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  1. 1. BPAM214 Topic 4: Case Study [I] -- China
  2. 2. Outline BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong2 1. Historical background leading to its authoritarian ruling 2. Basic organization: interlocking relations between party and state 3. Can and will China be democratized under the persistence of the authoritarian rule?
  3. 3. Political framework of a/an (semi-) authoritarian regime BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong3 Economic liberalization???
  4. 4. History [1] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong4 History/civilization shape politics China: most populous nation with long civilization of over 5,000 years Legacies of imperial China: 1.Tradition of unified rule under strong ruler First emperor of Qin dynasty unified China in 221 B.C. (built Great Wall, implying a self-defensive mentality) Emperor Qinshi believed in a unified China under strong central rule: Opposed federalism, decentralization, and separatism
  5. 5. History [2] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong5 2. Developed bureaucratic structure to maintain power centralization • 1 official for every 11,000 in 1650 • 1 for every 20,000 in 1850 2. Bureaucracy staffed by officials trained in Confucianism • Scholar-officials: emphasized virtuous rule, harmony, morality, and rule by men (not by law) 2. Examination system tested candidates to master Confucian classics through rote learning • Created legacy of educated elites 2. Bureaucrats came from scholar-gentry class whose members attained social status via scholarship/wealth
  6. 6. History [3] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong6 Peasant’s son moved up political/social ladder via exam, conferring wealth/status upon family Many scholar-gentry officials stayed in local areas, some as secretaries Overall, the traditional China was a static and stable society. Dynastic, rather than political/institutional, changes took place repeatedly until 1912 Despite the communist revolution in 1949 and a series of political campaigns thereafter, do you think the traditional mentality and practices remains unchanged? The mentality of the national unification, resisting power decentralization/sharing Bureaucracy , combining party and state Confucianism  Socialism + Economic pragmatism Scholar-officials/gentries were replaced by local party cadres
  7. 7. Party-State Insitutions BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong7 CCP as the source of political power hierarchical, centralist Determines social, economic and political goals for society 4 main levels of organizations 1. central 2. Provincial 3. county or district 4. basic/primary (schools, factories, villages)
  8. 8. Structure of the CCP & PRC BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong8 PARTY Central Committee ( 中央委員會 )  Politburo Standing Committee ( 政治局常務委 員會 )  Politburo ( 政治局 )  *Central Military Commission ( 中央軍事委員 會 ) ↓ Provincial Party Committees ↓ District Organizations (Xian Party Committees) ↓ City and Town Party Organizations ↓ Party sections in villages factory, neighborhood cells, workplace ↓ Individual Party members STATE President ↓ State Council ↓ National’s People Congress ↓ Local’s People Congresses
  9. 9. BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong9
  10. 10. Party [1] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong10 • CCP as the core – When it came to power in 1949, it faced the breakdown of political authority in China, foreign humiliation of the country, and failure of the old political order – succeeded in establishing and upholding the international status, enhancing its legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese – also inherited nationalism: use it to develop China economically, as with Great Leap Forward ( 大躍進 )
  11. 11. Party [2] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong11 CCP originally clandestine [secretive], hierarchical 1982 constitution abolished chairman position to prevent another person dominating like Mao Reform era: top party post has been general secretary, but real powers in the hands of Deng and other elders Hu Yaobang as general secretary from 1980 to 87, but ousted and replaced by Zhao Ziyang Zhao also ousted after 1989 Tiananmen
  12. 12. Party [3] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong12 • Supreme leader generally serves on the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC): – Composed of about seven to nine people who belong to inner circle of political power – Late 1970s to 1987: Deng served on PSC but generally did not rule through it – Deng insisted on being the third ranking member after Hu and Zhao – Much authorities were shifted to the CCP Secretariat from late 1970s to 1987 – Since 1987, power shifted back to PSC – This has been true in the Jiang era (as general secretary) and the current Hu Jintao era
  13. 13. Party [4] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong13 Each member of Politburo has functional responsibilities Highest ranking PSC member usually deals with overall party affairs and military Second or third ranking deals with premier of State Council (like Prime Minister in the West) and economic affairs Another leader deals with legal/security issues Others take charge of propaganda and organization
  14. 14. Party [5] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong14 This division of labor reflects six major systems in Chinese politics (systems: xitong) 1. Party affairs 2. Organization/Personnel 3. Propaganda/Education 4. Political/Legal Affairs 5. Finance/Economics; 6. Military
  15. 15. Party [6] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong15 • Politburo has 25 members currently, selected by the Central Committee with about 200 members – Central Committee (CC) elected by Party Congress held every 5 years – Since 1987, more candidates for CC than the seats in CC – Inner-party democracy: debates are permitted, but consensus should be made after decision-making
  16. 16. Party [7] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong16 Central Committee: has supreme power to govern party affairs and enact party policies as Party Congress not in session As a collective body, it seldom initiates Party policy, but it approves policies, programs and membership changes of leading central organs Usually hold annual plenary sessions Plenums are forums for discussion and ratification of policies and programs Steady increase in CC size 1956: 97 members 2007: 204 members.
