12/9/2011_Effective actors_for_international_peace

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One aspect of the changes in Japanese security policies since the Cold War has been the dispatch of Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) overseas to engage in a range of missions most commonly referred to as ‘PKO’. Beyond the initial political controversy and the attendant media frenzy little is generally known of the nature of the operations, of JSDF duties, and of whether the Forces carried them out effectively or efficiently. The JSDF, Defense Agency/Ministry of Defense, and other public bodies have failed to analyse overseas dispatch operation (ODO) performance, and have generally branded them as successful based upon their completion, and without loss of life, in contrast with Japanese police ODO.
Looking at ODO during the 1990s it is possible to project analyses forward into the operations of the 21st century to evaluate the operations of the post-9.11 period and the prevailing strategic policies driving them, and also to more fully understand the qualities and limitations of JSDF performance in the immediate aftermath of the 3.11 triple disasters. Since JSDF ODO have become the most prominent symbols of an emergent ‘new Japanese strategy’ it is worth understanding whether the Forces have actually been ‘effective international actors’.

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12/9/2011_Effective actors_for_international_peace

  1. 1. Effective International Actors?Japan Self-Defense Force Overseas Dispatch Operations Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  2. 2. Structure of Presentation Effective International Actors?:JSDF Overseas Dispatch Operations (ODO)1 Questions and Parameters2 Extant Research3 Definition of Terms4 Methodology and Operational Analysis 5 Immediate Findings: OA & ODO 6 Broader Findings: ODO and Japan Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  3. 3. Quiz! Know your ODO!!! 1 When/where was the first Japanese post-war ODO? 2 When/where was the first JSDF ODO? 3 Does Japan do Peacekeeping? 4 Why does Japan send JSDF ODO? Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  4. 4. 1 Questions and Parameters What operations? How and why selected? What did the JSDF actually do? How did they perform? How did performance affect the JSDF? How JSDF culture/configuration affected performance? Were the JSDF effective international actors? Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  5. 5. 2 Extant Research General  Specific Politics of Defence Journalism: event Constitutional Issues specific US-Japan Alliance „PKO‟ studies: operations Japan-Asia Relations „PKO‟ studies: concepts „Normal‟ Japan Participant studies Historical controversies JSDF operational studies Party Politics Official historiesLimited applicability Limited coverage orContextual understanding applicability; unpublished Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  6. 6. 3 Definition of Terms „PKO‟  Japan does not „do‟ „PKO‟  Japan developed a „PSO‟ variant  Most operations were not PKO/PSO/PKF  Japan distinguished between „PKO‟ & „PKF‟ Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  7. 7. 3 Definition of Terms An Agenda for Peace  The Brahimi Report Boutros Boutros Ghali (Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations) 1992/95 2000Main Findings: Main Findings:1 There are five forms of 1 Identified only 3 forms of Peace Operation: Peace Operation: PMO, PKO, PSO, PEO, PMO, PKO, PBO PBO 3 Need to develop lessons3 There is no simple learned capabilities and progression from one to doctrine the other.Complex, confusing, but Clear, simple, but potentiallyclear for JSDF a legal problem for the JSDF Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  8. 8. An Agenda for Peace Strata of UN Peace OperationsPeacemaking (PMO)- settlement or suspension of conflictPeacekeeping (PKO)- policing/observing of settlement/ ceasefirePeace Support (PSO)- support of peace by aiding civil societyPeace Enforcement Operations (PEO)- use of military power for settlement/ceasefire, or for compliance with UNSC Chapter VII resolutionPeace Building (PBO)- post-conflict reinforcement of civil society Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  9. 9. 3 Definition of Terms Overseas Dispatch Operations (ODO)  Japanese: International Peace Cooperation Activities (IPCA: 国際平和協力活動)  Neutral, covering UN/non-UN operations, unilateral and multilateral  The IPCA term (and IPC Law) was developed from the ODA policies of the 1980s  Overseen by IPCH, with JSDF and Police in the IPCC Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  10. 10. Japanese ODO Policy Actors MoFA Cabinet Office/ IPCH MOD/ NPA/ JSDF Police Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  11. 11. Legal and Constitutional Limits on JSDF ODO Article 9: Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  12. 12. 戦争の放棄 第9条 日本国民は、正義と秩序を 基調とする国際平和を誠実に希求 し、国権の発動たる戦争と、武力に よる威嚇又は武力の行使は、国際紛 争を解決する手段としては、永久に これを放棄する。 2 前項の目的を達するため、陸海 空軍その他の戦力は、これを保持し ない。国の交戦権は、これを認めな い。 Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  13. 13. Fear of Clouds and Codes There is an implicit „code‟ The code is based upon perceptions of interpretations of a translated document The code is not codified The code hangs above, like a „cloud‟ The code/cloud affects laws, policies, and operational decisions The code/cloud is imaginary, and very real, and exerts a tremendous influence Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  14. 