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CONTAINING
CRYPTOLOCKER
How Predictive Analytics
Combat Emerging Threats

OpenDNS Confidential
AGENDA

1

CYBER ATTACKS & THREATS
multiple stages, varying tactics

2

CRYPTOLOCKER IN-DEPTH
how it works, what can stop it

3

WHY SECURITY FALLS BEHIND
how OpenDNS contained Cryptolocker, why we stay ahead

#2

Ÿ

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential
CYBER ATTACKS
AND THREATS

OpenDNS Confidential
CYBER-ATTACKS ARE MULTI-STAGE

A BUSINESS MAY OBSERVE
UP TO FIVE STAGES

1 2 3 4 5
RECON
& PREP

#4

Ÿ

LURE
USER

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential

INFECT
SYSTEM

PHONE
HOME

BREACH
NETWORK

REALIZE
MOTIVE

MOVE DATA
& MONEY
LURE & INFECTION

MULTIPLE ATTACK VECTORS
EMAIL ONLY
SociallyEngineered
Content

Links in
Forums or
Search
Engines

(business
sender)

Malicious
Attachment
(ZIP and/or
EXE falsely
labeled as PDF)

#5

Ÿ

WEB ONLY

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential

Malware
Drop Host
(often exploits
browser or plug-in
vulnerabilities)

EMAIL TO WEB
FalselyLabeled
Web Link

Compromised
Web Site

Compromised
Web Site

(Javascript
redirection)

(Javascript
redirection)

Malware
Drop Host
(often exploits
browser or plug-in
vulnerabilities)
PHONE HOME (to CnCs)

INCREASING SOPHISICATION
STATIC

FAST FLUX
23.4.34.55

23.4.24.1

23.4.24.1

DGA

(domain generation algorithm)

44.6.11.8

23.4.34.55
44.6.11.8
87.32.4.21

129.3.6.3
83.56.21.1

34.4.2.110
bad.com

#6

Ÿ

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential

34.4.2.110
bad.com

129.3.6.3
23.4.24.1

34.4.2.110
bad.com?
baa.ru?
bid.cn
BREACH & MOTIVE

MOST BREACHES YOU DON’T SEE
DISRUPTS

YOUR BUSINESS

HIJACKS

YOUR INFRASTRUCTURE

MANIPULATES
YOUR DATA

Pay the
Ransom
to Unlock
the Data
Locks You Out
of Your Data on
Your Network

#7

Ÿ

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential

Attacks Other
Businesses Using
Your Reputation

Cyber-Criminals and
Nation States Obtain
Your Knowledge
CRYPTOLOCKER
IN-DEPTH

OpenDNS Confidential
BUSINESSES OFTEN MISS SEEING THE THIRD STAGE

IT IS TARGETING BUSINESSES

EMAIL-ONLY

1 VECTOR
#9

Ÿ

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential

2 FAKE
EXECUTABLE

DGA-BASED
3 PHONE HOME

4 ENCRYPT
DATA

COLLECT
5 RANSOM
SECURITY REQUIRES VISIBILITY, INTELLIGENCE AND ENFORCEMENT

WHICH SOLUTIONS CAN STOP IT?
EMAIL-ONLY

1 VECTOR

Firewalls or
Gateways

2 FAKE
EXECUTABLE

Endpoint
Protections

DGA-BASED
3 PHONE HOME
Firewalls,
Gateways
or Endpoint
Protections

BLOCK WHAT IS KNOWN TO BE MALICIOUS:
•  by appearance
•  by origin
•  by behavior
#10

Ÿ

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential

4 ENCRYPT
DATA

Encryption or
DB Security

COLLECT
5 RANSOM

Data
Archiving
DISCOVERING WHAT IS MALICIOUS IS A COLLECT AND REACT APPROACH

IF IT’S NOT KNOWN, THEN…
COLLECT

ANALYZE

REACT
•  block new
appearances
•  block new
origins
•  block new
behaviors

time 0
#11

Ÿ

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential

time 1-N

time N
MALWARE ANALYSIS APPROACHES WILL NEVER STAY AHEAD

Variant G

Variant H
Variant C

Variant A

Variant E
Variant F
Variant K
NEW DGA
Variant B
Variant I

#12

Ÿ

Variant D

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential

Variant J
MALWARE ANALYSIS APPROACHES WILL NEVER STAY AHEAD

Variant A

#13

Ÿ

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential
MALWARE ANALYSIS APPROACHES WILL NEVER STAY AHEAD

