you have to complete the following readingIan Bogost, Program.docx

you have to complete the following reading:
Ian Bogost, Programmers: Stop Calling Yourselves Engineers.
In The Atlantic, November, 2015. Available at:
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/11/progra
mmers-should-not-call-themselves-engineers/414271
short answers to the following questions (no more than 100
words per question):
1.What are the origins of the phrase “software engineering”?
2.What are the differences between software engineering and
the traditional disciplines of engineering?
3.What is the author’s opinion about the Scrum method and
why?
US President Donald J. Trump’s administration has found it
chal-lenging to maintain a consistent position with respect to
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s repression at home and
aggression abroad. The US president’s accommodating language
about Putin;
his mixed messages about Ukraine, a country defending itself
against Russian
attack; and frequent refusal to recognize Kremlin interference in
the US elec-
tion process seem at odds with the generally stronger position
of the admin-
istration as a whole. Given this inconsistency, it may again fall
to Congress
to attempt to counter Russia’s election interference, already
ongoing in the

form of disinformation; back Ukraine as its government seeks to
deal with a
Russian invasion; and contend with other forms of Kremlin
aggression.
The authors of this issue brief are executive branch veterans and
admit to
general skepticism about making foreign policy through
legislation, particu-
Pushing Back Against
Russian Aggression:
Legislative Options
ISSUE BRIEF
MARCH 2020 DANIEL FRIED AND BRIAN O’TOOLE
The Atlantic Council’s Global Business
& Economics Program (GBE) promotes
transatlantic leadership as defenders
of open market democracies in a new
era of great-power competition and
works to find multilateral solutions to
today’s most pressing global economic
opportunities and risks. Key challenges
the program addresses include
fostering broad-based economic
growth, advancing understanding of
the impact of economic sanctions, and
defining the future shape of the rule-
based trade order.
Atlantic Council
GLOBAL BUSINESS
& ECONOMICS PROGRAM

Economic sanctions have become a policy tool-of-choice for the
US govern-
ment. Yet sanctions and their potential pitfalls are often
misunderstood. The
Economic Sanctions Initiative (ESI) seeks to build a better
understanding of
the role sanctions can and cannot play in advancing policy
objectives and of
the impact of economic statecraft on the private sector, which
bears many of
the implementation costs.
2 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
ISSUE BRIEF Pushing Back Against Russian Aggression:
Legislative Options
larly in nuanced matters that the executive is better struc-
tured to address. However, such legislation is sometimes
needed. In 2017, in response to reasonable concerns that
the new Trump administration was considering a unilateral
rescission of Russia sanctions imposed after Russia’s at-
tack on Ukraine in 2014, Congress passed the Countering
America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
CAATSA has its flaws, but it blocked a unilateral capitula-
tion of US foreign policy and forced the administration to
maintain pressure on Putin for his ongoing aggression, and
we supported it on that basis.1 Because Trump often ap-
pears to continue to regard Ukraine and Kremlin election
interference in a partisan political context, and because
the Kremlin challenge is real and may grow, legislation may
again be needed.

Several Russia sanctions bills are in various stages of prepa-
ration in Congress and more may emerge. Two of the most
notable—DETER [the Defending Elections from Threats
by Establishing Redlines, introduced by US Sens. Marco
1 Daniel Fried and Brian O’Toole, The New Russia Sanctions
Law: What it Does and How to Make it Work, Atlantic Council,
September 19, 2017, https://www.
atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-
new-russia-sanctions-law/.
Rubio (R-FL) and Chris Van Hollen (D-MD)], and DASKA [the
Defending American Security Against Kremlin Aggression
Act, introduced by US Sens. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) and
Robert Menendez (D-NJ)]—seek, wisely in our view, to use
the threat of new sanctions to forestall new Russian aggres-
sion, if it reaches a certain level, rather than responding
with retrospective sanctions to past Russian actions that
could be seen solely as punitive. Legislation that moves for-
ward must contend with how to deter election interference
that is already ongoing in some form, and how to scope the
sanctions response to be relevant and credible.
DETER
At its title makes clear, DETER focuses on thwarting elec-
tion interference alone. It thus has the advantage of sim-
plicity and focuses on the Kremlin’s malign behavior that
most directly attacks the United States. Its definition of
election interference usefully includes actions both “hard”
United States Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) is one of the
co-sponsors of the Defending American Security from Kremlin
Aggression Act
(DASKA). Source: US Department of Defense
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-

brief/the-new-russia-sanctions-law/
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-
brief/the-new-russia-sanctions-law/
3ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Pushing Back Against Russian Aggression: Legislative
OptionsISSUE BRIEF
(e.g., blocking or degrading of, or unauthorized access to,
election and campaign infrastructure) and “soft” (e.g., disin-
formation or unlawful contributions or advertising).
DETER outlines a trigger mechanism for action: by sixty
days following a US election, the director of national in-
telligence (DNI), in consultation with the directors of the
National Security Agency (NSA), the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);
the secretaries of State, Treasury, and Homeland Security;
and the attorney general, must determine with “a high level
of confidence” whether a foreign government interfered
in that US election and submit a report to Congress about
that determination (Sec. 101). It is not clear whether current
reported levels of Kremlin-connected disinformation tar-
geting the US presidential election would reach DETER’s
threshold. We would argue for setting a relatively high bar,
e.g., a break-and-leak operation involving computer com-
promise and leaking stolen e-mails. This standard would
not prevent Russian disinformation that is already ongoing,
but would threaten harsh sanctions in response to more in-
trusive and aggressive Russian actions; it is not perfect, but
there may not be a better option at this late stage in the
2020 electoral process.
Sanctions provisions. Should the DNI determine that the

Russian government interfered in the US election, DETER
(Sec. 202) mandates the following sanctions:
◆ Either (i) full blocking sanctions or (ii) prohibition of
(or strict conditions on) US correspondent or pay-
able-through accounts for two or more of the fol-
lowing large Russian state banks: Sberbank, VTB
Bank, Gazprombank, Vnesheconombank (VEB), and
Rosselkhozbank. Full blocking sanctions on Sberbank
and VTB, Russia’s largest banks, would risk unin-
tended consequences, including significant blowback
on the Western financial sector and legitimate global
trade. The flexibility to select targets is important as it
allows for some ability to calibrate impact;
◆ A full prohibition of new US investments in the Russian
energy sector or a Russian energy company. The bill
calls for regulations to define “new investment.” It
would be important to craft these to target major new
investments and not joint ventures in which Russian
2 Daniel Fried, Brian O’Toole, and David Mortlock, “New
Russia Sanctions: Justified, but Feeble and Awkward,” New
Atlanticist, August 5, 2019, https://www.
atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/new-russia-sanctions-
justified-but-feeble-and-awkward/.
3 Anders Åslund, Ashish Kumar Sen, and Daniel Fried,
“Kremlin Report: A Missed Opportunity to Check Russian
Aggression,” New Atlanticist, January 30, 2018,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/kremlin-
report-a-missed-opportunity-to-check-russian-aggression/.
participation is relatively minor in order, among other
things, to forestall Russia forcing US investors out of
otherwise worthy projects by injecting a small Russian

ownership stake as a poison pill;
◆ Full blocking sanctions on defense and intelligence
sector entities. This may not be impactful as sanctions
have already been applied to these sectors;
◆ Prohibition on transactions by US persons with new
Russian sovereign debt. This would seem to expand on
the limited sovereign debt sanctions the Trump admin-
istration imposed in response to Russia’s attempted as-
sassination of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal in the
United Kingdom in 2018. Sovereign debt sanctions are
a logical expansion of existing financial sanctions and
supported by many observers, including the authors;2
◆ Blocking sanctions on Putin’s cronies or others who
contributed to the electoral interference. These would
be useful targeted sanctions that do not expand upon
the current sanctions architecture on Russia, though
attribution might be a challenge; and
◆ DETER also includes the same waiver review provision
as CAATSA, which would allow Congress to overturn
the president’s decision to issue any of the waivers
granted for a “vital national security interest,” which in
practice is a relatively low bar. The CAATSA review pro-
vision is a significant infringement on executive branch
authority to execute foreign policy authorities and
would be a major hurdle to waiving or rolling back any
sanctions imposed. We appreciate Congress’s concern
about premature sanctions relief, but believe that re-
moving sanctions must remain a viable option should
their original purpose be achieved.
DETER also calls for an update to the Kremlin Report on
Putin’s cronies mandated by CAATSA Section 241 (DETER

Sec. 102) and a parallel report on the wealth of Putin and
others identified in the updated Kremlin Report (DETER
Sec. 201). Both reports have value in identifying the struc-
ture of Putin’s network of cronies and agents; the Trump
administration prepared a solid classified Kremlin Report in
early 2018, but bungled the public rollout of the unclassi-
fied version, vitiating much of its potential impact.3
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/new-
russia-sanctions-justified-but-feeble-and-awkward/
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/new-
russia-sanctions-justified-but-feeble-and-awkward/
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/kremlin-
report-a-missed-opportunity-to-check-russian-aggression/
4 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Legislative Options
EO 13848 on election interference. The DETER Act, we
were told, inspired the Trump administration to issue on
September 14, 2018, Executive Order 13848, which calls for
a DNI report assessing foreign election interference and
provides mandatory sanctions on persons responsible and
discretionary sanctions on one of “largest business enti-
ties” in the financial services, defense, energy, technology,
and transportation sectors of the offending country’s econ-
omy. The administration aimed to have EO 13848 serve as
an alternative to legislation—a reasonable effort which may
have taken some of the momentum out of DETER, which
takes a more aggressive approach with its broad financial
sanctions. However, EO 13848 has been used only once,
against the Internet Research Agency (the St. Petersburg
troll farm responsible for interference in the 2016 and 2018

