2015-01-13 Guidelines for contractual arrangements for BRT systems by Rosário Macário

1. Rosário Macário
Marisa J. G. Pedro
CESUR/DECIVIL, Instituto Superior Técnico, Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal
Guidelines for contractual
arrangements for BRT
systems
Washington, 13th January 2015, BRT-ALC General Assembly
CESUR/DECivil, Instituto Superior Técnico 1

2. Introduction
• Public transport (service and infrastructure) is defined and
structured in a wide variety of contractual practices depending on the
country and city.
• Numerous factors influence this variety, the most relevant are:
– The constitutional setting (principles and legal architecture)
– The way national and local authorities divide regulatory powers upon
public transport
– The way public transport funding and financed is organised
– The ownership and structure transport of transport operators
– The nature of the relationship between authorities and operators
– The market access regime (free market regimes, authority provision)
– Infrastructure management model, etc
– Competence of the authorities
– Quality of information (market, operations, etc)
CESUR/DECivil, Instituto Superior Técnico 2

3. Research Goal
• Import to BRT design and implementation of a wide experience
on contract design for public transport services and
provision of infrastructures that is available in other modes
and services
• Provide guidelines for contract design (including incentives)
and monitoring for application to BRT systems
• Scope: relations between authorities and operators of services
and infrastructures (not labour related contracts)
CESUR/DECivil, Instituto Superior Técnico 3

4. The Research
• This study is supported by:
– an analysis of a set of public transport service contracts selected covering most
practices on Public Service Obligations across world.
– an analysis of a set of contracts for provision of transport infrastructure
– Analysis of a set of BRT contracts
• Includes contracts set up under various regulatory regimes:
– market initiative regimes (e.g. deregulated free-entry regimes)
– authority initiative regimes (with or without competitive tendering)
• Includes contracts for different scopes of infrastructure development and provision
(DBOT, etc)
• Includes contracts with various forms of risk allocation:
– cost risk and revenue risk, with gross-cost, net-cost and super-incentive contracts
• Include various kinds of awarding procedures:
– direct award, competitive tendering procedures
CESUR/DECivil, Instituto Superior Técnico 4

5. The Case Studies Database
Case
Study
Country
Contract
Type
Modes
concerned
Award
procedure
Regime
for PSO
Year
Contract
Length
(…)
Risk
Sharing
Risk
allocated
COST Risks by
Operator
(…)
REVENUE
S by
Operator
REVENUE
S by
Authority
Types of
other
incentives
(…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…)
Brussels Belgium Net cost
contract
Bus,
Subway,
Tram
Direct award
to public
operator
without
competitive
tendering
Contract2001 5 years
(…)
YES COST and
REVENUES
Operator carries
the risk on
operational
costs
(personnel,
energy,
maintenance,…)
(…)
Operator
carries risk
on
passenger
revenues
n/a Financial
incentives
for the
operator
Frankfurt Germany Gross
cost
contract
Bus Award
procedure
with
competitive
tendering to
operate non
commercial
routes
Contract2004 6 years
(…)
YES COST and
REVENUES
The contract
price can not be
renegotiated. If
the payment
turns out not to
be sufficient, it is
the operators
risk
(…)
Operator
carries
responsibilit
y for fare
revenues
Authority
carries
responsibilit
y for
passenger
revenues
Environme
ntal
incentives
for the
operator
Dublin Ireland Gross
cost
contract
Tram Award
procedure
with
competitive
tendering
with
negotiation
Contract2002 5+5 years
(…)
YES COST Operator carries
the risk on
operational
costs
(personnel,
energy,
maintenance,…)
(…)
n/a Authority
carries
responsibilit
y for
passenger
revenues
Passenger
incentives
for the
operator
(…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…) (…)
58 cases
34 filled
CESUR/DECivil, Instituto Superior Técnico 5

6. Basic Contract Typology
CESUR/DECivil, Instituto Superior Técnico 6
EC, 2008

7. Risk continuum
CESUR/DECivil, Instituto Superior Técnico 7
EC, 2008

8. Some Findings…
CESUR/DECivil, Instituto Superior Técnico 8
42%
32%
7%
19%
Contract type
Gross cost contract
Net cost contract
Management contract
Others
13%
10%
6%
55%
16%
Award procedure
Direct award to public operator
Direct award to public operator with
competitive tendering procedure
Direct award to public operator without
competitive tendering
Award procedure with competitive
tendering
29%
61%
3%
7%
Modes concerned
All Network Bus Tram Subway

9. CESUR/DECivil, Instituto Superior Técnico 9
Some Findings…
10
8
6
Frequent Contract
length
(average of years)
Gross cost contract
Net cost contract
Management contract
Gross cost
contract
Net cost
contract
Bus contracts 47% 26%
The bus contracts

