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Catherine (Kate) Pearce
Sr Security Consultant, Cisco Security Services
Feb 22, 2016
Decoupling transport protocols from what's below
Multipathed, Multiplexed, Multilateral Transport Protocols
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2
Who?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2
Who?
• Catherine (Kate) Pearce
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2
Who?
• Catherine (Kate) Pearce
• @secvalve
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2
Who?
• Catherine (Kate) Pearce
• @secvalve
• Sr. Security Consultant 

(Customer Focused)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2
Who?
• Catherine (Kate) Pearce
• @secvalve
• Sr. Security Consultant 

(Customer Focused)
• Break & Report
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2
Who?
• Catherine (Kate) Pearce
• @secvalve
• Sr. Security Consultant 

(Customer Focused)
• Break & Report
• Coach the builders
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2
Who?
• Catherine (Kate) Pearce
• @secvalve
• Sr. Security Consultant 

(Customer Focused)
• Break & Report
• Coach the builders
• Research what’s ahead
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2
Who?
• Catherine (Kate) Pearce
• @secvalve
• Sr. Security Consultant 

(Customer Focused)
• Break & Report
• Coach the builders
• Research what’s ahead
• Distinguishing Features:
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2
Who?
• Catherine (Kate) Pearce
• @secvalve
• Sr. Security Consultant 

(Customer Focused)
• Break & Report
• Coach the builders
• Research what’s ahead
• Distinguishing Features:
• Loud, Yellow
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2
Who?
• Catherine (Kate) Pearce
• @secvalve
• Sr. Security Consultant 

(Customer Focused)
• Break & Report
• Coach the builders
• Research what’s ahead
• Distinguishing Features:
• Loud, Yellow
• Or is that “Loud Yellow”?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2
Who?
• Catherine (Kate) Pearce
• @secvalve
• Sr. Security Consultant 

(Customer Focused)
• Break & Report
• Coach the builders
• Research what’s ahead
• Distinguishing Features:
• Loud, Yellow
• Or is that “Loud Yellow”?
ALL OPINIONS ENTIRELY MY OWN. 

NO official Cisco representations of any kind
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 3
MPTCP changes
fundamental assumptions
about
how TCP works*
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 3
MPTCP changes
fundamental assumptions
about
how TCP works*
Use it to break
things today
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 3
MPTCP changes
fundamental assumptions
about
how TCP works*
Use it to break
things today
Adapt to it for
tomorrow
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 4
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 4
QUIC also changes
fundamental assumptions
about
how HTTP works*
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 4
QUIC also changes
fundamental assumptions
about
how HTTP works*
Use it to break
things today
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 4
QUIC also changes
fundamental assumptions
about
how HTTP works*
Use it to break
things today
Adapt to it for
tomorrow
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 5
2 Simple Examples: #1
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2 Simple Examples: #1
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 6
2 Simple Examples: #1
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 7
2 Simple Examples: #1
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 7
2 Simple Examples: #1
Wait,
What!?!!
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 8
2 Simple Examples: #1
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 8
2 Simple Examples: #1
Wait,
What!?!!
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 9
2 Simple Examples: #2
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 10
2 Simple Examples: #2
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 10
2 Simple Examples: #2
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 10
2 Simple Examples: #2
Err?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 11
What’s going on here?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 11
What’s going on here?
à Let’s talk about upcoming transport
protocols
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 12


Introduction ✔ 



Background (TCP, Why Change it?) 



MPTCP 

Background Redux (Why NOT to change TCP)

QUIC

Implications

Conclusion and Takeaways
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 13
Multiplexing
~ Layer Technique Endpoint Endpoint Definition
1 Uniplex Wire Implicit
1/2 Circuit
Switching
Physical Wire Address Local Network Address
3 Packet
Switching
Routed Logical Address Routable Network Address (Mac/IP)
4 Packet
Switched
Transport
Software Logical Port
(linked to a single logical
network address)
Routable Network Address
+ Transport Protocol
+ Port
4+ Multipath
Networking
Process with a Logical
Connection Identifier.
(Linked to n logical network
addresses + transports)
+ Multipath Protocol Identifier
+ Connection Identifier
(Transport & Network Agnostic – as long as one given)
5 / 6 / 7 N/A URI/URL URI/URL (Transport-agnostic)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 14
Internet Scale Explosion
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 14
• Host count
Internet Scale Explosion
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 14
• Host count
• Interfaces / host
Internet Scale Explosion
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 14
• Host count
• Interfaces / host
• Applications / host
Internet Scale Explosion
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 14
• Host count
• Interfaces / host
• Applications / host
• Connections /
application
Internet Scale Explosion
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 14
• Host count
• Interfaces / host
• Applications / host
• Connections /
application
Internet Scale Explosion
More Addresses!
(Carrier NAT if that doesn't work)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 14
• Host count
• Interfaces / host
• Applications / host
• Connections /
application
Internet Scale Explosion
More Addresses!
(Carrier NAT if that doesn't work)
More Compute
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 14
• Host count
• Interfaces / host
• Applications / host
• Connections /
application
Internet Scale Explosion
More Addresses!
(Carrier NAT if that doesn't work)
More Compute
Workarounds & New
Application protocols
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 14
• Host count
• Interfaces / host
• Applications / host
• Connections /
application
Internet Scale Explosion
More Addresses!
(Carrier NAT if that doesn't work)
More Compute
Workarounds & New
Application protocols
?????
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 15
Why do you care?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 15
• Familiar Problems
• Address Space Exhaustion
• Route Table Explosion
Why do you care?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 15
• Familiar Problems
• Address Space Exhaustion
• Route Table Explosion
• “New” Problems
• NAT Table Explosion
• Client-Controlled routing - Route Arbitrage and Swarming
Why do you care?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 16
TO BE CLEAR:
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 16
TO BE CLEAR:
These technologies are more culture shock
than direct vulnerability / concern
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 16
TO BE CLEAR:
These technologies are more culture shock
than direct vulnerability / concern
Personally, I like them, and want them to
succeed
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 16
TO BE CLEAR:
These technologies are more culture shock
than direct vulnerability / concern
Personally, I like them, and want them to
succeed
Network tools and operators, need to be ready
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 17
Current TCP is rather limited
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Doesn’t support use cases for:
Current TCP is rather limited
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 17
Doesn’t support use cases for:
• High Availability
Current TCP is rather limited
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 17
Doesn’t support use cases for:
• High Availability
• Link Aggregation
Current TCP is rather limited
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 17
Doesn’t support use cases for:
• High Availability
• Link Aggregation
• Multihoming
Current TCP is rather limited
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 17
Doesn’t support use cases for:
• High Availability
• Link Aggregation
• Multihoming
• Mesh networking
Current TCP is rather limited
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 17
Doesn’t support use cases for:
• High Availability
• Link Aggregation
• Multihoming
• Mesh networking
Makes a lot of round trips
Current TCP is rather limited
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 17
Doesn’t support use cases for:
• High Availability
• Link Aggregation
• Multihoming
• Mesh networking
Makes a lot of round trips
Blocks stream on retransmits
Current TCP is rather limited
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 17
Doesn’t support use cases for:
• High Availability
• Link Aggregation
• Multihoming
• Mesh networking
Makes a lot of round trips
Blocks stream on retransmits
Current TCP is rather limited
MPTCP
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 17
Doesn’t support use cases for:
• High Availability
• Link Aggregation
• Multihoming
• Mesh networking
Makes a lot of round trips
Blocks stream on retransmits
Current TCP is rather limited
QUIC
MPTCP
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 18
Why is this happening?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 18
Networks need multipath, but there’s more
than one way to do it
Why is this happening?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 18
Networks need multipath, but there’s more
than one way to do it
1. MPTCP Extends TCP to Multiplex
Why is this happening?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 18
Networks need multipath, but there’s more
than one way to do it
1. MPTCP Extends TCP to Multiplex
2. QUIC IGNORES TCP to handle it itself
Why is this happening?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 18
Networks need multipath, but there’s more
than one way to do it
1. MPTCP Extends TCP to Multiplex
2. QUIC IGNORES TCP to handle it itself
But, these technologies change the way the
internet behaves
Why is this happening?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 19


Introduction ✔

Background (Why Change TCP) ✔ 



MPTCP 



Background Redux (Why NOT to change TCP)

QUIC

Implications

Conclusion and Takeaways
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 20
Earlier: 



Current TCP is rather limited
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 20
Doesn’t support use cases for:
• High Availability
• Link Aggregation
• Multihoming
• Mesh networking
Makes a lot of round trips
Earlier: 



Current TCP is rather limited
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 21
Multipath TCP
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Multipath TCP
Multipath TCP is an extension to TCP that adds
the above functionality
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 21
Multipath TCP
Multipath TCP is an extension to TCP that adds
the above functionality
AND: it works over existing infrastructure
• (it IS TCP… just more so)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 21
Multipath TCP
Multipath TCP is an extension to TCP that adds
the above functionality
AND: it works over existing infrastructure
• (it IS TCP… just more so)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 21
Multipath TCP
Multipath TCP is an extension to TCP that adds
the above functionality
AND: it works over existing infrastructure
• (it IS TCP… just more so)
BUT: nothing much else understands it
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 22
Motivations and Advantages
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Motivations and Advantages
• TCP implements connections between
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 22
Motivations and Advantages
• TCP implements connections between
IP:PORT & IP:PORT, “without regard to
path”
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 22
Motivations and Advantages
• TCP implements connections between
IP:PORT & IP:PORT, “without regard to
path”
• NOT between endpoint A and endpoint B
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 22
Motivations and Advantages
• TCP implements connections between
IP:PORT & IP:PORT, “without regard to
path”
• NOT between endpoint A and endpoint B
• In the past this was a distinction without a
difference, but not any more
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 23
Riding atop of TCP
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Riding atop of TCP
•An MPTCP Connection is defined by a
connection ID
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 23
Riding atop of TCP
•An MPTCP Connection is defined by a
connection ID
•It is composed of multiple streams, where each
stream is a regular TCP connection (with an
option strapped on)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 24
MPTCP Characteristics
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MPTCP Characteristics
•Backwards compatibility
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MPTCP Characteristics
•Backwards compatibility
•Performance >= now
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 24
MPTCP Characteristics
•Backwards compatibility
•Performance >= now
•Security >= now
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 25
MPTCP – Simple Case
MPTCP connection looks like TCP so
far…
Client Server
Network A
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 26
MPTCP – Simple Case
Client Server
Network A
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MPTCP – Simple Case
Client Server
Network A
Network B
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 26
MPTCP – Simple Case
Client Server
Network A
Network B
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 26
MPTCP – Simple Case
N different TCP connections,
contributing to ONE logical data flow
Client Server
Network A
Network B
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 26
MPTCP – Simple Case
N different TCP connections,
contributing to ONE logical data flow
Client Server
Network A
Network B
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 27
MPTCP – Simple Case
N different TCP connections, contributing to ONE
logical data flow… data flows through any/all
Client Server
Network A
Network B
DATA[0]
DATA[1]
DATA[2]
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 28
MPTCP – Simple Case
Client Server
Network A
Network B
DATA[0]
DATA[1]
DATA[2]
Sender of a packet can choose to use
any flow (this will be important)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 29
MPTCP – Simple Case
Any subset of connections can drop,
overall flow continues.
Client Server
Network A
Network B
DATA[3]
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 30
MPTCP – Simple Case
Connections can be re-added at any time
Client Server
Network A
Network B
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 31
MPTCP – Simple Case
Un-ACK’d data can be quickly resent over a
different flow… first ACK is good enough!
Client Server
Network A
Network B
DATA[4]
ß
DATA[4]
ACK
DATA[4]
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 32
MPTCP – Basic Use Cases
Client Server
Network A
Network B
For seamless roaming For high
availability
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 33
How is MPTCP implemented? – TCP Option
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 34
What does it look like?
•Packet Breakdown - WireShark
• [WireShark / TCPdump Capture
screenshot]
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 34
What does it look like?
•Packet Breakdown - WireShark
• [WireShark / TCPdump Capture
screenshot]
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 34
What does it look like?
•Packet Breakdown - WireShark
• [WireShark / TCPdump Capture
screenshot]
TCP Options
field
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 34
What does it look like?
•Packet Breakdown - WireShark
• [WireShark / TCPdump Capture
screenshot]
TCP Options
field
Option 30 

