CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that the nuclear deal will not change Iran’s policy towards the United States. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approved a resolution endorsing the nuclear agreement on July 20. Shortly before the UNSC vote, IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari said that Iran will never accept provisions in the resolution regarding Iran’s “armament capabilities.” 2. Yemen’s exiled government may be attempting to re-establish a foothold in the country, which would serve to counter the al Houthi-run government in Sana’a. Yemeni government officials began returning to Aden after fighters retook the city under “Operation Golden Arrow,” backed by the Saudi Arabian-led coalition. 3. AQIM may be looking to reemerge in the North African region after a period of lessened activity. Militants carried out the group's deadliest attack in over a year in Algeria, killing nine soldiers. AQIM may also be seeking to increase its activity in light of the recent rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham’s popularity in the region.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
July 22, 2015

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
2
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1. The UN Security Council approved a resolution endorsing the Iranian nuclear agreement on July
20. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said the deal would not change Iran’s policy
toward the U.S.
2. Yemen’s exiled government may be attempting to re-establish a foothold in the country. Officials
began returning to Aden after fighters retook the city under “Operation Golden Arrow,” backed by
the Saudi Arabian-led coalition.
3. AQIM may be looking to reassert itself in the North African region. It carried out its deadliest attack
in over a year in Algeria, killing nine Algerian soldiers.
2

3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
The Pentagon confirmed the death of Muhsen al Fadhli, a senior al Qaeda operative with a distinguished resume, in a July 8
airstrike in Syria. Fadhli was serving as the leader of the so-called “Khorasan group,” a cell of al Qaeda veterans that worked
alongside al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, providing strategic guidance. Fadhli had fought in Chechnya and
Afghanistan, ran al Qaeda’s Iran-based network in 2011, and traveled to Syria in 2013. Though Fadhli’s death is significant,
removing senior al Qaeda leaders from the battlefield has not degraded the leadership long term.
The al Qaeda network continues to remain cohesive despite persistent rumors of defections to the Islamic State in Iraq and al
Sham (ISIS).
Outlook: Muhsen al Fadhli’s death in Syria is unlikely to affect al Qaeda operations overall. The strategy of degrading al Qaeda
leadership has been ineffective in the long term.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) emir Mullah Fazlullah released a statement on the occasion of Eid al Fitr, promoting the unity of
his group and threatening to attack Pakistani soldiers and political groups. This statement comes at a time when the Pakistani
military’s Operation Zarb-e-Azb has destroyed several of the TTP’s strongholds in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA). The group appears to be splintered and this message from Fazlullah may be seen as an attempt to raise the morale of
his fighters.
Pakistani military has begun to phase out their anti-militancy operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Asim
Bajwa, Director General of the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) announced the completion of Operation Khyber, an
offshoot of Operation Zarb-e-Azb in Khyber Agency. Operation Zarb-e-Azb, the offensive against militancy in North Waziristan is
now in its final phase.
Outlook: Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) may increase its attacks against Pakistani security forces, following the message
from Mullah Fazlullah.
3
AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government may be seeking to establish itself in the southern port city of Aden following
the city’s liberation from al Houthi militants. Members of Hadi’s government arrived in Aden on July 17 with a stated role to
ensure security and stability within the city as well as the revival of state institutions within Aden. There are rumors that Hadi will
return to Aden. Hadi appointed Nayef al Bakri, the head of the Resistance Council in Aden, as governor on July 20.
Outlook: It is possible that Hadi will encounter resistance to his return from hardline members of southern resistance forces
who seek an independent southern Yemeni state.
Security
The momentum of the conflict in Yemen appears to be shifting in favor of local anti-al Houthi popular resistance groups.
Southern popular resistance groups, with the assistance of Saudi Arabian-led Operation Golden Arrow, took control of Aden city
from al Houthi militants on July 19. Additionally, popular resistance fighters have advanced toward Taiz International Airport on
July 15 as well as the Hawd al Ashraf area of Taiz city July 16.
Outlook: It is likely that Operation Golden Arrow forces will seek to liberate the city of Taiz from al Houthi forces. In response,
members of the al Houthi movement may begin to withdraw toward northern Yemen.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
Both ISIS and AQAP appear to be taking advantage of the successes of Operation Golden Arrow to carry out operations
against a weakened al Houthi movement. ISIS Wilayat Aden claimed credit via Twitter for a July 18 raid that captured and killed
a number of al Houthi snipers in the Crater district of Aden. Additionally, AQAP claimed responsibility for taking control of the
headquarters of the 119th Mechanized Brigade in Shabwah governorate on July 18.
Outlook: AQAP will likely seek to establish itself as a superior fighting force within Yemen as it continues to fight alongside
popular resistance groups. ISIS in Yemen will likely seek to maintain its relevancy by engaging in minor conflict with the al
Houthi movement.
4
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: YEMENGULF OF ADEN
5
1
3
2
4
1) 20 JUL: ISIS
Wilayat Sana’a
detonated a VBIED in
al Jiraf, Sana’a.
2) 19 JUL: Operation
Golden Arrow forces
retook al Tawahi
district, liberating
Aden city from the al
Houthis.
3) 18 JUL: AQAP
fighters took control
of the camp of the
119th Infantry
Brigade in Shabwah.
4) 16 JUL: Local
popular resistance
groups advanced
upon the Hawd al
Ashraf region of Taiz
City.