10. CESUR/DECivil, Instituto Superior Técnico 10
Field Management contracts Gross cost contracts Net cost contracts
Bearer of risk
The authority bears both
the production cost risk
and revenue risk
The operator bears the
production cost risk; the
authority retains the
revenues risk
The operator bears both
risks – the cost risk and
the revenue risk
Remuneration
Authority remunerates the
operator for know-how and
technical assistance,
usually both a fixed amount
and a variable component
Contribution based on the
kilometres operated, index
often updated in relation to
changes in costs (diesel,
gas, salaries, sales price of
vehicles, etc).
Operator remunerated by
keeping the ticket
revenues; compensation
is paid by the authority (a
fixed sum).
Ticket sales
Revenues related to
operation belong to the
authority / operator
Operator collects revenues
on behalf of the public
transport authority
Revenues related to
operation belong to the
operator
Incentive schemes
Financial incentives can
relate to productivity and
quality
Quality or revenue
incentives will encourage
the operator to focus not
only on the production /
costs but also revenue /
passenger satisfaction
Quality incentives
frequently make use of
stated minimum demands
or results on customer
surveys
Ancillary activities
Revenues are collected by
the operator on behalf of
the public transport
authority
Operator retains ancillary revenues
Summary of practices

11. CESUR/DECivil, Instituto Superior Técnico 11
Field Management contracts Gross cost contracts Net cost contracts
Monitoring
Authority generally
monitors the operator
regarding policy and
budget
Authority monitors the operator regarding service
performance through qualitative and quantitative
assessments
Definition of the
services
Decided by the public transport authority Often shared
responsibility, however
with significant operator
influence
Quality
Authority: strategic responsibility to define the level of quality
Operator: managerial and operational responsibility
Tariffs and fares
All related issues under the responsibility of the public
transport authority
Policy defined by
authority, autonomy for
the operator for
commercial fares such as
discounts, fare sections
Information and
promotion
All related issues usually a shared responsibility
Personnel and
employment conditions
All related issues usually a shared responsibility but may also be wholly an operator
responsibility

12. • PROVISION of INFRASTRUCTURE
CESUR/DECivil, Instituto Superior Técnico 12

13. A Classification of Infrastructure Delivery Models (I)
Source: (Miller, 2000).
 The two axes are
 Delivery Method (horizontal): from
segmented (each stage with a
separate contract) to combined (all
stages in a single contract)
 Client Finance Method (vertical)
[Client = State]: from direct (all
financing to come from State
budgets) to indirect (all financing
done by other parties, repaid with
user charges or with State budget
contributions)

14. Existing experience
 The most traditional forms are in Q4, with
direct financing by the State and
separation of the various stages
 In Q1 the State still assures (most of)
financing needs directly, but “buys” from
the private sector the construction and
operation of the infrastructure (possibly
with maintenance in the package)
 In Q2 the Private Sector assures (most of)
financing needs, keeping within its
responsibility good performance of
several stages of the lifecycle Source: (Miller, 2000).

15. MATRIXofRESPONSIBILITIESIN
PROVISIONOFINFRASTRUCTURE
Public – Private Partnership
Works and Service
Contracts (conventional
procurement)
Management and maintenance
contracts
Operation and
Management
Concessions
Build – Operate –
Transfer
Concessions
Privati-
zation
Type
Design,
Bid,
Build
Design, Build
Management
contracts
Performance-
based
contracts
Lease or
Franchise or
Affermage
Brownfield
BOT/DBFO/BOO
Greenfield
Design
Private
by fee
contract Private by fee
contract
Private by
concession
contract
Private
Build
Private
by fee
contract
Operation
and
Maintenance
Public Public
Private by fee
contract
Private by
Performance-
based contract
(PBC)
Private by
concession
contract
Finance Public Public Public Public
Own Public Public Public Public Public
Public after
contract
(BOT/DBFO) or
Private (BOO)
Private
Sector
Revenue
Options
Tolls (concession models)
Availability Payments* (PFI model)
Government guarantees and support
Other support (e.g. insurance)

16. City size
City characteristics
Financial Position
Possible Packages
Severe
environmental
problems
Capital intensive
public transport
Yes No High/low Low Strong Weak
Very
large/large
√ √ √ Public sector self-financing
√ √ √
Public/private partnership, full
commercialization
√ √ √ Public sector with subsidies
√ √ √
Public sector with additional
User/beneficiaries charges,
Public/private partnerships,
Full commercialization
Small/mediu
m
√ √ √ Public sector self-financing
√ √ √
Self-financing & additional
User/beneficiaries charges to serve
Self-financing, private finance
√ √ √ Public sector with subsidies
√ √ √
Public sector with additional
User/beneficiaries charges
Public/private partnerships,
full commercialization

17. NEXT STEPS
• Analysis of BRT contracts
• Finalization of the database
• Transfer the experience in contractual arrangements
for the provision of infrastructures to BRT system
• Finalize guidelines
CESUR/DECivil, Instituto Superior Técnico 17

18. Thank you !
rosariomacario@tecnico.ulisboa.pt
CESUR/DECivil, Instituto Superior Técnico 18