IPv6 is the most recent version of the Internet Protocol (IP), and was developed by IETF to overcome the inevitable exhaustion of IPv4 addresses. In order to simplify the transition towards IPv6, the protocol iterated very little on how IPv4 operates other than offering more address space. This inadvertently produced the exact opposite of the intended effect: with no compelling new features for anyone outside of network engineering, IPv6 deployment has been hampered for decades, as developers find increasingly creative ways of efficiently using IPv4 address space rather than bearing the cost of transition. In this talk, Fastly Network Engineer João Taveira discusses these protocol design failures and instead explain how Fastly re-architected its infrastructure around IPv6. By addressing IPv6 in a clean-slate manner, Fastly avoided perpetuating many of the mistakes of IPv4, and the resulting network architecture has the potential to significantly affect the performance, resilience, and economics of content delivery.

1. Addressing IPv6
@jta joão taveira araújo

2. me ~ last year
“…no one cares about IPv6…”

3. “…IPv6 is now in limited availability…”
me ~ this year

5. 10.0.0.1

6. 10.0.0.1
172.16.0.1

7. an IP address is who you are on the network

8. 10.0.0.1
172.16.0.110.0.0.0/8

9. 10.0.0.1
172.16.0.1
172.16.0.0/16
10.0.0.0/810.0.0.0/8

10. an IP address is you are on the network{ }
who
where

11. 19 45678912304567891230897

12. IPng

13. “…to scale Internet addressing to
accommodate the millions of designers
needed to fix the MOSAIC logo…”

14. 199
IPng
3456
IPv6

15. IPng
- lots of good ideas
- needed something deployable
- implemented none of them

16. IPng
- lots of good ideas
- needed something deployable
- implemented none of them

17. IPng
- lots of good ideas
- needed something deployable
- implemented none of them

18. IPng 32 bits 128 bits

19. 199
NAT
3
CIDR

20. 10.0.0.1
10.0.0.1
193.0.1.1

21. me ~ last year
“…no one cares about IPv6…”

22. network engineers

23. HTTP
(1996, 2015)

24. (1995, 1997, 1998, 2014)

26. companies where
addressing sucks

27. datacenters

28. carriers

29. CDN

30. ƒ
CDN

31. ƒ-1

32. SJC
CDN addressing 101
LAXclients
Points of Presence

33. SJC
Unicast model
LAX
SJC
LAX
Prefix announcements
~1998

34. SJC
Unicast model
LAX
SJC
LAX
DNS
offsetLAX offsetSJC
IP address
~1998

35. SJC
Unicast model
LAX
SJC
LAX
DNS
offsetLAX offsetSJC
~1998

36. SJC
Unicast model
LAX
SJC
LAX
DNS
offsetLAX offsetSJC
~1998

37. LAX
SJC
SJC
LAX
DNS
offsetLAX
LAX
Unicast blackhole

38. SJC
SJC
LAX
SJC
Unicast DDoS
LAX

39. SJC
Anycast model
LAX
DNS
Same prefix
offset
Anycast IP address
~2006

40. SJC
LAX
DNS
offset
Anycast model ~2006

41. SJC
LAX
DNS
offset
Anycast model ~2006

42. SJC
LAX
DNS
offset
Anycast model ~2006

43. SYD
Anycast model
uses limited address space

44. SYD
Anycast model
uses limited address space
gracefully handles DDoS

45. SYD
Anycast model
uses limited address space
gracefully handles DDoS
impossible to fully control

46. 2011 unicast2014 unicast + anycast2015 backing anycast

47. SYD
anycast prefix
SYD“unicast” prefix
(subnetted from anycast prefix)
Backing anycast ~2015

48. SYD
SYD
DNS
offsetSYD
Backing anycast ~2015

49. SYD
Backing anycast ~2015
SYD
DNS
offsetSYD

50. SYD
DNS
offsetSYD
Backing anycast ~2015

51. SYD
DNS
offsetSYD
Backing anycast ~2015

52. FRA
FRA
control of unicast model
Backing anycast ~2015

53. FRA
FRA
control of unicast model
gracefully handles DDoS
Backing anycast ~2015

54. FRA
FRA
control of unicast model
gracefully handles DDoS
requires investment
Backing anycast ~2015

55. FRA
FRA
control of unicast model
gracefully handles DDoS
requires investment
still not enough control
Backing anycast ~2015

56. ❤
FRA
Service providers
💶💶💶💶

57. FRA
FRA
offsetFRA
Service providers

58. FRA
FRA
FRA
offsetFRA
Lousy providers

59. FRA
FRA
FRA
offsetFRA
Lousy providers

60. Lousy providers

61. Lousy providers

62. FRA
FRA
FRA
offsetFRA
Lousy providers

63. Per-provider addressing 2016

64. Per-provider addressing 2016

65. FRA
FRA
FRA
FRA
FRA
FRA
FRA
FRA
FRA
Per-provider addressing 2016
SYD
SYD
SYD
SYD
SYD
LAX
LAX
LAX
LAX
LAX
ASIA
ASIA
ASIA
ASIA
ASIA
SJC
SJC
SJC
SJC
SJC

66. FRA
FRA
Per-provider addressing 2016
offsetFRA FRA
FRA
FRA
FRA

67. FRA
Per-provider addressing 2016
SYD
LAX
ASIA
SJC
www.example.com
www.example.com
www.example.com
www.example.com
www.example.comSJC
SJC
SJC
SJC

68. Per-provider addressing 2016
64 bit service identifier

69. Per-provider addressing 2016

70. FRA
Per-provider addressing 2016
deployed for IPv6

71. FRA
Per-provider addressing 2016
deployed for IPv6
graceful fallback

72. FRA
Per-provider addressing 2016
deployed for IPv6
graceful fallback
complete control of ingress path

73. FRA
Per-provider addressing 2016
deployed for IPv6
graceful fallback
complete control of ingress path
really really hard to implement

74. FRA
FRA
FRA
Per-provider origin pull 2016

75. FRA
Per-provider origin pull 2016
FRA
FRA
FRA
FRA

76. Questions
- limited availability
- configuration complexity
- limit impact on global routing table
- higher order dimensionality

77. Questions
- limited availability
- configuration complexity
- limit impact on global routing table
- higher order dimensionality

78. Questions
- limited availability
- configuration complexity
- limit impact on global routing table
- higher order dimensionality

79. Questions
- limited availability
- configuration complexity
- limit impact on global routing table
- higher order dimensionality

80. Questions

81. Questions
why do you not implement X like Y?

82. Questions
because Y did a terrible job of it.

83. Questions
IPng

84. Questions

85. Questions

86. Questions
why is it taking you so long to get here?

87. Questions

88. Questions

89. Questions

90. end