1. Strategy for
Public Transport Revitalization
The Reform of the Urban Bus Industry:
Industry Structure, Planning, Regulation and Institutions
Richard Meakin
Legal and Institutional Specialist
2. 2
Challenges
• Falling bus ridership, increasing car and m/cycle use
• Traffic congestion affecting buses – a vicious cycle
• Private vehicle restraint is not politically feasible until
public transport offers an acceptable level of service
• Must avoid escalating subsidy: buses must be:
– demand-responsive
– efficient
– value for money
• Consolidation of the bus industry is complex:
– many stakeholders
– well-entrenched
– low cost/low quality equilibrium
3. 3
Key Constraints on Bus Industry Reform
Current System Proposed System
Route permits & control card.
Perpetual, no service obligations
Limited-duration contracts with
performance standards
Fleet owned by individuals, organised
into cooperatives
No service obligations
Fleet owned by company
Setoran daily rental to drivers Drivers employed, paid a wage
Flat fares Graduated fares based on distance,
service quality
4. 4
Opportunities
• Jakarta (non-BRT) buses all recover operating costs from revenue.
Retain this key threshold.
• Commercial operation and cost recovery imperative will impose
financial discipline and market sensitivity on planners, operators,
regulators.
• BRT and MRT will adopt electronic ticketing
– enables flexible pricing, data collection, secure revenue, passenger
convenience.
Promote a common ticket.
• MRT ridership will depend on effective integration
• Tendered contracts promote competition and demand-responsive
• Operation by companies will:
– mobilize market incentives, management expertise, capital
– enable internal cross-subsidy
– enable performance standards
– consolidate bus industry into a manageable number of clients
5. 5
Requirements for Successful Management of
Urban Buses
1. A coherent and progressive policy with clear objectives
and time frame
2. A manageable industry structure
3. An appropriate regulatory framework (laws,
regulations, standards etc)
4. A capable institution for monitoring, planning and
regulation
7. 7
Pillar 1 - A Coherent Policy
Keberhasilan Pengelolaan Bis
8. 8
Why Draft a Policy Statement?
• Encourages a formal, rational and comprehensive approach
• Successive statements enable a progressive, long-term, approach
• Notifies stakeholders and community of government’s proposals
and provides a focus for consultation
• Difficult dilemmas require community consensus and support
• Guides day-by-day decision-making
• Discourages short-term, political expediency
• Government’s performance can be measured against its policy
• Promotes investors’ confidence
• Can develop common strategies for many cities - mutual learning
• Provides a basis for transport law
9. 9
The Mayor of London’s Transport
Policy 2009
Fast Forward
Copenhagen 2003
Draft for Consultation
Examples of Urban Transport Policy Papers
10. 10
Does Jakarta have a Transport Policy?
No specific policy paper
Policy can be inferred from a variety of sources:
Government publications:
• Pola Transportasi Makro (PTM) 2007 - a transport infrastructure plan
• Grand Design draft 2010 - management principles, (not published)
Consultants studies:
• JAPTraPIS* 2012 a transport masterplan, advocates bus industry consolidation
Laws and regulations:
• Law UU 22 of 2009 on Transport
• DKI Perda of 2013 on Transport
Ministers statements and actions
DKI Transport Policy is not coherent, progressive
Still scope for short-term, ad hoc, expedient measures
Laws tend to pre-empt policy, most transport operations now illegal
* Jabodetabek Public Transport Policy Implementation Strategy’ (Japtrapis)
12. 12
Current Industry is too Fragmented to
Regulate Effectively – Must Consolidate
14,000 angkots
2,200 medium bus
1,600 big bus
• Each vehicle licensed separately by Route Permit and
Control Card - no service obligations
• Each setoran vehicle is a separate business, must recover
costs each day
• Co-operatives act as intermediaries
• Illicit regulation fills the ‘regulatory vacuum’
• Setoran separates owners from drivers
• Nobody is accountable for service delivery
14. 14
Some Principles of Regulation
• Operators’ incentives should align with policy objectives,
eg to maximise ridership, respond to demand
• Competition is the most effective incentive
• Operators must be accountable for service delivery
• Some functions should be left to the operators: eg minor
changes to fares and routes
• Severing the link between revenue and cost (eg by pay-
by-km) requires complex management, financial
accountability, and incurs a high risk of escalating subsidy
15. 15
Conditions to Attract Private Investment
Contracts must attract commercial, corporate operators
with experience, qualified management and financial
resources
Government must minimize risks:
– Risk of ‘unfair’ competition (low cost, low quality, no
service obligations) from angkots, illegal modes,
and government buses
– Risk of fare constraints for socio-political reasons
despite rising costs
– Risk of congestion reducing bus productivity and
efficiency
– Risk of imposing unprofitable service obligations
– Risk of high front-end investment (eg depots)
Contract conditions must give a reasonable assurance of
cost-recovery over the life of the contract
16. 16
Best Practice in Commercial Contracts
• Minimum contract - one route. Can be area network
• Private companies with resources and management skills
• Operating under multi-year, fixed-term, contracts
• Service obligations with sanctions
• Competition for contracts
• Market incentives, some commercial freedom
• Cost recovery, no operating subsidy
• Fares to reflect market and costs
17. 17
The National Law Provides for Bus Reform
National Law UU22 on Transport:
• Encourages ‘healthy competition’ (198)
• Main routes must be served by big buses (158)
• Small buses may not operate parallel to big buses (158)
• Operating right may be a limited-duration contract, or an
area network (174)
• Contracts to be awarded by ‘selection or tender’ (174)
• No individual may operate a fixed-route transport service
(139)
• Fares for non-economy routes set by the operator (185)
• Non-economy services may not be subsidised (185)
• All public transport operators to comply with minimum
service standards, to be elaborated by regulation (198)
• No Ministers regulations yet made under UU22
18. 18
The DKI Perda of 2013 – A Missed Opportunity?