6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Somalia’s Interim Jubba Administration and Puntland semiautonomous region may soon cooperate with the Somali Federal
Government’s federalization process. The three administrations reportedly reconciled during talks held in Garowe, Puntland,
where the states signed on to Somalia’s Provisional Constitution. Somali President Omar Abdirashid announced during the
talks that the Galmudug Interim Administration border would now reflect the current Puntland border, which reduces the size of
territory under the newly formed state, but was a key issue preventing Puntland from participating in the federalization process.
Outlook: Jubbaland and Puntland’s renewed ties with the Somali Federal Government are a positive development in the
Somali federalization process, but it is likely that tensions between the groups will redevelop before the 2016 deadline, further
stalling the process.
Security
Kenyan officials are likely to continue to increase security measures prior to President Barack Obama’s visit later this week. The
Kenyan administration announced that all flights between Somalia and Nairobi’s Wilson and Jomo Kenyatta airports will be
grounded during the U.S. delegation’s visit. Separately, the U.S. Department of State released a travel alert for U.S. citizens in
Kenya, warning that the summit President Obama is set to attend may be a target for terrorist activity.
Outlook: Kenyan officials will continue to implement measures to prevent travel from Somalia during President Obama’s visit,
and the nation’s security organizations will increase their presence in Nairobi in preparation for a potential attack.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab continues to attempt to defend its major strongholds of Bardhere, Gedo region, and Dinsoor, Bay region. The group
began to clash with Ethiopian troops in Bay region on July 17 and has resorted to detonating improvised explosive devices
(IED) targeting the troops. Separately, the group captured a military base in Golweyn, Lower Shabelle region, bringing its
holdings to at least eleven bases in the region.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely continue to clash with Ethiopian troops as they approach the group’s strongholds in southern
Somalia. The group may also increase its presence in the Lower Shabelle to block troops moving north from Mogadishu.
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
6

7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
77777
1
2
3
4
7
1) 16 JUL: A
suspected U.S.
airstrike killed at least
two al Shabaab
senior officials near
Bardhere, Bay region.
2) 17 JUL: Al Shabaab
seized a Somali
military base near
Golweyn, Lower
Shabelle region.
3) 17 JUL: Al Shabaab
clashed with
Ethiopian troops near
Gofgudud, Bay
region.
4) 19 JUL: Somali and
Ethiopian troops
seized Ufurow, Bay
region, from al
Shabaab militants.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

8. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The signing of the Libyan Political Accord elicited praise from the international community and the UN Security Council. The
GNC has not made a public statement since the summit concluded and UN Envoy Leon has made several public appearances,
where he called on the GNC to join the democratic process. The success of the diplomatic process likely inspired the adoption
of new peace treaties in Western Libya under the auspices of the LNA’s Western Operations Room.
Outlook: The process to collect unity government leadership suggestions will proceed in the background and will remain
confidential. Furthermore, the GNC will find itself under increasing pressure to compromise on its demands and join the
leadership selection process. The GNC will likely announce its decision in the next week.
Security
The widespread clashes between the LNA and Ansar al Sharia in Benghazi reduced in frequency as Eid al Fitr approached. At
this time, no side appears to have gained any strategic edge over the other and this failure to make progress raises questions
on General Hafter’s claim that Operation Dignity will be completed soon. Outside of Benghazi, LNA forces from the Eastern
Operations Room have surrounded ISIS’s Derna forces in Fatahia, a village to the east of Derna.
Outlook: General Hafter’s posturing on the imminent success of Operation Dignity adds greater pressure to the LNA Benghazi
commanders to force Ansar al Sharia out of the city. The LNA will focus on isolating the militia bases from resupply and
reinforcement, instead of overrunning their positions.
Ansar al Sharia Libya and ISIS in Libya
Ansar al Sharia continued its defense of its bases in the Laithi, Buatni, and Buhdeima neighborhoods of Benghazi against LNA
operations and initiated a new naval reinforcement and resupply operation through Marissa port in northwest Benghazi. In
central Libya, ISIS undertook a reorganization of its Sirte leadership with the arrival of Mohammad al Firjani, an Iraqi militant,
and expanded into Abu Grain, a village 112 km SE of Misrata, with checkpoints.
Outlook: Ansar al Sharia will cease offensive operations and fortify their remaining bases ahead of increased pressure from
both LNA land and air forces. ISIS will develop its base in Abu Grain and direct its convoy to occupy al-Jufra air base.
8
LIBYAWEST AFRICA

9. ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
AQIM continues to become more active after its month-long silence. The group claimed credit for its deadliest attack in North
Africa in a year; killing 11 Algerian soldiers in an ambush near Ain Defla, Algeria. The increase in activity may signal the start of
a campaign to increase visibility and attacks. Algerian forces responded with a coordinated response, which resulted in the
death of sixteen AQIM militants.
Outlook: Algeria will look to respond to the increase of AQIM activity near militant outposts through increased security
measures. AQIM will likely retaliate through small-scale attacks on patrols and military checkpoints.
Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)
Militant groups continue to threaten Tunisia with future attacks and unrest. Jund al Khilafa Tunisia threatened to carry out
another attack on foreigners and Christians in Tunisia, while other ISIS supporters threatened Tunisian political leaders. Threats
to foreigners were made weeks before the June 26 attack in Sousse, indicating that another major attack may be planned.
Separately, Tunisian security forces continued to root out terrorist cells. Officials announced the arrest of over 70 individuals
from July 11-17.
Outlook: Tunisian authorities will look to address the new threats to the country through heightened security measures. Jund al
Khilafa Tunisia and similar groups will likely attempt operations that target popular tourist areas.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
Malian security forces continue to aggressively pressure Ansar al Din members in border areas. The Malian Army killed 30
suspected militants in Sikasso, Mali. Security forces arrested 15 other militants and seized weapons and vehicles during the
operation. Malian security forces will continue sweeping operations in the Sikasso area, which has recently served as a
logistical base for Ansar al Din.
Outlook: Ansar al Din may limit its attacks in those areas as Malian security forces continue to conduct aggressive sweeping
operations in southern Mali,. The group may return to its stronghold in northern Mali to regroup.
9
MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

10. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST AFRICA
1
2
3
4
10
1) 14 JUL: Gunmen,
potentially linked to
Ansar al Sharia,
attempted to
assassinate LNA Col
Zwai. The attack failed.
2) 15 JUL: An ISIS
convoy established a
camp in al Rawagah
neighborhood in
Waddan.
3) 15 - 17 JUL: The LNA
continued its airstrike,
artillery, and ground
campaign on Ansar al
Sharia positions in
Benghazi.
4) 19 JUL: Four Italian
nationals were
kidnapped by gunmen.
No statement has been
made.

11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
1) 14 JUL: Tunisian
authorities arrested
15 suspected
terrorists south of
Tunis.
2) 14 - 19 JUL:
Tunisian forces
carried out a shelling
campaign on militant
outposts in Kef,
Tunisia.
3) 17 - 19 JUL: AQIM
militants killed 11
Algerian soldiers in an
ambush near Ain
Defla. Algerian forces
responded by killing
16 terrorists in a
counter attack.
1
3 2
11

12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: SAHELWEST AFRICA
1) 16 JUL: The Malian
Army killed 30
suspected militants in
Sikasso. Security
forces also
dismantled the
militant camp,
arrested 15 other
militants, and seized
weapons and
vehicles.
2) 15 JUL: Unknown
assailants seized an
ambulance and its
occupants, including
two Malian soldiers,
in Bourem.
2
1
12

