CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Prominent Iranian Reformists’ mobilization of votes for more centrist candidates in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections on February 26 could help centrist politicians win the additional seats they need in both bodies to sideline their hardliner opponents. Many reformist candidates had sought to run in both elections until the Guardian Council, or the body charged with vetting electoral candidates, disproportionally disqualified them. 2. U.S. airstrikes targeted an Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) training camp near Sabratha in northwestern Libya. The strikes killed over 40 militants, including a Tunisian ISIS operative linked to the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis. Targeted strikes may temporarily disrupt ISIS’s ability to plan and launch spectacular attacks in the region, but the group maintains an experienced leadership cell in Libya and will be able to regenerate capabilities. 3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Ali Mohsen, the former commander of Yemen’s powerful First Armored Division, is a powerbroker whose support of Hadi requires contesting the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen. Ali Mohsen’s appointment probably indicates the coalition will prioritize actions to further isolate the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen and to apply pressure directly on the capital, Sana’a.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
February 23, 2016

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
2
1
3
1. Prominent Reformists’ mobilization of votes for more centrist candidates in the Assembly of Experts and
parliamentary elections on February 26 could help centrist politicians win the additional seats they need in
both bodies to sideline their hardliner opponents.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeting an ISIS training camp near Sabratha in northwestern Libya and killing more than 40
militants, including a Tunisian ISIS operative linked to the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis, may
disrupt ISIS attacks in the short term, but ISIS will probably regenerate the capability.
3. Yemeni President Hadi appointment of General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as deputy commander of Yemen’s
Armed Forces may indicate the coalition is going to prioritize the fight in northern Yemen.
2

3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda’s affiliates and network remains robust in face of the challenge from the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and AQIM-linked groups are increasing the operational tempo of attacks against UN
peacekeeping forces in Mali. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to expand its control in Yemen. Further, a
Yemeni media group released a video accusing a Yemeni ISIS group of staging a video and of killing Yemeni civilians, not al
Houthi members. Al Shabaab has carried out a series of deadly attacks against peacekeeping forces in Somalia, and Jabhat al
Nusra is positioned to strengthen in Syria.
Outlook: Al Qaeda-linked groups will continue to conduct their local and regional military campaigns, building strength and
local resilience.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda Associates
The U.S. targeted multiple Haqqani network hideouts in Pakistan’s tribal belt. A U.S. drone strike killed at least three militants in
Pakistan’s restive Kurram Agency area on 22 February, according to the Long War Journal. The U.S. has previously criticized
Pakistan’s inaction in targeting the Haqqani network.
Outlook: Pakistani security forces have increased operations in various parts of the country, to counter the increasing militant
attacks.
3
AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Both sides played on the Saudi-led coalition’s fears of Iranian interference in Yemen. President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi
mentioned his government’s arrest and detainment of Hezbollah and IRGC members operating in Yemen and claimed that
Hassan Nasrallah had confirmed Hezbollah’s presence in Sa’ada in a letter. Former president Ali Abdullah Saleh downplayed
such provocative interference, but expressed hope that Iran would offer non-military support. Saleh likely aims to bolster his
bargaining position with an implicit threat to invite more direct Iranian intervention.
Outlook: Rhetoric around Iran and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance remains unlikely to change the coalition’s calculus.
Security
Coalition advances in Nihm, Sana’a, and al Misrakh, Taiz, remain contested. Hadi appointed General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, a
powerful ally with influence among Yemen’s northern tribes, to deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Ali Mohsen was
the commander of the First Armored Division and defected from Saleh’s regime in March 2011. Hadi is likely seeking to bolster
support among northern tribes.
Outlook: The coalition will probably further prioritize isolating the al Houthi-Saleh forces in north-central Yemen and may seek
to pressure their control of Sana’a directly.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP continues to exercise pragmatism, prioritizing freedom of movement over territorial control. Militants withdrew from
Ahwar, Abyan, in exchange for free passage through the city. AQAP also continues to emphasize governance, pressuring
Hadramawt University to resume classes in al Mukalla. AQAP may also be behind a video claiming recent propaganda from
ISIS in Yemen was staged, in what may be a new effort to shape the media narrative. ISIS continued its series of attacks in
Aden. An ISIS suicide bomber struck a pro-Hadi military camp, killing more than a dozen and wounding over 60.
Outlook: AQAP will continue to prioritize stability over territorial expansion, while seeking to counter ISIS advances.
4
YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
5
YEMENGULF OF ADEN
2
1
5
4
3
1) 20 FEB: AQAP
ceded control of
Ahwar, Abyan for free
passage through the
city.
2) 17 FEB: ISIS
Wilayat Aden-Abyan
launched a SVEST
attack against a pro-
Hadi military camp in
Aden.
3) 22 FEB: Gunmen
assassinated Abyan
Axis commander in
Aden.
4) 16 FEB: Reported
U.S. airstrikes struck
AQAP targets in al
Hawta, Lahij.
5) 20 FEB: Reported
U.S. airstrike struck
an AQAP vehicle near
al Aqla, Shabwah.