• Does not expand the reform provisions of UU22
• Many matters left to Governor’s regulation
• May subsidise passengers (conflicts with UU22)
• Route or area contracts awarded by ‘selection’ or tender,
but 5-year Route Permits and 1-year control cards
retained (97–106)
• Operators submit monthly performance reports (102)
• Maximum age of buses 7-10 years (Art 51). Euro 2 (54).
• Small buses to be replaced by large buses on expiry (52)
• DKI government to ‘monitor and evaluate’ each bus
route annually (112)
• Head of Dishub must evaluate the performance of the
transport system every year (205)
20. 20
Key Roles of the Agency
• Manage the reform process
• Plan
– Annual 5-year network, service and financial planning cycle
– Coordination with other government agencies (economic affairs,
land use, infrastructure, police etc)
– Draft transport policy and strategy
• Monitor
– Monitor the performance of the PT system and all operators vs
demand, affordability, policy objectives
– Introduce measures to address deficiencies in the annual plan
• Regulate
– Procure transport services under contracts
– Take measures to remedy deficiencies, improve performance
– Maintain balance of supply/demand, revenue/cost/affordability
21. 21
• Established and defined by a regulation
• Governed by an appointed board
• Clear objectives
• Accountable for performance
• Some autonomy, within legal limits:
- revenue and expenditure
- staffing and conditions
- operations
Features of a Transport Authority
22. 22
• To procure public transport services using formal and transparent
competitive procedures
•To coordinate and integrate several transport modes, eg to manage the
modal share between bus and rail
• To coordinate transport strategies and financial arrangements between
multiple local governments
• To provide political accountability for subsidies from public funds
•To concentrate limited resources – expertise and funds.
• To reduce opportunities for direct political interference in service
provision
• To focus policy attention and funding on urban transport
• To coordinate the programmes of different departments responsible for
different aspects of urban transport.
• Sometimes a condition of donor project funding to manage funds,
ensure supervision and accountability.
Functions of a Metropolitan Public
Transport Authority
23. 23
Steps in the Transition Towards a
Jabodetabek Transport Authority
Phase 1 - Strengthen Dishub’s capability:
– to plan, monitor, regulate
– to manage the consolidation and reform of the industry
Phase 2 – Create a DKI Public Transport Authority based
on the strengthened Dishub public transport division
Phase 3 – Extend the jurisdiction of the TA to Jabodetabek
Editor's Notes
1. Kebijakan yang terarah, tujuan dan strategi pencapaian yang realistis mengembangkan angkutan bis
2. Struktur industri yang patuh terhadap peraturan dan mampu menyediakan layanan yang reponsif terhadap permintaan.
Ada 4 jenis struktur industri: monopoli, oligopoli, campuran operator umum/swasta besar/kecil, dan berbagai operator perorangan swasta
3. Kerangka perencanaan dan peraturan yang mampu mencapai tujuan-tujuan kebijakan
4. Perencanaa dan regulator yang handal
1. Kebijakan yang terarah, tujuan dan strategi pencapaian yang realistis mengembangkan angkutan bis
2. Struktur industri yang patuh terhadap peraturan dan mampu menyediakan layanan yang reponsif terhadap permintaan.
Ada 4 jenis struktur industri: monopoli, oligopoli, campuran operator umum/swasta besar/kecil, dan berbagai operator perorangan swasta
3. Kerangka perencanaan dan peraturan yang mampu mencapai tujuan-tujuan kebijakan
4. Perencanaa dan regulator yang handal