2. Table of Content
• Multi-Generational Cellular and Families of Video Codecs
Standards.
• International Approaches
• Determining What Should Swim in the Pool: Landscaping and/or
SDO Patent Disclosures and/or Normative Standard /
Conformance Implementation
• Gatekeeping: SEP Essentiality Mechanisms
3. Multi-Generational Cellular and Families of
Video Codecs Standards
• Cellular Standards: GPRS, EDGE, HSPA / HSPA+, LTE /LTE-A/LTE-A Pro, and 5G NR
• IoTs Standards: EC-GSM-IoT, NB-IoT, and LTE-M
• Video Standards: ITU H.261, ITU H.262 (MPEG-2), ITU H.263 (VCEG), ITU H.264
(MPEG-4 AVC), ITU H.265 (HEVC), and ITU H.266 (VVC)
Open Source and proprietary variants:
o VP8, VP9 and AV1 (Video)
o ORAN (Cellular), and
o LoRA, Sigfox, and Ingenu (LPWA IoTs proprietary)
4. Challenges to Patent Platforms
1. Push to implement IoTs, 5G NR and VVC:
o 5G RAN, 5G NR & other IoTs technologies enabler of Industrial 4.0 ecosystems
o Enhanced compression of new video codecs driven by perceived future network
bandwidth limitations (e.g., Cisco now claims by 2022 82% of all consumer
internet traffic related to video content)
2. Tsunami of potential SEPs:
o Patents / applications directed to previous / next generation or ancestor / decent
SEPs or patents directed to failed SDO work items
o Patents / applications directed to open source / proprietary alternatives
o Patents resulting from Chinese Patent Subsidies
o Universal understanding of Game Theory application to Pools (i.e., div. / cont.
practice - file as many as possible to win the game)
5. Challenges to Patent Platforms . . .
3. Complex Blocking, Complementary and/or Competing Analysis
4. New Challenges- Backwards compatibility:
o Essentiality to which standard?
VoiceAge EVS LLC v. HMD (19-cv-01945, Dist. Del. 2019)
o Scope of Field of Use / Covenant no to sue limited?
Sony v. EVS Codec Technologies, LLC, (18-cv-09518, S.D.N.Y. 2019)
5. New breed of SEP Licensor and Licensees
• Chinese SEP holders and NPEs (born of PRC Patent Subsidies)
• SMEs as SEP Licensees
7. Chinese Approach
February 2016 “Guidelines on Anti-Monopoly Enforcement against Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights,” (7Th
Draft) State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC)
o Article § 28(1) - Required disclosure of detailed patent information in IPR declaration statements while
participating in standards bodies (prior to freezing the standard) else waive rights to claim patents as SEPs in
subsequent licensing assertions.
o Article § 28(7) - Authorized the State Council to determine if a pool affects market power by examining if the
pool “. . . contain[ed] alternative technology, contained unimportant or invalid patents . . .”
October 2020 State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) published guidelines reflecting a significant
softening by Chinese regulators with respect to patent pools, signaling an endorsement with caveats: “[P]atent
pools can generally save costs, increase efficiencies and facilitate competition . . Article § 28(7)
Forthcoming 2021 Draft superseding December 2013 Interim Provisions on the Administration of National
Standards Involving Patents by SAIC and SIP0 (Now CNIPA). – resolving Article § 28(1) ?
8. q Hantei” (Advisory Opinion) for Essentiality Check
q JPO Guide to Licensing Negotiations Involving Standard Essential Patents
Japanese Approach
9. European Approach
q November 2017 -EU Commission COM(2017) 712 final, 29
q July 5, 2018 - Commission establishes ”Group of Experts” on Licensing and Valuation of Standard
Essential Patents
q 2019 – 2021 EU Joint Research Centre Studies:
1. The Relationship Between Open-Source Software and Standard Setting (2019);
2. Making the Rules: The Governance of Standard Development Organizations and their Policies on
Intellectual Property Rights (2019)
3. Landscape study of potentially essential patents disclosed to ETSI (2020);
4. Pilot study for essentiality assessment of Standard Essential Patents (2020).
q December 2020 to present – DG GROW Webinars with SEP stakeholders
q January 24, 2021 Group of experts on licensing and valuation of Standard Essential Patents (“SEPs Expert
Group”)- Group of Experts on Licensing and Valuation of Standard Essential Patents ‘SEPs Expert Group
10. June 2017 - U.S. DOJ & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for Licensing Intellectual Property (“2017 Report”)
United States Approach
July 2020 DOJ Avanci BRL - Refers back to 2002 3G Patent Platform Partnership BRL
September 2020 DOJ IEEE BRL
21. SEP Essentiality Mechanisms: Four Competencies
(1). Independence
“independent to each of the licensors”
See. MPEG LA, L.L.C. v. Alcatel Lucent, et al., No. 3317-VCL (Delaware Chancery Court June 1, 2009)
(2). Subject Matter Technical Competency
“Strong academics, Masters in EE + practical engineering experience in field of technology directly related standard (former
delegate, e.g., Dr. Kenneth Rubenstein, Esq. + Dr. Cliff Reader (Former Head of Video Group MPEG)
See. David Cooper, “Evaluating Standards Essential Patents In Mobile Cellular” les Nouvelles, Vol. 4, December 2019.
(3). Standards Interpretation Competency
“Claim charts must map to coherent section of the normative section of a technical standard”
See. Wilson, Kelce, “Designing a Standard Essential Patent (SEP) Program,” les Nouvelles, Vol. LIII No. 3, September 2018
(4). Patent Claim Competency
Literal versus application of Doctrine of Equivalence)
See. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 723-735 (2002).