Variant G
Variant C

Variant A

Variant E
Variant F

Variant B

Variant D
#14

Ÿ

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential
MALWARE ANALYSIS APPROACHES WILL NEVER STAY AHEAD

Variant G

Variant H
Variant C

Variant A

Variant E
Variant F
Variant K
NEW DGA
Variant B
Variant I

#15

Ÿ

Variant D

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential

Variant J
MALWARE ANALYSIS APPROACHES WILL NEVER STAY AHEAD

Variant G

Variant H
Variant C

Variant A

Variant E
Variant F
Variant K
NEW DGA
Variant B
Variant I

#16

Ÿ

Variant D

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential

Variant J
WHAT IS A BETTER APPROACH?

DISCOVER WHERE MALICIOUS ACTIVITY
WILL ORIGINATE, BEFORE IT HAPPENS
OBSERVE

PREDICT

DGA-based phone home activity

time 0
#17

Ÿ

future DGA domains

time 1

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential
TO OBSERVE YOU NEED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE

#18

Ÿ

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential
TO OBSERVE YOU NEED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE

Live Internet Activity

#19

Ÿ

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential
TO OBSERVE YOU NEED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE

#20

Ÿ

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential
OBSERVING CRYPTOLOCKER’S DGA-BASED PHONE ACTIVITY ACTIVITY

24-Oct

28.7M
24.6M

Unknown
Co-Occurring
DNS Requests
#21

Ÿ

19.1M

22.3M
18.1M

28-Oct

29-Oct

lcynqebqetamnmb.net

27-Oct

dblekuaonugn.biz

26-Oct

ljllkfudrvggepm.com

ixslpslobkddytp.info

25-Oct

ohjvagaptmlffn.info

23-Oct

byeixyixhmse.biz

22-Oct

dctqynvenluf.biz

21-Oct

ftamfiaivpdw.biz

20-Oct

shocdnhyfmdfsoj.co.uk

lfdicecqjetfqrm.com

Known
Domains
Blocked

paspmnbspwijo.ru

DAY
FOR EVERY 1 KNOWN DOMAIN PER DAY,
999 MORE DOMAINS OBSERVED

30-Oct

26.9M
21.7M

19.6M

17.6M

20.1M

7.3M
20-Oct

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential

21-Oct

22-Oct

23-Oct

24-Oct

25-Oct

26-Oct

27-Oct

28-Oct

29-Oct

30-Oct
PREDICTING CRYPTOLOCKER’S DGA-BASED PHONE HOME ACTIVITY

ONE OF THOSE 999 CO-OCCURRING
DOMAINS WILL BECOME ACTIVE NEXT

CRYPTOLOCKER

KNOWN DOMAINS
tctggapprqfatc.biz
uauuqfmmuwemsj.ru
psnineovwogkvx.org
#22

Ÿ

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential

ALL CO-OCCURRENCES INCLUDING NEWLY

DISCOVERED CRYPTOLOCKER DOMAINS T-1 T+1
uwelwphpjsemxsn.info (2100), google.com (800),
arjddblgbsumi.biz (575), danvawrrcgrwo.com (300),
facebook.co.uk (266), frjpjcapmnvdo.ru (34)
OBTAIN VISIBILITY, INTELLIGENCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF STAGE 3

STOP THE ATTACK’S “KILL CHAIN”
EMAIL-ONLY

1 VECTOR

2 FAKE
EXECUTABLE

DGA-BASED
3 PHONE HOME

4 ENCRYPT
DATA

At the Gateway and
on the Endpoint*
(*because it will not always
be behind the gateway)

