Counter to intent: Voters' mental models of alternative counting methods
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Here I talk about some preliminary findings from exploratory research about whether voters encounter problems using ballots that include contests that are counted in non-traditional ways.
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Counter to intent: Voters' mental models of alternative counting methods
- 1. Counter to intent Votersā mental models of alternative counting methods Dana Chisnell @danachis @ChadButterļ¬y
- 3. Not.
- 4. Ranked Choice Voting Instant Run-off Voting Fusion or Cumulative Voting
- 5. How are the votes counted?
- 6. Ballot design problems are well understood
- 7. Ballot design problems are well understood split contests across columns overvoting there are responses on both overvoting sides of names arrows rather than bubbles marking incorrectly formatting is inconsistent or undervoting too consistent instructions are complicated all kinds of crazy things or lacking voters donāt know how to lost votes correct their ballots
- 8. Ranked Choice Voting adds a twist
- 9. San Francisco and Oakland, December 2011 EVN, March 2012
- 11. Alameda Co. demo ballot
- 12. Minneapolis 2011
- 13. New York state demo
- 14. Voter slate
- 19. How RCV works
- 21. n=52
- 22. n=52
- 23. n=52 Joe
- 24. What we found
- 25. Mental models People make inferences about how things work based on available information and context
- 26. Mental models
- 27. Mental models This is what we teach people
- 28. Mental models
- 29. Mental models Sometimes it really is this simple - but not in the US
- 30. Mental models Sometimes it really is this simple - but not in the US
- 32. Much more like signing for a mortgage
- 33. This is the ballot we test NIST medium complexity ballot
- 34. Mental models
- 35. Mental models Point system
- 36. Mental models Point system Weighted
- 37. Mental models Point system Weighted Reversed
- 38. Alameda Co. demo ballot
- 39. Alameda Co. demo ballot
- 40. Point / weight system
- 41. Point / weight system
- 42. Point / weight system
- 43. 1. Voters develop faulty mental models
- 44. 2. Voters donāt understand the consequences of their actions
- 45. 3. Voters vote counter to their intentions
- 51. Top 2 primary
- 52. Top 2 primary + regular contests
- 53. Top 2 primary + regular contests + RCV
- 54. Top 2 primary + regular contests + RCV + multi-candidate
- 55. Top 2 primary + regular contests + RCV + multi-candidate + retention contests
- 56. Top 2 primary + regular contests + RCV + multi-candidate + retention contests + measures
- 57. Top 2 primary + regular contests + RCV + multi-candidate + retention contests + measures 6 different models
- 58. Weāre pretty sure thereās a problem
- 60. Poor design and instructions on ballots make understanding, marking, and casting difļ¬cult, time-consuming, and complicated
- 61. Poor design and instructions on ballots make counting, verifying, and audits difļ¬cult, time-consuming, and complicated
- 62. Raises questions about what is being secured.
- 63. RCV = lost votes
- 64. RCV + VBM = lost votes
- 65. RCV + multi-language = lost votes
- 67. RCV
- 68. RCV + VBM
- 69. RCV + VBM + multi-language
- 70. RCV + VBM + multi-language = thousands of lost votes
- 72. Lack of trust in elections Lack of trust in ofļ¬cials Recalls Scrambling county boards
- 74. Security = Counted as cast
- 75. Security = Cast as intended + counted as cast
- 76. This moment
- 77. Voter ed is not the answer.
- 78. Next steps
- 79. Next steps Develop & test versions of on-ballot instructions
- 80. Next steps Develop & test versions of on-ballot instructions Develop & test versions of pre-voting instructions
- 81. Next steps Develop & test versions of on-ballot instructions Develop & test versions of pre-voting instructions Study combinations of designs with instructions
- 82. Next steps Develop & test versions of on-ballot instructions Develop & test versions of pre-voting instructions Study combinations of designs with instructions Study combinations of voting modes on the same ballot
- 85. If itās not usable, itās not valid.
- 86. If itās not usable, itās not countable.
- 87. If itās not usable, itās not veriļ¬able.
- 88. If itās not usable, itās not auditable.
- 89. If itās not usable, itās not secure.
- 90. Thank you Rick Bond Jared Spool Cyd Harrell David Cary Ethan Newby Rebecca Sherrill Callie Wheeler Frank Castro Chelsey Glasson Sandy Olson Sara Cambridge Nancy Frishberg Laura Paajanen Yelena Nakhimovsky Beth Lingard Whitney Quesenbery Beth Pickard
- 91. New tools.
- 92. Field Guides series Research Research SOP and Usability Research commissioned by commissioned by and Civic Life commissioned by EAC NIST Project NIST
- 95. Coming soon
- 96. Coming soon Effective election department web sites Research partially funded by Kickstarter & MacArthur
- 97. Coming soon Effective election Delivering useful department voter education web sites Research partially Research partially funded by funded by Kickstarter & Kickstarter & MacArthur MacArthur
- 98. Coming soon Effective election Delivering useful Effective design department voter education for vote-by-mail web sites Research partially Research partially Research to be funded by funded by funded by the Kickstarter & Kickstarter & MacArthur MacArthur MacArthur Foundation
- 99. Coming soon Effective election Delivering useful Effective design Designing multi- department voter education for vote-by-mail language ballots web sites Research partially Research partially Research to be Research to be funded by funded by funded by the funded by the Kickstarter & Kickstarter & MacArthur MacArthur MacArthur MacArthur Foundation Foundation
- 100. Field Guides To Ensuring Voter Intent civicdesigning.org /ļ¬eldguides