(0x1E)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 35
Path Management - Linux
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 35
Path Management - Linux
• The Linux Path Manager has two
primary path managers at present
• Fullmesh – n:n (all to all)
• Ndiffports – 1-1 interfaces, n-1 ports
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 35
Path Management - Linux
• The Linux Path Manager has two
primary path managers at present
• Fullmesh – n:n (all to all)
• Ndiffports – 1-1 interfaces, n-1 ports
• This is in the TCP stack… application
layers get MPTCP for free (mostly)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 36
Path Management - ndiffports
N different source ports,
1 destination port
Client Server
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 36
Path Management - ndiffports
N different source ports,
1 destination port
Client Server
N = 1
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 36
Path Management - ndiffports
N different source ports,
1 destination port
Client Server
N = 2
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 36
Path Management - ndiffports
N different source ports,
1 destination port
Client Server
N = 3
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 37
Path Management - fullmesh
All possible paths used
Client Server
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 37
Path Management - fullmesh
All possible paths used
Client Server
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 37
Path Management - fullmesh
All possible paths used
Client Server
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 37
Path Management - fullmesh
All possible paths used
Client Server
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 37
Path Management - fullmesh
All possible paths used
Client Server
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 38


Introduction ✔

Background (Why Change TCP) ✔ 

MPTCP ✔ 



Background Redux (Why NOT TO change TCP) 



QUIC

Implications

Conclusion and Takeaways
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 39
Why NOT Change TCP?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 39
Why NOT Change TCP?
Lessons from MPTCP
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 39
Why NOT Change TCP?
Lessons from MPTCP
•Slow moving
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 39
Why NOT Change TCP?
Lessons from MPTCP
•Slow moving
•Meddleboxes limit protocol deployability
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 39
Why NOT Change TCP?
Lessons from MPTCP
•Slow moving
•Meddleboxes limit protocol deployability
•Chicken and egg deployment
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 40
Why NOT Change TCP?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 40
Why NOT Change TCP?
TCP Characteristics:
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 40
Why NOT Change TCP?
TCP Characteristics:
•Handshake design
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 40
Why NOT Change TCP?
TCP Characteristics:
•Handshake design
•Outside user-space
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 40
Why NOT Change TCP?
TCP Characteristics:
•Handshake design
•Outside user-space
•End-of-line Blocking
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 41
Why NOT Change TCP?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 41
Why NOT Change TCP?
If you can’t change TCP what’s left?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 41
Why NOT Change TCP?
If you can’t change TCP what’s left?
•SCTP?
• Same problems, but amplified
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 41
Why NOT Change TCP?
If you can’t change TCP what’s left?
•SCTP?
• Same problems, but amplified
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 41
Why NOT Change TCP?
If you can’t change TCP what’s left?
•SCTP?
• Same problems, but amplified
•UDP?
• But it doesn’t do ANYTHING fancy?
• Exactly.
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 42


Introduction ✔

Background (Why Change TCP) ✔ 

MPTCP ✔ 

Background Redux (Why NOT TO change TCP) ✔ 



QUIC 



Implications

Conclusion and Takeaways
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 43
QUIC 

(Quick UDP Internet Connections)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 43
•You thought MPTCP developed fast?
QUIC 

(Quick UDP Internet Connections)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 43
•You thought MPTCP developed fast?
•QUIC was even QUIC-ker
• Already in use on many Google properties
• Youtube, Google search, and more
• Likely several percent of your traffic
QUIC 

(Quick UDP Internet Connections)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 44
Current TCP is rather limited
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 44
Makes a lot of round trips
Current TCP is rather limited
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 44
Makes a lot of round trips
Blocks stream on retransmits
Current TCP is rather limited
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 44
Makes a lot of round trips
Blocks stream on retransmits
Current TCP is rather limited
QUIC
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 45
QUIC 

(Quick UDP Internet Connections)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 45
QUIC 

(Quick UDP Internet Connections)
UDP transport
protocol
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 45
QUIC 

(Quick UDP Internet Connections)
UDP transport
protocol
- Google championed
successor to SPDY
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 45
QUIC 

(Quick UDP Internet Connections)
UDP transport
protocol
- Google championed
successor to SPDY
- Latency Optimized
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 45
QUIC 

(Quick UDP Internet Connections)
UDP transport
protocol
- Google championed
successor to SPDY
- Latency Optimized
- Reliable, Multiplexed
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 45
QUIC 

(Quick UDP Internet Connections)
UDP transport
protocol
- Google championed
successor to SPDY
- Latency Optimized
- Reliable, Multiplexed
- Always Encrypted
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 45
QUIC 

(Quick UDP Internet Connections)
UDP transport
protocol
- Google championed
successor to SPDY
- Latency Optimized
- Reliable, Multiplexed
- Always Encrypted
Open Source
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 45
QUIC 

(Quick UDP Internet Connections)
UDP transport
protocol
- Google championed
successor to SPDY
- Latency Optimized
- Reliable, Multiplexed
- Always Encrypted
Open Source
User Space
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 45
QUIC 

(Quick UDP Internet Connections)
UDP transport
protocol
- Google championed
successor to SPDY
- Latency Optimized
- Reliable, Multiplexed
- Always Encrypted
Open Source
User Space
- No OS requirements
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 45
QUIC 

(Quick UDP Internet Connections)
UDP transport
protocol
- Google championed
successor to SPDY
- Latency Optimized
- Reliable, Multiplexed
- Always Encrypted
Open Source
User Space
- No OS requirements
- Fast Evolving
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 46
QUIC connection – Latency Reduction
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 46
• 0-RTT Connection establishment (1 sometimes)
QUIC connection – Latency Reduction
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 46
• 0-RTT Connection establishment (1 sometimes)
• FEC-based packet-loss recovery
QUIC connection – Latency Reduction
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 46
• 0-RTT Connection establishment (1 sometimes)
• FEC-based packet-loss recovery
• Flow Control at both connection and stream level
QUIC connection – Latency Reduction
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 46
• 0-RTT Connection establishment (1 sometimes)
• FEC-based packet-loss recovery
• Flow Control at both connection and stream level
• Certificate and header compression
QUIC connection – Latency Reduction
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 47
• Google claims:
• 30% reduction in video rebuffers
• 10% reduction in page load times
https://peering.google.com/#/learn-more/quic
QUIC connection – Benefits
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 48
QUIC connection - Overview
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 48
• UDP Port 80 and 443
QUIC connection - Overview
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 48
• UDP Port 80 and 443
• Upgrade headers in HTTP:
• Alternate-Protocol: [port]:quic
• Alternate-Protocol: 443:quic
QUIC connection - Overview
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 49
QUIC Infodump 0% [Starting…]
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 49
• Quic isn’t simple.
• Read the RFC, docs, and source
QUIC Infodump 0% [Starting…]
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 49
• Quic isn’t simple.
• Read the RFC, docs, and source
• QUIC is way more intricate than MPTCP
QUIC Infodump 0% [Starting…]
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 49
• Quic isn’t simple.
• Read the RFC, docs, and source
• QUIC is way more intricate than MPTCP
QUIC Infodump 0% [Starting…]
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 49
• Quic isn’t simple.
• Read the RFC, docs, and source
• QUIC is way more intricate than MPTCP
• I’m going to RACE through some details to
show the complexity of QUIC
QUIC Infodump 0% [Starting…]
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 50
QUIC Infodump 5% [x-------------------] Packet
Types
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 50
• Regular Packets
• Frame Packets
QUIC Infodump 5% [x-------------------] Packet
Types
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 50
• Regular Packets
• Frame Packets
• Special packet types
• Version negotiation,
• Public reset
QUIC Infodump 5% [x-------------------] Packet
Types
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51
QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51
QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
UDP
UDP Packet UDP Packet
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51
QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
UDP
QUIC Public Header
UDP Packet UDP Packet
QUIC Packet
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51
QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
UDP
QUIC Public Header
UDP Packet
AEAD Data
UDP Packet
QUIC Packet
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51
QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
UDP
QUIC Public Header
UDP Packet
AEAD Data
QUIC Private Header
UDP Packet
QUIC Packet
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51
QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
UDP
QUIC Public Header
QUIC Frame Packet
UDP Packet
AEAD Data
QUIC Private Header
UDP Packet
QUIC Packet
Frame Packet
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51
QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
UDP
QUIC Public Header
QUIC Frame Packet
QUIC Frame 1
UDP Packet
AEAD Data
QUIC Private Header
UDP Packet
QUIC Packet
Frame Packet
Frame
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51
QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
UDP
QUIC Public Header
QUIC Frame Packet
QUIC Frame 1
UDP Packet
AEAD Data
QUIC Private Header
UDP Packet
QUIC Packet
Frame Packet
FrameQUIC Frame 2
Frame
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51
QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
UDP
QUIC Public Header
QUIC Frame Packet
QUIC Frame 1
UDP Packet
AEAD Data
QUIC Private Header
UDP Packet
QUIC Packet
Frame Packet
Frame
FrameQUIC Frame 2
Frame
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51
QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
UDP
QUIC Public Header
QUIC Frame Packet
QUIC Frame 1
UDP Packet
AEAD Data
QUIC Private Header
UDP Packet
QUIC Packet
Frame Packet
Frame
FrameQUIC Frame 2
QUIC Frame n
Frame
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51
QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
UDP
QUIC Public Header
QUIC Frame Packet
QUIC Frame 1
UDP Packet
AEAD Data
QUIC Private Header
UDP Packet
QUIC Packet
Frame Packet
Frame
FrameQUIC Frame 2
QUIC Frame n
Frame
Unencrypted
Authenticated
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51
QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
UDP
QUIC Public Header
QUIC Frame Packet
QUIC Frame 1
UDP Packet
AEAD Data
QUIC Private Header
UDP Packet
QUIC Packet
Frame Packet
Frame
FrameQUIC Frame 2
QUIC Frame n
Frame
Unencrypted
Authenticated
Encrypted
Authenticated
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 52
QUIC Infodump 14%[--x-----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 52
• ONE QUIC Connection
QUIC Infodump 14%[--x-----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 52
• ONE QUIC Connection
QUIC Infodump 14%[--x-----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
• ONE QUIC Packet
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 52
• ONE QUIC Connection
QUIC Infodump 14%[--x-----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
• ONE QUIC Packet
Contains
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 52
• ONE QUIC Connection
QUIC Infodump 14%[--x-----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
• ONE QUIC Packet
Contains
• 0-1 Frame Packets
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 52
• ONE QUIC Connection
QUIC Infodump 14%[--x-----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
• ONE QUIC Packet
Contains
• 0-1 Frame Packets
Each containing
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 52
• ONE QUIC Connection
Contains
• N Streams
QUIC Infodump 14%[--x-----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
• ONE QUIC Packet
Contains
• 0-1 Frame Packets
Each containing
• N frames
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 52
• ONE QUIC Connection
Contains
• N Streams
QUIC Infodump 14%[--x-----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
• ONE QUIC Packet
Contains
• 0-1 Frame Packets
Each containing
• N frames
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 53
QUIC Infodump 17%[---x----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 53
• Two primary parts to a [regular] QUIC packet
QUIC Infodump 17%[---x----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 53
• Two primary parts to a [regular] QUIC packet
• Public Header (Authenticated, NOT Encrypted)
QUIC Infodump 17%[---x----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 53
• Two primary parts to a [regular] QUIC packet
• Public Header (Authenticated, NOT Encrypted)
• Private (Authenticated, Encrypted)
QUIC Infodump 17%[---x----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 53
• Two primary parts to a [regular] QUIC packet
• Public Header (Authenticated, NOT Encrypted)
• Private (Authenticated, Encrypted)
• AEAD (authenticated encryption and
associated data) data directly after Public
header, used to interpret Private data
QUIC Infodump 17%[---x----------------] 

