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1. 1) In this work I examine two philosophical conceptions: language games of L.
Wittgenstein and Lifeworld of E. Husserl.
I am going to point at the resemblances and the differences between these two
conceptions.
2) My work consists of three parts. The first part is called ‘From the picture
theory of language to language games’. In this part I will tell you about the
change of Wittgenstein’s views on language and world.
In the second part I will tell you about the constitution of reality and the
philosophical conception of Lifeworld in the phenomenology of E. Husserl.
And in the third part I will say the resemblances and differences between these two
conceptions.
3) The first part of my work consists of two parts. The first part is called “From
the ideal language to everyday language”. The second part is called
‘Relativity of meaning of words’.
Language is the central point of L.Wittgenstein’s philosophy. n his early work
“Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” Wittgenstein proposed the picture theory of
language, also known as the picture theory of meaning. In this theory he suggested,
that a proposition represents the state of affairs and language is also a limit of the
world. ‘The proposition is a picture of reality’ (4.01) (The proposition is a model
of reality as we think it is). And ‘The limits of my language mean the limits of my
world (5.6)’ 5.62 ‘That the world is my world, shows itself in fact that the limits of
the language (the language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my
world’.
In Tractatus he shows an ideal language. But already here he points the problems
of an everyday language. «Everyday language is a part of the human organism and
is not less complicated than it» (4.002) Then after Ramsey’s critic of Tractatus,
Wittgenstein wrote a book “Some remarks on Logical Form”, where he reviewed
ideas about the language. Further he came up with the idea, that language is not a
picture of reality, but language is an instrument. In “Philosophical Investigations”
Wittgenstein wrote: «So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true
and what is false? <…> It is what human being say that is true and false, and they
agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of

2. life». It is better to say that in Tractatus and Investigations Wittgenstein told about
not two different forms of language: the ideal language and everyday language, but
about to ways of examining language in whole. These ways are two different
approaches to language systems. Now we have come to the concept of language
game as a form of life. Wittgenstein said that the process of speaking is a
component of activity or a form of life. He said that there are many language
games, but all of them are games. If we look carefully, we will see likeness,
affinity, resemblance between all of them. This kind of resemblance he called
family resemblance. The idea of family resemblance accentuates the point, that
meanings of words depend on application. The rules of using words depend on
conventions between people. People come up with agreement about meaning of
one word, and so a new language game appears. It is important, that there must be
more than one person to make a new language game. One person can think up a
new rule to use a word, but nobody will understand him, so this situation cannot be
a language game. We need at least two persons, who will know the new rules of an
application of a word.
These conventions follow to relativity. If the meaning of the word depends only on
using this word, here is no place for absolute meaning of words. So meta- language
and meta- language game are also impossible. There is multitude of language
games and all of them are connected with each other.
We live in the world, where language is an inalienable part of it. We think with
help of language, our thoughts are expressed with help of language in words. But
each word has no single meaning or sense. Each word has many meanings and
people use different meanings in different situations. So the meaning of the word
depends on application. From the picture theory of language Wittgenstein came to
language games. There are many language games and each human belongs to
different language games. But there is no meta- language game, because there is no
absolute meaning of each word. Language games as forms of life make a
community. This community is the world, the intersubjective world of all the
humanity: the world of our language, culture, science, our everyday world, the
world where we all live.

3. 4) The second part of my presentation is called Constitution of reality and
philosophical conception of lifeworld. It consists of two parts: the first part
is called Constitution of reality in phenomenology and the second part is
called: the phenomenon of the Other and lifeworld.
World in a natural standpoint is the world of ordinary people, surrounding reality,
the world of things, values, goods, the practical world. This is the natural world.
We all belong to it. Perceiving others as people, I accept them as "I" subjects, just
as I myself am "I". We accept the surrounding reality as essential, as it presents
itself to us. The aim of Husserl was to find the undoubted foundation of our
knowledge. So instead of staying in a natural standpoint, one should radically
change it. We should doubt absolutely everything we were certain about,
everything that was obvious to us. Husserl was the first one to propose a method of
receiving apodictic knowledge known as phenomenological reduction. Exercising
a phenomenological reduction means transition from the natural standpoint of
mind to the phenomenological one. The method of phenomenological reduction
consists in abstaining from judgments about anything that can be put to doubt.
Husserl again uses Grecian terminology: epoche, abstaining from judgments.
Epoche means incrementally taking everything that can be put to doubt out of the
brackets. One should look if anything is left in brackets, anything that cannot be
put to doubt. Firstly, everything perceptional is left aside. We take natural world
out of context. But we do not deny this world or put its existence to doubt. Husserl
does not state that something that is left out of context does not exist. It is just that
the existence of this has rather a problematic nature, than apodictic. Secondly,
natural sciences are left aside. Then so are society, and history, and most
importantly - one's empirical psychophysical "I", one's feelings. That means one
should put to doubt no only the nature and people, but also one's own body and
psyche. Then Husserl takes out of context the existence of God and eidetic
knowledge of nature, which belongs to empirical sciences. In the end we come to
the fact that consciousness has its own special being, which cannot be exposed to
phenomenological reduction. This is the remainder of epoche. Thanks to epoche
we achieve pure consciousness together with the whole of phenomenological area.
Only "I" and one's doubt are left in parenthesis. Husserl states that this "I" exists in
the form of pure transcendental ego. Thereby, performing incremental
phenomenological reduction we come to the fact that apodictically only
transcendental ego exists. The search for apodictic basis of all scientific and
unscientific knowledge is over - this basis is transcendental ego, transcendental
subject.