  17. 17. Party [8] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong17 CC memberships as reward to loyal supporters of Party and government Representation of workers/peasants increased Now CC members younger, more educated technocrats Members from military, technocrats, provincial gov’t elites, and people from mass organizations like intellectuals and workers Democratic centralism Party decisions discussed at lower level first before decision. Once decision made, all party members carry it out Reality, more centralism than democracy Under CC, the Secretariat that drafts document is crucial (as in the Soviet case)
  18. 18. Party [9] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong18 Central Military Commission (CMC) CMC: controls military and accountable to the Politburo Mao head of the CMC, later Deng, recently Jiang and now Hu Jiang as first civilian leading the CMC
  19. 19. Party [10] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong19 Local party organizations Each of China’s 30 provinces is headed by a party committee with a standing committee and a party secretary Below provinces, party organizations exist at each county, township and village Recent years, some local party organizations are loose
  20. 20. Party [11] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong20 Party organizational techniques affect the life of every Chinese Under the danwei (unit) system, all citizens are attached to specific bureaucratic, industrial or agricultural organizations Organizations affect individual life greatly, offering medical care and other welfare Employment was for life Difficult to move from one place to another In recent years, the danwei system has begun to loosen as economy diversifies and labor mobile In rural areas, peasants allowed to travel and migrate in recent years, unlike the past when they were tied to the land
  21. 21. Party [12] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong21 The danwei system enforced by household registration system (hukuo) and dossier system Citizen assigned a household registration assigning him or her to a specific location Dossier maintained on each citizen, like family background, education history, one’s political thought and activities Combination of danwei, hukuo and dossiers let the state control population Recently the systems have been weakened (dossiers less threatening), but at high levels of party/gov’t, dossiers allow Organization Dept to control promotion of cadres/officials
  22. 22. State [1] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong22 The state apparatus has two parts: administrative and legislative Administratively, the State Council and its ministries (departments) run daily affairs Led by Premier, vice-premiers, heads of national ministries and commissions Premier usually second or third ranking person in Politburo, showing that party control of the state Administers gov’t through functional ministries and commissions Stable composition: technocrats and administrators Many departments under State Council, like national defense, foreign affairs, trade, family planning, national audit, IT, water resources, public security and national affairs, etc
  23. 23. [Party-]State [2] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong23 Party Control of the State is done through the nomenclatura system achieved through party cells or groups (dangzu) existing at different levels of state bureaucracy Minister usually the party secretary of the ministry’s party group or cell Party group sets policy for the ministry
  24. 24. State [3] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong24 At the legislative level, the National People’s Congress (NPC) is crucial NPC members elected every five years through a multi- tiered representative electoral system. Delegates are elected by the provincial people's congresses, who in turn are elected by lower level congresses, and so on through a series of tiers to the local people's congresses which are directly elected by the electorate.
