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Comprehensive Approach Lecture Stenden Hogeschool 18092012 Final
The document discusses the comprehensive approach to security, which involves coordination between civil and military actors. It outlines differences between civil and military organizations that can impact cooperation, such as decision-making processes and views on the use of violence. The document also describes levels of interaction between actors, from coexistence to integration. It provides examples of how to cooperate through establishing common ground, mutual benefit, and different levels of coordination. Collaborative decision-making is discussed as an approach to overcome differences and adaptively work towards unity of effort.
Comprehensive Approach Lecture Stenden Hogeschool 18092012 Final
- 1. The Comprehensive Approach Marcvan den Homberg, TNO Cpt Pieter van Ingen, 1 Civil Military Interaction Command September 16th 2012, Stenden Hogeschool, Leeuwarden
- 2. Contents • Introduction • Learning objectives • Movie CIMIC (5 min) • Introduction to Comprehensive approach • Differences between civil and military • How to cooperate and coordinate? • Collaborative decision making • Comprehensive approach in practice: case Afghanistan
- 3. Marc van denHomberg • Study and work background: • Ph.D. Physics and MBA • KPN Research • TNO, founded ICT4D team in 2006: • Reserve officer civil-military interaction Battalion since 2010 • Private: • Living in Rotterdam, married with two kids • Hobbies: mountaineering, running
- 4. Objectives • To beable to explain the Comprehensive Approach and make the link to comprehensive security • To be able to explain the civil military interaction spectrum • To know the differences between civil and military organisations and how this impacts their interdependent dealing with a (post) conflict setting • To have an understanding of how the theory works in reality.. (Afghanistan)
- 5. Intrastate Complex conflicts emergencies Catastrophic Transborder Security The terrorism environment organized crime
- 6. Complex emergencies The roots of these conflicts are COMPLEX and require a multidisciplinary and comprehensive approach to create a sustainable peace !
- 7. All the same? Integrated Approach Comprehensive Crisis Management DIME Civ Mil Interaction
- 8. NATO Comprehensive approachdefinition Synergy amongst all actors and actions of the International Community through the coordination and de-confliction of its political, development and security capabilities to face today’s Challenges including Complex Emergencies (Result of NATO internal CA Stakeholder Meeting 22 / 23 September 2010)
- 9. Civil and militaryactors Civil actors about the military “boys with toys”, rigid, authoritarian, conservative, impatient, arrogant, civilian phobic, excessively security conscious Military about civil actors non-guided organisations, children of the 60s, tree huggers, undisciplined, unpunctual, anarchic, anti-military
- 10. But “thé NGO”does not exist Position in Comprehensive approach depends on: • Type of intervention (manmade versus nature disaster) • Type of organisation (humanitarian versus development) • Implementing via local organisations or by themselves • National context (relationship between ministries and NGOs, e.g. Germany vs Netherlands) and autonomy Just like “thé military” does not exist…!
- 11. NGOs versus Militarydifferences 1. Decision making process (flat versus hierarchical; autonomous versus political) 2. Role (neutrality, impartiality versus choosing sides in a conflict) 3. Long term versus short term 4. Vision on the use of violence 5. Cultural knowledge 6. Execution (process oriented versus task oriented) 7. Involvement of local partners (bottom-up versus top-down) 8. Perception of local population
- 12. Levels of Interaction Integration: Integrated planning and action. Coherence: Common goals and trust lead to comprehensive actions – concerted planning and action. Cooperation: Shared view and economy of activities encourages common purposes and common goals. De-confliction: Shared view avoids interference and encourages economy of activities – self-synchronize. Awareness: Transparency and information sharing enhances shared view of the engagement space. Coexistence: The state of being together in the same place at the same time. Note: Principles of NGOs and IOs limit their potential level of interaction
- 13. Comprehensive approach matrix Actors Intra-agency Whole-of- Inter-agency Internal- government External Various sections of the Various Canadian Operation Desert Storm, Elections in DRC 2006 United Swedish government government agencies 1991 Gulf War Various components of UN UK Stabilisation Unit or UN Peacekeeping mission Liberia 2009: use of PRS Integrated Peacekeeping mission Canadian Stabilization and and UN Country Team, e.g. Reconstruction Task Force Liberia 2009 DPKO and OCHA work Civilian and military pillars Afghanistan Bonn-process EULEX and the Kosovo Cooperate together on UN Protection of USA PRT in Afghanistan, 2003; UN-EU cooperation government, 2009 of Civilians Guidelines 2009 in Chad, 2008 DPKO and OCHA in the Civilian and military pillars Humanitarian cluster UN and Sudanese Coordinate field of Norwegian PRT in approach to coordinate; Independent Electoral Afghanistan, 2009 Kosovo UNMIK Commission in April 2010 elections Various parts of EU in Chad DFID and MOD fail to agree Humanitarian community UNAMID and Government Coexist in 2008 on common evaluation and MONUC in Eastern of Darfur, 2008 criteria for UK PRT in DRC, 2009 Afghanistan, 2008 Various sections of a US State Department, US Humanitarian agencies and Taliban and ISAF/UNAMA; Compete ministry compete for Department of Defense and UNMIL disagree on Government of Chad and funding CIA in Afghanistan, 2007 movement of IDPs from MINURCAT, 2010 Monrovia, 2005 Coherence and coordination The limits of the comprehensive approach, Cedric de Coning and Karsten Friss, Journal of International Peacekeeping 15 (2011) 243-272
