A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE AND NATURAL SCIENCE ON VALUE JUDGMENT.pdf
1. A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE AND NATURAL
SCIENCE ON VALUE JUDGMENT
By
AKANMU TOBA CALEB
tobacalebakanmu@gmail.com
07069091141
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
OBAFEMI AWOLOWO UNIVERSITY, ILE IFE
ABSTRACT
This essay looks into the debate on the nature of science and social science on their
claims of value-judgment. It is generally believed that science is value free while social
science is value dependent. Scientists believe that their objectivity is evident through
generating of laws to explain natural events while social science lacks this. Critics have
however viewed that what make scientists to suppose that social science is value laden is
also eminent in science, therefore if social can be argued to be value-laden base on their
characteristics and these characteristics are also evident in science, then social science is
also objective. This essay argues that both science and social science are value-laden. What
science calls objectivity are just facts they discover. Moreover, discovering facts is not
peculiar to science alone as social science also discover facts. However, their (both science
and social science) statements about these facts are value laden.
2. 1
1. Introduction
What is value? What is value-judgment? What is Objectivity? These are germane
questions that ought to be considered before delving into the debate on the nature of science
and social science on value-judgment.
This essay makes attempt to look into the nature of value, value-judgment and
objectivity, in order to understand if truly either science or social science makes objective
or subjective claim respectively. The essay attempts to address some arguments for and
against social science and science. The essay concludes that neither science nor social
science makes objective claim and what people consider as their objective claims are facts
discovered. However, an in-depth understanding of value and value judgment shows that
they (both science and social science) make value-laden claims.
2. Value and Value-Judgement and Objectivity
What is value? Are all statements value-laden? How do we identify a statement that
is value-laden? Is a value-laden-statement subjective or objective? One easy way to
identify a value statement is to contrast it with a factual statement. One can consider the
examples below;
(a) There is a knife on the table
(b) The lecturer writes on the board
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(c) The boy lied about the incidence. (the boy reported the opposite of the real
incidence)
All the above examples are factual. This is because their expressions are checkable
and confirmable and not dependent on individuals’ view. We can consider the examples
below to see how value comes in;
(d) The knife on the table is a useful utensil
(e) The lecturer’s writing on the body is beautiful.
(f) It is wrong for the boy to lie about the incidence.
The words useful, beautiful and wrong are all value words imputed in those factual
statements to express the individual’s view about the facts stated. Generally speaking,
value connotes general conceptions or say preferences, needs, sentiments and dispositions
towards an object or say the world at large. It can be said to be beliefs or ideals shared by
the members of an organization or society or say a culture about what they agree or set to
be good or bad and desirable or undesirable. On the other hand, value judgement can be
generally expressed as easy evaluation that is based upon a finite information available.1
This evaluation is necessary because there is a need for a decision to be made on. In the
examples above, there are numbers of values that are made either about the quality of the
boy or the knife or the lecturer. Value is an ambiguous concept that governs human
behavior. They are subjective and vary across people and culture.2
According to R.K. Mukherjee, values are argued to be socially approved desires
and goals that are internalized through the process of conditioning, learning or socialization
1
Rokeach, Milton (1973). The Nature of Human Values. New York: The Free Press. P.10
2
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Value_judgment, 6 April, 2019
4. 3
and that become subjective preferences, standards, and aspirations.3
Mukherjee’s definition
implies that our views about a particular thing comes as a product of the knowledge we
have been equipped with in the process of learning or a particular way of life we imbibe.
After learning, what we learn becomes ideas in our minds through which we form some
norms or conceptions about some particular things. Mukherjee’s definition seems
problematic in the sense that there may be some who has not gone through any kind of
learning or come in contact with any kind of socialization. Nonetheless, they express value
laden statements. Are value statements only construed through leaning or socialization?