#23

Ÿ

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential

COLLECT
5 RANSOM
WHY SECURITY
FALLS BEHIND
OpenDNS Confidential
THE PERFECT STORM HAS FORMED

INCOMPLETE
ENFORCEMENT
On-Network
Web Traffic
Roaming
Users &
Remote
Offices

#25

Ÿ

Non-Web
Protocols
& Ports

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential

LIMITED
VISIBILITY
Samples
Collected by
On-Premises
Appliances
Targeted
Attacks

Emerging
Threats

REACTIVE
INTELLIGENCE
Similar
Appearance
Different
Behavior

Unknown
Origin
WANTED: SECURITY FOR THE WAY THE WORLD WORKS TODAY

EVERYWHERE

ENFORCEMENT

#26

Ÿ

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential

GLOBAL

VISIBILITY

PREDICTIVE

INTELLIGENCE
GLOBAL VISIBILITY

ENFORCEMENT
UMBRELLA

INTELLIGENCE

SECURITY GRAPH

PREDICTIVE SECURITY
WHAT MAKES OPENDNS’S SECURITY UNIQUE

THE ONLY CLOUD-DELIVERED
AND DNS-BASED
SECURITY SOLUTION

80M+
100K+
#28

Ÿ

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential

REQUESTS TO ADVANCED
MALWARE, BOTNET & PHISHING
THREATS BLOCKED DAILY
NEW THREAT ORIGINS
DISCOVERED OR PREDICTED DAILY
UMBRELLA LEVERAGES OPENDNS’S FOUNDATIONS

THE WORLD’S LARGEST
INTERNET SECURITY NETWORK
"   50M+ ACTIVE USERS DAILY
"   21 DATA CENTER LOCATIONS
"   1500+ BGP PEERING SESSIONS

"   50B+ REQUESTS DAILY
"   160+ COUNTRIES W/USERS
"   ZERO NET NEW LATENCY

EUROPE, MIDDLE
EAST & AFRICA

AMERICAS

#29

Ÿ

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential

ASIA-PACIFIC
EVERYWHERE.
#30

Ÿ

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential

TOTAL
NEW

NEW

TOTAL

NEW

for 1,000s of our
customers daily.

TOTAL

OPENDNS IS
PREDICTING &
CONTAINING
CRYPTOLOCKER

TOTAL

USER CLIENTS ATTEMPTING TO PHONE HOME TO CRYPTOLOCKER’S CnCs
CUSTOMERS PROTECTED BEFORE TRADITIONAL SECURITY APPROACHES

OPENDNS PREDICTED
CRYPTOLOCKER’S DGA
before others could reverse engineer it

#31

Ÿ

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential
OPENDNS WILL HELP YOUR BUSINESS

We Predict,
Prevent And Contain
Emerging Threats

BEFORE THE INFECTION
OR BREACH HAPPENS
#32

Ÿ

11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential
FOR A FREE INSTANT TRIAL,
VISIT WWW.UMBRELLA.COM OR
EMAIL SALES@OPENDNS.COM
FOR TECHNICAL QUESTIONS,
EMAIL ME BARRY@OPENDNS.COM
OpenDNS Confidential

