This thesis examines the communication between the Dutch military and civil United Nations entities during the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Specifically, it analyzes the communication between the Dutch military's Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance company (ISR-coy) and various civil UN entities in the Gao region of Mali, including the UN peacekeeping forces and humanitarian agencies. Through interviews with Dutch military and UN personnel, the study finds that communication was most effective between the ISR-coy and civil MINUSMA entities located in Gao, but less effective with UN agencies located outside of Gao due to greater physical, organizational and linguistic barriers. Key factors in

1. Civil-military communications within
integrated United Nations Peacekeeping
The interaction between the Dutch military and civil United Nations
entities during the MINUSMA-mission in Gao (Mali)
Master Thesis International Humanitarian Action
Name: Koen van der West
Student-number: 1960407
E-mail: koenvanderwest@msn.com
Phone: +31638422374
Supervisors:
Dr. S. de Hoop, University of Groningen
Dr. Ir. S.J.H. Rietjens, Netherlands Defence Academy
March 2016
Amount of words: 27.572

2. 2
This thesis is submitted for obtaining the Joint Master’s Degree in International Humanitarian Action.
By submitting the thesis, the author certifies that the text is from his own hand, does not include the
work of someone else unless clearly indicated, and that the thesis has been produced in accordance with
proper academic practices.

3. 3
Abstract
Civil and military actors are more and more active in the same environment. The relationship
between both actors has been troublesome, and as a result research on Civil-Military Interaction
(CMI) is en vogue. Within the research field of CMI it is often mentioned that communication
between civil and military actors is problematic. It appears however that there has been a lack
of research which specifically focuses on civil-military communication. Besides this, there are
gaps in research on interaction between military and civil actors which are not humanitarian
organizations, and on CMI within integrated peacekeeping missions. This research therefore
tries to combine these gaps by focusing on a case of communication between a military entity
and several sorts of civil entities within an integrated peacekeeping mission. It will do so by
focusing on the Dutch Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance company (ISR-coy),
which is a military unit that provides intelligence for the United Nations (UN), and different
sorts of civil UN entities, ranging from civil peacekeeping actors to humanitarian UN agencies.
The selected case in which this communication takes place is the United Nations
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The research answers
the following question: To what extent is communication between the Dutch military and civil
UN entities within the MINUSMA mission in the Gao-region (Mali) effective?
This question was answered by making use of a theoretical framework on civil-military
communication. The framework looked at the external information needs of both entities and
included barriers that might hamper communication. Effective communication was defined as
follows: ‘The process by which information is transmitted between civil and military
organizations, in which a minimum of communication barriers are present, so that an
understanding response of the information occurs.’ For obtaining relevant data to answer this
question, personnel was interviewed from the Dutch military, as well as from several civil UN
entities. The interviews were transcribed and analysed by using a qualitative data analysis
programme, out of which the following findings were disseminated:
Communication between the Dutch ISR-coy and several civil entities from within
MINUSMA, such as the Sector Headquarter (HQ) East and the Joint Mission Analysis Centre
(JMAC), was to a large extent effective. These actors could help each other in fulfilling their
information needs, whilst only a minimum amount of communication barriers seems to have
been present. The communication with civil UN entities who are placed to a great extent outside
of MINUSMA, the so-called UN agencies, was less effective however. The communication of

4. 4
the ISR-coy with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(UNOCHA) was even rated as ineffective. For these entities communication barriers were
highly present, in which linguistic barriers, and internal organizational issues were mostly
hampering the communication. An important example is the fact that many persons from the
ISR-coy did not speak French, whilst on the civil side there was a lack of English proficiency.
Although these communication barriers have also been present in the communication with civil
MINUSMA entities, the effectiveness of communication with these entities seems to have been
determined by the closeness of civil and military actors in terms of culture, mission, tasks, and
goals. Additionally it was found that personal relationships and individual cultural closeness of
persons involved in communication were important factors which contributed to the
effectiveness of civil-military communication. The research also provided recommendations
that mainly focused on improved and intensified training for civil as well as military entities on
issues related to CMI. Lastly recommendations were provided on enhancing organizational
structures and the capacity of the different entities involved.
Key words: Civil-Military Interaction, CMI, CIMIC, CMCoord, Civil-Military relations,
peacekeeping, Mali, MINUSMA, Gao, Dutch army, United Nations, development aid,
humanitarian aid, communication, inter-organizational relations, information management,
ASIFU, ISR, UN intelligence.