However, Ralph Barton Perry believes that values are created, or instituted, in the
psychological processes of desire and interest. To desire something or put more
appropriately, to take an interest in something, is to institute value. Value is created by an
interest attitude. Where interest attitude connotes our constant subjective view about a
case.4
Similarly, I. J. Lehner and N.J. Kube suppose value as an integral part of the personal
philosophy of life by which we generally construe the system of values. The philosophy of
life includes our aims, ideals, and manner of thinking and the principles by which we guide
our behavior.5
T. W. Hippie clearly points out that this philosophy of life can either turn out to be
“conscious or unconscious motivators and justifiers of the actions and judgment”.6
Arguably, it can be said that value can be a shared idea about how something should be in
terms of desirability. This shared idea then becomes a standard by which the ends of action
3
Ramkrishna Mukherjee (1979) Sociology of Indian Sociology. Mumbai: Allied Publishers. P. 199
4
B, Perry (1926) General Theory of Value. Cambridge: Harvard University Press
5
I. J. Lehner, N.J. Kube (1967). Values as the Guiding Force of Human Behaviour. New Delhi: MacMillan
Publication. P.52-59.
6
T. W. Hippie https://iedunote.com/values 6 April, 2019.
5. 4
are selected. In sum, values are attached to one’s personal interest, normative issues,
motivating actions and community of superiors.
From the foregoing it can be inferred that value statement cannot be objective but
subjective given its dependency on the expression or say the view of the subjective agent.
In other words, value statements are subjective. How can a statement be objective? What
is objectivity?
Objectivity is mostly viewed as independent of any judgment. It is independent of any
conscious awareness. Empiricists, like John Locke, call objective claims the given.7
This is because
they believe that objective things’ existence is not dependent on our views or perception. Barring
any skeptics’ idea of either non-reliability of the senses or non-existence of what our senses
proclaim and given the nature of our world as physically made entity, objects in the world
exist as facts.
An objective statement can then be said to be such about a fact which can be proved
to be true or false. For objective statements, there exist widely recognized criteria and
methods to determine whether a claim is true or false; we all know what a table is, what
water looks like etc. On the other hand, a value statement will be subjective statement
because it is not a fact but an expression of belief, opinion, or personal preference; as in
the water is tasteless, smokers are liable to die young, etc.8
Are the criteria that establish a
statement or claim as objective not subjective to those that set them? Can some subjective
claims by some be supposed as objective?
7
Locke, John. (1689) Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. Peter Nidetch (1975) Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
8
Rorty, Richard. (1991) Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
6. 5
Arguably, there is no general conclusive criteria to prove a subjective statement
either true or false. This is because there may be a more convincing view to prove a
confirmed right statement wrong and a confirmed wrong statement right. This implies that
the truth of a statement does not make it objective. If we all agree that example f is true,
another person may come to show a stronger reason while the statement in example f is
false.
Nonetheless, facts also may turn out false sometimes. Most especially when there
are more researches and new discoveries. Even if a factual statement is demonstrably false,
it remains an objective claim on a factual matter. For instance, there was a conception that
there are nine planets in the solar system which turns out to be false. It is not false that
there are planets in the solar system but it is false that they are nine. A fact is always
accessible for confirmation.
Given our understanding of value, value-judgement and objectivity, can it be
concluded that social science gives no objective judgement and that science is inherently
objective?
3. Social Science and Value-Judgement
Is social science value free? There have been many arguments against the claim for
a value free social science. It is often argued that a number of social factors influence the
values held by social scientists and these values in turn influence the nature of social
science itself. Therefore it is not possible to have such a social science that is value free.
Ernest Nagel expounds the critics view to show the areas which the critics often
posit as the challenges and through which value manifests itself in the deals of social
7. 6
sciences. These are; the selection of problems, the determination of the contents of
conclusion, the identification of facts and the assessment of evidence.9
To start with, in the selection of problems, the critics argue that the selections of
problems by the social scientists are determined by their conception of the socially
important values. Their dealings with materials attributed to cultural significance makes
value orientation to be inherent in their choice of materials or investigation. Just as David
Hanson argues that the subject matters of social science is value, therefore they are value
dependent. In his words, he states; “social scientists hold, consciously and unconsciously,
values which constitute premises or postulates in their analytic systems, values about their
subject matter which influence the problems they select for study, and so forth.” 10
Despite this, arguably, this supposition by the critics imply that the value oriented
social science does not thoroughly investigate everything but always have their attention
focused on some certain selected portion of the concrete reality which interest them.
