ASF: GLOBAL IMPACT AND CONTROL ASF REFERENCE LABORATORYProf. José M. Sánchez- Vizcaíno firstname.lastname@example.org www.sanidadanimal.info
ASFV: A old friend 1978- MAIN WORK: DIAGNOSIS TEST & REAGENTS ASF REFERENCE LABORATORY EPIDEMIOLOGY-CONTROL and ERADICATION
AGENDA:ASF. A REEMERGING DISEASE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL SITUATIONCRITICAL POINTS FOR CONTROL ASF VACCINE ASF FUTURE CONCLUTIONS
ASF. Routes of transmission FREE AREAS: By eating infected swill or garbages By direct contact between sick or carrier and healthy animals (exudates, wounds,...) ONCE ESTABLISHED:INFECTED OR CARRIERS PIGS (D&W) play an important role in the dissemination of the disease Contaminated transport, FOOD Ticks and back yard slurry, insects, rats...
1. Raw pork waste at airport/port: Lisbon 1957 Malta, 1978 Sardinia, 1978 Georgia, 20072. Movement of pork or pig products: Portugal, 1960 Spain 1960 Italy, 1983 Belgium, 1985 Russia, 2008-3. Movements of infected wild boars: Russia, 2008-
1. Movements of infected pigs or carriers frominfected neighbouring countries Nigeria, Togo, Benin, all in 1997-98; Zambia, 2001; Kenya 2001; Ghana 2002;Tanzania 2004; Burkina Faso 2007;Kenya 2007; Tanzania 20082. Boar or pork meat of infected swine fed to pigs (movement of infected meat) South Africa 1973; Sao Tome & Principe, 1979; Ivory Coast 1996; Namibia 2004; Kenya 2007
ASF EPIDEMIOLOGY: Historical distribution I 1957 Portugal, 1957 Kenya1921 Spain 1960 Frane 1974 Malta 1978 Sardinia 1978 Italy, 1983 Belgium, 1985 Russia, 2008-
ASF. Scenarios : Europe I Spain 1985-1995 IN DOOR
ASF. Scenarios : Europe II Sardinia,Italy PARTICULAR FARMES Backyard (16,031) : 90.34% Intensive (320): 1,80% Confined/Fr (899): 5.06% Free ranging (494).: 2.78% NO SOFT TICKS in Sardinia 1993-2003 (37) 2004-2005 (38) 1993-2005 (20) Pig population.: 248.356 Epidemic weaves:94-96; 2004-2005. Source of info.: NRL for ASF meeting , 2006, D. Rutili
ASF EPIDEMIOLOGY: Historical distribution II 1978
ASF.Scenarios :Central and S.America• CUBA 1978• D. REPUBLIC 1978•BRASIL 1980 BACKYARD NO TICK
ASF EPIDEMIOLOGY: Historical distribution 2007 1998 2001
ASF.Scenarios: South and East Africa Positive Virus. No Abs. Tolerance pigs ???? Sylvatic cycle 21 Genotypes D+D+T DOMESTIC INFECTED PIGS NO Ab ?
ASF. Scenarios : West Africa back yard D to D W to D Role of Ticks ??
2007 Asfv, genotype II Mozambique, Madagascar, Zambia 273 Outbreaks. More 78.000 Dead pigs ASF 2007-2011
ASF EPIDEMIOLOGY: 4 affected countries 273 notified outbreaks +78.000 dead pigs Source: OIE, own elaboration
ASF in Russian Federation• April 2007ASFV p72 genotype II, compatible with the virus circulating in Mozambique, Madagascar and Zambia (Rowlands et al., 2008)• All the ASFV isolates identical p72, p54 and CVR sequences suggesting only one entry (Gallardo et al., 2009)• No pathological changes Acute and hiperacute forms of the disease (Blagodarsnosti, 2011) .• No serological (Ab) surveillance has been made
ASF. Scenarios : Europe III D + W + BY D to D Back yard pigs Risk of Endemicity Chronic form ?