5. 5
Table of contents page
Abstract…………..……………………………………………………………………………3
Preface…………………………………………………………………………………………7
List of abbreviations………………………………...…………………………………….….8
List of figures………………………………………………………………………………….9
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….10
1. The research field of Civil-Military Interaction…………………………………...16
1.1. The concepts of the civil-military spectrum…………………………………..17
1.2. Issues within CMI research………...…………………………………………18
1.2.1. Cultural differences……………………….…………………………..19
1.2.2. Humanitarian principles, accessibility and security……………….….20
1.2.3. Information-sharing and communication……………………………..21
1.2.4. Side note: Internal differences and external similarities…………..….22
1.3. CMI within UN peacekeeping missions…………..……………………….…23
1.4. Gaps within CMI research……………………………………………………25
2. A theory of civil-military communication………………………………………….27
2.1. Civil-military communication and information management………………...27
2.2. Communication in general……………………………………………………30
2.3. Barriers to effective communication………………………………………….31
2.4. Inter-organizational and civil-military communication barriers…………..….32
2.5. A theoretical framework of civil-military communication…………………...34
3. Methodology…………………………………………………………………………36
3.1. Research approach & design………………………………………………….36
3.2. Methods & instruments……………………………………………………….37
3.3. Sampling & analysis………………………………………………………….38
3.4. Ethical considerations……………………………………………………...…40
4. The MINUSMA mission in Gao…………………………………….………………41
4.1. UN peacekeeping and CMI………………………………….………………..41
4.2. The path to MINUSMA………………………………………………………43
4.3. The MINUSMA mission………………………………………….…………..45
4.4. Civil-military interaction in MINUSMA…………………………..…………46
4.5. The Dutch ISR company……………………………………………...………47
4.6. Civil UN entities in Gao………………………………………………………49
4.6.1. Civil MINUSMA………………………………………….………….49
4.6.2. UN agencies………………………………………………….……….52
4.6.3. Organogram of the involved entities………………………………….54

6. 6
5. Results…………………………………………………………………………..……55
5.1. Information needs………………..………………………………………...…55
5.2. The interaction of the ISR company with civil UN entities…………………..57
5.3. Communicational successes and failures…………………………………..…59
5.3.1. Overall appreciation of the interaction………………………………..57
5.3.2. Interaction with Sector Headquarter East………………………….…60
5.3.3. JMAC and other civil MINUSMA entities…………………………...62
5.3.4. Effective information exchange with civil MINUSMA entities…...…63
5.3.5. The troublesome communication with UNOCHA and others………..64
5.4. Identified communication barriers……………………………………………64
5.4.1. Physical and mechanical barriers……………………………………..66
5.4.2. Psycho-social barriers………………………………………………...70
5.4.3. Linguistic barriers…………………………………………………….71
5.5. Explaining effective communication………………………………………...72
5.5.1. Individual cultural closeness………………………………………….72
5.5.2. Personal relationships and personalities……………………………...73
5.6. Conclusion: effectiveness of civil-military communication…………….……74
6. Discussion…………………………………………………………………………….76
6.1. The findings in relation to previous studies…………………………………..76
6.2. Overcoming the hurdles within civil-military communication……………….78
6.2.1. MINUSMA specific and other peacekeeping missions………………78
6.2.2. Dutch army specific…………………………………………………..79
6.2.3. Civil UN entities specific……………………………………………..81
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………82
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………84
Annexes………………………………………………………………………………………91
A. Interview guides………………………………………………………………………92
B. Interview statistics…………………………………………………………………….96
C. Coding scheme………………………………………………………………………..97
D. Translated quotes……………………………………………………………………...99
E. MINUSMA organizational structure………………………………………………...102
F. Map Mali…………………………………………………………………………….103
G. The ISR-coy’s interaction of different rotations…………………………………….104