However, the fact that a social scientist focuses on matters which he believes to be socially
important values does not necessitate any effect on whether social science adequately
evaluates the evidence for his conclusion.11
In other words, selection of problems that is of
interest does not nullify the pursuit of objectivity in social science.
The critics argue that social scientists own notions of what satisfies their standards
of conclusion.12
This necessitates the determination of the contents of conclusion. Hanson
9
Nagel, Ernest (1994) “The Value Oriented Bias of Social Inquiry”. In: Micheal Martin and Lee C.
Meintyre (eds.) Readings in the Philosophy of Social science. Cambridge: MIT Press. P. 571
10
David, Hanson (1969) “Values and Social Science Social Science” Social Science 44 (2) P. 81-87
11
J S, Mill, (1965) On the Logic of the Moral Sciences. Henry M. Magis (ed.) New York: The Bobbs-Merril
Company. P. 21-22
12
Taylor, Charles (1994) “Neutrality in Political Science”. In: Micheal Martin and Lee C. Meintyre (eds.)
Readings in the Philosophy of Social science. Cambridge: MIT Press. P. 547-570
8. 7
views that the values of social science to individuals, groups, or society held by the social
scientists toward that which they study makes it difficult to arrive at an objective
conclusion.13
Agreeably, truly it is difficult to give a judgment that is independent of some
contents of value. These contents of value are aversions, hopes, fears etc. and they colour
one’s conclusion.
Nonetheless, though it may be true that the contents of value colour our judgement,
however, there is a way we can detect such conclusion that is value coloured and objective.
This way of detection is clarifying the difference between factual judgement and value
judgment, as done in section 2 of this essay. It can be inferred from section 2 that factual
judgements is objective while value judgment is subjective.
Social science do not rely on subjectivity but objectivity. Social scientists believe
that one of the indispensable character of a researcher is objectivity in his reports and
conclusions. This implies that if it is possible for us to differentiate value judgement from
factual judgement, then there will be no problem in determining an objective conclusion
which is value free. However, it can be argued that truly facts are objective but any
judgment about facts is subjective. If it is true that there is no objective judgement but
subjective judgement then it will not be false that social science gives no objective
judgement.
Nevertheless, how can we identify the relevant objective facts from the ones that
are value dependent? For the critics, it seems hyperbolic to conclude that facts can be
distinguished from value in analyzing human behavior. For them, an ethically neutral social
science is impossible. This is because; one, a number of characterizations sometimes
13
David, Hanson “Values and Social Science” P. 81-87
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assumed to be purely factual descriptions of social phenomena are otherwise formulations
of value judgement; two, social enquiry entails the fusion of facts and values and most
times values prevail. This is because values are attached to means and not only to the
ends.14
Given these conditions it will be difficult if not impossible to argue that objective
facts are different from value dependent ones. The views of the critics seem not genuine.
Is there a field or discipline that is not composed of description of objects or events? Are
all descriptions or interpretations always similar in arriving at a conclusion? These
questions absolutely attract “no” as answers. For instance if I am given figure 4 to describe,
there are ways to give our description. One, it can be said that, figure 4 is an addition of
figure 1 in four places. Two, it can be said that figure 4 is an addition of figure 2 in two
places. It can also be said that figure 4 is the multiplication of figure two in two places.
Moreover, we can also posit that figure 4 is “taking a way figure 1 from figure 5 or adding
figure 3 to figure 1”. Having a look at the examples above, does our description affect our
conclusion, “figure 4” which stands to be our objective fact? No! In essence, even if it can
be supposed that values cannot be isolated from social enquiries, arguably, the values that
accompany the enquiries cannot be said to affect the objective conclusion.