14. 4 Methodology and Operational Analysis  Methodology  Operational Analysis1 Triangulation: JSDF UN Ops JSDF Performance JSDF non-UN Ops Indicators Non-Japanese Actors2 Analytical Framework: 1 Effectiveness Mission Context 2 Efficiency Preparation and Logistics 3 Quality JSDF Performance (OBrien, R.J., Police as Overall Mission Contribution peacekeepers: an evaluation of the performance of Australian police peacekeeping on Cyprus 1964 – 1998, PhD thesis (Adelaide: University of South Australia, 2001). Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  15. 15. 4 Limits of Methodology and Operational Analysis No systematic JSDF/JDA/MOD analysis Lack of documentation Uncritical, non-specific documentation Small security community Interview-based Limited media resources Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  16. 16. 4 Limits of Methodology and OA ODO of the 1990s UN ODO  Non-UN ODO  Allied Support ○ Persian Gulf 1991  UNTAC Cambodia 1992-1993  Humanitarian Assistance 人道支援 ○ Rwanda/Zaire 1994,  ONUMOZ Mozambique West Timor 1999 1992-1995  UNDOF Golan Heights  Disaster Relief 緊急援助 1996-present ○ Honduras 1998, Turkey 1999UN command, PSO, ‘nation Varied, strongly liberalbuilding’ and ‘classical’ ops IPCO character Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  17. 17. 21st Century JSDF ODO UN ODO  Non-UN ODO  Anti-Terrorism UNMISET East Timor  OEF-MIO 2002~2004 (680)  Allied Support UNMIN Nepal (6)  Iraq, Gulf of Aden/Djibouti 2007~2011  Refugee Relief MINUSTAH Haiti (350)  Afghanistan/Pakistan, Iraq/J ordan 2010~present  Disaster Relief UNMISS South Sudan  Iran, Thailand/Indonesia, Ru (c.500) 2012~ ssia, PakistanPattern of the 1990s Appearing to be ‘new’ but mainly 1990s patterns Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  18. 18. 5 Immediate Findings: Operational Analysis and ODO Common Issues Slow deployment and logistical limits Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  19. 19. 5 Immediate Findings: Operational Analysis and ODO Common Issues Slow deployment and logistical limits  Legal and political obstacles ○ IPCL as ‘umbrella legislation’  JDA-MOD/JSDF management and culture ○ GSDF ‘rotation’, poor ‘jointery’, culture  Poor local intelligence ○ Mixed Agency, reliance upon US  Defence investment legacies and policies ○ Industrial war priorities in post-modern age Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  20. 20. Slow deployment and logistical limits IPCL limit of 2000 personnel Each mission requires separate legislation (with exceptions) Rapid deployment disabled by use of ad hoc units assembled from personnel within a Regional Army “Alice in Wonderland” approach to unit security (ROE/equipment etc.) pre-1998 Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  21. 21. Preparation for ODO: Investment Comparison Japan and UK Air Transport Capability 2006 Japan  UK Tactical 137 Tactical 20 Theatre 16 Theatre 47 Strategic 2 (VIP) Strategic 17 Tankers (4) Tankers 12 Also differences in quality of air-lift capabilities Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  22. 22. Preparation for ODO: Investment Comparison Canada and Australia Air Transport Capability 2006 Canada  Australia Tactical 10 Tactical 13 Theatre 25 Theatre 20 Strategic 5 Strategic 4 (plus contracts) Tankers 2 Tankers 7 Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  23. 23. Preparation for ODO: Investment ComparisonJapan & UK Strategic Sealift & Support Capability 2006 Japan  UK3 Vessels (Oosumi 15 Vessels (6 classes) class) = 291,600 tons= 26,700 tonsAlso, auxiliary support 12 varied vessels vessels, 353,600 tons4 AOE 72,550 tons Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  24. 24. Logistical Limitation Examples Mozambique and Honduras Mozambique  Honduras Antonov charter  ASDF required half airlift and schedule C-130 force to airline flights sustain 80-man C-130s: five days GSDF medical team No MSDF support,  C-130: four days merchant charter  Only one vehicle and light equipment Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  25. 25. 5 Immediate Findings: Operational Analysis and ODO Common Issues Slow deployment and logistical limits Poor risk assessment and management in first generation ODO Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  26. 26. 5 Immediate Findings: Operational Analysis and ODO Common Issues Slow deployment and logistical limits Poor risk assessment and management  Highly risk averse: form and function  Poor risk-reduction management  Implicit reliance upon collective security  Explicit rejection of collective security  JDA-MOD/JSDF conflict with MoFA Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  27. 27. Watanabe Takashi :The PKO in Cambodia-Lessons Learned: 101 What is basic common sense for the militaries of nations taking part in PKOs is not recognized by Japan... Japanese PKO personnel were only able to defend themselves and other unit members …Moreover, the use of weapons …was left to the judgment of the individual, and appeared to be outside the standards of conduct for troops. Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  28. 28. 5 Immediate Findings: Operational Analysis and ODO Common Issues Slow deployment and logistical limits Poor risk assessment and management Inadequate preparations and follow-up Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  29. 