7. 7
Preface
Groningen, 31 March 2016
This thesis is the result of a qualitative research on civil-military communication within UN
peacekeeping. It has been performed as part of the International Humanitarian Action Master
from the Network On Humanitarian Action at the University of Groningen.
My interest in Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) was already raised while I was finishing my
Bachelor in History. During this Bachelor my first supervisor, Sipke de Hoop, introduced me
to the civil-military field in his Peace and Security courses. Later, whilst studying for one of
the courses from my Master, I got in contact with my second supervisor, Bas Rietjens, who was
one of the authors of an interesting article in civil-military communication. Bas inspired me to
conduct my Master thesis research on the communication between the Dutch army and civil
UN entities within the peacekeeping mission in Mali. Furthermore he provided me with some
useful contacts for the interviews. I want to thank both of my supervisors for their enthusiasm,
knowledge and professional guidance during the course of this research.
Furthermore I would like to thank all the people who I have interviewed for their time, insights
and information. Without you this thesis could not have been finished. I also want to thank
Myrthe Sablerolle for correcting and improving my spelling and grammar. Lastly, I want to
thank my girlfriend, family and friends for their support!
Koen van der West

8. 8
List of abbreviations
1.CMI Co: First Civil-Military Interaction Command (Dutch army)
AFISMA: African-led International Support Mission in Mali
ASIC: All Sources Information Cell
ASIFU: All Sources Information Fusion Unit
AQIM: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AU: African Union
CIMIC: Civil-Military Cooperation
Civad: Civil adviser
CMCoord: Civil-Military Coordination (United Nations)
CMI: Civil-Military Interaction
CNRDR: National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State
DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
FC: Force Commander
HC: Humanitarian Coordinator
HOTO: Hand-Over Take-Over
HQ: Headquarter
HRD: Human Rights Division
IED: Improvised Explosive Device
IO: International Organization
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
ISR-coy: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Company
JMAC: Joint Mission Analysis Centre
MIA: Islamic Movement of Azawad
MNLA: Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad
MUJWA: Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
MINUSMA: Mission multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation
au Mali (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in
Mali)
MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders)
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO: Non-Governmental Organization
SRSG: Special Representative of the Secretary-General
PoC: Protection of Civilians
S&R: Stabilization and Recovery
UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UN: United Nations
UNDP: United Nations Development Program
UNDPKO: United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
UNDSS: United Nations Department for Safety and Security
UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund
UNOCHA: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNMAS: United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMIL: United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS: United Nations Mission in the republic of South-Sudan
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
WFP: World Food Program
WHO: World Health Organization

9. 9
List of figures page
Figure 1: The information management framework…………………………….…………….28
Figure 2: Adapted information management framework……………………………………..29
Figure 3: Communication process………………………...…………….………………...…..30
Figure 4: Framework of civil-military communication…...……………….…………...……...35
Figure 5: UN mission organizational structure………………………….…………...………..43
Figure 6: Organogram of the involved entities………………………………………………...54
Figure 7: The interaction of the ISR-coy with Civil UN entities………….………..………....58