How do we arrive at an objective conclusion? How do we affirm a process to meet
up with the objective conclusion? For the critics, assessment of evidence for one’s
objective conclusion seems not independent of values. It is evident that social scientists
assess their evidences and from these evidences they affirm the truth or falsity of a
conclusion to become objective. It is in this assessment that critics suppose that values are
imported. It is also supposed that the perspective of the social scientists and their widely
14
Nagel, Ernest “The Value Oriented Bias of Social Inquiry” P. 571
10. 9
accepted standards for assessing human behavior both enter social inquiry. It is supposed
that in a given hypothesis, errors are detected through the test performed on it. It is in the
result from this test that a social scientist is faced with the problem of what risk he is willing
to take with his decision to reject or accept a hypothesis based on what is more important
to him personally.15
Can we conclude that objectivity is impossible in social science given the claim by
the critics that no matter how social science dodges its value dependent nature? Should we
trust any data posited by social scientists? Or put more appropriately, to what extent is
social science judgement reliable if it can be concluded that their judgements are not value
independent?
Proponents of social science can be summed to mean that though values influence
the subject social science, this does not make social science subjective because this value-
influence does not negate the possibility of applying the techniques of science in the study
of the object of social analysis. To put more clearly on the objectivity of social science,
Alfred Marshal states
It is the business of [social science] as of almost every other
science, to collect facts, to arrange and interpret them, and to draw
inferences from them. Observation and description, definition and
classification are the preparatory activities. But what we desire to
reach thereby is knowledge of the interdependence of [social]
phenomena.16
15
Weber M, (1949) Methodology of the Social Sciences. Trans and edited by Edward A. Shik and Henry
A Finch. New York: The Free Press. P.1
16
Marshall, Alfred Principles of Economic by (1890) Rod Hay’s Archive for the History of Economic
Thought, McMaster University, Canada
http://www.marxist.org/refernce/subject/economics/marshall/index.htm. Accessed on 10/04/2019
11. 10
The next section of this essay looks into the nature of natural science and its
objective-judgment. This becomes essential in order to determine relevance and the
indispensability of value in giving an objective judgements.
4. Natural Science and Objectivity
The debates of fact –value distinction in social science necessitated that of natural
science. It brings about the question of the objectivity of science; is science really
objective? Can we suppose that science do not really engage in value decision as scientists
believe? Can we really conclude that there can be a scientific knowledge devoid of
scientists’ personal interest, value commitment, sentiment and standard? If science is value
laden, can it still be objective? How compatible is value judgement and objectivity in
science? Do scientists pay cognizance to the ethical consequence of their action before
observing them in research work? These are few among the numerous questions that
begged to be answered on fact/value distinction in science. In essence, the question on the
relationship of the making of value judgment in a typical sense to the methods and
procedures of science cannot be waived aside.
The value-free conception of science is based on two main theses. One, the claim
that science is not entitled to formulate value-judgments in which any non-cognitive values
are taken into account. This implies that any research which gives a value-judgement will
not amount to science. Science is always objective. Two, science does not provide goals,
but it is able to provide efficient means to a chosen goal. Through the provision of this
means, it is assumed to be objective.17
17
Weber, M. (1992). “Value-Judgments in Social sciences”. In: R. Boyd, Ph. Gasper, & J. D. Trout (Eds.),
The Philosophy of Science Cambridge MA: MIT Press. P. 719–731.
12. 11
Scientific objectivity is supposed to be the basis of the authority of science. It is a
characteristic of scientific claims, methods and results. It appears that these ideas, claims,
methods and results of science are not or should not be influenced by particular
perspectives, value commitments, or personal interest.18
However, it has been argued by
some critics that though the position held by proponents of science in the above debate is
right, nonetheless their arguments are untenable. Since scientific methods and procedures
intrinsically require value decisions, therefore, science makes value judgement.19
There are three major areas through which it can be shown that science is also value
oriented. These are, having science instead of anything else is a value making decision,
selection of research problems and scientists as value-human beings. Is science only what
there is? To argue that science is the only discipline that there is will be unreasonable.