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Cryptolocker Webcast

  • 1. CONTAINING CRYPTOLOCKER How Predictive Analytics Combat Emerging Threats OpenDNS Confidential
  • 2. AGENDA 1 CYBER ATTACKS & THREATS multiple stages, varying tactics 2 CRYPTOLOCKER IN-DEPTH how it works, what can stop it 3 WHY SECURITY FALLS BEHIND how OpenDNS contained Cryptolocker, why we stay ahead #2 Ÿ 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential
  • 4. CYBER-ATTACKS ARE MULTI-STAGE A BUSINESS MAY OBSERVE UP TO FIVE STAGES 1 2 3 4 5 RECON & PREP #4 Ÿ LURE USER 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential INFECT SYSTEM PHONE HOME BREACH NETWORK REALIZE MOTIVE MOVE DATA & MONEY
  • 5. LURE & INFECTION MULTIPLE ATTACK VECTORS EMAIL ONLY SociallyEngineered Content Links in Forums or Search Engines (business sender) Malicious Attachment (ZIP and/or EXE falsely labeled as PDF) #5 Ÿ WEB ONLY 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential Malware Drop Host (often exploits browser or plug-in vulnerabilities) EMAIL TO WEB FalselyLabeled Web Link Compromised Web Site Compromised Web Site (Javascript redirection) (Javascript redirection) Malware Drop Host (often exploits browser or plug-in vulnerabilities)
  • 6. PHONE HOME (to CnCs) INCREASING SOPHISICATION STATIC FAST FLUX 23.4.34.55 23.4.24.1 23.4.24.1 DGA (domain generation algorithm) 44.6.11.8 23.4.34.55 44.6.11.8 87.32.4.21 129.3.6.3 83.56.21.1 34.4.2.110 bad.com #6 Ÿ 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential 34.4.2.110 bad.com 129.3.6.3 23.4.24.1 34.4.2.110 bad.com? baa.ru? bid.cn
  • 7. BREACH & MOTIVE MOST BREACHES YOU DON’T SEE DISRUPTS YOUR BUSINESS HIJACKS YOUR INFRASTRUCTURE MANIPULATES YOUR DATA Pay the Ransom to Unlock the Data Locks You Out of Your Data on Your Network #7 Ÿ 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential Attacks Other Businesses Using Your Reputation Cyber-Criminals and Nation States Obtain Your Knowledge
  • 9. BUSINESSES OFTEN MISS SEEING THE THIRD STAGE IT IS TARGETING BUSINESSES EMAIL-ONLY 1 VECTOR #9 Ÿ 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential 2 FAKE EXECUTABLE DGA-BASED 3 PHONE HOME 4 ENCRYPT DATA COLLECT 5 RANSOM
  • 10. SECURITY REQUIRES VISIBILITY, INTELLIGENCE AND ENFORCEMENT WHICH SOLUTIONS CAN STOP IT? EMAIL-ONLY 1 VECTOR Firewalls or Gateways 2 FAKE EXECUTABLE Endpoint Protections DGA-BASED 3 PHONE HOME Firewalls, Gateways or Endpoint Protections BLOCK WHAT IS KNOWN TO BE MALICIOUS: •  by appearance •  by origin •  by behavior #10 Ÿ 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential 4 ENCRYPT DATA Encryption or DB Security COLLECT 5 RANSOM Data Archiving
  • 11. DISCOVERING WHAT IS MALICIOUS IS A COLLECT AND REACT APPROACH IF IT’S NOT KNOWN, THEN… COLLECT ANALYZE REACT •  block new appearances •  block new origins •  block new behaviors time 0 #11 Ÿ 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential time 1-N time N
  • 12. MALWARE ANALYSIS APPROACHES WILL NEVER STAY AHEAD Variant G Variant H Variant C Variant A Variant E Variant F Variant K NEW DGA Variant B Variant I #12 Ÿ Variant D 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential Variant J
  • 13. MALWARE ANALYSIS APPROACHES WILL NEVER STAY AHEAD Variant A #13 Ÿ 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential
  • 14. MALWARE ANALYSIS APPROACHES WILL NEVER STAY AHEAD Variant G Variant C Variant A Variant E Variant F Variant B Variant D #14 Ÿ 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential
  • 15. MALWARE ANALYSIS APPROACHES WILL NEVER STAY AHEAD Variant G Variant H Variant C Variant A Variant E Variant F Variant K NEW DGA Variant B Variant I #15 Ÿ Variant D 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential Variant J
  • 16. MALWARE ANALYSIS APPROACHES WILL NEVER STAY AHEAD Variant G Variant H Variant C Variant A Variant E Variant F Variant K NEW DGA Variant B Variant I #16 Ÿ Variant D 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential Variant J
  • 17. WHAT IS A BETTER APPROACH? DISCOVER WHERE MALICIOUS ACTIVITY WILL ORIGINATE, BEFORE IT HAPPENS OBSERVE PREDICT DGA-based phone home activity time 0 #17 Ÿ future DGA domains time 1 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential
  • 18. TO OBSERVE YOU NEED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE #18 Ÿ 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential
  • 19. TO OBSERVE YOU NEED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE Live Internet Activity #19 Ÿ 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential
  • 20. TO OBSERVE YOU NEED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE #20 Ÿ 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential
  • 21. OBSERVING CRYPTOLOCKER’S DGA-BASED PHONE ACTIVITY ACTIVITY 24-Oct 28.7M 24.6M Unknown Co-Occurring DNS Requests #21 Ÿ 19.1M 22.3M 18.1M 28-Oct 29-Oct lcynqebqetamnmb.net 27-Oct dblekuaonugn.biz 26-Oct ljllkfudrvggepm.com ixslpslobkddytp.info 25-Oct ohjvagaptmlffn.info 23-Oct byeixyixhmse.biz 22-Oct dctqynvenluf.biz 21-Oct ftamfiaivpdw.biz 20-Oct shocdnhyfmdfsoj.co.uk lfdicecqjetfqrm.com Known Domains Blocked paspmnbspwijo.ru DAY FOR EVERY 1 KNOWN DOMAIN PER DAY, 999 MORE DOMAINS OBSERVED 30-Oct 26.9M 21.7M 19.6M 17.6M 20.1M 7.3M 20-Oct 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential 21-Oct 22-Oct 23-Oct 24-Oct 25-Oct 26-Oct 27-Oct 28-Oct 29-Oct 30-Oct
  • 22. PREDICTING CRYPTOLOCKER’S DGA-BASED PHONE HOME ACTIVITY ONE OF THOSE 999 CO-OCCURRING DOMAINS WILL BECOME ACTIVE NEXT CRYPTOLOCKER KNOWN DOMAINS tctggapprqfatc.biz uauuqfmmuwemsj.ru psnineovwogkvx.org #22 Ÿ 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential ALL CO-OCCURRENCES INCLUDING NEWLY DISCOVERED CRYPTOLOCKER DOMAINS T-1 T+1 uwelwphpjsemxsn.info (2100), google.com (800), arjddblgbsumi.biz (575), danvawrrcgrwo.com (300), facebook.co.uk (266), frjpjcapmnvdo.ru (34)
  • 23. OBTAIN VISIBILITY, INTELLIGENCE AND ENFORCEMENT OF STAGE 3 STOP THE ATTACK’S “KILL CHAIN” EMAIL-ONLY 1 VECTOR 2 FAKE EXECUTABLE DGA-BASED 3 PHONE HOME 4 ENCRYPT DATA At the Gateway and on the Endpoint* (*because it will not always be behind the gateway) #23 Ÿ 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential COLLECT 5 RANSOM
  • 25. THE PERFECT STORM HAS FORMED INCOMPLETE ENFORCEMENT On-Network Web Traffic Roaming Users & Remote Offices #25 Ÿ Non-Web Protocols & Ports 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential LIMITED VISIBILITY Samples Collected by On-Premises Appliances Targeted Attacks Emerging Threats REACTIVE INTELLIGENCE Similar Appearance Different Behavior Unknown Origin
  • 26. WANTED: SECURITY FOR THE WAY THE WORLD WORKS TODAY EVERYWHERE ENFORCEMENT #26 Ÿ 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential GLOBAL VISIBILITY PREDICTIVE INTELLIGENCE
  • 28. WHAT MAKES OPENDNS’S SECURITY UNIQUE THE ONLY CLOUD-DELIVERED AND DNS-BASED SECURITY SOLUTION 80M+ 100K+ #28 Ÿ 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential REQUESTS TO ADVANCED MALWARE, BOTNET & PHISHING THREATS BLOCKED DAILY NEW THREAT ORIGINS DISCOVERED OR PREDICTED DAILY
  • 29. UMBRELLA LEVERAGES OPENDNS’S FOUNDATIONS THE WORLD’S LARGEST INTERNET SECURITY NETWORK "   50M+ ACTIVE USERS DAILY "   21 DATA CENTER LOCATIONS "   1500+ BGP PEERING SESSIONS "   50B+ REQUESTS DAILY "   160+ COUNTRIES W/USERS "   ZERO NET NEW LATENCY EUROPE, MIDDLE EAST & AFRICA AMERICAS #29 Ÿ 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential ASIA-PACIFIC
  • 30. EVERYWHERE. #30 Ÿ 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential TOTAL NEW NEW TOTAL NEW for 1,000s of our customers daily. TOTAL OPENDNS IS PREDICTING & CONTAINING CRYPTOLOCKER TOTAL USER CLIENTS ATTEMPTING TO PHONE HOME TO CRYPTOLOCKER’S CnCs
  • 31. CUSTOMERS PROTECTED BEFORE TRADITIONAL SECURITY APPROACHES OPENDNS PREDICTED CRYPTOLOCKER’S DGA before others could reverse engineer it #31 Ÿ 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential
  • 32. OPENDNS WILL HELP YOUR BUSINESS We Predict, Prevent And Contain Emerging Threats BEFORE THE INFECTION OR BREACH HAPPENS #32 Ÿ 11-Dec-13 Ÿ OpenDNS Confidential
  • 33. FOR A FREE INSTANT TRIAL, VISIT WWW.UMBRELLA.COM OR EMAIL SALES@OPENDNS.COM FOR TECHNICAL QUESTIONS, EMAIL ME BARRY@OPENDNS.COM OpenDNS Confidential