29. 5 Immediate Findings: Operational Analysis and ODO Common Issues Slow deployment and logistical limits Poor risk assessment and management Inadequate preparations and follow-up  Training flaws: climate, vaccination, multinational ops, languages, security, ODO- specific issues  Poor intelligence and briefings  Few de-briefs, few lessons learned Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  30. 30. 5 Immediate Findings: Operational Analysis: Negative Dissatisfaction with MoFA briefings Little „Learning from Others‟ No PKO Training Centre (~2007) No „Lessons Learned‟ Centre (~2008) Little „Recycling‟ of personnel Poor De-briefing Poor Rotation System for PKO Dispatch No extraction force (~2007 ?) Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  31. 31. 5 Immediate Findings: Operational Analysis: Positive JSDF Innovations  Collective Security by Stealth (UNTAC, ONUMOZ, Rwanda/ Zaire, UNDOF)  Defrosting „frozen activities‟ (UNMISET) 2001  HQ presence and close cooperation with non-US partners (ONUMOZ, Iraq)  Local intelligence gathering as CIMIC (UNTAC, Iraq) Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  32. 32. 5 Immediate Findings:Security Issues and JSDF ODO Risk Averse  Law, Policy, Missions, Deployments Risk Negligent  Poor camp/unit security, ridiculous limits Risk Accepting  Patrolling by another name Collective Security  De facto collective security (UNTAC, ONUMOZ, UNDOF, Zaire, Hondur as) Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  33. 33. 5 Immediate Findings: Operational Analysis: Positive Technically capable  Water purification  Engineering  Medical assistance  Logistical support  CIMIC (Civilian-Military Cooperation) Professional Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  34. 34. Medical Work of JSDF Medical Missions  Heavy Zaire/Rwanda  Light Honduras Non-Medical Missions  Human Security  Human Care  UNTAC Max. 17 medical personnel - up to 600 patients/day, c.7000 cases in total. - normal workload = 20~40 cases/day Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  35. 35. 5 JSDF Refugee Relief Unit (RRU) Zaire/Rwanda Sept-Dec 1994 Division Personnel • In-patients Out-patients Medical 70 70 2100  Clinical 23  Surgical 18  Hygiene 9  Prevention 16  HQ 4 Combined Daily Average 30 Security 50 Including serious surgery and Water 43 intensive care Administration 68 HQ 29 Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  36. 36. 5 Honduras JDR ODO 17th Nov-10th Dec 1998 Division Personnel • In-patients Out-patients • 0 4031 • Daily Average 288 Medical 23 Prevention 15 Support 42 ○ Innovation of Tele-medicine (with JSDF Central Hospital and the GSDF School of Field Medicine) Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  37. 37. 6 Broader Findings: ODO and Japan Effects of ODO upon the JSDF JSDF self-confidence GSDF survey December 1974 ~ January 1975, 15,220 personnel below rank of Lt. Col. “Do you feel that the work of the SDF is meaningful”: 40.3% Not very much; 45.4% Yes, I do; 6.5% Yes, very much so; 7.8% No. Equivalent surveys in 1995, 1997, and 2000 revealed positive answers above 75% level. Due both to domestic and overseas operations. Defense of Japan, 1976, p.118; Defense of Japan 1995~2000, JDA, Tokyo. Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  38. 38. 6 Broader Findings: ODO and Japan ODO Costs Japan defence budget 2006  $43.7 Billion Japanese spending (gross), above the MoFA UN PKO contribution: UNTAC: 11.8 Billion = $102.6 Million (@115/$1) ONUMOZ: 2.2 Billion = $19 Million (@115/$1)  =0.006~0.16% of Japanese defence budgets (1992-95) Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  39. 39. 6 Broader Findings: ODO and Japan ODO-Inspired Investments and Innovations GSDF: CRF Central Readiness Force  Force Trainer, Force Provider, Force Consumer ~2007 GSDF: Peacekeeping Training Center ~2008 GSDF: LAV and Type-96 APC ASDF: Freighter-tanker KC-767 (x4) ~2009 MSDF: Oosumi-class (x3) ~1998 Jointery  First Joint ODO 2005 (SEA Tsunami JDR) Allied Cooperation through ODO (Functionalism)  UK, Australia, France, RoK, Netherlands etc. Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  40. 40. 6 Broader Findings: ODO and Japan Personnel and Support Issues JDA 2007 23,262 staff for 259,590 JSDF UK MoD 2009 87,000 staff for 187,210 military Japan MOD has c. three times the ratio of military to civilians as Australia MoFA is also much smaller than the British or French foreign ministries Japan has very limited and fragmented intelligence capabilities. Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  41. 41. 6 Broader Findings: ODO and Japan Effective Actors, Effective Policy? Generally effective JSDF ODO Confused and contradictory policies, laws, and rules Constitutional fear („code and cloud‟) What is gained by such limited ODO? What is the point? ODO as a strategic device? The enigma of leadership Garren Mulloy Daito Bunka University
  42. 42. Conclusions JSDF ODO: Low Cost – Medium Return Introduced new security „horizons‟ ODO as a „Trojan Horse‟ for new norms? JSDF as Effective International Actors JSDF stretched by missions Capability gaps: logistics, „jointery‟, training etc. As yet, no militarization of policy As yet, strategy as speculation

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