US election campaigns), its funder Yevgeny Prigozhin (who
had already been sanctioned), and associated targets. The
mixed signals from the administration about its commit-
ment to expose and act against Russian election interfer-
ence, which recent DNI testimony indicates is ongoing, and
disinformation have weakened EO 13848’s impact as an
alternative to legislation.
The sanctions suggested by DETER and EO 13848 are of
similar design, but different orders of magnitude. The prin-
cipal value added of DETER, compared to EO 13848, is that
it would act as a credible threat of sanctions escalation in
response to Kremlin electoral interference, reducing the
president’s wild card role in responding to Russian threats.
DASKA
DASKA is more advanced in the legislation process—it was
reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last
4 Daniel Fried served from 2013 to 2017 as the first and so far
only sanctions coordinator at the State Department.
December 12—and thus arguably the Russia sanctions bill
most able to move fast should political will in the Senate ma-
terialize. It attempts to be far broader in combatting Russian
aggression than DETER. It also has been drafted with careful
consideration of its side effects and was done so to avoid
the harried conclave that produced CAATSA with several
critical drafting errors and other unintended consequences.
Scope. DASKA targets malign Russian activity, including
election interference and aggression against Ukraine;
seeks to create a firewall against precipitous US withdrawal
from NATO (reflecting early concern, now somewhat dimin-
ished, about Trump’s view of the alliance that has main-
tained general European security for more than seventy

years); strengthens the public diplomacy structure at the
State Department (Sec. 202); strengthens cyberspace and
digital economy policy offices at the State Department
(Sec. 211), charging them with combatting Russian disinfor-
mation and cyber security challenges; and recreates the
office of the State Department’s coordinator for sanctions
policy (Sec. 622), an office created in US President Barack
Obama’s second term and abolished early in the Trump
administration.4 DASKA Title III covers chemical weapons
nonproliferation and is explicitly tied to the Russian govern-
ment’s use of a nerve agent in the attempted assassination
of Skripal and his daughter, Yulia. Title IV covers cyber-
crime. Title V expands the definition of election interfer-
ence and includes visa bans for individuals engaged in it.
Sanctions provisions. Like DETER, DASKA (Title VI) man-
dates contingency (not retroactive) sanctions. These in-
clude sanctions for election interference, though the
definition of interference does not explicitly include dis-
information, thus setting a potentially higher bar than
DETER, whose definition does. Critically, DASKA’s tar-
geting of Russian financial institutions is limited to those
that aided in election interference, setting a very high bar
for such a drastic measure. DASKA also calls for sanc-
tions in response to an escalation of Russian military
aggression against Ukraine or in response to a Russian
regime-directed assassination on US or NATO member
state territory.
The triggers for sanctions related to election interference or
Russian offensive military operations against Ukraine would be
a positive finding in a joint report to Congress by the secretary
of state and the DNI, which is more appropriate than DETER’s
reliance solely on a report from the DNI, an apolitical body, as
“Both DETER and DASKA bills

at tempt to push the Trump
administration to take a stronger,
more consistent stance against
the Kremlin’s malign behav ior.”
5ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OptionsISSUE BRIEF
a trigger. The triggers for sanctions related to assassination
would be a DNI determination to Congress in consultation with
the affected NATO member government.
Sanctions triggered by affirmative reports would include:
◆ In response to a finding of Kremlin election interference
(Sec. 602):
◆ Mandatory full blocking sanctions against political
figures, oligarchs, and parastatal entities facilitating
corrupt activities on behalf of Putin (Sec. 602/235).
Because they are conduct-based, the number of
sanctions under this provision is apt to be small;
◆ Full blocking sanctions against any person en-
gaged in a significant transaction with persons
supporting or facilitating malicious cyber activities
(Sec. 602/236). This targets funders of election in-
terference; though it is unlikely to cut off all such
funding, it could reveal a useful set of facilitators
beyond the well-known Prigozhin, who funded the

St. Petersburg troll farm IRA;
◆ A menu of lesser but significant sanctions (drawn
from CAATSA Sec. 235) against persons investing in
a Russian-owned or controlled liquefied natural gas
(LNG) export facility located outside Russia (Sec.
602/237). This may not target many existing facili-
ties, but may discourage such facilities in the future;
◆ Blocking sanctions against new Russian sovereign
debt over fourteen days (Sec. 602/238). This has
been considered a likely next option in financial
sanctions since the end of the Obama administra-
tion. The Trump administration imposed a narrow
Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, speaks at
the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting in Davos. Source:
Wikimedia
Commons
6 ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Legislative Options
set of sovereign debt sanctions in August 2019 in
response to the attempt to assassinate Skripal;
these blocking sanctions would go further, though
the impact would be modest to moderate; and
◆ Full blocking sanctions against Russian financial in-
stitutions that have supported election interference
(Sec. 602/239). As noted above, this is a strong
measure, but the bar for determination is set high.

◆ In response to a finding of renewed Russian offensive
military operations in Ukraine (Sec. 603):
◆ A menu of significant (but not full blocking) sanc-
tions (drawn from CAATSA Sec. 2355) against per-
sons who invest in new oil or natural gas projects
outside Russia that include a Russian state or para-
statal ownership over 33 percent or a majority of
the voting interest, and are greater than $250 mil-
lion in value (Sec. 603/239A); and
◆ The same menu of sanctions against provision of
goods, services, technology, financing or support
over $1 million (or $12 million in one year) for crude oil
production projects inside Russia (Sec. 603/239B).
These sanctions are logical extensions of current re-
strictions on development of new Russian or Russian-
controlled energy resources. The 33 percent share
threshold is a departure from the usual 50 percent
level used in sanctions designations.6
◆ In response to a determination by the secretary of state
that Russia is interfering with freedom of navigation in
the Kerch Strait or elsewhere inconsistent with inter-
national law (Sec. 603/239C), imposition of full block-
ing sanctions on the Russian shipbuilding sector for a
minimum of three years. The administration should be
careful about implementing this provision due to the
potential for unintended consequences.
◆ In response to a finding of assassination, imposition
of full blocking sanctions as provided in the Global
5 Sections 231 and 235, Section 231 of the Countering
America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017,” US

Department of State, Bureau of International
Security and Nonproliferation, accessed February 2020,
https://www.state.gov/countering-americas-adversaries-through-
sanctions-act-of-2017/sections-231-
and-235/.
6 While it is beyond the scope of this paper, a US and Western
response to a renewed Russian military offensive against
Ukraine should include more than
sanctions.
Magnitsky Accountability Act (Sec. 611). Attribution will
be a challenge, but this is worthy mandate.
ASSESSMENT
Is legislation needed? Both DETER and DASKA bills at-
tempt to push the Trump administration to take a stronger,
more consistent stance against the Kremlin’s malign behav-
ior. They are both, by their nature as legislations, blunter in-
struments than we prefer, but the case for these bills flows
from the president’s inconsistency on Russia policy (and on
Ukraine) and the resulting weakening of a credible deter-
rent to continued Russian aggression. While the Trump ad-
ministration has advanced some sanctions against Russia,
those have seemed more reluctant actions than proactive
engagement with a Moscow bent on undermining the trans-
atlantic alliance and democracy as a form of government.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his team are
hopeful about making some progress in negotiations with
Russia over a Donbas settlement, but signs that the Kremlin
is prepared to respond constructively are mixed, especially
with Washington sitting largely on the sidelines. The United
States must disabuse Putin of the notion that he can attack
the US elections or Ukraine without consequence.
The attribution problem. Both bills depend on a DNI (plus

multiagency) process or a DNI/secretary of state determi-
nation of malign Russian behavior as the trigger for action.
While attribution can be complex, it is possible to detect
some forms of Russian election interference. Independent
civil society researchers (as well as the intelligence commu-
nity) have done so in the past and have already been mak-
ing their judgments known during the current US election
cycle. Detection of Russian offensive military operations
should prove even simpler.
The problem is whether the administration will make a
straight and timely call. We understand the argument for
assigning this task to the DNI. Reliance on the DNI seems
unreliable , however, after Trump dismissed his acting DNI
reportedly due to unhappiness over an intelligence assess-
ment of Russian electoral interference and replaced him
7ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OptionsISSUE BRIEF
with a political ally.7 Making a call with policy implications
arguably should not be put on the DNI, as an apolitical body,
even in the anomalous current circumstances. Congress
may wish to assign the designation responsibility to the
president, perhaps on the basis of an independent assess-
ment of the facts sent to the both houses of Congress.
Are the bills’ sanctions the right ones? Both bills draw from
a set of sanctions escalatory measures—covering finance,
energy, and the cyber sector—that have been discussed
by sanctions experts in and out of government since the
end of the Obama administration. We provide specific com-

ments on individual provisions above but generally believe
that DASKA’s sanctions are more measured and thus more
implementable. DETER’s sanctions on financial institutions
are simply too harsh and risk too much spillover to US
and Western financial markets to be implementable. That
maximalism also undermines the provision’s utility as an
effective deterrent as it is almost inconceivable that such
sanctions would be imposed without significant carve-outs
or other methods of blunting potential blowback to US and
European interests.
The bills also differ over whether the US government
should focus on one big problem—election interference—
or more areas of potential Russian aggression. While an ar-
gument can be made for focus, we prefer DASKA’s attempt
at a more comprehensive approach, going after the major
areas of potential Kremlin aggression rather than just one.
◆ For the sake of addressing all major areas of poten-
tial Russian aggression, we suggest adding to DASKA
contingency sanctions should the Kremlin again use
gas supplies as a political weapon. Last December,
Congress passed the PEES (Protecting Europe’s
Energy Security) Act, introduced by US Sens. Ted Cruz
(R-TX) and Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), using the threat
of sanctions in an effort to block the Nord Stream II
gas pipeline, which many believe could give Russia
the ability again to withhold gas from Ukraine or from
Central Europe. PEES has slowed Nord Stream II and
could derail it altogether (though that is less likely).8
DASKA could add a provision for discretionary sanc-
tions should the Russian government use gas cutoffs
or significant reductions to coerce or exercise political
leverage over Ukraine or any European Union member