However, the very act by the scientists to have what is called science and not any other
thing is an act of making value judgement. This act involves one’s decision in respect to
the established body of knowledge which fulfills scientist preconceived idea of what
science is, which other discipline do not or cannot fulfill. Therefore, the decision to have
science involves having a set idea of science which the proposed science must fulfill.20
Moreover, the attempt to select research problem for inquiry or investigation out of
other existing problems by the scientist also points out that scientists do make value
judgement. In essence, scientists only select what is of interest to them. In other words,
18
Scientific Objectivity, Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-objectivity/#Bib.
Accessed on 06/04/2019
19
Rudner, Richard. (1953) “The Scientist Qua Scientist makes Value Judgment” Chicago Journal of
Science, 20 (1) P. 2
20
Rudner, Richard. “The Scientist Qua Scientist makes Value Judgment” P. 3
13. 12
scientists choose problem that is appealing to them and of importance to their field.21
Further, one thing that cannot be taken from human beings is that we are value-made
beings. This means that in one way or another our decision despite a set rules or standard
cannot be independent of the contents of value; desires, hopes, feelings, therefore, no
matter how scientists claim to be objective and neutral, they can never be separated from
their research work. This is because scientists are human beings and it cannot be denied
that they have mass of predilections.22
These predilections unavoidable influence all his
activities including his scientific research. Arguably, scientific research is influenced by
the personality, sentiment, personal bias, ideals, goals and desires, standard of the
researcher.23
However, it can be argued that the suppositions are misplaced in science. This is
because the supposed claims are not part of the scientific methods and procedures. They
are only regarded as pre-scientific or extra scientific. They are not art of what can be called
science. Therefore they must be avoided in order not to mistake science for what it is not.
Nonetheless, Rudner Richard is of the view that the scientists’ submission is built on a
misunderstood processes of science.24
Contrary to what was pointed out by the empirically oriented philosophers and
scientists, arguably, value judgement is essentially involved in the procedures and methods
of science. The very notion of scientific methods and procedures of accepting or rejecting
hypotheses. In this process of accepting or rejecting hypothesis, scientists make ethical
21
Rudner, Richard. “The Scientist Qua Scientist makes Value Judgment” P. 4
22
Rudner, Richard. “The Scientist Qua Scientist makes Value Judgment” P. 5
23
Agnieszka, Lekka-Kowalik (2010) “Why Science cannot be Value-Free” Sci Eng Ethics 10 (10) P. 33–
41
24
Rudner, Richard. “The Scientist Qua Scientist makes Value Judgment” P. 5
14. 13
decision regarding which hypotheses should be accepted. However, this view can be
objected in the sense that the acceptability or rejection of a claim in science is not based on
any individual but on an established parameter as determinant of a valid claim or not.
Nonetheless, the objection may not be sufficient to save science from its dilemma of value.
This is because the very determinant parameter entails observation, formulation of
hypotheses, experimentation or testing of hypotheses, drawing of laws and arriving at a
conclusion. Value judgement comes into play in this case because all the entailment of this
parameter are based on ethical responsibility the scientists think they owe their discipline
and the society.25
Arguably, no hypotheses is very completely verified and since scientist must come
up with an hypothesis as the solution to the researched problem, there is then a need to
choose one hypothesis out of the several selected hypotheses for research. In this case, the
decision to make is left to the scientists either the evidence is sufficiently strong or that the
probability is sufficient for the hypothesis to be accepted. This acceptance is assumed to
be based on scientist’s discretion.26
This claim may not be true. This is because if
acceptance of research is based on a scientist’s discretion, how do we have similar results
from other scientist’s research? For instance, when researches are carried out, the results
we have, often, are the same regardless of the research predilection, beliefs, time and space.
If hypothesis is accepted at the discretion of a scientist, I suppose we ought to have a
different views or result across the globe.
25
Glass, B. (1993) “The Ethical Basis of Science”. In R. E. Bulger, E. Heitman, and S. J. Reiser (eds.) The
Ethical Dimensions of the Biological Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. P. 43–55.