- 14. How to cooperate/coordinate(1) Common ground 1. Commitment to peace and stability 2. Hard working attitude 3. International experience 4. Life with hardship and danger 5. Personal risk of injury 6. Decision making under pressure 7. Frustration with political decision making
- 15. How to cooperate/coordinate(2) Mutual benefit Military-Civil Interaction Civil-Military Interaction • Local knowledge • Security • Experience • Information (roads, weather, maps, • Information and contacts mines, incidents…) • Assessment • Support within means and www.dfid.gov.uk capabilities (medical, comms, www.usaid.gov logistics) • Language and customs • Situation Assessment
- 16. How to cooperate/coordinate(3) Levels of interaction Integration Projects jointly executed, or by NGOs but financed by the military Cooperation Direct cooperation around agreed upon activities but separately executed Awareness Military and NGOs exchange information wrt safety, reconstruction and development projects Coexistence Military (e.g. PRT) and NGOs are present in the same area but have no close relationship
- 17. How to cooperate/coordinate(4) Some additional observations • Exchange of information is done between stakeholders, but quite often behind the scenes and with strict conditions • Open cooperation between NGOs and military is –because of security reasons- almost never a good idea • Ministry of Foreign Affairs forms a natural interface between Defense and NGOs • Local NGOs are more pragmatic in their dealing with soldiers than INGOs
- 18. How to cooperate/coordinate(5) Collaborative decision making
- 19. Challenges in collaborativedecision making • How can all actors overcome their differences and cooperate in complex mission environments? • How do diplomacy, defense and development activities enforce instead of oppose each other? • How can the actors be adaptive?
- 20. What is CollaborativeDecision Making? • Characteristics • For civil and military parties in complex mission environments • Based on military and civilian (planning) processes • Translation of political aims in specific approaches and activities • Adaptive ways to stability, development and security, not end state driven • Unity of Effort/Unity of Purpose (instead of Unity of Command) • Track record • Uruzgan Campaign Plan • Comprehensive Mission Design Kunduz
- 21. Non endstate driven,but iterative approach STARTING Long term POINT objective MISSION
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- 23. Backbone CDM process: Conceptual framework Factors to mitigate Factors to exploit Sec. Forces Presence National programmes Unsupportive leaders IO/GO/NGO activities Supportive leaders Influence of INS Local Conflicts Narcotics (OC) How to get there? How to use it? 1. Governance Development themes 2. Rule of Law 3. Security Apparatus 4. Education 5. Healthcare 6. Agriculture & Rural Development 7. Infrastructure & natural resources 8. Economic Development 9. Social Protection
- 24. Marc van denHomberg, Questions?? Ideas? 21032012 Jump in! Feel free to contact me at: Marc van den Homberg +31 6 51069884 marc.vandenhomberg@tno.nl
- 25. References For this presentationthe following sources were used: • Collaborative Decision Making, Ingrid van Bemmel and Aletta Eikelboom, Jan 19th 2012, presentation for 1 GNC. • NATO’s Contribution to a Comprehensive Approach, Nils T. Gallagher, CCOE • De comprehensive approach vanuit NGO perspectief: Une liaison dangereuse, Paul van den Berg en Eveline Rooijmans, CA Conferentie, 23 mei 2012, The Hague • Civiel-militaire relaties in complexe noodsituaties, Kees Homan, Hfd 8 in Humanitaire ruimte: tussen onpartijdigheid en politiek • Coherence and coordination The limits of the comprehensive approach, Cedric de Coning and Karsten Friss, Journal of International Peacekeeping 15 (2011) 243-272
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- 27. 95% Decision making: 95% ofour decision are made within a few milliseconds and based on our need for happiness/satisfaction and security, short-term oriented Therefore: Comprehensive approach with people we don’t know is very difficult. Trust has to be established first
- 29. Economic Strategy Strategy Strategy Strategy Strategy Security Political Social IO 2050 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010010 2 Mission Approach URUZGAN: Conceptual Framework Sec. Forces Presence TFU effects Enablers National programmes IO/GO/NGO activities Infl. of powerbrokers Local Conflicts Disablers Narcotics (OC) OMF activities
- 31. Change ambition Main Players Diplomacy Governor District Commanders and foreign affairs Chiefs officials Defence Security Force End State Battle group, mentoring &Liaison & police teams Development From Civ effects To development Reconstruction and mentoring teams
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- 40. Development- project
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- 43. ISAF ends in2014 in Afghanistan once transition is done to: • Local authorities • Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Note that this implies that not all three D’s from 3D are covered NATO (USECT) • Understand • Shape • Engage Defence • Consolidate • Transition U S E CT Development Diplomacy