7 Rozina Sabur, “Donald Trump Dismisses US Intelligence
Briefing Warning Russia is Working to Boost His Re-Election,”
Telegraph, February 21, 2020, https://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/02/21/us-intelligence-chief-
replaced-clash-donald-trump-russian-bid2/.
8 Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019, S.1441—
116th Congress (last update July 31, 2019),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1441.
state. The sanctions could include financial restrictions
on Gazprom; escalation of technology restrictions for
gas and oil exploration equipment and LNG facilities;
and intensified financial restrictions on all Russian en-
ergy development projects.
Our bottom lines are these: in a best-case scenario, we
would prefer no sanctions legislation at all. An administra-
tion should have discretion in the foreign policy realm to
act and should earn that discretion through consistent pol-
icy application that is communicated promptly to Congress.
However, a best case is no longer available. Unevenness
on the part of the administration, especially its top-level in-
jection of domestic partisan calculations into responses to
real Russian threats with respect to Ukraine and US elec-
tions, despite the best efforts of many skilled career and
political appointees, has made Russia sanctions legislation
a needed second-best alternative.
DASKA and DETER are both serious pieces of legislation; we
prefer DASKA as the more comprehensive and measured op-
tion. With admitted regret, we support its passage. If a sub-
sequent bill emerges, we hope that it incorporates the best
elements of both and benefits from this and other analyses.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Brian O’Toole is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s
Global Business & Economics Program. Brian writes regu-
larly on sanctions and foreign policy issues for the Economic
Sanctions Initiative and is a recognized expert on economic
and financial sanctions. Previously, Brian worked at the US
Department of the Treasury from 2009 to 2017.
Ambassador Daniel Fried serves as the Weiser Family
Distinguished Fellow at the Atlantic Council. In the course
of his forty-year Foreign Service career, Ambassador Fried
played a key role in designing and implementing American
policy in Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union.
This issue brief is part of the Atlantic Council’s
Economic Sanctions Initiative and is made possible
by generous support through Guidehouse LLP,
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Procter & Gamble,
and the Hon. David D. Aufhauser
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/02/21/us-intelligence-
chief-replaced-clash-donald-trump-russian-bid2/
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/02/21/us-intelligence-
chief-replaced-clash-donald-trump-russian-bid2/
CHAIRMAN
*John F.W. Rogers
EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN
EMERITUS
*James L. Jones
CHAIRMAN EMERITUS

Brent Scowcroft
PRESIDENT AND CEO
*Frederick Kempe
EXECUTIVE VICE CHAIRS
*Adrienne Arsht
*Stephen J. Hadley
VICE CHAIRS
*Robert J. Abernethy
*Richard W. Edelman
*C. Boyden Gray
*Alexander V. Mirtchev
*John J. Studzinski
TREASURER
*George Lund
SECRETARY
*Walter B. Slocombe
DIRECTORS
Stéphane Abrial
Odeh Aburdene
Todd Achilles
*Peter Ackerman
Timothy D. Adams
*Michael Andersson
David D. Aufhauser
Colleen Bell
Matthew C. Bernstein
*Rafic A. Bizri
Dennis C. Blair
Philip M. Breedlove
Myron Brilliant

*Esther Brimmer
R. Nicholas Burns
*Richard R. Burt
Michael Calvey
James E. Cartwright
John E. Chapoton
Ahmed Charai
Melanie Chen
Michael Chertoff
*George Chopivsky
Wesley K. Clark
*Helima Croft
Ralph D. Crosby, Jr.
*Ankit N. Desai
Dario Deste
*Paula J. Dobriansky
Thomas J. Egan, Jr.
Stuart E. Eizenstat
Thomas R. Eldridge
*Alan H. Fleischmann
Jendayi E. Frazer
Ronald M. Freeman
Courtney Geduldig
Robert S. Gelbard
Gianni Di Giovanni
Thomas H. Glocer
John B. Goodman
*Sherri W. Goodman
Murathan Günal

*Amir A. Handjani
Katie Harbath
John D. Harris, II
Frank Haun
Michael V. Hayden
Amos Hochstein
*Karl V. Hopkins
Andrew Hove
Mary L. Howell
Ian Ihnatowycz
Wolfgang F. Ischinger
Deborah Lee James
Joia M. Johnson
Stephen R. Kappes
*Maria Pica Karp
Andre Kelleners
Astri Kimball Van Dyke
Henry A. Kissinger
*C. Jeffrey Knittel
Franklin D. Kramer
Laura Lane
Jan M. Lodal
Douglas Lute
Jane Holl Lute
William J. Lynn
Mian M. Mansha
Chris Marlin
William Marron
Neil Masterson
Gerardo Mato
Timothy McBride
Erin McGrain
John M. McHugh

H.R. McMaster
Eric D.K. Melby
*Judith A. Miller
Dariusz Mioduski
Susan Molinari
*Michael J. Morell
*Richard Morningstar
Virginia A. Mulberger
Mary Claire Murphy
Edward J. Newberry
Thomas R. Nides
Franco Nuschese
Joseph S. Nye
Hilda Ochoa-Brillembourg
Ahmet M. Oren
Sally A. Painter
*Ana I. Palacio
*Kostas Pantazopoulos
Carlos Pascual
W. DeVier Pierson
Alan Pellegrini
David H. Petraeus
Lisa Pollina
Daniel B. Poneman
*Dina H. Powell McCormick
Robert Rangel
Thomas J. Ridge
Michael J. Rogers
Charles O. Rossotti
Harry Sachinis
C. Michael Scaparrotti

Rajiv Shah
Stephen Shapiro
Wendy Sherman
Kris Singh
Christopher Smith
James G. Stavridis
Richard J.A. Steele
Mary Streett
Frances M. Townsend
Clyde C. Tuggle
Melanne Verveer
Charles F. Wald
Michael F. Walsh
Ronald Weiser
Geir Westgaard
Olin Wethington
Maciej Witucki
Neal S. Wolin
*Jenny Wood
Guang Yang
Mary C. Yates
Dov S. Zakheim
HONORARY DIRECTORS
James A. Baker, III
Ashton B. …
4/10/20, 7)39 PMRussia in the Middle East: Jack of All Trades,
Master of None - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Page 1 of 22https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/31/russia-
in-middle-east-jack-of-all-trades-master-of-none-pub-80233
Eugene Rumer October 31, 2019

Paper
Russia in the Middle East: Jack of All Trades,
Master of None
The Return of Global Russia
Executive Summary
The 2015 Russian military intervention in Syria was a pivotal
moment for Moscow’s Middle East policy. Largely absent from
the Middle East for the
better part of the previous two decades, Russia intervened to
save Bashar al-Assad’s regime and reasserted itself as a major
player in the region’s
power politics. Moscow’s bold use of military power positioned
it as an important actor in the Middle East.
The intervention took place against the backdrop of a United
States pulling back from the Middle East and growing
uncertainty about its future role
there. The geopolitical realignment and instability caused by the
civil wars in Libya and Syria and the rivalry between Iran and
Saudi Arabia have
opened opportunities for Russia to rebuild some of the old
relationships and to build new ones.
The most dramatic turnaround in relations in recent years has
occurred between Russia and Israel. The new quality of the
relationship owes a great
deal to the personal diplomacy between Russian President
Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu,
but Russia’s emergence as
a major presence in Syria has meant that the Israelis now have
no choice but to maintain good relations with their new
“neighbor.” Some Israeli
officials hope that Moscow will help them deal with the biggest

threat they face from Syria—Iran and its client Hezbollah. So
far, Russia has delivered
some, but far from all that Israel wants from it, and there are
precious few signs that Russia intends to break with Iran, its
partner and key ally in Syria.
Russian-Iranian relations have undergone an unusual
transformation as a result of the Russian intervention in the
Syrian civil war. Their joint victory is
likely to lead to a divergence of their interests. Russia is
interested in returning Syria to the status quo ante and reaping
the benefits of peace and
reconstruction. Iran is interested in exploiting Syria as a
platform in its campaign against Israel. Russia lacks the
military muscle and the diplomatic
leverage to influence Iran. That poses a big obstacle to
Moscow’s ambitions in the Middle East.
Russian-Turkish relations have received an upgrade as a result
of Russia’s intervention in Syria. Russian-Turkish relations
have been improving since
the fall of the Soviet Union; trade and energy ties as well as a
shared sense of alienation from the West are now the key
drivers of that relationship.
The Russian intervention in Syria gave it a new quality,
however, since it changed the Turkish calculus in Syria and left
Ankara with no alternative to
going along with Russian priorities there. The rift between
Turkey and the West because of the former’s authoritarian
politics has deepened
rapprochement with Russia. However, the relationship remains
well short of a real partnership given the geopolitical, cultural,
and historical differences
that divide them.
Much like Turkey, Saudi Arabia had no choice but to upgrade

its relationship with Russia. In addition to its stake in the
outcome of the Syria conflict
and rivalry with Iran, Saudi Arabia has a growing interest in
coordinating oil production with Russia at a time when both are
grappling with a surge in
U.S. energy production. Saudi King Salman’s 2017 visit to
Moscow was a historic first, and the two energy superpowers
have pledged to coordinate
their oil export policies, but much like the Israelis, the Saudis
are likely to be disappointed in their hope that better relations
with Russia could lead it to
abandon its partnership with Iran. Still, with influential U.S.
voices arguing for reducing the U.S. commitment to the Middle
East, good relations with
Russia provide an additional, even if not very reliable, hedge
against uncertainty.
Russia’s return to North Africa too has to be considered against
the backdrop of the United States’ disengagement from the
region. The relationship
between Moscow and Cairo, interrupted in the 1970s with the
latter’s pivot toward the United States, underwent a significant
upgrade after the 2013
coup in Egypt and the rise of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to the
presidency. Criticized in the West for his human rights abuses,
Sisi found in Putin a convenient
partner to help shore up his domestic standing and leverage vis-
à-vis Washington. Egypt has emerged as an important customer
for Russian arms.
Russia and Egypt have partnered in supporting one of the
factions in the Libyan civil war, the Libyan National Army, but
the country remains too badly
fractured for the LNA to score a decisive victory. Moscow
expects to have a say in negotiations about the conflict and to
reestablish commercial
opportunities derailed by Muammar Qaddafi’s demise.