  25. 25. State [4] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong25 Highest gov’t organ and similar duties as parliaments Upon PRC President’s recommendation, NPC designates and may remove premier and other members of the State Council, and can elect President of Supreme People’s Court and the Chief Procurator Delegates from mass organizations, the CCP and non-CCP members
  26. 26. State [5] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong26 • Receives (amends) gov’t report, consider legislation, supervise gov’t – Delegates divided into groups, submit motions, ask questions, raise suggestions on a variety of topics – Criticisms and praise on the quality of legislators in recent years – Some heated debate on bankruptcy law – When NPC not in session, its Standing Committee is the executive body – SC can declare martial law
  27. 27. Problems in Party-State Institutions BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong27 1. Interlocking relations between Gov’t and Party  Needs reforms  Hua Guofeng as chair of CCP, premier of central gov’t and chair of MAC in 1977-78  Major economic ministries in hands of ministers who were members of either Politburo or CC 2. Overstaffing problem in gov’t needs streamlining work 3. Political reforms are lacking: needs to consolidate legal system, democratize NPC, separate power between gov’t and Party  Not easy to implement all these reforms (Zhao envisioned reforms but he was disposed)
  28. 28. China’s Democracy: Social Tensions in the Mainland and Political Change in Greater China BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong28 Introduction The quest for democracy—citizens are masters determining their own affairs—has become a major theme in the political development of modern China Chinese political culture, some argue, has an element of democracy Mencius (a Confucian thinker): “The people are the masters, the country is of secondary importance, and the monarch is of least importance.” Historical review The 1919 May Fourth Movement: students were triggered by nationalism to demand for better, stronger, more open and democratic government (Mr. Democracy & Mr. Science) The 1989 Tiananmen Incident (“Massacre”): People’s Liberation Army mobilized to crush/suppress student demonstrators
  29. 29. Factors [1] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong29 Factors shaping China’s democratic development 1.Historically, China remained a traditional dynasty in which political power is concentrated at the top. Dynastic cycle in Chinese history has not changed this feature, including the current Communist regime •Long history/recent global emergence may reinforce Chinese civilization: – China has 3,000 years of recorded history. Not only do the people feel proud of their civilization, but the leaders are naturally resistant to Western values
  30. 30. Factors [2] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong30 The 19th century: China learned Western technology to strengthen itself, but not Western values (retaining the traditional values) Chinese historically are afraid of luan (chaos): The successive political chaos from 1900 to 1976 Recent entry into the WTO and the successful bid in holding the 2008 Olympics means PRC leaders are keen to restore China’s “greatness”, and reinforces Chinese values
  31. 31. Factors [3] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong31 2. Ethnically, China has a heterogeneous population although Hans are the majority. There are 56 nationality groups, implying that democracy, if mismanaged, may lead to separatism and ethnic nationalism 3. From central-local or central-provincial perspective, democracy may have the danger of exacerbating provincialism, a historical problem in Chinese history that was once punctuated by warlordism and provincial struggle against central government (Revolutionary movements led by Sun Yat-sen was begun in Guangdong)
  32. 32. Factors [4] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong32 4. From economic perspective, China’s political leaders often emphasize economic liberalization rather than political democratization. They are Marxist-Leninists who believe in the leadership of the Communist Party, and in Marx’s assumption that economic change is the “base” affecting superstructure like politics/culture/society
  33. 33. Factors [5] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong33 5. The nature of one-party state in China: it means hegemony of CCP has to be maintained. Any social/political force independent of the state has to be suppressed, like Falun Gong (religious sect) Although social groups have emerged since reform era, like business groups, they are not really challenging the power of the state Workers are coopted into official trade unions
  34. 34. Factors [6] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong34 6. Ideologically: democracy has been viewed as dangerous, separatist and un-Chinese concept toppling the regime in power. Tiananmen incident as well as Falun Gong were cases. “socialist democracy” is different from capitalist democracy. China is resistant to Western democracy because ideologically it is associated with capitalism, not socialism Socialism remains the official ideology
  35. 35. Factors [7] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong35 7. Culturally, Chinese (Sinic) civilization different from Western civilization Chinese civilization: harmony, hierarchy, political authoritarianism, group interests and obedience to authority (Huntington) Western civilization: conflicts, equality, political pluralism, individualism and autonomy Although more Chinese may exhibit “Western” values, the Chinese civilization remains slow in its process of transformation
  36. 36. Tensions [1] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong36 Social Tensions in Mainland China and the CCP Response •A survey conducted by Institute of Macro-Economic Studies of State Planning Committee and the Chinese Academy of Social Science in 2001 found urban residents identified 5 sources of social instability (1) Rising unemployment/lay-offs, (2) bureaucratic corruption, (3) widening gap between rich and poor, (4) declining social morality, (5) deteriorating law and order •Social tensions can be seen in gap between rich & poor, and conflicts between villagers/workers/the powerless & cadres/the police/the powerful
  37. 37. Citizens Assessment of Stability BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong37  Urban Residents Rural Residents Rank % Rank %  Rising unemployment/lay-offs 1 79.1 5 45.4  Bureaucratic corruption 2 75.1 2 62.9  Widening rich-poor gap 3 64.5 3 61.1  Declining social morality 4 61.5 4 50.2  Deteriorating law/order 5 47.0 7 38.7  Widespread fake products 6 41.4 6 39.1  Pollution of environment 7 40.4 8 38.4  Heavy burden of peasants 8 21.3 1 65.0  Tension between cadres/masses 9 17.3 9 17.2  Tension amongst ethnic groups 10 7.9 10 3.5  Sample size (N) 1,425 574