WHY IS ASF MOVING?World globalization More ASF virus in AfricaEconomic crisis Swill feeding
IDENTIFICATION OF RISK FACTORSENTRANCE IN CAUCASUS REGION: Increase of the ASF V in Africa Economic crisis Swill feeding Lack of biosecuritySPREAD: Swill feeding!! TRADITION Wild boars contact with domestic No biosecurity (ASF don’t need high biosecurity) Movement of animals and products WITHOUT CONTROL No a Coordinated National control program (Local Program Krasnodar Region)ENDEMICITY: Wild boar affected Swill feeding Potential. Carriers and chronic infections NO COORDINATED NATIONAL PROGRAM. NO COMPESATION FOR FARMES Vector (ticks)?
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSASF in the Caucasus and Russian Federation• The ASFV circulating in the Caucasus and the Russian Federation is a highly virulent virus. No reduction of virulence since the first outbreak in 2007 in Georgia.• ASF has spread in the TCC and in the RF since 2007; measures put in place were not sufficient to control the spread • The risk of maintaining ASF and its spread within the TCC and the RF in domestic pigs is HIGH • The risk of ASF introduction into the EU is moderate • Risk of ASF become endemic in domestic pigs in EU is negligible (High Biosecurity), low or moderate (free range)
EVALUATING THE RISK OF ASFV ENTRANCE IN THE EUDevelopment of a generic CUANTITATIVE risk assessmentframework for the introduction of ASF in EU countries
ROUTES FOR ASFV INTRODUCTION IN THE UE Live animals (domestic+wild)• Legal imports Semen and embryo Animal Products• Illegal imports Meat Products• Wild animals• Ticks: Ornithodorus spp.• Fomits: vehicules, leftovers, people….
RA (stochastic) for the potential ASFV introduction into the UE Pathway Live pig Pathway imports Wild boars Suitable areas for WB Mur et al., 2011 De la Torre et al., 2011
LEGAL IMPORTS OF LIVE SWINESThe overall mean (95% PI) annual probability of ASFV introduction into the EU by legal import of live pigs was 5.22*10-3 (6.06*10-4, 1.84*10-2 ) ~ one outbreak in 192 years. 69 % 68%
LEGAL IMPORTS OF PIG PRODUCTS EXTRA EU OTHER 3% FRESH 30% FROZEN 67%
AFRICAN SWINE FEVER IMPORTANCES POINTS No neutralizing Ab Pigs &products No vaccine availableDomestic & Wild High variabilityanimals affected PROBLEMS FOR ASF CONTROL TicksCarrier animals Freezer Clinical signs similar to other diseases Laboratory diagnosis needed Very resistant in the environment
ASF LABORATORY DIAGNOSIS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 C M V257 bp-108 bp- PPC-3/4 + PPA-1/2 GOOD HEALTH
ASF PROTECTION: NO VACCINE• NO INACTIVATED VACCINE• ATENUATED VACCINE. NO SAFE AND ONLY PARTIAL PROTECTION in HOMOLOGOUS (CARRIERS & C. FORM)• NO RECOMBINAT VACCINE: NO good candidates ANTIBODIES ARE RELATED WITH SOME•NO DNA: TYPE OF PROTECTION Some AS WELL AS WITHCandidates CHRONIC AND ENDEMIC ASF INFECTION Eradication without vaccine is•NO SubUnit vaccines: very poor partial protection possible but not easy. Endemics:Portugal,Spain. No Endemics countries: Brazil…
ASF IMMUNE RESPONSES INVOLVED IN PROTECTIONPOOR UNDERSTOOD:• PROTECTIVE IMMUNITY AGAINST HOMOLOGOUS VIRUS (VIRUS IN LINPHO NODES)• THE MAIN DIFFICULTY. LACK OF NEUTRALIZING Ab and high genetic variability• Ab PARTIAL PROTECTION. DELAY IN THE ONSET C. SIGNS• IMPORTANCE ROLE OF NK AND CD 8. DESTROYED I. M• SOME TYPE OF PROTECCION (Ab and CMI) OCCURS
PROBLEMS OF ATENUATED ASF VACCINE UNTIL NOW: LIMITED FIELD STUDIES: PORTUGAL and SPAIN 60s-70s EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS: SEVERAL AUTHORS A) Release of infected virus: Low virulence strains, Chronic forms ?. Carriers (Portugal, Spain 70s ) B) No sufficiently attenuated C) Only Homologous virus protection.