By reversing the course of the Syrian civil war and saving an
old client, Moscow sent a message to other Middle Eastern
regimes that it is a reliable
partner. Hardly anyone would question that Moscow has
positioned itself as an important geopolitical and military actor
at the proverbial crossroads of
the world following decades of undisputed U.S. military
superiority. Russia has positioned itself as a valuable
interlocutor to all parties to the region’s
conflicts.
That said, one of Russia’s key accomplishments is also
symbolic of the limits of its power and influence in the Middle
East. In a region torn by fierce
rivalries, the ability to talk to everyone without taking sides has
limited utility. Absent major capabilities for power projection
and economic resources,
and with its diplomatic capital confined largely to a well-
advertised willingness to talk to all parties, Russia’s clout is not
sufficient to resolve any of the
region’s myriad problems.
For the United States, Russia’s return to the Middle East is
important, but hardly a seismic shift. Much of what Russia has
accomplished is owed to the
United States reconsidering its commitments in the region. The
challenge for the United States is to define and defend its own
interests there, to gain a
better understanding of Russian interests and policy drivers, and
to explore the extent to which U.S. and Russian interests truly
clash and where they
do not. As U.S. decisionmakers develop U.S. policy in the
Middle East, they will need to think more creatively about how
to build on the successful
deconfliction effort with Russia in Syria and develop a model of

coexistence in the region as a whole.
https://carnegieendowment.org/experts/917
https://carnegieendowment.org/specialprojects/thereturnofglobal
russia/
Introduction
The Russian military intervention in Syria in the fall of 2015
marked the major turning point in the Syrian civil war and
Russia’s return to the Middle
East as a major power player after a decades-long absence.
Russian airpower, in cooperation with Iranian boots on the
ground, reversed the course of
the war and saved Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s
government from imminent collapse. Russian President
Vladimir Putin used that victory to
rekindle old partnerships and strike up new ones. He has
convened conferences to decide the fate of post–civil war Syria,
exchanged visits with long-
standing U.S. allies in the Middle East, and signed deals to sell
them weapons and nuclear power plants. Russia seems resurgent
from the Persian
Gulf to North Africa especially as the United States, worn out
by nearly two decades of endless wars, appears eager to
minimize its commitments in
the region. Unwilling to stand in the way of Russian ambitions,
U.S. policy has become increasingly erratic and disruptive for
long-standing adversaries
and allies alike.

President Donald Trump’s October 2019 decision to withdraw
the remaining U.S. troops from northern Syria and in effect
green-light Turkey’s military
action against U.S.-aligned Kurdish-led militias is the most
dramatic manifestation of Washington’s desire to put an end to
nearly two decades of war. It
has magnified the impression of a hasty U.S. retreat from the
Middle East and Russian ascendancy. Adding insult to injury,
U.S. withdrawal from
northern Syria coincided with triumphant visits by Putin to
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both long-standing
U.S. allies.
However, a sober assessment of the Kremlin’s pursuits across
the Middle East suggests that the image of its ascendancy is
somewhat of an
exaggeration, and that the actual accomplishments of Russian
diplomacy across the region are far more modest than they seem
at first blush. Of
course, the Kremlin’s accomplishments to date should not be
minimized or ignored. But the single biggest accomplishment—
a shared victory in the
Syrian civil war—that has positioned Russia as the key power in
the war-torn country, comes with a host of major diplomatic,
military, and economic
challenges, which make the task of winning the peace even
more daunting than winning the war.
From the Persian Gulf to North Africa, nimble Russian
diplomacy has produced an array of trade and investment-
related deals and joint declarations
about expanded cooperation in various spheres. However, a
closer look at this impressive pattern of activity makes clear
that the practical
implementation of these agreements and deals is lagging or

remains unfulfilled. Russia’s trade with the Middle East remains
exceedingly modest, and
there is little likelihood that this state of affairs will change in
the foreseeable future.
This study offers a broad overview of Russian policy in the
Middle East in the past decade, its origins, its key drivers, its
accomplishments, especially
since the 2015 military intervention in Syria, as well as its
prospects. It examines Russia’s relationships with key Middle
Eastern powers—Turkey,
Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iran. And it concludes with
implications for U.S. interests and recommendations for U.S.
policy in the Middle East.
Why?—The Drivers of Russian Policy
Why is Russia returning to the Middle East? What explains its
ambition to reestablish itself as a power broker in the
tumultuous region? Why is it
seeking a major role in a region where major powers, including
the Soviet Union, have seen their ambitions thwarted and
fortunes wasted in pursuit of
grandiose plans? The short answer is because the Middle East is
the crossroads of the world, where tradition, interests, and
political ambition all
mandate an active Russian presence.
Yet for some observers, the Russian military intervention in
Syria that positioned it as a force in Middle Eastern politics has
been easy to dismiss as a
mistake or a potential invitation to plunge into new quagmires.
That would be wrong. It was the absence of Russia from the
region in the aftermath of
the Cold War that was a major departure from the norm.
Moscow’s post-2015 active presence marked the resumption of
centuries-old Russian

involvement in the region’s affairs.
Russian involvement in Middle Eastern affairs dates back to the
reign of Peter the Great and the founding of the modern Russian
state, if not earlier.
As is the case with many such long-standing foreign policy
pursuits, Russian policy has combined elements of geopolitics
and great-power competition
with ideology and religion. At various times in history, Russian
armed forces fought land battles against Persian, Turkish,
British, and French armies,
and confronted their navies in the Black Sea and the
Mediterranean.
In the more recent past, after World War II, the Soviet Union
emerged as a major presence in Middle Eastern affairs, securing
partnerships with Egypt,
Iraq, Libya, and Syria, and establishing itself as the key backer
of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Soviet
involvement in Middle Eastern
affairs during the Cold War was multifaceted and entailed
economic and technical assistance, military assistance and
training, arms sales, and even
direct involvement in the region’s conflicts in support of client-
states. The Soviet Union was a key party to efforts to find a
peaceful solution to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Soviet Navy became a regular
presence in the Mediterranean. Former U.S. officials recalled
Soviet threats to intervene
in and the risks of U.S.-Soviet confrontations in the 1967 and
1973 Arab-Israeli wars.
Russian policy in the Middle East has had multiple and diverse
drivers. Geopolitical and ideological factors were influenced by
its religious and cultural
ties to the vast region where the Russian and Ottoman Empires

played out their long-standing rivalry, from the Balkans to Asia
Minor and the Levant.
Over time, these drivers included the quest for warm water ports
and territorial expansion, protection of fellow Orthodox
Christian believers and Slavs
oppressed under Ottoman rule, and support for various
postcolonial or revolutionary movements and regimes. Russia
was wholly engaged in the
outright great-power competition for influence in the contested
region, where all major powers of the day had interests and
sought to project power and
influence.
Beyond history and tradition, Russian ambition to return to the
Middle East can be explained by the region’s proximity to
Russia’s borders. The claim to
a major role in the affairs of the Mediterranean by virtue of
being a Black Sea power has deep roots in Russian strategic
thought and policy.
Geography not only drives Russian geopolitical ambitions, but
also has obvious consequences for Russian national security.
Considering the difficult
terrain and porous borders of its neighbors, the prospect of
instability in the Levant spilling over into Russia’s restive
Caucasus region is a problem no
Russian national security analyst or official can ignore. Even
when there are legitimate differences of opinion on how to best
secure Russia against
that contingency, the existence of this problem cannot be
denied.
Nor can anyone deny that Russia has interests in the region
beyond historical attachments and security. It may seem, on the
basis of mere statistics
that bilateral trade with most individual countries is not a major
driver of Russian policy in the Middle East as a whole because

the region overall ranks
relatively low among Russian trading partners. Russia’s only
significant trading partner in the Middle East in 2017 was
Turkey, with the total trade
volume just under $16.5 billion. It was the fifth-largest market
for Russian goods (and fourteenth-largest source of imports to
Russia).
But numbers can be misleading. Several countries in the
region—Algeria, Egypt, Iraq—have been historically significant
buyers of Russian weapons.
The arms industry is an influential interest group in Russia and
arms sales have long been more than just another source of
revenue for this sector of
the Russian economy. During the lean times, when the Russian
military’s procurement budgets dried up, arms exports were
crucial to sustaining the
industry. More recently, arms exports have also served as an
important tool of Russian foreign policy.
By far the most important Russian economic interest in the
Middle East is in the region’s role as the supplier of oil and gas
to the global economy. As
1
2
3
4
5

one of the world’s top three producers of hydrocarbons, Russia
has a vital stake in the future of the global oil and gas
marketplace. The activities of
Middle Eastern oil and—increasingly—gas producers have
direct bearing on Russian economic well-being and political
stability. Although Russia and
Middle Eastern producers are competitors, they are increasingly
having to coordinate their activities as their previously
dominant positions as energy
superpowers are being challenged by the entry of new sources
of supply and technologies.
Several Middle Eastern states have also expressed interest in
investing in the Russian economy. While expressions of interest
have so far exceeded
actual amounts invested, they are not to be dismissed. For
Russia, struggling to overcome the twin obstacles of U.S. and
EU sanctions and its own
poor investment climate, the prospect of investments by some of
the biggest sovereign wealth funds is important and welcome as
proof of its ability to
break out of international isolation and economic potential.
Last, but not least, there is the domestic political context of
Russian foreign policy. Throughout Putin’s tenure at the helm,
making Russia great again
has been a major stated objective of Russian foreign policy and
Putin’s domestic political platform. The 2015 Russian military
intervention in Syria was
a critical milestone in that pursuit—a high-profile military

deployment in a region long dominated by the United States,
challenging the “indispensable
nation’s” monopoly on decisionmaking in the Middle East.
Coming on the heels of the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the
Syrian deployment was an
important juncture not merely in Russian policy in the Middle
East, but Russian foreign policy in general. A successful
intervention in Syria would
demonstrate to Washington and Brussels that their policy of
isolating Russia, marginalizing it in world affairs, and forcing it
to retreat under the weight
of U.S.-EU sanctions was doomed to fail; Russia could be
neither marginalized nor isolated, and it would not retreat.
For decades and centuries prior to the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and the loss of territories that long had been part of the
Russian Empire,
Russian presence in the Middle East had been recognized as a
natural phenomenon, a major element of the region’s complex
politics and the broader
context of great-power politics. Its legitimacy was hardly ever
questioned. It was to be opposed, as it was in the nineteenth
century, when the United
Kingdom and France fought Russia in Crimea; competed
against, as the United States and its allies sought to do
throughout the Cold War; but not
questioned as an aberration. Arguably, even the 2014 illegal
annexation of Crimea was consistent with Russia’s traditional
pursuit of unimpeded
access to the Mediterranean. The Kremlin justified it to the
Russian public in terms of historical continuity with earlier
centuries’ struggles and victories.
One does not need to put much stock in this propaganda to
conclude that with Russia’s return to the Middle East in 2015,
the geopolitics of the region
is not entering a new phase, but returning to a status quo ante.