13. ASSESSMENT:
Nuclear Talks
In a July 15 open letter addressed to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, President Hassan Rouhani declared that the
nuclear deal is “a lesson” that diplomacy can solve regional issues. In a response to Rouhani’s letter, Khamenei cautioned that
“some world powers are not trustworthy” and stressed that the nuclear deal needs to be scrutinized to ensure that the “other
side” does not violate the agreement. During a July 18 speech, the Supreme Leader stressed that the nuclear deal will not alter
Iran’s policies towards the U.S. “and vowed that Iran will continue to support its regional allies.” The United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) unanimously approved a resolution endorsing the nuclear agreement on July 20. Shortly before the UNSC
vote, IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari said that Iran “will never accept” provisions in the draft of the
UNSC resolution which violate Iran’s red lines, especially those regarding armament capabilities. Defense Minister IRGC
Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan also stated that Iran’s missile capabilities “have never been on the agenda of the talks.”
Outlook: The nuclear agreement is unlikely to fundamentally change Iran’s foreign policy or its support of regional proxies.
Regime officials will continue to push back on the resolution’s restrictions on purchase and sale of conventional weapons,
especially ballistic missiles.
Economy
Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated that the nuclear agreement “will provide for greater interaction…Iran is a great
investment opportunity.” Since the signing of the nuclear agreement, senior officials from Germany, Switzerland, Spain, Russia,
the EU, and Italy have expressed interest in strengthening economic ties with Iran. European firms have also started
discussions with Iranian officials on potential areas for investment. Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh announced that Iran’s oil
production will reach 4.7 million barrels per day “in the near future.” Central Bank of Iran (CBI) chief stated $26 billion in frozen
assets could be released once the nuclear agreement comes into effect. President Hassan Rouhani has claimed that the
nuclear deal places Iran on the path of “implementation of…the resistance economy.”
Outlook: Iran will try to bolster its economy by seeking to maximize sanctions relief and attract foreign investment. Increased
foreign trade, however, will not reverse the structural problems inherent in Iran’s economy in the short to medium term.
13
IRAN

14. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
14
15 JUL: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned that “some world powers are not trustworthy” and stressed that the
nuclear deal needs to be scrutinized to ensure that the “other side” does not violate the agreement.
15 JUL: President Hassan Rouhani praised the nuclear deal for placing Iran on the path of “implementation of…the resistance
economy.” He declared the deal a “lesson” that diplomacy can resolve regional issues.
16 JUL: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif indicated Iran’s readiness for “cooperation and partnership” with “Arab
countries” on “common challenges.”
16 JUL: IRGC Col. Qassem Gharib and IRGC Col. Abdul Karim Ghavabish were buried in Iran after they died in Syria during
separate attacks on July 11.
16 JUL: President Hassan Rouhani and British Prime Minister David Cameron discussed the possibility of reopening the British
embassy in Tehran.
17 JUL: President Hassan Rouhani indicated willingness to improve cooperation with Turkey during a telephone conversation
with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
17 JUL: Iranian crude oil supertanker Starla reportedly set sail for Asia with two million barrels of oil, making it the first tanker
to leave Iran’s water since the nuclear deal.
18 JUL: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei vowed that the nuclear deal will not change Iran’s policies towards the U.S. and
stated that Iran will continue to support its regional allies.
19 JUL: A 60-strong German trade delegation led by German Vice Chancellor and Minister for Economic Affairs Sigmar Gabriel
arrived in Tehran to boost economic ties.
20 JUL: Central Bank of Iran (CBI) chief Valiollah Seif stated $26 billion in frozen assets could be released once the nuclear
agreement comes into effect.
20 JUL: IRGC Brig. Gen. Hossein Dehghan stated, “Issues related to missiles have never been on the agenda of the [nuclear]
talks…”
20 JUL: Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh announced “Iran will raise its oil recovery to 4.7 million barrels per day in the near future.”
20 JUL: IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari declared that “we will never accept” sections in the draft of the
United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) resolution regarding Iran’s “armament capabilities.”
20 JUL: The UNSC unanimously approved a resolution endorsing the P5+1 and Iran nuclear deal.
14 JUL – 20 JUL 2015

15. ACRONYMS
15
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)
Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
North Waziristan (NWA)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
South Waziristan (SWA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

16. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Alexis Knutsen
al Qaeda analyst
alexis.knutsen@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
16