. ‣ Checklists and action models
‣ Flexibility
‣ Adaptability
‣ Cyclicity (the revisiting of items)
‣ Proactivity
‣ Reactiveness
Introduction: Getting Started (2 of 2)

7. A Simple and Effective Tool: Checklists (1 of 2)
‣ Benefits of checklists
‣ Quick reminder of things that need to be done
‣ Help you get back on track
‣ Lend themselves to uniformity
‣ Archiving is relatively simple
‣ Changing the checklist is relatively simple
‣ Most formats are easy to understand

8. ‣ Disadvantages to checklists
‣ Imply that there is only one right way
‣ Tendency to be either overly simple or overly lengthy
‣ Once checked, the ISO may forget to revisit it
‣ Cannot cover all possible incident types
‣ Imply an order for task completion
‣ May be subject to subpoena in legal matters
A Simple and Effective Tool: Checklists (2 of 2)

9. Action Models
‣ A template that outlines a mental or physical process
‣ Considers inputs that lead to an output or outcomes
‣ Provides flexibility and adaptability as opposed to checklists
‣ Process multiple inputs
‣ Logical
‣ Cyclic
‣ Meaningful way

10. Cyclic Thinking
‣ “Input saturation”
‣ IC needs to think in a linear fashion
‣ Need to be checks and balances
‣ ISO can help by doing the following:
‣ Creating an environment open to multiple inputs
‣ Maintaining a high degree of situation scanning and
awareness
‣ Being the “what-if” thinker

11. The Dodson/Vavra ISO Action Model (1 of 2)

12. ‣ Calls for the ISO to analyze four general arenas
‣ Neither a starting place for the model nor a direction of
flow should be inferred
‣ The ISO simply jumps into the cycle as directed
‣ The ISO can start where he or she feels attention is
warranted
‣ The ISO should conduct an initial survey of each arena and
then monitor the applicable concerns in each
‣ ISO performs a mental evaluation of the conditions,
activities, operations, or probabilities in each arena
The Dodson/Vavra ISO Action Model (2 of 2)

13. The Hazard “MEDIC” Action Models (1 of 6)
‣ Monitor
‣ Reconnaissance:
exploratory examination of
the incident scene
conditions and activities
‣ Monitor incident conditions,
activities, and
communications
Courtesy
of
David
Dodson

14. ‣ Evaluate
‣ The ISO must make judgments
‣ Form better judgments using front-loaded knowledge and
skill sets of reading risk and reading firefighters
‣ Specific items that the ISO must evaluate (analyze):
‣ Risk-taking level of the firefighters
‣ Safety systems for firefighters
‣ Incident hazard status and rate of change
‣ IAP accomplishment
‣ IAP components
The Hazard “MEDIC” Action Models (2 of 6)

15. ‣ Develop preventive measures
‣ Proactive actions you implement for forecasted hazards
‣ Awareness
‣ Accommodation
‣ Acclimation
‣ Adjusting or improving the standard method
‣ Development of preventive measures never ends!
‣ The ISO is always considering and devising ways to make
things safer
The Hazard “MEDIC” Action Models (3 of 6)

16. ‣ Intervene
‣ Imminent threats require a firm intervention
‣ A direct order to stop, alter, suspend, or withdraw
responders to prevent almost certain harm
‣ The IC must be notified (via radio) of any firm
intervention
‣ Soft interventions are used for hazards presenting potential
harm or damage
‣ Typically communicated through face-to-face methods
during the course of the incident
The Hazard “MEDIC” Action Models (4 of 6)

17. ‣ Communicate
‣ Interventions require communication to deliver urgent and
advisory messages
‣ These communications can be accomplished many ways:
‣ Warning signs
‣ Whistle
‣ Safety briefings
‣ Written safety messages
The Hazard “MEDIC” Action Models (5 of 6)

18. ‣ Communicate (cont.)
‣ The act of communicating
includes the ability to listen
‣ The ISO should
actively listen to what
is being said by other
responders
Courtesy of Superstition Fire and Medical District
The Hazard “MEDIC” Action Models (6 of 6)

19. The ISO Arrival Process (1 of 2)
‣ The duty ISO arrives (or the ISO assignment is given)
‣ Process of integration into the incident should be mandated
‣ The following steps can help the ISO get dialed in:
‣ Confirm the ISO assignment
‣ Collect information (IAP)
‣ Confirm communication links
‣ Don appropriate PPE and position identifier

20. ‣ Once the arrival sequence is completed, the IC might ask for:
‣ A more complete recon (360) of the incident
‣ Assistance to develop a quick IAP
‣ A check-up on the accountability system
‣ Where no IC direction is given, the ISO should start the MEDIC
action model
The ISO Arrival Process (2 of 2)

21. Risk-Taking Level (1 of 3)
‣ Risk-taking level
‣ The ISO must confirm the risk-taking level with the IC
‣ Low: take no risk for that lost
‣ Medium: minimize risk for savable property
‣ High: risk a lot to save people
‣ The declared risk profile gives the ISO a foundation for
monitoring and evaluating conditions

22. ‣ Common incident benchmarks
‣ 360 complete: all four sides of the incident environment
have been observed and notable factors have been
communicated to the IC
‣ All clear: a primary search of the incident environment has
been completed
‣ Under control: the destructive incident force (usually the
fire) has been controlled but not eliminated
‣ Loss stopped: fire has been extinguished, overhaul and
ventilation have been completed; no further loss expected
Risk-Taking Level (2 of 3)

23. ‣ Risk profiles are often tied to the incident benchmarks
‣ 360 complete: IC establishes the risk profile as low,
medium, or high
‣ All clear: high risk-taking moves to medium
‣ Under control: medium risk-taking moves to low
‣ Declaring an offensive or defensive mode is not the same as
risk profiling
Risk-Taking Level (3 of 3)

24. Personnel Safety Systems (1 of 3)
‣ Personnel accountability systems
‣ Tactical worksheets and command boards
‣ Apparatus riding lists/cards
‣ Electronic bar-code systems
‣ Accountability tags, keys, or passports
‣ Radio-based electronic tracking receivers and software

25. ‣ Accountability systems
‣ Track responders by number, function, and location
‣ Provide a rapid method to do a personnel accountability
report (PAR)
‣ Be expandable as the incident grows in size or complexity
‣ The ISO should inquire (evaluate) whether the accountability
system is working as intended
Personnel Safety Systems (2 of 3)

26. ‣ Rehabilitation
‣ Not the task of the ISO to
set up the rehab area
‣ The ISO does need to
monitor and evaluate the
effectiveness of the rehab
effort
‣ Mnemonic REHAB reminds
the ISO of the components
of an effective rehab effort
Courtesy of David Dodson
Personnel Safety Systems (3 of 3)

27. Control Zones (1 of 2)
‣ ISO is responsible for establishing control zones
‣ Colored-coded hazard tape
‣ Signage
‣ Cones
‣ Flashing beacons
‣ Fences
‣ Sentries
‣ Law enforcement or security personnel
‣ Other measures

28. ‣ Four-level hierarchy based on severity
‣ No-entry zone
‣ Nobody is allowed to enter this area
‣ Hot zone
‣ Operational areas that are judged to be immediately
dangerous to life and health
‣ Warm zone
‣ Area surrounding a hot zone or action area
‣ Cold zone
‣ Area surrounding a warm zone that is used for an
incident command post
Control Zones (2 of 2)