Packet Structure- Overview
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 54
QUIC Infodump 25%[-----x--------------] 

Headers
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 54
• Public Header (Authenticated, NOT Encrypted)
• Flags
• Connection ID (Variable length, optional)
• Packet Number (Variable length)
• Version Header (If flag set)
QUIC Infodump 25%[-----x--------------] 

Headers
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 54
• Public Header (Authenticated, NOT Encrypted)
• Flags
• Connection ID (Variable length, optional)
• Packet Number (Variable length)
• Version Header (If flag set)
• Private (Authenticated, Encrypted)
• Flags
• FEC (Optional)
• Frame or FEC Payload
QUIC Infodump 25%[-----x--------------] 

Headers
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 55
QUIC Infodump 40%[--------x-----------] 

Frames
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 55
• Frame Packet (contains frames)
• Type
• Special
• Regular
• N Frames
QUIC Infodump 40%[--------x-----------] 

Frames
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 55
• Frame Packet (contains frames)
• Type
• Special
• Regular
• N Frames
• FEC Packet
• NULL-padded XOR of the data packets in the payload group
• Payload group details in the Private header
QUIC Infodump 40%[--------x-----------] 

Frames
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 56
QUIC Infodump 47%[----------x---------] 

Frame Types
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 56
• Control Frames
• Padding
• RST Stream
• Connection Close
• Goaway
• Window Update
• Blocked
• Stop_waiting
• Ping
QUIC Infodump 47%[----------x---------] 

Frame Types
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 56
• Control Frames
• Padding
• RST Stream
• Connection Close
• Goaway
• Window Update
• Blocked
• Stop_waiting
• Ping
QUIC Infodump 47%[----------x---------] 

Frame Types
• Special Frames
• Stream
• Ack
• Congestion feedback
• Most relevant:
• Stream frame
• ACK Frame
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 57
QUIC Infodump 52%[-----------x--------] 

Stream Frame
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 57
• Contained inside a frame packet
QUIC Infodump 52%[-----------x--------] 

Stream Frame
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 57
• Contained inside a frame packet
• Fields
• Type (Frame header: flags about lengths of other
items below)
• Stream ID
• Offset
• Length (0+, optional, omission means full packet)
QUIC Infodump 52%[-----------x--------] 

Stream Frame
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 58
QUIC Infodump 57%[------------x-------] 

ACK Frame
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 58
• Contained inside a frame packet
QUIC Infodump 57%[------------x-------] 

ACK Frame
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 58
• Contained inside a frame packet
• Fields
• Type (Frame header: flags about forms of other items below)
• Largest Observed packet #
• ACK Delay time
• Timestamp Section (Used as congestion indicator)
• Missing Packet Section (~NACK)
• Revived Packet Section (Which did FEC revive)
QUIC Infodump 57%[------------x-------] 

ACK Frame
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 59
QUIC Infodump 65% [-------------x------] 

Addressing
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 59
• Connection ID
• 64 bit, client chosen
• Independent of Network Address
• Source Address token (from previous connection)
QUIC Infodump 65% [-------------x------] 

Addressing
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 59
• Connection ID
• 64 bit, client chosen
• Independent of Network Address
• Source Address token (from previous connection)
• Stream ID
• Data flow WITHIN a connection
QUIC Infodump 65% [-------------x------] 

Addressing
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 60
QUIC Infodump 77% [---------------x----] 

Cryptographic
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 60
• Replaces, and Comparable to, TLS
• Client reuses encryption parameters from previous
connection
QUIC Infodump 77% [---------------x----] 

Cryptographic
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 60
• Replaces, and Comparable to, TLS
• Client reuses encryption parameters from previous
connection
• IP Spoofing protection
• Requires an IP-validated Source Address Token, or
negotiates a new one (0/1 RTT)
• No trivial reflection attacks as in NTP/DNS
QUIC Infodump 77% [---------------x----] 

Cryptographic
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 61
QUIC Infodump 84%[----------------x---] 

Forward Error Correction
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 61
• XOR of all packets in FEC block
QUIC Infodump 84%[----------------x---] 

Forward Error Correction
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 61
• XOR of all packets in FEC block
• FEC block size is variable
QUIC Infodump 84%[----------------x---] 

Forward Error Correction
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 61
• XOR of all packets in FEC block
• FEC block size is variable
• If “revived by FEC” then indicate this ID as
NACK and REVIVED
QUIC Infodump 84%[----------------x---] 

Forward Error Correction
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 62
QUIC Infodump 93%[-------------------x] 

Connection Management
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 62
• All connections assumed to be left in open
state until user leaves page
QUIC Infodump 93%[-------------------x] 

Connection Management
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 62
• All connections assumed to be left in open
state until user leaves page
• Address mobility supported
QUIC Infodump 93%[-------------------x] 

Connection Management
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 62
• All connections assumed to be left in open
state until user leaves page
• Address mobility supported
• Multipath planned, but not yet there
QUIC Infodump 93%[-------------------x] 

Connection Management
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 63
• QUIC intends to handle most HTTP/2
stream management
QUIC Infodump 99%[-------------------x] 

HTTP/2 Integration
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 64
• UDP Unicast unimpeded
• No filters
• No Rate Limiters
• UDP NAT good practice
• E.g. Timeouts set reasonably
QUIC Infodump 100% [ Finishing… ] 

Network Requirements
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 65
• Chrome:
• chrome://net-internals/#quic
Debugging UIC
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 66
• Wireshark:
QUIC dissector =>
Debugging QUIC
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 67


Introduction ✔

Background (Why Change TCP) ✔ 

MPTCP ✔ 

Background Redux (Why NOT TO change TCP) ✔ 

QUIC ✔ 



Implications 



Conclusion and Takeaways
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 68
Was anyone thinking about the network environment?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 68
Was anyone thinking about the network environment?
•The security and stability of
MPTCP itself
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 68
Was anyone thinking about the network environment?
•The security and stability of
MPTCP itself
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 68
Was anyone thinking about the network environment?
•The security and stability of
MPTCP itself
•What changes like this could
mean for network security
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 68
Was anyone thinking about the network environment?
•The security and stability of
MPTCP itself
•What changes like this could
mean for network security
… not so much
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 69
Was anyone thinking about the network environment?
•The security of MPTCP itself
•What changes like this could mean for
network security
… not so much
QUIC put more work into
this
• Google also operates the network
• But they also put in “Protection”
against network operator
interference
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 70
What does it look like?
•On the network: If you don’t
understand
•…
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 71
What does it look like?
•On the network: If you don’t
understand
Each yellow blob is actually part of an address label
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 72
What does it look like?
•On the
network: If
you don’t
understand it,
but you
cluster IPs
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 73
What does it look like?
• On the network: If you do understand
▪ But you can only do this when you can see & correlate all related flows…
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 74
MPTCP and … Network Management
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 74
MPTCP and … Network Management
• These protocols are agnostic of IPv4 and
IPv6, happily use both
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 74
MPTCP and … Network Management
• These protocols are agnostic of IPv4 and
IPv6, happily use both
• If tool doesn’t understand MPTCP, flows
look like unrelated TCP streams
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 74
MPTCP and … Network Management
• These protocols are agnostic of IPv4 and
IPv6, happily use both
• If tool doesn’t understand MPTCP, flows
look like unrelated TCP streams
• If tool doesn’t understand QUIC, flows
look like unrelated UDP flows
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 75
IDS
Monitoring – Cross-path fragmentation
Client Server
SEND 

ABCD
RECV

ABCD
AC
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 75
IDS
Monitoring – Cross-path fragmentation
Client Server
SEND 

ABCD
RECV

ABCD
AC
BD
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 75
IDS
Monitoring – Cross-path fragmentation
Client Server
IDS
SEND 