6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud spoke at the 6th Annual High Level Partnership Forum (HLPF) on Somalia in
Istanbul. He urged the repeal of the 1992 United Nations (UN) arms embargo on Somalia, claiming that obsolete weaponry and
vehicles are hurting Somalia’s ability to combat threats. The UN-imposed arms embargo currently allows the Somali Federal
Government (SFG) to import certain arms, although requests require approval by the UN Sanctions Committee.
Outlook: The SFG will likely continue to seek the removal of the arms embargo in order to better equip its security forces and
possibly to remove reliance on African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces for more advanced capabilities.
Security
Ugandan AMISOM officials announced the deaths of two al Shabaab commanders and the capture of a third near Marka,
Lower Shabelle region. Additionally, Kenyan Defense forces (KDF) officials claimed to have killed an al Shabaab bomb maker in
Gedo region. Somali National Army (SNA) forces also conducted security sweeps in the Bay region’s Dinsor district, likely in an
effort to interdict al Shabaab members heading toward Lower Shabelle region.
Outlook: Security officials will probably continue to announce tactical successes against al Shabaab in the wake of high-profile
and high-casualty al Shabaab attacks against AMISOM forces.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab increased its activities in Lower Shabelle region. It attempted a coordinated attack against security forces in Afgoi,
Lower Shabelle region. Additionally, militants disrupted AMISOM’s Lower Shabelle lines of communication (LOCs) by
ambushing multiple convoys. The group also released a video of the January 15 attack on the Kenyan AMISOM contingent’s
base in el Adde, Gedo region, threatening further attacks against Kenyan interests.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will most likely continue disruptive attacks against AMISOM and SNA convoys.
6
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
7
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
4
3
1
2
1) 18 FEB: Kenyan
police arrested a
college student
attempting to join ISIS
in Libya in Nairobi,
Kenya.
2) 19 FEB: Ugandan
AMISOM troops
captured one and
killed two al Shabaab
commanders in Marka,
Lower Shabelle region.
3) 22 FEB: Al Shabaab
clashed with civilians
at unspecified rural
villages in the Mudug
region.
4) 16 FEB: Al Shabaab
militants attacked
several SNA
checkpoint near Afgoi,
Lower Shabelle region.

8. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) did not reach a verdict on the proposed cabinet for the Government of National
Accord (GNA). The HoR postponed the vote until next week.
Outlook: Conflicting political interests will continue to delay the formation of the GNA.
Security
The LNA claimed to liberate Ajdabiya from the Ajdabiya Revolutionary Shura Council. It is also conducting a city-wide offensive
against Ansar al Sharia, ISIS Wilayat Barqa, and other Salafi-jihadi groups in Benghazi, where it has successfully cut several
militant supply lines. The LNA is preparing a brigade for the liberation of Sirte, composed of LNA officers and refugees from
Sirte. The Mujahideen Shura Council of Derna continues to seize ground from ISIS Wilayat Barqa militants. The LNA is now
fighting against ISIS Wilayat Barqa militants in Derna as well. While the MSCD and the LNA are not officially cooperating, the
LNA has provided helicopter gunships to support MSCD fighters on at least one occasion.
Outlook: The LNA will continue to seize territory in Benghazi and prepare for future offensive operations to liberate Sirte.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
U.S. F-15Es bombed an ISIS training camp outside of Sabratha in northwestern Libya. The strikes targeted a Tunisian ISIS
militant who organized the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis. Reports suggest ISIS militants were training for
additional attacks in Tunisia. Meanwhile, ISIS fighters mobilized westward from Sirte toward Misratan militia positions, and
Misratan aircraft bombed an ISIS position on the outskirts of Sirte. ISIS resumed attacks on oil infrastructure in central Libya.
Outlook: ISIS will continue to generate regional threats from its safe haven in Libya, despite leadership attrition. ISIS will
resume its attacks on Libyan oil infrastructure as it contests Misratan forces’ ground lines of communication (GLOCs). Misratan
forces may attempt to roll back ISIS’s gains west of Sirte.
8
LIBYAWEST AFRICA

9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
9
LIBYAWEST AFRICA
1)19 FEB: U.S. F-15Es
bombed ISIS camp.
2)21 FEB: ISIS Wilayat
Barqa militants
mobilized westward.
3)21 FEB: LNA forces
claimed to have
liberated Ajdabiya.
4)20-FEB: LNA forces
conducted offensive
operations in
Benghazi.
5)18 FEB: Suspected
ISIS Wilayat Tarablus
militants attacked the
Fida oil field.
6) 21 FEB: Wounded
ISIS militants from
Benghazi and
Ajdabiya arrived in
Sirte by boat.
1
2
3
4
5
6

10. ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
AQIM released a tribute to the life of shari’a committee leader Abu al Hassan Rashid al Bulaydi, written by Bulaydi’s professed
disciple Abu Qatadah al Tayib al Wahrani. Algerian security forces killed Bulaydi in a combing operation in Tizi Ouzou, northern
Algeria, on December 25, 2015. Prolonged devotion to Bulaydi is an important indication that the group has maintained
cohesion following a series of AQIM defections to ISIS in September 2015, and that it will continue pursuing expansion in
Algeria and Mali, where a series of complex attacks have been carried out in recent weeks.
Outlook: AQIM and its affiliates will continue to oppose Western influence by recruiting and conducting attacks in Africa.
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a remained silent this week as Tunisian security forces actively search for suspected terrorists. Counterterrorism
forces killed two suspected terrorists in the mountains between Kasserine and Sidi Bouzid provinces, a common hideout for
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a militants. Tunisian authorities did not specify the victims’ terrorist affiliations.
Outlook: Uqba Ibn Nafa’a will stay in hiding while Tunisian forces sustain efforts against suspected militants.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
Attacks on local and international security forces in northern Mali continued this week. AQIM-linked militants were likely
responsible for reported attacks on UN convoys in Kidal Region, northeastern Mali and in Timbuktu region, northern Mali.
Former members of the Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA), a coalition of ex-rebel groups participating in the peace
process, attacked a Malian army checkpoint near the Malian-Nigerien border in northeastern Mali.
Outlook: AQIM-linked groups will continue to target local and international security forces to expand its area of operations and
disrupt the implementation of the Malian peace deal.
10
MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
11
MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
2
3
1 4
1) 18 FEB: ISIS-linked
Jund al Khalifa
militants killed three
Algerian soldiers at
Jebel Shakshut,
Bouira province.
2) 19 FEB: U.S.
airstrikes killed
Tunisian militant
Noureddine
Chouchane.
3) 21 FEB: Algerian
forces destroyed two
terrorist bunkers in
Sidi Bel Abbes,
Tlemcen province.
4) 22 FEB: Tunisian
forces killed two
terrorists near Jebel
Mghilla, between
Kasserine and Sidi
Bouzid provinces.

12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
12
SAHELWEST AFRICA
2
3
14
1) 17 FEB: Gunmen
ambushed a UN
vehicle near Anefis,
Kidal Region,
northeastern Mali.
2) 19 FEB: Gunmen
attacked a UN convoy
near Gossi, Timbuktu
region, northern
Mali.
3) 19 FEB: Former
members of the CMA
attacked a Malian
army checkpoint in
Gao region,
northeastern Mali.
4) 22 FEB: French
troops clashed with
suspected Islamist
militants in Timbuktu
region, northern
Mali.

13. ASSESSMENT:
Domestic Politics
Centrist politician Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and prominent Reformists, including Mohammad Reza Aref, signaled
a change in tactics ahead of the February 26 elections for the Parliament and the Assembly of Experts, the body tasked with
selecting the supreme leader. Rafsanjani and the Reformists moved from publicly criticizing the disproportionate disqualification
of Reformists to mobilizing Reformist votes for more centrist candidates. Aref also announced that Reformists are releasing a
joint list of endorsed candidates with moderates. Rafsanjani and others initially censured the disqualification of Reformists
candidates earlier in the vetting process.
Outlook: Centrist politicians are likely to benefit from Reformist support by gaining additional seats in Parliament and
marginalizing hardliners.
Military and Security
IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari praised the coordination between the IRGC, the Ministry of Intelligence
and Security (MOIS), and the Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) during the 1999 student protests and the 2009 Green Movement.
His remarks reflect the regime’s renewed fear of and preparation for protests during the February 26 elections. Rhetoric from
security officials has similarly indicated renewed preparations. Deputy Interior Minister for Security and Law Enforcement Affairs
Hossein Zolfaqari announced that the IRGC, the LEF, and MOIS have “stepped up border surveillance and security.”
Outlook: Protests in this election cycle are unlikely due to the steps the regime has taken to prevent the participation of
controversial Reformist candidates and to heighten coordinated security measures between the IRGC and the LEF.
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IRAN

14. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
14
FEB 16: The Guardian Council, the electoral vetting body, announced the finalized list of approved parliamentary candidates. It
confirmed 6,229 candidates from the original pool of 12,123.
FEB 16: IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari stressed the importance of continued coordination between
the IRGC, the Law Enforcement Forces, and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) ahead of the February 26
elections.
FEB 17: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei defended the Guardian Council’s vetting of candidates and condemned
domestic figures who “agree with the enemy” regarding the Guardian Council’s validity.
FEB 18: Basij Organization forces began military exercises in the western province of Lorestan. The Basij is a paramilitary
organization tasked with defending the regime against domestic threats.
FEB 18: The Principlist Coalition released its final nationwide list of endorsed parliamentary candidates.
FEB 19: Several Friday Prayer leaders reiterated claims that the West is interfering in the elections by pushing people to vote
for the candidates it wants.
FEB 20: Prominent centrist politician Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani urged supporters and disqualified Reformist
candidates to back centrist candidates.
FEB 21: Prominent Reformist Mohammad Reza Aref urged Iranians to participate in the elections, likely encouraging votes for
more centrist candidates.
FEB 21: Deputy Oil Minister Rokneddin Javadi repeated his previous call to boost oil production.
FEB 22: IRGC Ground Forces Deputy Commander Brig. Gen. Abdollah Eraghi announced the formation of a new helicopter
unit under the IRGC Ground Forces.
16 - 22 FEB 2016

15. ACRONYMS
15
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

16. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
16