  38. 38. Tensions [2] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong38 Middle-class citizens become more independent of the government; some are vocal/critical As economy grows, more middle-class members emerge and CCP may find it difficult to co-opt all of them into political institutions Some form anti-Japanese groups, protest groups, AIDS concern groups, but most of them are quickly suppressed
  39. 39. Tensions [3] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong39 China also has large number of floating population, who are migrant workers in provinces. They are a source of crime: Robbery, kidnapping, theft, secret societies??? Urban unemployment can become a source of instability as many state-owned enterprises lay off workers Ethnic minorities’ relations with the Hans are political: Tibet and Xinjiang are sensitive regions, more Hans populated there than before
  40. 40. Tensions [4] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong40 • China’s social interactions with the outside world, esp. HK/Taiwan have complicated internal social relations – Mainland workers confront HK/Taiwan factory owners; mainland Chinese in Guangdong more participative in protests and strikes (influenced by HK media) – Some mainlanders are also influenced by criminal elements in HK/Taiwan/Macau – Number of protests, according to Ministry of Public Security, increased from 8.700 incidents in 1993 to 11,000 in 1995, and to 32,000 in 1999 – Social tensions have increased over time, but they do not necessarily promote democracy although the state does respond (after Tiananmen, anti-corruption work has been enhanced but achieved so limitedly)
  41. 41. Tensions [5] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong41 CCP response: 1. Co-opt capitalists into the Party; 2. channel middle-class participation into institutions (like Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conferences and provincial congresses), 3. suppress middle-class organizations independent of the state; 4. Co-opt workers/women into officially sanctioned unions; 5. closely monitor ethnic minorities while localizing the bureaucracy in Tibet, co-opting ethnic representatives into NPC; 6. urge village cadres to continue using “mass line” to listen to views of the masses; 7. introduce village elections to increase openness and accountability of elected representatives to the public
  42. 42. Tensions [6] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong42 Village elections held in China in 1987 but the election law was revised in 1998 so that there could be free nomination of candidates, secret ballot and transparent ballot counting Elected cadres need support of villagers to stay in office, and also check the power of the village’s Party secretary Village elections can be seen as a means of democratizing the countryside, but in urban cities, CCP maintains a hard-line policy toward any political dissent
  43. 43. Tensions [7] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong43 Democratic change in Taiwan/Hong Kong constitutes a threat to the national security and one-party rule in China Taiwan’s democratization direct election of President since 1996 Universal suffrage of Legislative Yuan counselors, city manors in Taipei and Kaohsiung, as well as heads in cities, counties and townships
  44. 44. Tensions [8] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong44 Democratization in Taiwan is characterized by (1) changes from one-party dominance to multi-party competition, (2) the rotation of party in power (KMT to DPP, and then KMT again), (3) the persistence of money politics (but this has been under the severe criticism from the public under the Chan Shui-bian’s administration) (4) growth of strong Taiwan identity (not Chinese identity) De-Chiangization (e.g., the removal of Chiang Kai-shek’s colossus, the retitling of Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall as Liberty Square) De-sinicization (e.g., Taiwan’s history is NOT a part of Chinese history; China is regarded as a potential and an immediate threat to Taiwan)
  45. 45. Tensions [9] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong45 • These features are politically unacceptable in the PRC – Taiwan’s capitalist and liberal democracy is rejected by the PRC’s one-party authoritarianism • HKSAR’s gradual democratic reform in the colonial era (now the Chief Executive is elected by a 800-member Election Committee) and the protest by half a million people in July 2003 against the government have alarmed Beijing – The large-scale protests in 2003 were shocking to PRC leaders (Premier Wan Jiabao) who visited HK at that time – Beijing is concerned about impact of HK democratic development on provinces like Guangdong and Xinjiang, and on regions like Tibet (the Dalai Lama exile government calls for the adoption of HK model of “one country, two systems”)
  46. 46. Conclusion [1] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong46 1. Difficulties of China’s transition are perhaps common in many developing states: influence of history, culture, tradition; one-party authoritarianism; presence of economic reform without political democratization; strong state vs. weak society; the interventionist role of the military if necessary (Tiananmen incident, suppression of Tibetan protests)
  47. 47. Conclusion [2] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong47 2. Taiwan’s democratic consolidation and HK’s democratic aspirations are huge challenges to Beijing – The PRC regime is now keen to contain the spread of democracy from Taiwan/HK to the mainland, thus determining to restrain democratic development in HKSAR whereas criticizing Taiwan’s democratization as the path to independence – Beijing: does not want to see the Chief Executive directly elected by all HK people in 2007 and the direct elections of the entire Legislative Council in 2008
  48. 48. Conclusion [3] BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong48 3. Because of China’s long history, culture and political tradition, perhaps it is difficult to foresee a democratic breakthrough in the PRC in the years to come  Yet, it should be noted that the intentional resistance of democratization, corresponding with socio-political unrest (polarization, ethnical conflicts, corruption and power abuse) under a partial economic flourishing, may produce a volatile effect that goes beyond the CCP’s expectation and prevention.