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Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)

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Andreas Taudte
Andreas Taudte

Comguard's Event for Emerging Threats in Doha on 12th of March 2014

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BlueCat Network Intelligence For a secured Network Infrastructure Andreas Taudte Sales Engineer BlueCat Luca Maiocchi Territory Manager SE & Middle East BlueCat
How did you secure your network? Firewalls Network Access Control Anti-Virus
But, they have done the same... http://www.pcworld.com/article/2087240/target-pointofsale-terminals-were-infected-with-malware.html http://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-002A http://www.pcworld.com/article/2086700/yahoo-malvertising-attack-linked-to-larger-malware-scheme.html
...and they also. http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/22081/cyber-crime/cert-polska-detected-large-scale-dns-hacking-home-routers.html http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/news/china-internet-outage-dns-hack-136759 http://www.cloudshield.com/blog/dns-security-expert-series/groundhog-day-for-dns-ddos-attack-announcements/
Typical Attack Client connects to malicious Site unknowingly Client downloads the malicious Code Client becomes infected malware.site.com malware.site.com
Typical Protection Client: Security Software Network: Filtering Software related to Protocol Exit: Packet Inspection on a Firewall
Typical Attack in Detail Client first looks up the Host IP Many Attacks leverage DNS Allow to change IP w/o need to update Attack malware.site.com 54.235.223.101 malware.site.com 54.235.223.101 Landscape has changed DNS applies to all Applications & all Devices.
BlueCat Threat Protection For a secured DNS Infrastructure
BlueCat Threat Protection Security Feed and Response Policies Zones to filter DNS Traffic Recursive DNS Servers enabled to accept the BlueCat Security Feed
Typical Attack with BlueCat Threat Protection Blocks Devices from resolving malicious Hosts Another Layer of Depth for traditional Devices Blocks Access to known Malware, Botnet and other Sites for non-traditional Devices malware.site.com malware.site.com
How it works DNS server downloads list of known malicious sites (updated every 5 minutes) User queries for known malicious content 1 2 DNS server matches request against list 3 Response is given according to policy 4 Redirect Blacklist Do Not Respond Log
Redirect to notify the User & capture the Traffic Response is redirected to another server 4 Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipisicing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse You may be infected!! Matched queries are redirected to SIEM Admins can receive alerts from SIEM User connects to Walled Garden site 6 5 7
How to set up? Automated Updates Protection for all Devices and all Applications Self- maintained Security Feed Customizable Actions Easy to set up
Nice, but what about external DNS?
External DNS Challenges No Business No DNS No Network
Real Threats to DNS Services DNS Spoofing Attacks REAL SITE FAKE SITE Attacker Real User Redirected to Fake Server DNS DNS Queries
Real Threats to DNS Services DNS Reflection/Amplification Attacks Victim 2 Victim Victim 1 Target Attackers Legitimate UserSpoofed Source Address
What can be done to protect against them? Anycast DNS Same IP address n identical DNS Servers
What can be done to protect against them? DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) Real User Root Servers DNS Queries Real Authoritative DNS TLD DNS Resolver False Authoritative DNS Real Web Server False Web Server DNSSEC Signed RR UnsignedRR Resolver validates authoritative Responses
What can be done to protect against them? DNS Response Rate Limiting (RRL) DNS with RRL Malicious User Normal User Normal QPS Volume Abnormal # of Queries, but Responses Rate Limited by Admin
BlueCat Hosted DNS For a secured external DNS Infrastructure
The Power of the Cloud BlueCat Hosted DNS has it all:  DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)  DNS Response Rate Limiting (RRL)  Geographic Diversity (Anycast)  Processing Power and Bandwidth Capacity
BlueCat Hosted DNS Reliability: 100% uptime (in over 9 years) Redundancy: 18 global sites in 5 continents Security: 24/7 anti-attack team Scalability : providing additional DNS services
Yes nice, but how do you manage it all?
BlueCat Solution Components Address Manager DNS, DHCP and IPAM Connector for Windows DNS/DHCP DNS/DHCP Management Automation Manager System Integration Automation Manager Self-Service Device Registration Portal Self-Service External Hosted DNS Service Global Anycast DNS DNS/DHCP Server Anycast, DHCP-Failover, Clustering, DNSSEC and DNS Firewall
BlueCat Client Value for Management Single Pane of Glass for all IP Information Efficiency: Automate Provisioning from the IP up Security: Visibility and Control with IPAM Data Mobility: Simple for Users and maximum Control for IT Scalability: Manage complex dual-stacked Networks
Thank you for your time. Andreas Taudte Sales Engineer Luca Maiocchi Territory Manager SE & Middle East w w w . b l u e c a t n e t w o r k s . c o m

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Network Intelligence for a secured Network (2014-03-12)