PROSPECTS FOR ASF VACCINE:Know more about Mechanism of Atenuated vaccine:a)Pre Virus Entry (neutralizing Ab, Others)b)Post Virus Entry (Infections inhibition) 1) Low virulence isolates by passages in TC or from field 2) Generation ASFV recombinant without some genes* 3) Recombinat with several ASFV genes in DNA vector 4) Others * Several candidates look promesing
EARLY DETECTION CONTROL AND ERADICATION THE CHALLENGE
FIELD IS THE FIRST STEP: COLLABORATION: ADMINISTRATION- FARMERS
RISK FACTORS for EARLY DETECTION I• No perception of the risk for entrance: No good information to farmers and Vets – Legal and ilegal imports of live pigs and meat products – Commercial relations with affected countries – Other disases in the area (CSF, Erysipela…)• Low education level, no information about the disease to FAMERS and Vets No information of ASF. How is ASF?• Low biosecurity practices – Swill feeding – Backyard systems
RISK FACTORS for EARLY DETECTION II• Late detection caused by: – Wrong surveillance program. No RBS – Late detection in field no formation of veterinary services and farmers. Others diseases – Low veterinary service in the area inadequate connection field-laboratory – Unknown of the risk
ASF EARLY DETECTION NEEDED: FIELD: • Risk information • ASF Information LABs: • Good conection with field • Good test and procedure TRAINING: FIELD AND LABORATORY
ASF CONTINGENCY PLANS. FAST RESPONCE:ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE: Veterinary ServiceLegislation, diagnosis methodology, etc.LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION STRUCTURE: Census, farmsLocation, movements, wild live population….ASF CHARACTERISTICS: Risks factors, susceptible animalsVectors, clinical sings, lesions, samples to labs, route ofentrance, diagnosis methods, desinfectans, …..
Coordinated program1. A program of all for all2. Important farmers3. Medium
RISK FACTORS for CONTROL• Inadequate control program: – Movement of animals and products WITHOUT CONTROL – Swill feeding. Difficult to changes mentality – Not establish the control and surveillance area – Delayed compensation + lack of resources• Pig production system: – Pig density – Farming practices (backyard, swill feeding!!)• Presence of wild boars and contact with domestic pigs• Presence of ticks
MANUAL for a FAST RESPONCE 1. NOTIFICATION SYSTEM 2. ZONING OF AFECTED AREAS 3. BAN ON ANIMALS MOVEMENTS 4. LABORATORY CONFIRMATION 5. PROCEDURE FOR DESTRUCTIONS OF CARCASSES 6. DEPOPULATION 7. CLEANING AND DISINFECTION 8. SEROLOGICAL CONTROLS 9. STUDY WILD BOAR AND/OR VECTORS 10. SENTINEL ANIMALS 11. REPOPULATION
More ASFV in Africa and now in CC and RF Possibility of became No vaccine available. endemic in some countriesEradication without vaccine of Europe not easy but possibleModerate-high risk for the MORE TIME TO DETECT EU countries INFECTION MORE DIFFICULTES TO ERADICATE ARE WE AWARE ? ARE WE READY ?
IN MEMORIAN OF ISABEL MINGUEZ TUDELA(08/05/1956- 16/04/2011)Passed Away in Brussels at age of 54Sencientic Officer in the DG ResearchFor over 15 years, she acted as a majorbridge within the scientific communitylinking different European research teamsand establishing connections with scientistsfrom America, Asia and Africa. Manage a great number of EU research projects on animalhealth (ASFRisk)Rest in Peace, dear friend.