4. We can divide the area of transcendental intentional acts into two fields: the field
of my phenomena and the phenomena that are outside of this field. The field of my
phenomena consists of my physical body and my psyche- my empirical ego. In the
field of the phenomena that are outside my empirical ego we meet the phenomenon
of the Other.
Husserl claimed that the Others according to myself are not just physical bodies,
but they are psychophysical objects. But on the other hand they are the subjects,
how cognize the world like me. I experience the Other with the work of
appresentation.
Husserl wrote that mine alone (mir fremde) and others form an intersubjective
world. This world is for everyone. Each of us has his own phenomena- world, but
the whole world exists itself. All of us are experiencing subjects and the world
exists for everybody. This world exists apodictically as an intersublective world.
Transcendental ego constitutes an objective world. So we come from the theory of
experiencing someone else, as transcendental theory called ‘empathy’ to the
transcendental theory of the Objective world- Objective Nature. Intersubjective
world has a centralized structure. The center of it is my ego, I experience myself
ingenuously. Then, mediately, with the help of apperception the other, the whole
objective world is given to us. Husserl used Leibniz’s word – monad to describe
ego and its psychophysical life. All of us are monads and we constitute our
common objective world. Husserl told that we realize the world around us as a
horizon of our life. In this horizon are included people who I know, who are the
most close to me, they make a kind of kernel among the horizon of all people in
the world. All people and I form a horizon of our co-humanity. To this horizon of
co-humanity community belongs language. With the help of language everybody
in this objective community can discuss objects around us as objective objects in
the objective reality.
Lifeworld is an extensive horizon. It is the world that is always given to us directly
in our concrete life. It is the prescientific and the extra –scientific world, the world
of perceptional experience, which includes all urgent life.
In conclusion I shall make a resume. Phenomenology of Husserl shows how the
objective world around us is constituted by our consciousness. Firstly, we make the
operation of transcendental phenomenological epohé when we suspend the
existence of external world, then ‘bracketing’ our psychophysical bode, and
investigate the remainder. The remainder is ego cogito - pure consciousness. Then
in epohé we investigate our ego, its structure, our intentional acts. After it Husserl
shows how we constitute world around us. This world is constituted by cogitos of

5. all people in the world. This world is our life world, it is common for everybody,
and because of it science, culture, language can exist. But there are also millions of
life worlds, small worlds of each of us, where I am (my monad) the center of this
world and other people belong to my horizon and my world.
5) In the third part of my presentation I will show the results of my research.
Wittgenstein used the term "language-game" (Sprachspiel) to designate forms of
language simpler than the entirety of a language itself, "consisting of language
and the actions into which it is woven" (PI 7), and connected by family
resemblance. The concept was intended "to bring into prominence the fact that
the speaking of language is part of an activity, or a form of life" (PI 23).
The term 'language game' is used to refer to:
Fictional examples of language use that are simpler than our own everyday
language. (e.g. PI 2)
Simple uses of language with which children are first taught language (training in
language).
Specific regions of our language with their own grammars and relations to other
language-games.
All of a natural language seen as comprising a family of language-games.
«So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?" -
- It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language
they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.» (Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations, para. 241
Lifeworld (German Lebenswelt) may be conceived as a universe of what is self-
evident or given [1], a world that subjects may experience together [2]. For
Husserl, the lifeworld is the fundament for all epistemological enquiries

6. «In whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon, as
coherent universe of existing objects, we, each “I-the-man” and all of us together,
belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is our
world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this ‘living
together.’ We, as living in wakeful world-consciousness, are constantly active on
the basis of our passive having of the world... Obviously this is true not only for
me, the individual ego; rather we, in living together, have the world pre-given in
this together, belong, the world as world for all, pre-given with this ontic
meaning... The we-subjectivity... [is] constantly functioning» Crisis of European
Sciences (1936)