This study offers an overview of Russia’s return to the Middle
East as a major actor and of the crucial role its intervention in
Syria in 2015 has played in
that undertaking. The intervention in the Syrian civil war
occurred against the backdrop of the United States trying to
disengage from the turbulent
region thus greatly reducing the risk of a U.S.-Russian
confrontation. U.S. disengagement from the Middle East has
also created multiple opportunities
for Russia to reach out to U.S. partners seeking reassurance in a
time of uncertainty—in the Levant, in the Persian Gulf, and in
North Africa.
Notwithstanding Moscow’s success in building or restoring
important ties in these regions, it has neither the means nor the
ambition to fill the vacuum
resulting from the United States’ pullback. The Kremlin appears
careful not to overextend itself and content to remain as an
indispensable actor—one
whose presence is necessary, even if not sufficient, to address
the region’s many problems. Moreover, the advantage that
Russia has enjoyed since
returning to Middle Eastern politics—the ability to talk to all
parties—is also a key limiting factor in its pursuit of a further
enhanced role in the region. To
move beyond being everyone’s interlocutor and become a true
power broker in the Middle East would require taking sides in
the major conflict tearing
the region apart—between Iran and virtually everyone else. So
far, Russia has not been willing or able to take that step and
instead appears intent on
remaining the party everyone can talk to.
The Retreat in the 1990s
The 1990s were a period of a broad and deep Russian
retrenchment from the world stage, and the Middle East was no

exception to that phenomenon.
The post-Soviet Russian economy was in no position to sustain
an active military presence or any real degree of diplomatic,
economic, or
humanitarian engagement in the Middle East. The lack of
resources severely affected its military establishment and
restricted its capabilities for power
projection.
The Middle East held little attraction for the cash-strapped
Russian state. As a major exporter of hydrocarbons, it was a
competitor rather than a
market for the Russian economy. The predominantly Muslim
countries of the region were hardly natural partners to Russia
while it conducted a brutal
military campaign to suppress the rebellion of Muslims in
Chechnya and elsewhere in the Caucasus. The preeminent
position of the United States in
the Middle East left little room for Russia to expand its
influence there with its few remaining resources. Both literally
and figuratively speaking, it was
outgunned and outresourced. It was in no shape to compete, let
alone outcompete.
What was left was a relatively modest level of diplomatic
activity centered around the principle, but at the time seemingly
abstract, motivation behind
Russian foreign policy: a multipolar world. According to an
influential policy blueprint pushed by Yevgeniy Primakov, who
served as both foreign
minister from 1996 to 1998 and prime minister from 1998 to
1999, Russia along with China and India would form a global
counterweight to the United
States. In the eyes of Russian policymakers, their Cold War
opponent aspired to perpetuate the unipolar model and single-
handedly run the world.

However, the Middle East was not home to any major power
that could meaningfully join the Russia-China-India coalition.
Rather, the region was a
uniquely important arena for competition, where U.S.
dominance could be challenged once Russia gained the
necessary resources to do so.
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the most important
relationship that Russia was able to sustain in the Middle East
was its ties with Iran. That
too, however, was at least in part a reflection of Russia’s
weakness rather than strength. The Russian-Iranian relationship
was less a product of active
Russian diplomacy than of Iran’s international pariah status and
need for partners. For Russia, Iran’s isolation presented a
unique opportunity to
sustain its claim as a power with Middle East interests and a
major voice in the international community’s efforts to limit the
Iranian nuclear program.
Beyond the relationship with Iran, Russia managed to sustain its
relationship with Syria, including the naval facility in Tartus,
arms sales, and Soviet-
era debt forgiveness. The Syrian foothold also served as a
useful platform for intelligence collection on U.S. and Israeli
activities. That relationship
generally was perceived as Russia’s last outpost in the Middle
East, more a sign of its regional insignificance than a
springboard for projecting its
power and influence.
Elsewhere, the Russian presence in the region during that period
manifested itself mostly in the pursuit of market opportunities
for its struggling arms
industry, as well as a largely inconsequential diplomatic
engagement intended to show that Russia was still interested in

maintaining ties to the region.
It was not seen as a major actor, not even remotely comparable
to the United States. The George W. Bush administration
ignored Russian
protestations against the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the
overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Moscow’s former client—and
Russia could do little to change
that.
Always suspicious of grassroots prodemocracy movements and
fearing the West’s encouragement of them—especially as the
United States embraced
democracy promotion as one of its major foreign policy goals—
Moscow was quick to blame the 2011 Arab Spring on the United
States’ reckless
subversion of the existing order and the legitimate governments
in the Middle East. For Russian officials, the Libya intervention
by the United States
and its allies, which led to the downfall of the long-lived regime
of Muammar Qaddafi, and the West’s endorsement of the
antiregime protests in Syria
were more than enough evidence that turmoil in the Middle East
was a product of U.S. geopolitical designs on the region. The
fact that the Arab Spring
6
followed the invasion of Iraq, undertaken in the name of

democratizing the region; then president Barack Obama’s Cairo
speech in 2009; and then
secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s statements in 2012 that the
Assad regime had lost its legitimacy and “must go” supplied
further proof of
Washington’s unilateral, unipolar, disruptive agenda in the
Middle East.
The Syrian Pivot
The unrest in Syria, which began in 2011 and soon escalated
into a full-fledged civil war, was the catalyst for a qualitative
change in Russia’s
involvement in the Middle East. Several major considerations
were apparent in the Kremlin’s decision to step up its
involvement in the Syrian conflict.
Syria, as mentioned earlier, was the last remaining foothold in
the Middle East that Moscow could count as its client-state—
Iran was too big and
pursued a far too independent foreign policy to be considered a
Russian client. Syria was home to the last remaining Russian
military—in this case,
naval—facility in the Middle East and Russia’s biggest
electronic eavesdropping post outside its territory in Latakia.
The Kremlin’s relationship with the
ruling Assad family extended back to the 1970s.
The new chapter in Moscow’s Middle East policy began against
the backdrop of a general deterioration of relations between
Russia and the West.
Disagreements with Washington about the handling of the
escalating conflict in Syria intensified as the Obama-era “reset”
faded, and tensions
between Moscow and Washington rose with Putin’s return to the
presidency amid U.S. criticism of Putin’s crackdown on
domestic protests. The crisis
in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014

swept aside all interest in a cooperative relationship on both
sides, with the exception of a
handful of vitally important issues. In this context, the
increased Russian involvement in Syria acquired a poignant
anti-U.S. aspect.
Russian engagement in Syria has evolved over a period of
several years. It began with mostly political, diplomatic, and
economic support for the
Assad regime, and escalated into direct military engagement
with boots on the ground and airpower in the sky. This
evolution has been a direct
product of the changing fortunes of the Assad regime.
Victory from the Jaws of Defeat
Russian involvement in Syria intensified as the civil war inside
the country escalated and the conflict increasingly occupied the
center stage of
international diplomacy. The initial protests and the Assad
regime’s suppression of them were met with different, but
parallel and escalating responses
from Washington and Moscow. The Obama administration
viewed the protests as a legitimate effort by the nascent Syrian
prodemocracy forces and
an expression of the Syrian people’s desire for a more open,
representative government. Accordingly, the administration
condemned the Assad
regime’s actions to suppress the protests. As the conflict
escalated into a full-fledged civil war, the United States
provided political, diplomatic, and
material support for the anti-Assad forces. The Russian
government, for its part, condemned the protests as an
illegitimate, foreign-inspired attempt at
regime change; branded the opposition as terrorists; endorsed
the actions of the Assad regime to suppress them; and also
provided material support

for Assad to do so.
As the confrontation intensified and U.S. condemnation of the
Assad regime grew stronger, so did Russian actions to support
Assad. In the United
Nations Security Council, Russia stymied U.S. efforts to apply
international pressure on Assad to force him to ease his
oppression of the opposition
and negotiate with it. Joined by China, Russia put up an
insurmountable barrier to the United States’ push to impose
comprehensive sanctions,
including a ban on arms deliveries and financial transactions, on
the Syrian government.
In the meantime, Iran also emerged as a critical participant in
the conflict willing to intervene with boots on the ground.
Tehran’s …
1
Masked Diplomacy: Xi and Putin Seek Advantage and
Cover from the Pandemic
PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 643
April 2020
Elizabeth Wishnick1
Montclair State University; Columbia University

In the United States, President Donald Trump claims to be a
wartime president, while
denying any responsibility as the country proved unprepared to
confront its most serious
health emergency in more than a century. American voters will
soon have a chance to
weigh in on his leadership. In China and Russia, however, we
see authoritarian strongmen
with an indefinite hold on power taking cover from bad news of
the pandemic’s impact
on their countries while seeking to take advantage of
disorganized global and regional
responses to the pandemic for short-term political gain. Given
the outstanding questions
about the handling of the pandemic in both China and Russia,
such strategies may
backfire in the long term and raise questions about their role in
regional integration
strategies.
Where was Xi?
As the world grapples with the COVID-19 pandemic, which may
have originated as early
as mid-November 2019 in Wuhan, the Chinese government is
now seen as seeking to take
advantage of lagging global responses to claim global and
regional leadership. Rather
than a display of Chinese strength, efforts to reframe the
country’s role reveal an effort to
shore up President Xi Jinping’s reputation after Chinese
authorities suffered
unprecedented criticism for their own initial slow response and
attacks on early
whistleblowers.