ABCD
RECV

ABCD
AC
BD
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 76
Multipath and … Network monitoring
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 76
Multipath and … Network monitoring
• How would your CGNAT handle an exponential
increase in connections as well as clients?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 76
Multipath and … Network monitoring
• How would your CGNAT handle an exponential
increase in connections as well as clients?
• Two devices:
• One interface each: 1 flow
• Four interfaces each: 16 flows
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 76
Multipath and … Network monitoring
• How would your CGNAT handle an exponential
increase in connections as well as clients?
• Two devices:
• One interface each: 1 flow
• Four interfaces each: 16 flows
• What about virtual interfaces, VPNs, proxies, load
balancers..
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 77
D
Monitoring – Combined Cross-path and Cross-Stream fragmentation
Client Server
Server Client
A
B
C
Insert Route redundancy
and/or Proxies to be mean
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 77
D
Monitoring – Combined Cross-path and Cross-Stream fragmentation
Client Server
Server Client
A
B
C
Insert Route redundancy
and/or Proxies to be mean
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 77
D
IDS
Monitoring – Combined Cross-path and Cross-Stream fragmentation
Client Server
IDS
Server Client
A
B
Proxy
Proxy
C
Insert Route redundancy
and/or Proxies to be mean
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 78
Multipath and … Network monitoring
• How would your CGNAT handle an
exponential increase in connections as
well as clients?
• Two Devices:
• One interface each: 1 flow
• Four Interfaces each: 16 flows
• What about virtual interfaces, VPNs,
proxies, load balancers..
In trying to solve address
exhaustion with NAT do we risk
state processing exhaustion?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79
Because of
these…
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79
• Cross-path
Because of
these…
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79
• Cross-path
• Moving target
Because of
these…
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79
• Cross-path
• Moving target
• Connection
resilience
Because of
these…
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79
• Cross-path
• Moving target
• Connection
resilience
• Reverse 

connections
Because of
these…
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79
• Cross-path
• Moving target
• Connection
resilience
• Reverse 

connections
Because of
these…
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79
• Cross-path
• Moving target
• Connection
resilience
• Reverse 

connections
Because of
these…
… if your approach to network
management requires any of these…
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79
• Cross-path
• Moving target
• Connection
resilience
• Reverse 

connections
• See all app layer data in a TCP stream
Because of
these…
… if your approach to network
management requires any of these…
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79
• Cross-path
• Moving target
• Connection
resilience
• Reverse 

connections
• See all app layer data in a TCP stream
• Associate logical sessions to IP
addresses
Because of
these…
… if your approach to network
management requires any of these…
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79
• Cross-path
• Moving target
• Connection
resilience
• Reverse 

connections
• See all app layer data in a TCP stream
• Associate logical sessions to IP
addresses
• Tamper with or close "bad" connections
mid-stream
Because of
these…
… if your approach to network
management requires any of these…
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79
• Cross-path
• Moving target
• Connection
resilience
• Reverse 

connections
• See all app layer data in a TCP stream
• Associate logical sessions to IP
addresses
• Tamper with or close "bad" connections
mid-stream
• Differentiate clients from servers based
on connection direction
Because of
these…
… if your approach to network
management requires any of these…
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79
• Cross-path
• Moving target
• Connection
resilience
• Reverse 

connections
• See all app layer data in a TCP stream
• Associate logical sessions to IP
addresses
• Tamper with or close "bad" connections
mid-stream
• Differentiate clients from servers based
on connection direction
Because of
these…
… if your approach to network
management requires any of these…
…then something is probably going to break
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 80
Key Effects
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 80
Key Effects
• Cross-path traffic fragmentation
• That’s the whole point!
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 80
Key Effects
• Cross-path traffic fragmentation
• That’s the whole point!
• Moving target
• Ability to change source and destination addresses in the middle of a connection
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 80
Key Effects
• Cross-path traffic fragmentation
• That’s the whole point!
• Moving target
• Ability to change source and destination addresses in the middle of a connection
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 80
Key Effects
• Cross-path traffic fragmentation
• That’s the whole point!
• Moving target
• Ability to change source and destination addresses in the middle of a connection
• Connection resilience
• Has additional checksums that require capture of the initial packet to reliably fake
• Until every subflow is dead the overall connection keeps going
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 80
Key Effects
• Cross-path traffic fragmentation
• That’s the whole point!
• Moving target
• Ability to change source and destination addresses in the middle of a connection
• Connection resilience
• Has additional checksums that require capture of the initial packet to reliably fake
• Until every subflow is dead the overall connection keeps going
• “Reverse” connections
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 81
Key Effects
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 81
Key Effects
A few lot of slides back…
• The packet sender decides which data goes down which path.
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 82
John Gilmore, 1993
“The Net interprets censorship
as damage and routes
around it.”
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 83
Kate Pearce, 2014
“Multipath interprets
modification as damage and
routes around it.”
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 84
Key Effects
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 84
Key Effects
A few lot of slides back…
• The packet sender decides which data goes down which path.
• Normal/benign clients won’t choose pathological fragmentation
schemes
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 84
Key Effects
A few lot of slides back…
• The packet sender decides which data goes down which path.
• Normal/benign clients won’t choose pathological fragmentation
schemes
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 85
MPTCP and … Firewalls
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 85
MPTCP and … Firewalls
•MPTCP has address
advertisement
• This changes things for perimeters
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 85
MPTCP and … Firewalls
•MPTCP has address
advertisement
• This changes things for perimeters
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 85
MPTCP and … Firewalls
•MPTCP has address
advertisement
• This changes things for perimeters
•How’d you like an outbound
incoming connection?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 86
MPTCP and … Firewalls
• MPTCP connection looks like TCP so
far…
Client ServerFirewall
1. SYN (MP_CAPABLE)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 87
MPTCP and … Firewalls
• Still seems pretty standard, albeit with
extra TCP OPTIONS
Client ServerFirewall
2. SYN, ACK (MP_CAPABLE)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 88
MPTCP and … Firewalls
• OK, so it’s a TCP connection with an
additional options… so what?
Client ServerFirewall
3. ACK…
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 89
MPTCP and … Firewalls
• Well, what if the client tells the server
about a new address?
Client ServerFirewall
Pre-established
MPTCP Connection
4. ADD_ADDR (IP#2)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 90
MPTCP and … Firewalls
• Now, the “Internal” host may set up a
connection to the advertised address
Client ServerFirewall
Pre-established
MPTCP Connection
4. ADD_ADDR (IP#2)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 91
MPTCP and … Firewalls
Client ServerFirewall
Pre-established
MPTCP Connection
5. SYN (MP_JOIN)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 91
MPTCP and … Firewalls
Client ServerFirewall
Pre-established
MPTCP Connection
5. SYN (MP_JOIN)
▪ Is this new connection incoming or outgoing?
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 92
MPTCP and … Firewalls
• Is this new connection incoming or outgoing?
Client ServerFirewall
Pre-established
MPTCP Connection
5. SYN (MP_JOIN)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 93
Multipath and … Privacy
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 93
Multipath and … Privacy
• Multipath shifts power towards endpoints,
and away from infrastructure & ISP’s
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 93
Multipath and … Privacy
• Multipath shifts power towards endpoints,
and away from infrastructure & ISP’s
• I don’t fully trust my ISP or Cellular
company…
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 93
Multipath and … Privacy
• Multipath shifts power towards endpoints,
and away from infrastructure & ISP’s
• I don’t fully trust my ISP or Cellular
company…
• But they probably don’t trust each other
either!
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 94


Introduction ✔

Background (Why Change TCP) ✔ 

MPTCP ✔ 

Background Redux (Why NOT TO change TCP) ✔ 

QUIC ✔ 

Implications ✔ 



Conclusion and Takeaways 

© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 95
So… things people took away from my MPTCP work
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 95
So… things people took away from my MPTCP work
•It’s a problem of tools (NO)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 95
So… things people took away from my MPTCP work
•It’s a problem of tools (NO)
•It’s a problem that only exists because of
MPTCP
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 95
So… things people took away from my MPTCP work
•It’s a problem of tools (NO)
•It’s a problem that only exists because of
MPTCP
•NO
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 95
So… things people took away from my MPTCP work
•It’s a problem of tools (NO)
•It’s a problem that only exists because of
MPTCP
•NO
•NO
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 95
So… things people took away from my MPTCP work
•It’s a problem of tools (NO)
•It’s a problem that only exists because of
MPTCP
•NO
•NO
•NO
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 95
So… things people took away from my MPTCP work
•It’s a problem of tools (NO)
•It’s a problem that only exists because of
MPTCP
•NO
•NO
•NO
•NO
▪NO
▪NO
▪NO
▪NO
▪NO
▪NO
▪NO
▪NO
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 96
Key Insights- Multipath
•The (IP) network’s job is to transmit data from
end to end. (?)
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 97
[CERF, VINTON G., and ROBERT E. KAHN. "A Protocol for Packet Network
Intercommunication." (1974).]
“Within each network, communication may be
disrupted due to unrecoverable mutation of
the data or missing data. End-to-end
restoration procedures are desirable to allow
complete recovery from these conditions.”
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 98
Key Insights – Content
Inspection
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 98
Key Insights – Content
Inspection
Many network management approaches rely
too much on
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 98
Key Insights – Content
Inspection
Many network management approaches rely
too much on
- Metadata
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 98
Key Insights – Content
Inspection
Many network management approaches rely
too much on
- Metadata
- Data inspection
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 98
Key Insights – Content
Inspection
Many network management approaches rely
too much on
- Metadata
- Data inspection
- Context Inspection
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 98
Key Insights – Content
Inspection
Many network management approaches rely
too much on
- Metadata
- Data inspection
- Context Inspection
The Internet wasn’t designed to validate your
control over network data flows.
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 99
Technical Takeaways
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 99
• Address != connection endpoint
Technical Takeaways
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 99
• Address != connection endpoint
• State exhaustion could become the new
address exhaustion
Technical Takeaways
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 99
• Address != connection endpoint
• State exhaustion could become the new
address exhaustion
• Multipath tech breaks assumptions many
didn’t even know we were making
Technical Takeaways
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 100
Conclusions
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 100
Conclusions
• Multipath communications are awesome,
and they’re coming
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 100
Conclusions
• Multipath communications are awesome,
and they’re coming
• Multipath communication confounds
business & security models relying on
stateful inspection or lookup
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 100
Conclusions
• Multipath communications are awesome,
and they’re coming
• Multipath communication confounds
business & security models relying on
stateful inspection or lookup
• Now is the time for network security and
network management to prepare
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 101
• MPTCP:
• Raiciu, C. et al., 2012. How hard can it be? designing and implementing a deployable multipath TCP.
NSDI, (1). Available at: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/nsdi12/nsdi12-final125.pdf.
• ACM Queue - Multipath TCP, Decoupled from IP, TCP is at last able to support multihomed hosts -
Christoph Paasch and Olivier Bonaventure, UCL - http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2591369
• IETF Working group - http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/mptcp/
• QUIC
• https://peering.google.com/#/learn-more/quic
• https://www.chromium.org/quic
• https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tsvwg-quic-protocol-02
• https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tsvwg-quic-loss-recovery-01
References and Links
Questions?
Twitter: @secvalve
katpearc@cisco.com
Catherine (Kate) Pearce
© 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 103
All possible

paths can be used at the same time
Path Management – mesh networks
Internet

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Multipathed, Multiplexed, Multilateral Transport Protocols - Decoupling transport protocols from what's below