26
Rudner, Richard. “The Scientist Qua Scientist makes Value Judgment” P. 5
15. 14
Contrariwise, the argument above may not be applicable to all sciences. For
instance, sciences like mathematics, physics and some others do not approve any
hypothesis without complete verification. In mathematics, solutions are arrived at solely
according to the outcome of workings done.
However, another way value judgement can be detected in science is the inductive
nature of science. The inductive nature of science shows that the evidence provided by
scientists through hypotheses and validating how strong it is, is a function of the importance
in the typical ethical sense of making a mistake in accepting or rejecting the hypothesis.
Arguably, no scientific hypothesis is ever confirmed beyond reasonable doubt, so some
probability of errors always remains. When a scientist accepts or rejects hypothesis, there
is always a chance that his/her decision is also a function of the importance in the typically
ethical senses of making a mistake in accepting or rejecting a hypothesis, therefore
balancing between the seriousness of two possible errors; erroneous acceptance and
erroneous rejection of hypothesis, against each other.27
Science requires high evidence on hypotheses whose acceptance or rejection may
have grave consequences than hypothesis whose acceptance or rejection may not have
grave consequence. The sureness of the acceptance of our hypothesis depends on how
serious a mistake would be. In this process, of accepting or rejecting hypotheses, ethical
judgement and contextual values enter the scientist core activity of accepting and rejecting
a hypothesis. Rudner states;
"Clearly the scientist as scientist does make value judgments. For,
since no scientific hypothesis is ever completely verified, in accepting a
27
Proctor, R. N. (1991). Value-Free science? Purity and Power in Modern Knowledge. Cambridge MA:
Harvard University Press.
16. 15
hypothesis the scientist must make the decision that the evidence is
sufficiently strong or that the probability is sufficiently high to war- rant the
acceptance of the hypothesis. Obviously our decision regarding the
evidence and respecting how strong is 'strong enough,' is going to be a
function of the importance, in the typically ethical sense, of making a
mistake in accepting or rejecting the hypothesis”.28
Further, for Rudner, methods and procedures of science show that every inference
is properly construable as statistical methods and procedures of science shows that every
inference is properly construable as statistical inference. Scientists in this process has to
make the decision that the evidence was strong or sufficient enough to warrant the
acceptance of hypothesis. The confidence attached to the evidence provided in a hypothesis
depends on what scientist gives credence to. How great a risk one is willing to take of being
wrong in accepting or rejecting the hypothesis will depend upon how seriously in the
ethical sense one views the consequences of making a mistake.29
However, even if it is argued by the scientists that it is erroneous to assume that
scientists are tasked to accept or reject hypotheses but that they are only responsible solely
to determine the degree of confirmation or the strength of the evidence which exists for
hypothesis, it can also be questioned that on what basis do they do this? Is this their act of
determining the degree of confirmation of strength of the evidence not a value decision, if
they determine the degree of confirmation? Moreover, is the decision made not based on a
pre-conceived standard or measure in the scientists’ mind? What difference can be said to
exist between determining the degree of confirmation and acceptance of hypothesis? If the
scientists can argue that they are saddled with the responsibility of confirmation and
28
Rudner, Richard. (1953) “The Scientist Qua Scientist makes Value Judgment” Chicago Journal of
Science, 20 (1) P.1
29
Levi, L (1984) “Must the Scientist make Value Judgment?” Chicago Journal of Philosophy of Science.
20 (1) P. 5
17. 16
strength of evidence, is it not to guide in accepting or rejecting hypothesis? More so, there
seems to be misconception of responsibility here; if scientists do not accept or reject
hypothesis, then who does? How do they come up with a chosen hypothesis out of several
proposed ones?
Rudner concludes that science makes value judgement. He shows this by examining
the ontological commitment debate between Quine and Carnap. Quine and Carnap’s
reveals the value that is embedded in language. Given the condition that the ontological
status of science itself is clearly understood in language and no formulation can be
independent of either language expression or interpretation, then science is not value
independent.30
Inferably from the on-going discussion there seems to no objective judgement in
science. It appears that science also runs into the same problem as social science on value
and objectivity.