During the first few weeks of January, Xi was nowhere to be
seen. The Chinese president
did not visit the virus epicenter, Wuhan, until March 10, as the
disease appeared to be
weakening in the area. To counter such narratives, on February
26, Xinhua heralded the
publication of a new book about Xi’s outstanding leadership
during the pandemic. A
1 Elizabeth Wishnick is Professor of Political Science at
Montclair State University and Senior Research
Scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia
University.
http://www.ponarseurasia.org
http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/post-soviet-state-
responses-covid-19-making-or-breaking-authoritarianism
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/3074991/coro
navirus-chinas-first-confirmed-covid-19-case-traced-back
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-03-
18/coronavirus-could-reshape-global-
order,https:/asiatimes.com/2020/03/china-steals-a-covid-19-
march-on-us-in-se-
asia/?utm_source=The+Daily+Report&utm_campaign=393c8948
00-
EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_03_26_10_46&utm_medium=email
&utm_term=0_1f8bca137f-393c894800-
31532317&mc_cid=393c894800&mc_eid=e34aa4e08d,https://w
ww.nytimes.com/2020/03/20/world/europe/trump-leadership-
coronavirus-united-states.html
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-02-
10/coronavirus-stress-test-xi-jinping
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/coronavirus-
china-political-consequences-by-minxin-pei-2020-03
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2020-

02/26/c_1125627516.htm
http://www.ponarseurasia.org/members/elizabeth-wishnick
2
French publication reported that Chinese embassies all over the
world have been tasked
with refuting that the virus began in China and to claim instead
that the true origin of the
virus remains unknown.
Chinese news outlets and officials have put forth a variety of
outlandish origin stories,
claiming that the virus began in Italy or was the product of a
U.S. Army biological war
attack. This led Chinese Ambassador to the United States Cui
Tiankai to criticize such
claims made by his colleagues at the Chinese Foreign Ministry,
including spokesman
Zhao Lijian, as “crazy” and “harmful.” All of this is occurring
as Chinese officials gear up
for the rescheduled opening sessions of their national
legislature and a key advisory body,
which may happen in late April or May. One of the reasons for
the initial delay in
reporting the outbreak of the virus in Wuhan may have been
efforts by local officials to
hide bad news prior to the January 12, 2020 opening of the
provincial legislative session,
a preparatory meeting for the national session.
Putin and Russia’s Response
China is not alone is spreading disinformation about the origins
of the pandemic.

According to an EU report, Russia has been doing this as well,
in keeping with its ongoing
efforts to sow distrust in Europe and the United States.
Conspiracy theories about U.S.
responsibility for the virus are also targeted at Russian
audiences to deflect blame in case
the pandemic becomes more extensive at home. Like Xi,
President Vladimir Putin sees the
pandemic as a threat to his own personal power, which he has
recently sought to
institutionalize in an April 22 referendum (now postponed
indefinitely) regarding
constitutional changes extending his term as President. Just as
Xi made Prime Minister Li
Keqiang the face of China’s response, so has Putin largely left
it to other officials, his Prime
Minister Mikhail Mishustin and Moscow Mayor Sergei
Sobyanin, to manage the
pandemic.
Russia claims to have relatively few cases (2,337 cases and 17
deaths as of March 31) and
is only now taking serious steps to stem its spread. After the
city of Moscow and the
Moscow region announced a lockdown on March 30, 16 regions,
mostly in European
Russia, followed suit the same day. To enforce quarantines,
newly developed facial
recognition technology, widely used in China to identify regime
opponents, has been
deployed. Ironically, Chinese citizens were among the first to
be targeted by Russian
authorities using the technology, leading to official Chinese
protests about discriminatory
treatment of Chinese citizens in Russia. In February, the city of
Zhengzhou, some 300

miles north of Wuhan, began using facial recognition gates and
infrared temperature
checks in all subway stations. A Chinese tech company has just
developed the capability
to detect faces even through masks (though the addition of
sunglasses still vexes the
system).
https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/Asie-et-Oceanie/Chine-
reecrit-deja-lhistoire-coronavirus-Wuhan-2020-03-09-
1201082887,https:/bitterwinter.org/de-sinicizing-the-virus-how-
ccp-propaganda-is-rewriting-history/
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-03-
05/us-chinese-distrust-inviting-dangerous-coronavirus-
conspiracy
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/coronavirus-chinas-
top-envoy-to-us-breaks-with-foreign-ministry-on-virus-origins
https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2020/03/16/world/asia/16reute
rs-health-coronavirus-china-parliament.html
https://grici.or.jp/860,https:/www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
2020/03/10/wuhan-officials-tried-cover-up-covid-19-sent-it-
careening-outward/
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-special-report-disinformation-on-
the-coronavirus-short-assessment-of-the-information-
environment/
https://www.euractiv.com/section/coronavirus/news/russian-
coronavirus-disinformation-may-be-for-domestic-audiences-
expert-says/
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/30/world/europe/coronavirus
-russia-putin.html
https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/why-is-russias-
coronavirus-case-count-so-low
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/03/31/coronavirus-in-
russia-the-latest-news-march-31-a69117

https://tass.com/society/1137723
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/03/25/coronavirus-
outbreak-is-major-test-for-russias-facial-recognition-network-
a69736
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-moscow-letter-
idUSKCN20K1HU
https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/newsfeed/2020/02/coro
navirus-china-facial-recognition-infrared-scanners-
200224092119453.html
https://thenextweb.com/neural/2020/03/10/masks-wont-make-
you-safe-from-facial-recognition/
3
Experts claim that Russia has suspiciously few reported cases of
COVID-19. There may be
some underreporting in Russia, but other countries on China’s
northern and western
borders thus far have relatively few cases compared to other
countries. All closed their
borders to China without delay, strategic partnerships
notwithstanding. While Central
Asian countries now are seeing increased cases of COVID-19,
this is from the second wave
of the pandemic, reflecting travel from Europe not from China.
The Russian map of the
spread of COVID-19 (see Figure 1) shows a concentration of
cases in European Russia, not
along the border with China.
Figure 1. Cases of Coronavirus in Russia
Source: BBC (screenshot), March 31, 2020; data: Russian

Government Communication Center
The Pandemic and Regional Partnerships
Some analysts project that COVID-19 is likely to undermine the
Sino-Russian
partnership—in the Russian media, as in the White House, some
refer to the pandemic as
the “Chinese coronavirus.” Nonetheless, even on the pandemic
response we see a familiar
pattern in Sino-Russian relations: mutual support by Xi and
Putin, contrasted with
ambivalence in Russian regions, as some local authorities target
Chinese nationals in
enforcing quarantines, while others bemoan the loss of Chinese
visitors. We see similar
trends in Kazakhstan and Mongolia, where top-level goodwill is
maintained at the same
time as trade is halted and quarantines are enforced.
Although Belt and Road projects have been suspended in
Eurasia, China is only increasing
its leverage on its key regional partners. The pandemic
coincides with a dispute between
Russia and Saudi Arabia over oil prices, further weakening the
economies of resource-
producing states like Russia and Kazakhstan. Nonetheless,
Russian officials and analysts
now see the coronavirus as a bigger threat to the Russian
economy than the decline in the
price of oil. Putin has taken some initial steps to bolster the
Russian economy but much
depends on the length of the pandemic since 60 percent of
Russia’s trade is with Europe

and China. Nonetheless, the Russian President has also
capitalized on a disjointed
response to the pandemic in Europe to show the Russian flag in
Italy, sanctions
https://euobserver.com/coronavirus/147798
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/03/new-coronavirus-
finally-slamming-russia-country-ready
https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-51979104
https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-51979104
https://jamestown.org/program/fair-weather-friends-the-impact-
of-the-coronavirus-on-the-strategic-partnership-between-russia-
and-
china/,https:/asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Coronavirus/Coronavirus
-rocks-the-China-Russia-partnership
https://www.prcleader.org/elizabeth-wishnick
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-
03/20/c_138896283.htm
http://www.sixthtone.com/news/1005310/the-chinese-citizens-
caught-in-russias-covid-19-crackdown
https://meduza.io/en/feature/2020/03/05/on-the-border
https://www.inform.kz/en/kazakh-president-holds-telephone-
conversation-with-head-of-people-s-republic-of-china-xi-
jinping_a3629056,https:/www.reuters.com/article/us-china-
health-kazakhstan/kazakh-governor-to-seek-deportation-of-
chinese-over-coronavirus-fears-idUSKBN20E2KA
https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/mongolia-braces-for-
coronavirus-impact/
https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2020/3/11/chinas-
belt-and-road-initiative-affected-by-coronavirus
https://www.fpri.org/article/2020/03/central-asias-force-
majeure-fears-impact-of-covid-19-outbreak-on-chinas-natural-
gas-supply-demands/
https://informburo.kz/stati/poka-katastrofy-ne-proizoshlo-kak-
koronavirus-i-nizkie-ceny-na-neft-vliyayut-na-ekonomiku-
kazahstana.html

https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2020/03/01/82415
8-rasprostranenie-
virusa,https:/www.ntv.ru/novosti/2310744/?fb,https://meduza.io
/feature/2020/02/18/nashi-kitaytsy-zarazitsya-ne-mogli
https://www.ntv.ru/novosti/2310744/
4
notwithstanding. Russian sent nine planeloads of aid along with
100 troops, leading to
criticism that Putin was playing “viruspolitik.”
As China claims to see few new cases of COVID-19 (though
some dispute Chinese
figures), Chinese agencies and companies are now offering
assistance to a number of
affected countries. With train connections newly built for the
Belt and Road now idle, Xi
announced that 110,000 masks and 776 gowns would be sent to
Spain by rail (taking 17
days). The Chinese leader now speaks of “the health Silk Road”
connecting China with
partners in the struggle against COVID-19. It remains to be seen
what the long-term
consequences of this outreach will be and its impact on China’s
soft power in the future.
In the immediate region, it is more likely that the experience
with COVID-19 will make
publics in Eurasia even more wary of regional connectivity than
previously, creating a
deeper disconnect between the messaging by the primarily
authoritarian leaders and their
more skeptical publics, who were already anxious about BRI
projects leading to a greater

influx of Chinese workers and leasing of property.
Conclusion
Rather than portending a new Chinese effort at global and
regional leadership, COVID-
19 reveals its absence and shows how poorly equipped global
architecture is for 21st-
century threats. No country or institution—not the United
States, China, Russia, the UN,
or the EU—has stepped up to craft a truly response that would
provide a template for
cooperative action and preventive measures for the health
security crises of the future that
are sure to come. Instead, the Chinese leadership, Putin’s
government, the Trump
administration, and others seek to assign blame to deflect
attention from their own
domestic shortfalls. China and Russia may seek to take
advantage of a leadership vacuum,
but they did not create it, nor do they have the soft power
resources to overcome it. It is
democracies in Asia like South Korea and Taiwan who are to be
emulated, as their
strategies to contain COVID-19 proved effective as well as
commensurate with democratic
ideals of transparency and accountability.