  • 1. Catherine (Kate) Pearce Sr Security Consultant, Cisco Security Services Feb 22, 2016 Decoupling transport protocols from what's below Multipathed, Multiplexed, Multilateral Transport Protocols
  • 2. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2 Who?
  • 3. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2 Who? • Catherine (Kate) Pearce
  • 4. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2 Who? • Catherine (Kate) Pearce • @secvalve
  • 5. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2 Who? • Catherine (Kate) Pearce • @secvalve • Sr. Security Consultant 
 (Customer Focused)
  • 6. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2 Who? • Catherine (Kate) Pearce • @secvalve • Sr. Security Consultant 
 (Customer Focused) • Break & Report
  • 7. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2 Who? • Catherine (Kate) Pearce • @secvalve • Sr. Security Consultant 
 (Customer Focused) • Break & Report • Coach the builders
  • 8. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2 Who? • Catherine (Kate) Pearce • @secvalve • Sr. Security Consultant 
 (Customer Focused) • Break & Report • Coach the builders • Research what’s ahead
  • 9. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2 Who? • Catherine (Kate) Pearce • @secvalve • Sr. Security Consultant 
 (Customer Focused) • Break & Report • Coach the builders • Research what’s ahead • Distinguishing Features:
  • 10. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2 Who? • Catherine (Kate) Pearce • @secvalve • Sr. Security Consultant 
 (Customer Focused) • Break & Report • Coach the builders • Research what’s ahead • Distinguishing Features: • Loud, Yellow
  • 11. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2 Who? • Catherine (Kate) Pearce • @secvalve • Sr. Security Consultant 
 (Customer Focused) • Break & Report • Coach the builders • Research what’s ahead • Distinguishing Features: • Loud, Yellow • Or is that “Loud Yellow”?
  • 12. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 2 Who? • Catherine (Kate) Pearce • @secvalve • Sr. Security Consultant 
 (Customer Focused) • Break & Report • Coach the builders • Research what’s ahead • Distinguishing Features: • Loud, Yellow • Or is that “Loud Yellow”? ALL OPINIONS ENTIRELY MY OWN. 
 NO official Cisco representations of any kind
  • 13. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 3 MPTCP changes fundamental assumptions about how TCP works*
  • 14. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 3 MPTCP changes fundamental assumptions about how TCP works* Use it to break things today
  • 15. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 3 MPTCP changes fundamental assumptions about how TCP works* Use it to break things today Adapt to it for tomorrow
  • 16. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 4
  • 17. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 4 QUIC also changes fundamental assumptions about how HTTP works*
  • 18. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 4 QUIC also changes fundamental assumptions about how HTTP works* Use it to break things today
  • 19. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 4 QUIC also changes fundamental assumptions about how HTTP works* Use it to break things today Adapt to it for tomorrow
  • 20. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 5 2 Simple Examples: #1
  • 21. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 5 2 Simple Examples: #1
  • 22. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 6 2 Simple Examples: #1
  • 23. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 7 2 Simple Examples: #1
  • 24. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 7 2 Simple Examples: #1 Wait, What!?!!
  • 25. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 8 2 Simple Examples: #1
  • 26. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 8 2 Simple Examples: #1 Wait, What!?!!
  • 27. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 9 2 Simple Examples: #2
  • 28. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 10 2 Simple Examples: #2
  • 29. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 10 2 Simple Examples: #2
  • 30. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 10 2 Simple Examples: #2 Err?
  • 31. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 11 What’s going on here?
  • 32. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 11 What’s going on here? à Let’s talk about upcoming transport protocols
  • 33. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 12 
 Introduction ✔ 
 
 Background (TCP, Why Change it?) 
 
 MPTCP 
 Background Redux (Why NOT to change TCP)
 QUIC
 Implications
 Conclusion and Takeaways
  • 34. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 13 Multiplexing ~ Layer Technique Endpoint Endpoint Definition 1 Uniplex Wire Implicit 1/2 Circuit Switching Physical Wire Address Local Network Address 3 Packet Switching Routed Logical Address Routable Network Address (Mac/IP) 4 Packet Switched Transport Software Logical Port (linked to a single logical network address) Routable Network Address + Transport Protocol + Port 4+ Multipath Networking Process with a Logical Connection Identifier. (Linked to n logical network addresses + transports) + Multipath Protocol Identifier + Connection Identifier (Transport & Network Agnostic – as long as one given) 5 / 6 / 7 N/A URI/URL URI/URL (Transport-agnostic)
  • 35. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 14 Internet Scale Explosion
  • 36. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 14 • Host count Internet Scale Explosion
  • 37. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 14 • Host count • Interfaces / host Internet Scale Explosion
  • 38. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 14 • Host count • Interfaces / host • Applications / host Internet Scale Explosion
  • 39. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 14 • Host count • Interfaces / host • Applications / host • Connections / application Internet Scale Explosion
  • 40. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 14 • Host count • Interfaces / host • Applications / host • Connections / application Internet Scale Explosion More Addresses! (Carrier NAT if that doesn't work)
  • 41. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 14 • Host count • Interfaces / host • Applications / host • Connections / application Internet Scale Explosion More Addresses! (Carrier NAT if that doesn't work) More Compute
  • 42. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 14 • Host count • Interfaces / host • Applications / host • Connections / application Internet Scale Explosion More Addresses! (Carrier NAT if that doesn't work) More Compute Workarounds & New Application protocols
  • 43. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 14 • Host count • Interfaces / host • Applications / host • Connections / application Internet Scale Explosion More Addresses! (Carrier NAT if that doesn't work) More Compute Workarounds & New Application protocols ?????
  • 44. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 15 Why do you care?
  • 45. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 15 • Familiar Problems • Address Space Exhaustion • Route Table Explosion Why do you care?
  • 46. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 15 • Familiar Problems • Address Space Exhaustion • Route Table Explosion • “New” Problems • NAT Table Explosion • Client-Controlled routing - Route Arbitrage and Swarming Why do you care?
  • 47. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 16 TO BE CLEAR:
  • 48. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 16 TO BE CLEAR: These technologies are more culture shock than direct vulnerability / concern
  • 49. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 16 TO BE CLEAR: These technologies are more culture shock than direct vulnerability / concern Personally, I like them, and want them to succeed
  • 50. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 16 TO BE CLEAR: These technologies are more culture shock than direct vulnerability / concern Personally, I like them, and want them to succeed Network tools and operators, need to be ready
  • 51. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 17 Current TCP is rather limited
  • 52. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 17 Doesn’t support use cases for: Current TCP is rather limited
  • 53. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 17 Doesn’t support use cases for: • High Availability Current TCP is rather limited
  • 54. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 17 Doesn’t support use cases for: • High Availability • Link Aggregation Current TCP is rather limited
  • 55. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 17 Doesn’t support use cases for: • High Availability • Link Aggregation • Multihoming Current TCP is rather limited
  • 56. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 17 Doesn’t support use cases for: • High Availability • Link Aggregation • Multihoming • Mesh networking Current TCP is rather limited
  • 57. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 17 Doesn’t support use cases for: • High Availability • Link Aggregation • Multihoming • Mesh networking Makes a lot of round trips Current TCP is rather limited
  • 58. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 17 Doesn’t support use cases for: • High Availability • Link Aggregation • Multihoming • Mesh networking Makes a lot of round trips Blocks stream on retransmits Current TCP is rather limited
  • 59. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 17 Doesn’t support use cases for: • High Availability • Link Aggregation • Multihoming • Mesh networking Makes a lot of round trips Blocks stream on retransmits Current TCP is rather limited MPTCP
  • 60. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 17 Doesn’t support use cases for: • High Availability • Link Aggregation • Multihoming • Mesh networking Makes a lot of round trips Blocks stream on retransmits Current TCP is rather limited QUIC MPTCP
  • 61. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 18 Why is this happening?
  • 62. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 18 Networks need multipath, but there’s more than one way to do it Why is this happening?
  • 63. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 18 Networks need multipath, but there’s more than one way to do it 1. MPTCP Extends TCP to Multiplex Why is this happening?
  • 64. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 18 Networks need multipath, but there’s more than one way to do it 1. MPTCP Extends TCP to Multiplex 2. QUIC IGNORES TCP to handle it itself Why is this happening?
  • 65. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 18 Networks need multipath, but there’s more than one way to do it 1. MPTCP Extends TCP to Multiplex 2. QUIC IGNORES TCP to handle it itself But, these technologies change the way the internet behaves Why is this happening?
  • 66. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 19 
 Introduction ✔
 Background (Why Change TCP) ✔ 
 
 MPTCP 
 
 Background Redux (Why NOT to change TCP)
 QUIC
 Implications
 Conclusion and Takeaways
  • 67. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 20 Earlier: 
 
 Current TCP is rather limited
  • 68. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 20 Doesn’t support use cases for: • High Availability • Link Aggregation • Multihoming • Mesh networking Makes a lot of round trips Earlier: 
 
 Current TCP is rather limited
  • 69. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 21 Multipath TCP
  • 70. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 21 Multipath TCP Multipath TCP is an extension to TCP that adds the above functionality
  • 71. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 21 Multipath TCP Multipath TCP is an extension to TCP that adds the above functionality AND: it works over existing infrastructure • (it IS TCP… just more so)
  • 72. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 21 Multipath TCP Multipath TCP is an extension to TCP that adds the above functionality AND: it works over existing infrastructure • (it IS TCP… just more so)
  • 73. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 21 Multipath TCP Multipath TCP is an extension to TCP that adds the above functionality AND: it works over existing infrastructure • (it IS TCP… just more so) BUT: nothing much else understands it
  • 74. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 22 Motivations and Advantages
  • 75. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 22 Motivations and Advantages • TCP implements connections between
  • 76. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 22 Motivations and Advantages • TCP implements connections between IP:PORT & IP:PORT, “without regard to path”
  • 77. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 22 Motivations and Advantages • TCP implements connections between IP:PORT & IP:PORT, “without regard to path” • NOT between endpoint A and endpoint B
  • 78. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 22 Motivations and Advantages • TCP implements connections between IP:PORT & IP:PORT, “without regard to path” • NOT between endpoint A and endpoint B • In the past this was a distinction without a difference, but not any more
  • 79. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 23 Riding atop of TCP
  • 80. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 23 Riding atop of TCP •An MPTCP Connection is defined by a connection ID
  • 81. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 23 Riding atop of TCP •An MPTCP Connection is defined by a connection ID •It is composed of multiple streams, where each stream is a regular TCP connection (with an option strapped on)
  • 82. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 24 MPTCP Characteristics
  • 83. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 24 MPTCP Characteristics •Backwards compatibility
  • 84. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 24 MPTCP Characteristics •Backwards compatibility •Performance >= now
  • 85. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 24 MPTCP Characteristics •Backwards compatibility •Performance >= now •Security >= now
  • 86. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 25 MPTCP – Simple Case MPTCP connection looks like TCP so far… Client Server Network A
  • 87. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 26 MPTCP – Simple Case Client Server Network A
  • 88. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 26 MPTCP – Simple Case Client Server Network A Network B
  • 89. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 26 MPTCP – Simple Case Client Server Network A Network B
  • 90. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 26 MPTCP – Simple Case N different TCP connections, contributing to ONE logical data flow Client Server Network A Network B
  • 91. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 26 MPTCP – Simple Case N different TCP connections, contributing to ONE logical data flow Client Server Network A Network B
  • 92. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 27 MPTCP – Simple Case N different TCP connections, contributing to ONE logical data flow… data flows through any/all Client Server Network A Network B DATA[0] DATA[1] DATA[2]
  • 93. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 28 MPTCP – Simple Case Client Server Network A Network B DATA[0] DATA[1] DATA[2] Sender of a packet can choose to use any flow (this will be important)
  • 94. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 29 MPTCP – Simple Case Any subset of connections can drop, overall flow continues. Client Server Network A Network B DATA[3]
  • 95. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 30 MPTCP – Simple Case Connections can be re-added at any time Client Server Network A Network B
  • 96. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 31 MPTCP – Simple Case Un-ACK’d data can be quickly resent over a different flow… first ACK is good enough! Client Server Network A Network B DATA[4] ß DATA[4] ACK DATA[4]
  • 97. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 32 MPTCP – Basic Use Cases Client Server Network A Network B For seamless roaming For high availability
  • 98. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 33 How is MPTCP implemented? – TCP Option
  • 99. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 34 What does it look like? •Packet Breakdown - WireShark • [WireShark / TCPdump Capture screenshot]
  • 100. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 34 What does it look like? •Packet Breakdown - WireShark • [WireShark / TCPdump Capture screenshot]
  • 101. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 34 What does it look like? •Packet Breakdown - WireShark • [WireShark / TCPdump Capture screenshot] TCP Options field
  • 102. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 34 What does it look like? •Packet Breakdown - WireShark • [WireShark / TCPdump Capture screenshot] TCP Options field Option 30 
 (0x1E)
  • 103. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 35 Path Management - Linux
  • 104. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 35 Path Management - Linux • The Linux Path Manager has two primary path managers at present • Fullmesh – n:n (all to all) • Ndiffports – 1-1 interfaces, n-1 ports
  • 105. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 35 Path Management - Linux • The Linux Path Manager has two primary path managers at present • Fullmesh – n:n (all to all) • Ndiffports – 1-1 interfaces, n-1 ports • This is in the TCP stack… application layers get MPTCP for free (mostly)
  • 106. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 36 Path Management - ndiffports N different source ports, 1 destination port Client Server
  • 107. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 36 Path Management - ndiffports N different source ports, 1 destination port Client Server N = 1
  • 108. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 36 Path Management - ndiffports N different source ports, 1 destination port Client Server N = 2
  • 109. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 36 Path Management - ndiffports N different source ports, 1 destination port Client Server N = 3
  • 110. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 37 Path Management - fullmesh All possible paths used Client Server
  • 111. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 37 Path Management - fullmesh All possible paths used Client Server
  • 112. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 37 Path Management - fullmesh All possible paths used Client Server
  • 113. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 37 Path Management - fullmesh All possible paths used Client Server
  • 114. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 37 Path Management - fullmesh All possible paths used Client Server
  • 115. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 38 
 Introduction ✔
 Background (Why Change TCP) ✔ 
 MPTCP ✔ 
 