5. No Discipline makes Objective Judgement but are Objective in Discovering Facts
Is social science really value independent? From the argument posited by the
proponents of social science, it can be supposed social science do make value judgment,
since value commitments do enter the decision of a social scientist on whether to accept or
reject an hypothesis. However, the proponents claim this does not affect the objectivity of
social science as social scientist are trained professionals. Even if the claim of the social
scientist is true, and it is also true that our likes, aversions hopes and fears cannot wholly
be removed from social scientist as a human being who is full of values then to what extent
30
Rudner, Richard. “The Scientist Qua Scientist makes Value Judgment” P. 5
18. 17
can our emotional attachment influence our conclusion of social inquiry in order to have
an objective conclusion?
For the scientist, from the critics’ claim, it is evident that there seems to be problem
with the validity of having a science that makes objective judgement. How possible will it
then be for science to be full of variables of value decision or judgment by different
scientists? Even if for the purpose of argument, it is agreed that scientific research are not
influenced by personal values, one cannot escape from the fact that scientific investigation
is influenced by personal values.
How do we differentiate an objective “judgment” statement from an objective
statement or a subjective statement? An objective “judgment” statement is supposed to be
such that is devoid of any value input while objective statements will be statements about
facts. However, arguably we cannot have a judgment that is devoid of value even if they
are abstracted from an established objective standard. In other words, no judgement is
objective.
Investigations in science are said to require objectivity in their methodology,
techniques and results but such objectivity are said to be impossible in social science
because of the influence of value in their subject matter. However, it is clear from the
previous sections that what science does is discovering and stating of facts. Their discovery
of facts is achieved through researches, observations and experiments. It is through these
researches, observations and experiments that they generate laws. These laws are then used
to explain events concurrently. For instance, the statement on the law of gravity; “anything
that goes up will surely come down” and others like “water boils at 1000
C”, “an external
force will be in motion or at a state of rest until an external force is acted against it” and
19. 18
many others are facts that are discovered by science. The truth of those facts are not
determined by science but are discovered by them. In essence, it is erroneous for science
to lay claim of objectivity based on the facts discovered by them. The subjectivity of
science is discovered through their explanations of those discoveries. The subjectivity of
science necessitates the reason why science makes every of their statement about fact as
hypothetical because they believe that no experimentation is conclusive, it can later turn
out to be false.
In a similar vein, social science also discovers and states facts. They also observe
and generate laws to explain the facts discovered. For instance, in economics, there is law
of demand which states that “the higher the price of a product, the lower the quantity
demanded, vice versa”. In sociology, there have been factual statements of what a
particular culture does. The truth of those facts are not dependent on social science. Their
discoveries too are also objective because they are facts.
Neither science nor social science makes an objective judgement. Descriptions of
explanations about facts to make judgments are value-laden. For instance, scientists argue
that “smoking is not good for the body because it kills” however, there has been no good
data or sufficient reason to show that smoking kills people. We have seen cases of addicted
smokers who live well longer than non-smoker. Anthropologists in their study of values
and norms of different cultures have supposed some implausible conclusions which later
turn out to be false. For instance, European anthropologists have erroneously concluded
that Africans lack logical thought. These two examples show that claims that either science
or social science make on facts discovered are always dependent on their established
standard what a thing should be or should not be based on their observations.
20. 19
Above all, it will be implausible to conclude that there is no objectivity in social
science and science given their methods of researches. However, it will be erroneous at the
same times to refer the judgments or explanations given by either social science or science
as objectives because there is none. What are objective in either social science or science
are the facts discovered. Notably, given the nature of value in relation to judgments or
explanations, both science and social science make no objective judgment but value laden.
6. Conclusion
The essay has looked into the arguments on the nature of value judgment made by
both science and social science. The essay discovered that neither both make objective
judgment. What they lay claim to as objective are just facts they discover. The essay argue
that no amount of arguments can be sufficient by either both field that can nullify the
influence of value in the judgment they make on the facts they discover.
21. 20
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