© PONARS Eurasia 2020. The statements made and views
expressed are solely
the responsibility of the author. PONARS Eurasia is an
international network
of scholars advancing new approaches to research on security,
politics,
economics, and society in Russia and Eurasia. PONARS Eurasia
is based at the
Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) at
the George
Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.
This
publication was made possible in part by a grant from Carnegie
Corporation
of New York. www.ponarseurasia.org
https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-soldiers-in-italy-contain-
the-coronavirus-and-mark-a-political-shift-
11585647002,https:/www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/03/26/80-
of-russias-coronavirus-aid-to-italy-useless-la-stampa-a69756
https://www.caixinglobal.com/2020-03-23/despite-official-
figures-wuhan-continues-to-find-new-asymptomatic-covid-19-
cases-daily-101532880.html
https://atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/is-china-
winning-the-coronavirus-response-narrative-in-the-
eu/,https:/www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-coronavirus-diplomacy-
11584744628
03/17/c_138886179.htm
03/17/c_138886179.htm
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/covid19-

pandemic-chinese-propaganda-by-minxin-pei-2020-03
https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/can-us-emulate-asias-coronavirus-
response,https:/www.ft.com/content/e015e096-6532-11ea-a6cd-
df28cc3c6a68
https://ieres.elliott.gwu.edu/
http://www.ponarseurasia.org/
4/20/19, 3:59 PMRussia Is Winning the Sanctions Game
Page 1 of
11https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/skeptics/russia-
winning-sanctions-game-47517
Published on The National Interest (https://nationalinterest.org)
Home > Russia Is Winning the Sanctions Game
March 14, 2019 Topic: Security Region: Eurasia Blog Brand:
The Skeptics
Tags: Sanctions, Russia, Moscow, Economy, Trade
Russia Is Winning the
Sanctions Game
https://nationalinterest.org/
https://nationalinterest.org/
https://nationalinterest.org/topic/security
https://nationalinterest.org/region/eurasia
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics
https://nationalinterest.org/tag/sanctions
https://nationalinterest.org/tag/russia
https://nationalinterest.org/tag/moscow
https://nationalinterest.org/tag/economy
https://nationalinterest.org/tag/trade

Page 2 of
These sanctions were supposed to punish Moscow's elite, but
instead
they've spurred economic development and patriotism.
by Judy Twigg
The current conversation about Russia sanctions centers around
targeting and scope.
Are we punishing the people whose behavior we most want to
change? Is there pain,
well inflicted, on those individuals responsible for creating
chaos in Ukraine and
Crimea, for reckless attacks on Sergei Skripal and others, and
for wanton interference
in Western elections? Can we hurt Russian elites in a way that
Putin will notice? Have
we done enough?
In at least one sector, though, the sanctions are a textbook case
of unintended
consequences: they’ve put Russian farmers in the best shape
they’ve ever been.

Countersanctions aimed at imported Western food products—
put into effect just days
after the initial sanctions in the summer of 2014—initially sent
Russian consumers into
a tailspin, hungry from a lack of immediate alternatives to tasty
European cheeses and
processed foods. But palates adjusted quickly, and the import
substitution effects
boosted Russia, by 2016, to the position of top wheat exporter
in the world. As the
United States hemorrhages global agro-market share courtesy of
Trump-era tariffs and
trade wars, Russia is actively and aggressively filling the gap.
The Sanctions
https://nationalinterest.org/profile/judy-twigg
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-16/russia-is-
exporting-more-wheat-than-any-country-in-25-years
Page 3 of
In early 2014, following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea
and continued

involvement in separatist uprisings in eastern Ukraine, the
United States, European
Union, and several other Western countries imposed sanctions.
Throughout 2014, these
measures progressed from the diplomatic (limits on previously
scheduled meetings and
talks), to curbs on specific individuals and organizations
(targeted visa bans and asset
freezes), and finally, in July and September, to restrictions on
Russia’s financial,
defense, and energy sectors. The latter limited access to capital
markets and low-
interest loans, imposed an arms embargo and ban on exports of
dual-use items to
military clients, and prohibited export of innovative extractive
technology (with special
approval required for all other energy-related exports). Since
2014, the sanctions have
been sustained and augmented, but they have remained within
these categories.
In August of 2014, Russia initiated countersanctions to ban
specific food commodities
imported from the United States and EU. Affected foods
included beef, poultry,

fish/seafood, fruits/vegetables, nuts, milk and dairy, cheese, and
a wide range of
processed and prepared foods. The ban was broad, covering
both staples and luxury
items. It hit many foods on which Russia was most import-
dependent, and its wide
geographic scope (the range of countries it covers) has made it
difficult to compensate
fully for shortages by increasing imports from non-sanctioned
countries.
The Impact
Russia felt the whole spectrum of sanctions in three immediate
ways: increased
volatility on foreign exchange markets, leading to significant
depreciation of the ruble
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/6146
65/EPRS_BRI(2018)614665_EN.pdf
https://financialobserver.eu/cse-and-cis/russia/the-embargo-has-
transformed-the-russian-food-market/
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/russia/publication/russia-
economic-report-33
Page 4 of

and resulting inflationary pressures; restricted access to
financial markets; and
depressed consumption and investment. Imports sank in the
third quarter of 2014. The
steep drop in world oil prices in the fourth quarter of 2014
likely had even more
profound effects on the Russian economy than the sanctions and
countersanctions. In
late 2014 and early 2015, oil prices fell so far (from $100 per
barrel in Q2 2014, to
under $60 by the end of 2014, and even further by the second
half of 2015) that
Russia’s export revenues were cut by a third. And the financial
sanctions meant that
Russia could not mitigate the oil price plunge by borrowing
money.
Right off the bat, the countersanctions impacted $9.5 billion
worth of food annually,
covering almost a tenth of total food consumption in Russia and
a quarter of food
imports. Before the countersanctions, domestic production
covered less than 40 percent
of Russia’s intake of fruit, 80 percent of milk/dairy, and 90

percent of vegetables;
Russia was already a net exporter of cereals, potatoes, and oil
plants. The
countersanctions banned 60 percent of incoming meat and fish,
and half of imported
dairy, fruits, and vegetables. Overall, the share of imports in
total food consumption
decreased from over a third in 2014 to just over 20 percent in
the second quarter of
2017.
Prices immediately increased. By February of 2015, food
inflation (year-on-year) was
over 23 percent. Households shifted food buying and eating
habits away from pricier,
formerly imported foods (fruit, milk/dairy, beef) toward less
expensive, domestically-
sourced goods (potatoes, bread, chicken), and have adopted
“smart shopping” strategies
to value acceptable quality at lower prices (including a
diminished appetite for prestige
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/267590.pdf
https://www.ceps.eu/publications/revisiting-sanctions-russia-
and-counter-sanctions-eu-economic-impact-three-years-later

Page 5 of
brands in favor of trusted store brands). Before too long, the
consumer environment
had largely adjusted and recovered. By 2018, food price
increases were much lower
than overall inflation.
Some banned food products from the EU have made their way to
Russia as re-exports
from other countries. In the final quarter of 2014, for example,
EU dairy exports to
Belarus increased tenfold compared to the previous year, and
exports of fruit and fish
doubled—not likely a surge in the domestic Belarussian market.
While not a large
percentage of Russia’s overall food trade, these secondary
import substitutions have
exacerbated trade tensions between Russia and Belarus, leading
to a reinstatement of
customs controls between the two countries in December 2014,
as well as the threat of
restrictions on imports of milk products from Belarus as

recently as spring 2018.
Probably rightly, Russia accuses Belarus of being a willing
conduit for banned,
counterfeit, and low-quality or mislabeled foods.
The Industry
The countersanctions were a gift to the Russian agrifood
industry. They legitimized and
catalyzed an import substitution strategy whose broad objective
had been in place since
the late 2000s: to become self-sufficient in food. In other
words, the sanctions paved
the way for Putin to overcome a long-standing embarrassment
dating back to the
collapse of the sector in the 1990s. The timing of the
countersanctions—announced just
a couple of days after the sanctions—led many observers to
wonder whether the lists of
banned products had been planned beforehand, specifically as a
measure intended
https://ideas.repec.org/a/onb/oenbfi/y2018iq3-18b6.html
Page 6 of

ultimately to boost domestic production.
Russia’s food industry has seized this opportunity. Many
investors who had not
previously bothered with agriculture suddenly became interested
in farming. High-end
oligarchs also got the message, with the agriculture sector
becoming a point of national
pride and patriotism for some. Viktor Vekselberg, for example,
has started investing in
the construction of urban greenhouses. The government has
earmarked 242 billion
rubles (just under $4 billion USD) in agricultural support for
2018–2020, focused on
rail transportation, subsidized loans, block grants to regions,
partial compensation for
capital investments, and targeted support for dairy farmers. A
new legal requirement
for public procurement gives preferences to domestic
products—not just for food, but
across the board, including key industries like software. This
government purchasing
boost, in combination with the countersanctions, has been of

comparatively less benefit
to domestic sectors that don’t produce quality alternatives to
imports, but the food
industry has benefited significantly. Even sub-sectors not
covered by the
countersanctions have asked to get in on the game. In June
2015, Russian candy
manufacturers asked for countersanctions to extend to European
chocolate, hoping to
capture the market niche from Belgium, France and Germany.
The Minister of
Agriculture, Alexander Tkachev, summed it up neatly in 2015:
“We are thankful to our
European and American partners, who made us look at
agriculture from a new angle,
and helped us find new reserves and potential.”
Agrifood was one of the few bright spots in the country’s
otherwise bleak economy
from 2014–2016, boasting 3.2 percent average growth. In the
words of Andrey Guriev,
https://www.ft.com/content/b5115324-7c8e-11e7-ab01-
a13271d1ee9c
http://www.vrenergie.com/index.php/archive/2335-russias-
booming-fish-industry-is-a-great-lesson-in-why-sanctions-dont-
work.html