 Background Redux (Why NOT TO change TCP) 
 
 QUIC
 Implications
 Conclusion and Takeaways
  • 116. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 39 Why NOT Change TCP?
  • 117. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 39 Why NOT Change TCP? Lessons from MPTCP
  • 118. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 39 Why NOT Change TCP? Lessons from MPTCP •Slow moving
  • 119. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 39 Why NOT Change TCP? Lessons from MPTCP •Slow moving •Meddleboxes limit protocol deployability
  • 120. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 39 Why NOT Change TCP? Lessons from MPTCP •Slow moving •Meddleboxes limit protocol deployability •Chicken and egg deployment
  • 121. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 40 Why NOT Change TCP?
  • 122. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 40 Why NOT Change TCP? TCP Characteristics:
  • 123. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 40 Why NOT Change TCP? TCP Characteristics: •Handshake design
  • 124. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 40 Why NOT Change TCP? TCP Characteristics: •Handshake design •Outside user-space
  • 125. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 40 Why NOT Change TCP? TCP Characteristics: •Handshake design •Outside user-space •End-of-line Blocking
  • 126. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 41 Why NOT Change TCP?
  • 127. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 41 Why NOT Change TCP? If you can’t change TCP what’s left?
  • 128. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 41 Why NOT Change TCP? If you can’t change TCP what’s left? •SCTP? • Same problems, but amplified
  • 129. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 41 Why NOT Change TCP? If you can’t change TCP what’s left? •SCTP? • Same problems, but amplified
  • 130. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 41 Why NOT Change TCP? If you can’t change TCP what’s left? •SCTP? • Same problems, but amplified •UDP? • But it doesn’t do ANYTHING fancy? • Exactly.
  • 131. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 42 
 Introduction ✔
 Background (Why Change TCP) ✔ 
 MPTCP ✔ 
 Background Redux (Why NOT TO change TCP) ✔ 
 