  • 1. BlueCat Network Intelligence For a secured Network Infrastructure Andreas Taudte Sales Engineer BlueCat Luca Maiocchi Territory Manager SE & Middle East BlueCat
  • 2. How did you secure your network? Firewalls Network Access Control Anti-Virus
  • 3. But, they have done the same... http://www.pcworld.com/article/2087240/target-pointofsale-terminals-were-infected-with-malware.html http://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-002A http://www.pcworld.com/article/2086700/yahoo-malvertising-attack-linked-to-larger-malware-scheme.html
  • 5. Typical Attack Client connects to malicious Site unknowingly Client downloads the malicious Code Client becomes infected malware.site.com malware.site.com
  • 6. Typical Protection Client: Security Software Network: Filtering Software related to Protocol Exit: Packet Inspection on a Firewall
  • 7. Typical Attack in Detail Client first looks up the Host IP Many Attacks leverage DNS Allow to change IP w/o need to update Attack malware.site.com 54.235.223.101 malware.site.com 54.235.223.101 Landscape has changed DNS applies to all Applications & all Devices.
  • 8. BlueCat Threat Protection For a secured DNS Infrastructure
  • 9. BlueCat Threat Protection Security Feed and Response Policies Zones to filter DNS Traffic Recursive DNS Servers enabled to accept the BlueCat Security Feed
  • 10. Typical Attack with BlueCat Threat Protection Blocks Devices from resolving malicious Hosts Another Layer of Depth for traditional Devices Blocks Access to known Malware, Botnet and other Sites for non-traditional Devices malware.site.com malware.site.com
  • 11. How it works DNS server downloads list of known malicious sites (updated every 5 minutes) User queries for known malicious content 1 2 DNS server matches request against list 3 Response is given according to policy 4 Redirect Blacklist Do Not Respond Log
  • 12. Redirect to notify the User & capture the Traffic Response is redirected to another server 4 Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipisicing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse You may be infected!! Matched queries are redirected to SIEM Admins can receive alerts from SIEM User connects to Walled Garden site 6 5 7
  • 13. How to set up? Automated Updates Protection for all Devices and all Applications Self- maintained Security Feed Customizable Actions Easy to set up
  • 14. Nice, but what about external DNS?
  • 16. Real Threats to DNS Services DNS Spoofing Attacks REAL SITE FAKE SITE Attacker Real User Redirected to Fake Server DNS DNS Queries
  • 17. Real Threats to DNS Services DNS Reflection/Amplification Attacks Victim 2 Victim Victim 1 Target Attackers Legitimate UserSpoofed Source Address
  • 18. What can be done to protect against them? Anycast DNS Same IP address n identical DNS Servers
  • 19. What can be done to protect against them? DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) Real User Root Servers DNS Queries Real Authoritative DNS TLD DNS Resolver False Authoritative DNS Real Web Server False Web Server DNSSEC Signed RR UnsignedRR Resolver validates authoritative Responses
  • 20. What can be done to protect against them? DNS Response Rate Limiting (RRL) DNS with RRL Malicious User Normal User Normal QPS Volume Abnormal # of Queries, but Responses Rate Limited by Admin
  • 21. BlueCat Hosted DNS For a secured external DNS Infrastructure
  • 22. The Power of the Cloud BlueCat Hosted DNS has it all:  DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)  DNS Response Rate Limiting (RRL)  Geographic Diversity (Anycast)  Processing Power and Bandwidth Capacity
  • 23. BlueCat Hosted DNS Reliability: 100% uptime (in over 9 years) Redundancy: 18 global sites in 5 continents Security: 24/7 anti-attack team Scalability : providing additional DNS services
  • 24. Yes nice, but how do you manage it all?
  • 25. BlueCat Solution Components Address Manager DNS, DHCP and IPAM Connector for Windows DNS/DHCP DNS/DHCP Management Automation Manager System Integration Automation Manager Self-Service Device Registration Portal Self-Service External Hosted DNS Service Global Anycast DNS DNS/DHCP Server Anycast, DHCP-Failover, Clustering, DNSSEC and DNS Firewall
  • 26. BlueCat Client Value for Management Single Pane of Glass for all IP Information Efficiency: Automate Provisioning from the IP up Security: Visibility and Control with IPAM Data Mobility: Simple for Users and maximum Control for IT Scalability: Manage complex dual-stacked Networks
  • 27. Thank you for your time. Andreas Taudte Sales Engineer Luca Maiocchi Territory Manager SE & Middle East w w w . b l u e c a t n e t w o r k s . c o m

Editor's Notes

  1. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2087240/target-pointofsale-terminals-were-infected-with-malware.html http://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-002A http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/22081/cyber-crime/cert-polska-detected-large-scale-dns-hacking-home-routers.html http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/news/china-internet-outage-dns-hack-136759 http://www.cloudshield.com/blog/dns-security-expert-series/groundhog-day-for-dns-ddos-attack-announcements/ http://www.pcworld.com/article/2086700/yahoo-malvertising-attack-linked-to-larger-malware-scheme.html
  2. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2087240/target-pointofsale-terminals-were-infected-with-malware.html http://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA14-002A http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/22081/cyber-crime/cert-polska-detected-large-scale-dns-hacking-home-routers.html http://www.techweekeurope.co.uk/news/china-internet-outage-dns-hack-136759 http://www.cloudshield.com/blog/dns-security-expert-series/groundhog-day-for-dns-ddos-attack-announcements/ http://www.pcworld.com/article/2086700/yahoo-malvertising-attack-linked-to-larger-malware-scheme.html
  3. A DNS reflection attack is a popular form of denial of service (DoS) that relies on the use of inherited vulnerability of the DNS protocol to overwhelm a target system with DNS response traffic from victims’ authoritative servers.