https://gain.fas.usda.gov/Recent%20GAIN%20Publications/Agri
cultural%20Economy%20and%20Policy%20Report_Moscow_Ru
ssian%20Federation_7-19-2018.pdf
http://tass.com/russia/803511
https://www.ft.com/content/422a8252-2443-11e7-8691-
d5f7e0cd0a16
Page 7 of
the chief executive of PhosAgro, a Russian phosphate fertilizer
producer: “In one day,
the Russian agricultural sector became profitable as hell.” And
the growth continues.
Russia now produces almost twice as much grain as it
consumes, and it’s nearly self-
sufficient in sugar and meat products. Domestic production has
completely displaced
imports of pork and chicken. By 2016, Russia had become the
world’s largest exporter
of grains, which had overtaken arms sales to become Russia’s
second-largest export
commodity (after oil/gas) to the tune of almost $21 billion. The
Black Earth region of
central and southern Russia, close to Black Sea ports, is well

positioned to supply large
wheat importers like Turkey and Egypt, and there has been huge
investment in storage
facilities and export terminals. This food market turbulence has
attracted a new
superpower; China is rapidly creating a market for Russian
soybeans and sunflower
seeds, replacing U.S. products hit by Trump-era tariffs. And it
doesn’t stop there.
Russia has about 50 million still-unused acres of potentially
productive land, on top of
the seventy-nine million where wheat was grown in 2017, and
its crop rotation schemes
—including winter wheat, corn, barley—hedge well against bad
weather and
unpredictable markets. Putin’s “May decrees” last year included
a goal to double
2018’s $25 billion in food exports by 2024.
Import substitution in agrifood has certainly not been challenge-
free. Ruble
depreciation has increased prices for imported machinery and
technology used in food
production, and the availability of Russian replacements
remains limited, hiking

modernization and expansion costs. High interest rates have
constrained possibilities
for accelerated investment. Government support schemes
routinely disbursed funds
late. The slump in demand for relatively expensive foods has
reduced the benefits
accruing from lack of Western competition. Imports still
dominate the landscape of
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-07/china-
turns-to-russia-in-search-to-replace-u-s-soybeans
https://www.agriculture.com/news/crops/russia-us-wheat-
acreage-gap-seen-widening
https://russiabusinesstoday.com/agriculture/russia-expects-
grain-to-boost-overall-food-exports/
Page 8 of
high-value products, including beef, fruits, and vegetables.
Russian wheat is, on
average, of lower quality than Western counterparts (11.5
percent protein versus 13.5
percent in American wheat). But the impact of all of these
factors has diminished since

2016. Last year, for example, Germany and The Netherlands
sold $650 million worth
of farm equipment to Russia, and lower Russian wheat prices
seem to be working as a
compromise for lesser quality.
Russian consumers adjusted quickly to the new lineup of
products on the shelves. Over
time, shoppers have perceived that the quality of domestic
alternatives to imported
food is getting better. Two-thirds of consumers polled in August
of 2017 indicated that
the quality of food under the import ban had not deteriorated
over the previous year.
Against a backdrop of bubbling unrest about Putin’s overall
economic policies, most
Russians still blame Western sanctions—rather than Russian
countersanctions—for
restrictions on availability and increased prices of imported
foods. This attitude appears
to be robust, even as popular concerns about the sanctions
overall rose from 28 percent
to 43 percent in 2018. Russian consumers have adopted “food
nationalism” in response
to the sanctions environment; 94 percent of urban consumers in

2015, and 90 percent in
2016, reported that they preferred to buy Russian-made food
products even when
equally priced imports of comparable quality were available.
“Grown in Russia” is a
powerful sentiment.
There’s Just One Lingering Problem
The most visible hitch in matching Western food quality has
centered on cheese.
https://www.agriculture.com/news/crops/russia-us-wheat-
acreage-gap-seen-widening
https://www.yugagro.org/en-GB/press/news/5-trends-Russian-
agriculture.aspx
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2017/08/03/russians-are-
adjusting-to-food-import-ban-and-poor-cheese
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/426193-russia-
sanctions-myths-and-lessons
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14631377.2018.1
470854?tokenDomain=eprints&tokenAccess=C7c8mBSpkjcjYtw
k99j7&forwardService=showFullText&doi=10.1080%2F146313
77.2018.1470854&doi=10.1080%2F14631377.2018.1470854&jo
urnalCode=cpce20
Page 9 of

Things have become desperate: in August 2017, a Russian man
was caught trying to
smuggle one hundred kilograms of cheese from Finland in a
compartment of his car
disguised as a fuel tank. Although many small, artisanal Russian
manufacturers have
sprung up, none have quite risen to the level of Swiss, Italian,
and French cheeses,
many of which take decades to produce. Parmesan is especially
challenging: it uses a
lot of milk, as well as access to credit to keep things running
while the cheese ages.
Russia produces only about 60% of the raw milk needed to
satisfy demand for cheese
and other dairy products; some domestic cheese makers are
instead using imported dry
milk, separated dairy proteins, and even palm oil. By mid-2015,
about a quarter of
Russian cheese was considered “fake” due to use of palm oil,
whose imports increased
by 35.8 percent in the first quarter of 2018 over the previous
year, indicating that the
practice continues. Desperate to find acceptable milk sources,
one farm outside

Moscow imported one thousand French goats in late 2016
specifically to source cheese.
Despite these challenges, the countersanctions have clearly
created a market
opportunity around cheese. The Moscow regional government,
for example, is
currently compensating half of the cost of modernization of
family dairy farms and up
to 20 percent for cheese-making facilities. At a large cheese
festival held outside
Moscow every summer since 2016, farmers have exhibited a
prized dairy cow named
“Sanctions,” and one vendor sells “Thanks for Sanctions” t-
shirts. And journalists have
had fun with “punny” illustrative headlines: “Sanctions Present
Russian Cheesemakers
with Gouda Opportunity”; “War and Cheese”; and “Russians
Find Whey around
Sanctions by Copying Cheese.”
https://metro.co.uk/2017/08/10/smuggler-caught-at-russian-
border-with-100kg-of-illicit-cheese-6843761/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/please-pass-the-
russian-parmesan-cheesemakers-celebrate-sanctions-and-hope-
they-continue/2016/10/07/049907b1-bd72-4c6f-89c9-
73d9ca695c06_story.html?utm_term=.52a572170a0d
https://www.euronews.com/2018/02/07/how-russian-

businessmen-are-overcoming-bans-on-eu-food-imports
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-sanctions-cheese-
idUSKBN1AN1U1
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/russia-cheese-economy-
1.4243222
https://slate.com/human-interest/2017/09/after-russia-banned-
cheese-imports-oleg-sirota-became-a-cheesemaker-video.html
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/russians-find-whey-around-
sanctions-by-copying-cheese-3v0xn9p78
Page 10 of
Source URL: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/skeptics/russia-
“We’ll Show You”
In July of last year, Putin announced that the countersanctions
would remain in place at
least through December 2019. This was no surprise. Why would
he backtrack, when his
previously languishing farmers have thrived under these new
conditions? The sanctions
created an opportunity to build back a crippled Russian food
industry, and Putin
grabbed it. Recent U.S. tariffs have expanded the opening even
further to new export

markets. Moving forward, the Trump administration needs to
think this through:
unintended consequences are more likely when a clever
adversary is actively looking
for ways to create and exploit them. Regardless of whether
Trump sees Russia as an
adversary or wants to maintain sanctions at all, it’s hard to
imagine the bolstering of a
Russian competitor to U.S. farmers as a desired outcome of the
sanctions regime. In
this specific case, Russia remains a few steps ahead in the
game.
Judy Twigg is a professor of political science at Virginia
Commonwealth University, an
adjunct professor at Georgetown University, and a senior
associate (non-resident) at
CSIS. She consults regularly on global health and development
issues for the World
Bank, U.S. government, and other agencies.
Image: Reuters

of
4/10/20, 6)20 PMRussia Is Losing the Oil War Against Saudi
Arabia—and the Middle East
Page 1 of 5https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/09/russia-saudi-
arabia-oil-price-war-middle-east/
F
VOICE
Russia Is Losing the Oil
War—and the Middle East
Moscow spent years building influence in the region—and lost
it all
playing hardball with Riyadh.
BY STEVEN A. COOK | APRIL 9, 2020, 3:56 PM
or the past few years, the foreign-policy community has
collectively
come to believe that a new era in international politics is
emerging.
The defining features of this post-post-Cold War order are
great-

power competition and the realignment of America’s
relationships around
the world. Nowhere is this more apparent than the Middle East,
where U.S.
allies are developing diplomatic, commercial, and military
relationships
with the very powers with which Washington is supposed to be
competing—
China and Russia—and precisely at a time when so many U.S.
experts,
analysts, officials, and politicians are expressing a desire to
retrench from
the Middle East. That has led many of the same folks to
conclude that the
new regional order will be forged in either Beijing or Moscow.
There are plenty of reasons to doubt that—some of which have
become
clearer in recent weeks. Most acute is the ongoing oil price war
between
Moscow and Riyadh, which has demonstrated how Russia has
overplayed its
hand in the region.
https://foreignpolicy.com/author/steven-a-cook/
https://foreignpolicy.com/category/analysis/voice/

Almost 30 years after the end of the Cold War, leaders around
the Middle
East are indeed more welcoming of the exercise of Russian
power. With the
ideological baggage of Soviet communism gone and the United
States
proving itself to be a spent, feckless, incompetent force,
Moscow has seemed
to regional leaders not quite an alternative to Washington but at
least a more
constructive regional player. The contrast between the way
former U.S.
President Barack Obama is perceived to have abandoned
Egyptian leader
Hosni Mubarak and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s
intervention in Syria
to save Bashar al-Assad made a big impression on Arab
potentates. Added to

the negative perception of the United States is the fact that
Middle Eastern
economies and political systems have more in common with
Russia—their
dependence on oil revenues, their authoritarianism—than with
the United
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States.
Washington has contributed to their developing relationship. By
fracking its
way to what U.S. President Donald Trump calls “energy
independence”
(whatever that is supposed to mean), the United States has
flooded markets
with natural gas and oil. That has created downward pressure on
energy
prices, which is why in 2016 members of OPEC (but really
Saudi Arabia) and
Russia agreed to limit production in the service of higher
prices.
The agreement, which was actually the result of a previous oil
war during
which the Saudis refused to cut production hoping to damage
U.S. shale

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