 QUIC 
 
 Implications
 Conclusion and Takeaways
  • 132. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 43 QUIC 
 (Quick UDP Internet Connections)
  • 133. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 43 •You thought MPTCP developed fast? QUIC 
 (Quick UDP Internet Connections)
  • 134. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 43 •You thought MPTCP developed fast? •QUIC was even QUIC-ker • Already in use on many Google properties • Youtube, Google search, and more • Likely several percent of your traffic QUIC 
 (Quick UDP Internet Connections)
  • 135. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 44 Current TCP is rather limited
  • 136. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 44 Makes a lot of round trips Current TCP is rather limited
  • 137. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 44 Makes a lot of round trips Blocks stream on retransmits Current TCP is rather limited
  • 138. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 44 Makes a lot of round trips Blocks stream on retransmits Current TCP is rather limited QUIC
  • 139. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 45 QUIC 
 (Quick UDP Internet Connections)
  • 140. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 45 QUIC 
 (Quick UDP Internet Connections) UDP transport protocol
  • 141. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 45 QUIC 
 (Quick UDP Internet Connections) UDP transport protocol - Google championed successor to SPDY
  • 142. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 45 QUIC 
 (Quick UDP Internet Connections) UDP transport protocol - Google championed successor to SPDY - Latency Optimized
  • 143. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 45 QUIC 
 (Quick UDP Internet Connections) UDP transport protocol - Google championed successor to SPDY - Latency Optimized - Reliable, Multiplexed
  • 144. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 45 QUIC 
 (Quick UDP Internet Connections) UDP transport protocol - Google championed successor to SPDY - Latency Optimized - Reliable, Multiplexed - Always Encrypted
  • 145. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 45 QUIC 
 (Quick UDP Internet Connections) UDP transport protocol - Google championed successor to SPDY - Latency Optimized - Reliable, Multiplexed - Always Encrypted Open Source
  • 146. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 45 QUIC 
 (Quick UDP Internet Connections) UDP transport protocol - Google championed successor to SPDY - Latency Optimized - Reliable, Multiplexed - Always Encrypted Open Source User Space
  • 147. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 45 QUIC 
 (Quick UDP Internet Connections) UDP transport protocol - Google championed successor to SPDY - Latency Optimized - Reliable, Multiplexed - Always Encrypted Open Source User Space - No OS requirements
  • 148. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 45 QUIC 
 (Quick UDP Internet Connections) UDP transport protocol - Google championed successor to SPDY - Latency Optimized - Reliable, Multiplexed - Always Encrypted Open Source User Space - No OS requirements - Fast Evolving
  • 149. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 46 QUIC connection – Latency Reduction
  • 150. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 46 • 0-RTT Connection establishment (1 sometimes) QUIC connection – Latency Reduction
  • 151. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 46 • 0-RTT Connection establishment (1 sometimes) • FEC-based packet-loss recovery QUIC connection – Latency Reduction
  • 152. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 46 • 0-RTT Connection establishment (1 sometimes) • FEC-based packet-loss recovery • Flow Control at both connection and stream level QUIC connection – Latency Reduction
  • 153. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 46 • 0-RTT Connection establishment (1 sometimes) • FEC-based packet-loss recovery • Flow Control at both connection and stream level • Certificate and header compression QUIC connection – Latency Reduction
  • 154. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 47 • Google claims: • 30% reduction in video rebuffers • 10% reduction in page load times https://peering.google.com/#/learn-more/quic QUIC connection – Benefits
  • 155. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 48 QUIC connection - Overview
  • 156. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 48 • UDP Port 80 and 443 QUIC connection - Overview
  • 157. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 48 • UDP Port 80 and 443 • Upgrade headers in HTTP: • Alternate-Protocol: [port]:quic • Alternate-Protocol: 443:quic QUIC connection - Overview
  • 158. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 49 QUIC Infodump 0% [Starting…]
  • 159. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 49 • Quic isn’t simple. • Read the RFC, docs, and source QUIC Infodump 0% [Starting…]
  • 160. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 49 • Quic isn’t simple. • Read the RFC, docs, and source • QUIC is way more intricate than MPTCP QUIC Infodump 0% [Starting…]
  • 161. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 49 • Quic isn’t simple. • Read the RFC, docs, and source • QUIC is way more intricate than MPTCP QUIC Infodump 0% [Starting…]
  • 162. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 49 • Quic isn’t simple. • Read the RFC, docs, and source • QUIC is way more intricate than MPTCP • I’m going to RACE through some details to show the complexity of QUIC QUIC Infodump 0% [Starting…]
  • 163. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 50 QUIC Infodump 5% [x-------------------] Packet Types
  • 164. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 50 • Regular Packets • Frame Packets QUIC Infodump 5% [x-------------------] Packet Types
  • 165. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 50 • Regular Packets • Frame Packets • Special packet types • Version negotiation, • Public reset QUIC Infodump 5% [x-------------------] Packet Types
  • 166. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51 QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview
  • 167. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51 QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview UDP UDP Packet UDP Packet
  • 168. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51 QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview UDP QUIC Public Header UDP Packet UDP Packet QUIC Packet
  • 169. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51 QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview UDP QUIC Public Header UDP Packet AEAD Data UDP Packet QUIC Packet
  • 170. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51 QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview UDP QUIC Public Header UDP Packet AEAD Data QUIC Private Header UDP Packet QUIC Packet
  • 171. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51 QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview UDP QUIC Public Header QUIC Frame Packet UDP Packet AEAD Data QUIC Private Header UDP Packet QUIC Packet Frame Packet
  • 172. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51 QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview UDP QUIC Public Header QUIC Frame Packet QUIC Frame 1 UDP Packet AEAD Data QUIC Private Header UDP Packet QUIC Packet Frame Packet Frame
  • 173. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51 QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview UDP QUIC Public Header QUIC Frame Packet QUIC Frame 1 UDP Packet AEAD Data QUIC Private Header UDP Packet QUIC Packet Frame Packet FrameQUIC Frame 2 Frame
  • 174. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51 QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview UDP QUIC Public Header QUIC Frame Packet QUIC Frame 1 UDP Packet AEAD Data QUIC Private Header UDP Packet QUIC Packet Frame Packet Frame FrameQUIC Frame 2 Frame
  • 175. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51 QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview UDP QUIC Public Header QUIC Frame Packet QUIC Frame 1 UDP Packet AEAD Data QUIC Private Header UDP Packet QUIC Packet Frame Packet Frame FrameQUIC Frame 2 QUIC Frame n Frame
  • 176. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51 QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview UDP QUIC Public Header QUIC Frame Packet QUIC Frame 1 UDP Packet AEAD Data QUIC Private Header UDP Packet QUIC Packet Frame Packet Frame FrameQUIC Frame 2 QUIC Frame n Frame Unencrypted Authenticated
  • 177. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 51 QUIC Infodump 10%[--x-----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview UDP QUIC Public Header QUIC Frame Packet QUIC Frame 1 UDP Packet AEAD Data QUIC Private Header UDP Packet QUIC Packet Frame Packet Frame FrameQUIC Frame 2 QUIC Frame n Frame Unencrypted Authenticated Encrypted Authenticated
  • 178. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 52 QUIC Infodump 14%[--x-----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview
  • 179. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 52 • ONE QUIC Connection QUIC Infodump 14%[--x-----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview
  • 180. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 52 • ONE QUIC Connection QUIC Infodump 14%[--x-----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview • ONE QUIC Packet
  • 181. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 52 • ONE QUIC Connection QUIC Infodump 14%[--x-----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview • ONE QUIC Packet Contains
  • 182. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 52 • ONE QUIC Connection QUIC Infodump 14%[--x-----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview • ONE QUIC Packet Contains • 0-1 Frame Packets
  • 183. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 52 • ONE QUIC Connection QUIC Infodump 14%[--x-----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview • ONE QUIC Packet Contains • 0-1 Frame Packets Each containing
  • 184. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 52 • ONE QUIC Connection Contains • N Streams QUIC Infodump 14%[--x-----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview • ONE QUIC Packet Contains • 0-1 Frame Packets Each containing • N frames
  • 185. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 52 • ONE QUIC Connection Contains • N Streams QUIC Infodump 14%[--x-----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview • ONE QUIC Packet Contains • 0-1 Frame Packets Each containing • N frames
  • 186. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 53 QUIC Infodump 17%[---x----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview
  • 187. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 53 • Two primary parts to a [regular] QUIC packet QUIC Infodump 17%[---x----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview
  • 188. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 53 • Two primary parts to a [regular] QUIC packet • Public Header (Authenticated, NOT Encrypted) QUIC Infodump 17%[---x----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview
  • 189. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 53 • Two primary parts to a [regular] QUIC packet • Public Header (Authenticated, NOT Encrypted) • Private (Authenticated, Encrypted) QUIC Infodump 17%[---x----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview
  • 190. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 53 • Two primary parts to a [regular] QUIC packet • Public Header (Authenticated, NOT Encrypted) • Private (Authenticated, Encrypted) • AEAD (authenticated encryption and associated data) data directly after Public header, used to interpret Private data QUIC Infodump 17%[---x----------------] 
 Packet Structure- Overview
  • 191. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 54 QUIC Infodump 25%[-----x--------------] 
 Headers
  • 192. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 54 • Public Header (Authenticated, NOT Encrypted) • Flags • Connection ID (Variable length, optional) • Packet Number (Variable length) • Version Header (If flag set) QUIC Infodump 25%[-----x--------------] 
 Headers
  • 193. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 54 • Public Header (Authenticated, NOT Encrypted) • Flags • Connection ID (Variable length, optional) • Packet Number (Variable length) • Version Header (If flag set) • Private (Authenticated, Encrypted) • Flags • FEC (Optional) • Frame or FEC Payload QUIC Infodump 25%[-----x--------------] 
 Headers
  • 194. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 55 QUIC Infodump 40%[--------x-----------] 
 Frames
  • 195. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 55 • Frame Packet (contains frames) • Type • Special • Regular • N Frames QUIC Infodump 40%[--------x-----------] 
 Frames
  • 196. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 55 • Frame Packet (contains frames) • Type • Special • Regular • N Frames • FEC Packet • NULL-padded XOR of the data packets in the payload group • Payload group details in the Private header QUIC Infodump 40%[--------x-----------] 
 Frames
  • 197. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 56 QUIC Infodump 47%[----------x---------] 
 Frame Types
  • 198. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 56 • Control Frames • Padding • RST Stream • Connection Close • Goaway • Window Update • Blocked • Stop_waiting • Ping QUIC Infodump 47%[----------x---------] 
 Frame Types
  • 199. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 56 • Control Frames • Padding • RST Stream • Connection Close • Goaway • Window Update • Blocked • Stop_waiting • Ping QUIC Infodump 47%[----------x---------] 
 Frame Types • Special Frames • Stream • Ack • Congestion feedback • Most relevant: • Stream frame • ACK Frame
  • 200. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 57 QUIC Infodump 52%[-----------x--------] 
 Stream Frame
  • 201. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 57 • Contained inside a frame packet QUIC Infodump 52%[-----------x--------] 
 Stream Frame
  • 202. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 57 • Contained inside a frame packet • Fields • Type (Frame header: flags about lengths of other items below) • Stream ID • Offset • Length (0+, optional, omission means full packet) QUIC Infodump 52%[-----------x--------] 
 Stream Frame
  • 203. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 58 QUIC Infodump 57%[------------x-------] 
 ACK Frame
  • 204. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 58 • Contained inside a frame packet QUIC Infodump 57%[------------x-------] 
 ACK Frame
  • 205. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 58 • Contained inside a frame packet • Fields • Type (Frame header: flags about forms of other items below) • Largest Observed packet # • ACK Delay time • Timestamp Section (Used as congestion indicator) • Missing Packet Section (~NACK) • Revived Packet Section (Which did FEC revive) QUIC Infodump 57%[------------x-------] 
 ACK Frame
  • 206. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 59 QUIC Infodump 65% [-------------x------] 
 Addressing
  • 207. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 59 • Connection ID • 64 bit, client chosen • Independent of Network Address • Source Address token (from previous connection) QUIC Infodump 65% [-------------x------] 
 Addressing
  • 208. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 59 • Connection ID • 64 bit, client chosen • Independent of Network Address • Source Address token (from previous connection) • Stream ID • Data flow WITHIN a connection QUIC Infodump 65% [-------------x------] 
 Addressing
  • 209. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 60 QUIC Infodump 77% [---------------x----] 
 Cryptographic
  • 210. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 60 • Replaces, and Comparable to, TLS • Client reuses encryption parameters from previous connection QUIC Infodump 77% [---------------x----] 
 Cryptographic
  • 211. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 60 • Replaces, and Comparable to, TLS • Client reuses encryption parameters from previous connection • IP Spoofing protection • Requires an IP-validated Source Address Token, or negotiates a new one (0/1 RTT) • No trivial reflection attacks as in NTP/DNS QUIC Infodump 77% [---------------x----] 
 Cryptographic
  • 212. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 61 QUIC Infodump 84%[----------------x---] 
 Forward Error Correction
  • 213. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 61 • XOR of all packets in FEC block QUIC Infodump 84%[----------------x---] 
 Forward Error Correction
  • 214. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 61 • XOR of all packets in FEC block • FEC block size is variable QUIC Infodump 84%[----------------x---] 
 Forward Error Correction
  • 215. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 61 • XOR of all packets in FEC block • FEC block size is variable • If “revived by FEC” then indicate this ID as NACK and REVIVED QUIC Infodump 84%[----------------x---] 
 Forward Error Correction
  • 216. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 62 QUIC Infodump 93%[-------------------x] 
 Connection Management
  • 217. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 62 • All connections assumed to be left in open state until user leaves page QUIC Infodump 93%[-------------------x] 
 Connection Management
  • 218. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 62 • All connections assumed to be left in open state until user leaves page • Address mobility supported QUIC Infodump 93%[-------------------x] 
 Connection Management
  • 219. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 62 • All connections assumed to be left in open state until user leaves page • Address mobility supported • Multipath planned, but not yet there QUIC Infodump 93%[-------------------x] 
 Connection Management
  • 220. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 63 • QUIC intends to handle most HTTP/2 stream management QUIC Infodump 99%[-------------------x] 
 HTTP/2 Integration
  • 221. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 64 • UDP Unicast unimpeded • No filters • No Rate Limiters • UDP NAT good practice • E.g. Timeouts set reasonably QUIC Infodump 100% [ Finishing… ] 
 Network Requirements
  • 222. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 65 • Chrome: • chrome://net-internals/#quic Debugging UIC
  • 223. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 66 • Wireshark: QUIC dissector => Debugging QUIC
  • 224. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 67 
 Introduction ✔
 Background (Why Change TCP) ✔ 
 MPTCP ✔ 
 Background Redux (Why NOT TO change TCP) ✔ 
 QUIC ✔ 
 
 Implications 
 
 Conclusion and Takeaways
  • 225. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 68 Was anyone thinking about the network environment?
  • 226. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 68 Was anyone thinking about the network environment? •The security and stability of MPTCP itself
  • 227. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 68 Was anyone thinking about the network environment? •The security and stability of MPTCP itself
  • 228. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 68 Was anyone thinking about the network environment? •The security and stability of MPTCP itself •What changes like this could mean for network security
  • 229. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 68 Was anyone thinking about the network environment? •The security and stability of MPTCP itself •What changes like this could mean for network security … not so much
  • 230. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 69 Was anyone thinking about the network environment? •The security of MPTCP itself •What changes like this could mean for network security … not so much QUIC put more work into this • Google also operates the network • But they also put in “Protection” against network operator interference
  • 231. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 70 What does it look like? •On the network: If you don’t understand •…
  • 232. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 71 What does it look like? •On the network: If you don’t understand Each yellow blob is actually part of an address label
  • 233. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 72 What does it look like? •On the network: If you don’t understand it, but you cluster IPs
  • 234. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 73 What does it look like? • On the network: If you do understand ▪ But you can only do this when you can see & correlate all related flows…
  • 235. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 74 MPTCP and … Network Management
  • 236. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 74 MPTCP and … Network Management • These protocols are agnostic of IPv4 and IPv6, happily use both
  • 237. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 74 MPTCP and … Network Management • These protocols are agnostic of IPv4 and IPv6, happily use both • If tool doesn’t understand MPTCP, flows look like unrelated TCP streams
  • 238. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 74 MPTCP and … Network Management • These protocols are agnostic of IPv4 and IPv6, happily use both • If tool doesn’t understand MPTCP, flows look like unrelated TCP streams • If tool doesn’t understand QUIC, flows look like unrelated UDP flows
  • 239. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 75 IDS Monitoring – Cross-path fragmentation Client Server SEND 
 ABCD RECV
 ABCD AC
  • 240. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 75 IDS Monitoring – Cross-path fragmentation Client Server SEND 
 ABCD RECV
 ABCD AC BD
  • 241. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 75 IDS Monitoring – Cross-path fragmentation Client Server IDS SEND 
 ABCD RECV
 ABCD AC BD
  • 242. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 76 Multipath and … Network monitoring
  • 243. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 76 Multipath and … Network monitoring • How would your CGNAT handle an exponential increase in connections as well as clients?
  • 244. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 76 Multipath and … Network monitoring • How would your CGNAT handle an exponential increase in connections as well as clients? • Two devices: • One interface each: 1 flow • Four interfaces each: 16 flows
  • 245. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 76 Multipath and … Network monitoring • How would your CGNAT handle an exponential increase in connections as well as clients? • Two devices: • One interface each: 1 flow • Four interfaces each: 16 flows • What about virtual interfaces, VPNs, proxies, load balancers..
  • 246. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 77 D Monitoring – Combined Cross-path and Cross-Stream fragmentation Client Server Server Client A B C Insert Route redundancy and/or Proxies to be mean
  • 247. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 77 D Monitoring – Combined Cross-path and Cross-Stream fragmentation Client Server Server Client A B C Insert Route redundancy and/or Proxies to be mean
  • 248. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 77 D IDS Monitoring – Combined Cross-path and Cross-Stream fragmentation Client Server IDS Server Client A B Proxy Proxy C Insert Route redundancy and/or Proxies to be mean
  • 249. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 78 Multipath and … Network monitoring • How would your CGNAT handle an exponential increase in connections as well as clients? • Two Devices: • One interface each: 1 flow • Four Interfaces each: 16 flows • What about virtual interfaces, VPNs, proxies, load balancers.. In trying to solve address exhaustion with NAT do we risk state processing exhaustion?
  • 250. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79 Because of these…
  • 251. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79 • Cross-path Because of these…
  • 252. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79 • Cross-path • Moving target Because of these…
  • 253. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79 • Cross-path • Moving target • Connection resilience Because of these…
  • 254. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79 • Cross-path • Moving target • Connection resilience • Reverse 
 connections Because of these…
  • 255. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79 • Cross-path • Moving target • Connection resilience • Reverse 
 connections Because of these…
  • 256. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79 • Cross-path • Moving target • Connection resilience • Reverse 
 connections Because of these… … if your approach to network management requires any of these…
  • 257. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79 • Cross-path • Moving target • Connection resilience • Reverse 
 connections • See all app layer data in a TCP stream Because of these… … if your approach to network management requires any of these…
  • 258. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79 • Cross-path • Moving target • Connection resilience • Reverse 
 connections • See all app layer data in a TCP stream • Associate logical sessions to IP addresses Because of these… … if your approach to network management requires any of these…
  • 259. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79 • Cross-path • Moving target • Connection resilience • Reverse 
 connections • See all app layer data in a TCP stream • Associate logical sessions to IP addresses • Tamper with or close "bad" connections mid-stream Because of these… … if your approach to network management requires any of these…
  • 260. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79 • Cross-path • Moving target • Connection resilience • Reverse 
 connections • See all app layer data in a TCP stream • Associate logical sessions to IP addresses • Tamper with or close "bad" connections mid-stream • Differentiate clients from servers based on connection direction Because of these… … if your approach to network management requires any of these…
  • 261. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 79 • Cross-path • Moving target • Connection resilience • Reverse 
 connections • See all app layer data in a TCP stream • Associate logical sessions to IP addresses • Tamper with or close "bad" connections mid-stream • Differentiate clients from servers based on connection direction Because of these… … if your approach to network management requires any of these… …then something is probably going to break
  • 262. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 80 Key Effects
  • 263. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 80 Key Effects • Cross-path traffic fragmentation • That’s the whole point!
  • 264. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 80 Key Effects • Cross-path traffic fragmentation • That’s the whole point! • Moving target • Ability to change source and destination addresses in the middle of a connection
  • 265. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 80 Key Effects • Cross-path traffic fragmentation • That’s the whole point! • Moving target • Ability to change source and destination addresses in the middle of a connection
  • 266. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 80 Key Effects • Cross-path traffic fragmentation • That’s the whole point! • Moving target • Ability to change source and destination addresses in the middle of a connection • Connection resilience • Has additional checksums that require capture of the initial packet to reliably fake • Until every subflow is dead the overall connection keeps going
  • 267. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 80 Key Effects • Cross-path traffic fragmentation • That’s the whole point! • Moving target • Ability to change source and destination addresses in the middle of a connection • Connection resilience • Has additional checksums that require capture of the initial packet to reliably fake • Until every subflow is dead the overall connection keeps going • “Reverse” connections
  • 268. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 81 Key Effects
  • 269. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 81 Key Effects A few lot of slides back… • The packet sender decides which data goes down which path.
  • 270. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 82 John Gilmore, 1993 “The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.”
  • 271. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 83 Kate Pearce, 2014 “Multipath interprets modification as damage and routes around it.”
  • 272. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 84 Key Effects
  • 273. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 84 Key Effects A few lot of slides back… • The packet sender decides which data goes down which path. • Normal/benign clients won’t choose pathological fragmentation schemes
  • 274. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 84 Key Effects A few lot of slides back… • The packet sender decides which data goes down which path. • Normal/benign clients won’t choose pathological fragmentation schemes
  • 275. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 85 MPTCP and … Firewalls
  • 276. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 85 MPTCP and … Firewalls •MPTCP has address advertisement • This changes things for perimeters
  • 277. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 85 MPTCP and … Firewalls •MPTCP has address advertisement • This changes things for perimeters
  • 278. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 85 MPTCP and … Firewalls •MPTCP has address advertisement • This changes things for perimeters •How’d you like an outbound incoming connection?
  • 279. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 86 MPTCP and … Firewalls • MPTCP connection looks like TCP so far… Client ServerFirewall 1. SYN (MP_CAPABLE)
  • 280. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 87 MPTCP and … Firewalls • Still seems pretty standard, albeit with extra TCP OPTIONS Client ServerFirewall 2. SYN, ACK (MP_CAPABLE)
  • 281. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 88 MPTCP and … Firewalls • OK, so it’s a TCP connection with an additional options… so what? Client ServerFirewall 3. ACK…
  • 282. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 89 MPTCP and … Firewalls • Well, what if the client tells the server about a new address? Client ServerFirewall Pre-established MPTCP Connection 4. ADD_ADDR (IP#2)
  • 283. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 90 MPTCP and … Firewalls • Now, the “Internal” host may set up a connection to the advertised address Client ServerFirewall Pre-established MPTCP Connection 4. ADD_ADDR (IP#2)
  • 284. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 91 MPTCP and … Firewalls Client ServerFirewall Pre-established MPTCP Connection 5. SYN (MP_JOIN)
  • 285. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 91 MPTCP and … Firewalls Client ServerFirewall Pre-established MPTCP Connection 5. SYN (MP_JOIN) ▪ Is this new connection incoming or outgoing?
  • 286. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 92 MPTCP and … Firewalls • Is this new connection incoming or outgoing? Client ServerFirewall Pre-established MPTCP Connection 5. SYN (MP_JOIN)
  • 287. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 93 Multipath and … Privacy
  • 288. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 93 Multipath and … Privacy • Multipath shifts power towards endpoints, and away from infrastructure & ISP’s
  • 289. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 93 Multipath and … Privacy • Multipath shifts power towards endpoints, and away from infrastructure & ISP’s • I don’t fully trust my ISP or Cellular company…
  • 290. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 93 Multipath and … Privacy • Multipath shifts power towards endpoints, and away from infrastructure & ISP’s • I don’t fully trust my ISP or Cellular company… • But they probably don’t trust each other either!
  • 291. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 94 
 Introduction ✔
 Background (Why Change TCP) ✔ 
 MPTCP ✔ 
 Background Redux (Why NOT TO change TCP) ✔ 
 QUIC ✔ 
 Implications ✔ 
 
 Conclusion and Takeaways 

  • 292. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 95 So… things people took away from my MPTCP work
  • 293. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 95 So… things people took away from my MPTCP work •It’s a problem of tools (NO)
  • 294. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 95 So… things people took away from my MPTCP work •It’s a problem of tools (NO) •It’s a problem that only exists because of MPTCP
  • 295. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 95 So… things people took away from my MPTCP work •It’s a problem of tools (NO) •It’s a problem that only exists because of MPTCP •NO
  • 296. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 95 So… things people took away from my MPTCP work •It’s a problem of tools (NO) •It’s a problem that only exists because of MPTCP •NO •NO
  • 297. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 95 So… things people took away from my MPTCP work •It’s a problem of tools (NO) •It’s a problem that only exists because of MPTCP •NO •NO •NO
  • 298. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 95 So… things people took away from my MPTCP work •It’s a problem of tools (NO) •It’s a problem that only exists because of MPTCP •NO •NO •NO •NO ▪NO ▪NO ▪NO ▪NO ▪NO ▪NO ▪NO ▪NO
  • 299. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 96 Key Insights- Multipath •The (IP) network’s job is to transmit data from end to end. (?)
  • 300. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential 97 [CERF, VINTON G., and ROBERT E. KAHN. "A Protocol for Packet Network Intercommunication." (1974).] “Within each network, communication may be disrupted due to unrecoverable mutation of the data or missing data. End-to-end restoration procedures are desirable to allow complete recovery from these conditions.”
  • 301. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 98 Key Insights – Content Inspection
  • 302. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 98 Key Insights – Content Inspection Many network management approaches rely too much on
  • 303. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 98 Key Insights – Content Inspection Many network management approaches rely too much on - Metadata
  • 304. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 98 Key Insights – Content Inspection Many network management approaches rely too much on - Metadata - Data inspection
  • 305. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 98 Key Insights – Content Inspection Many network management approaches rely too much on - Metadata - Data inspection - Context Inspection
  • 306. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 98 Key Insights – Content Inspection Many network management approaches rely too much on - Metadata - Data inspection - Context Inspection The Internet wasn’t designed to validate your control over network data flows.
  • 307. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 99 Technical Takeaways
  • 308. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 99 • Address != connection endpoint Technical Takeaways
  • 309. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 99 • Address != connection endpoint • State exhaustion could become the new address exhaustion Technical Takeaways
  • 310. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 99 • Address != connection endpoint • State exhaustion could become the new address exhaustion • Multipath tech breaks assumptions many didn’t even know we were making Technical Takeaways
  • 311. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 100 Conclusions
  • 312. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 100 Conclusions • Multipath communications are awesome, and they’re coming
  • 313. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 100 Conclusions • Multipath communications are awesome, and they’re coming • Multipath communication confounds business & security models relying on stateful inspection or lookup
  • 314. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 100 Conclusions • Multipath communications are awesome, and they’re coming • Multipath communication confounds business & security models relying on stateful inspection or lookup • Now is the time for network security and network management to prepare
  • 315. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 101 • MPTCP: • Raiciu, C. et al., 2012. How hard can it be? designing and implementing a deployable multipath TCP. NSDI, (1). Available at: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/nsdi12/nsdi12-final125.pdf. • ACM Queue - Multipath TCP, Decoupled from IP, TCP is at last able to support multihomed hosts - Christoph Paasch and Olivier Bonaventure, UCL - http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2591369 • IETF Working group - http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/mptcp/ • QUIC • https://peering.google.com/#/learn-more/quic • https://www.chromium.org/quic • https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tsvwg-quic-protocol-02 • https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tsvwg-quic-loss-recovery-01 References and Links
  • 317. © 2015 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Confidential2016 103 All possible
 paths can be used at the same time Path Management – mesh networks Internet