10. 10
Introduction
“In today’s operations, civil-military interaction is extremely difficult to manage, but
impossible to avoid.”
(Gjørv, 2014, p. 8)
Civil and military actors are nowadays more and more active in the same environments and are
thus increasingly forced to interact with one another. Examples are plentiful, not only do both
entities interact during violent conflict, but also increasingly during natural disasters (Metcalfe
et al, 2012). Within United Nations peacekeeping missions for instance, military, humanitarian
and other spheres of action are combined. The success of these integrated missions highly
depends on an effective interaction between civil and military actors (Hatzenbichler, 2001).
Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) has, however, often been described by scholars as difficult and
problematic, especially in terms of communication (Metcalfe et al, 2012; Maiers et al., 2009;
Rietjens et al., 2009; Maynard, 2001; Fenton and Loughna, 2013).
Research problem
The increasing interaction between military and humanitarian actors in the last decades has
been given much attention by scholars. These scholars have however until recently mainly
focused on ‘conceptual issues’ and ‘questions of principles’ (Metcalfe et al., 2012 p. 1). It has
therefore been argued by Metcalfe et al. that more attention should be given to analysing civil-
military engagement on a practical level (2012). One of the regularly mentioned practical issues
within CMI is that problems are arising in communication and information management
between civil and military actors (Fenton and Loughna, 2013; Metcalfe et al, 2012; Rietjens,
2009; Rosen, 2009). This issue, although mentioned by many, has not gained much specific
attention by scholars. Only several authors have specifically focused their research on
communication within CMI. This despite the fact that communication is the most basic form of
interaction, and which, when done effectively, can be used to overcome the conceptual hurdles
that have been discussed in length within the CMI spectrum (Rietjens et al, 2009; Bollen, 2002;
NATO, 2003). Linked to effective communication are, for instance, an increase of trust and
understanding, an avoidance of overlap in information gathering, a broader information base
for both actors and an increase of security (Rietjens et al., 2009). It assumed that a more
effective communication and information exchange leads to more effectiveness for both entities
(Altay and Labonte, 2014).

11. 11
Besides this Metcalfe et al. acknowledged that there is also a gap in research which
specifically focuses on civil-military engagement within international interventions, which
pursue integrated approaches (2012). Lastly the bulk of the research within CMI has focused
on humanitarian-military interaction in which mainly NGOs have been investigated. The civil
spectrum is however much broader, and also involves humanitarian and developmental UN
agencies, civil peacekeeping actors, local civil societies and host nation authorities. It is
therefore interesting to see if the same communicational problems also occur with other civil
actors.
Research objectives and research question
In order to fill the lacuna in research focused on the broad spectrum of civil-military
communication within integrated international interventions, this research will focus on a
practical example that deals with these issues. Focusing on civil-military communication within
an international intervention will hopefully provide more insight on communicational issues
within CMI, and more importantly will bring about recommendations for overcoming these
issues. Furthermore it also shows differences and commonalities in communication between
different sorts of civil actors when engaging with the military, which have not been discussed
within the CMI research spectrum yet.
This research will do so by looking into an example of civil-military interaction within
UN peacekeeping, in which several sorts of civil actors are engaging with the military. More
specifically, this research will look into the communication between the Dutch military and
civil UN entities within the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
in Mali (MINUSMA). The case of MINUSMA was chosen because it, first and foremost, is an
integrated mission, in which several spheres of action, like security, development and
humanitarian are combined. The mission’s mandate for instance states that MINUSMA aims
“to contribute to the creation of a secure environment for the safe, civilian-led delivery of
humanitarian assistance, in accordance with humanitarian principles, and the voluntarily return
of internally displaced persons and refugees in close coordination with humanitarian actors”
(UN Security Council, 2013). Moreover the Dutch military in Gao have been tasked to provide
intelligence for the MINUSMA mission through their Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance company (ISR-coy) (van Dalen, 2015). They therefore assumingly have a high
need for information. As a result communication between civil and military actors seems to be
a necessity within this case, and it thus lends itself perfectly for a research on civil-military
communication. In order to make the research manageable, this research only focuses on civil

12. 12
UN entities. This choice was furthermore based on the assumption that interaction between civil
and military UN actors within UN peacekeeping should be less problematic (Frerks et al.,
2006). Lastly, the choice for this specific case was informed by the fact that MINUSMA is a
very recent, and still on-going, mission, which will provide insight into the current state of
affairs in CMI.
This thesis therefore seeks to identify the way in which communications between civil
UN entities and the Dutch military takes place and, if possible, hopes to give recommendations
for future improvement. The research question can be stated as follows:
‘To what extent is communication between the Dutch military and civil UN entities within the
MINUSMA mission in the Gao-region (Mali) effective?’
Sub-questions and hypotheses
For answering this question in a manageable way several sub-questions have been compiled.
After each question, it is indicated which chapter is going to answer the question. The sub-
questions for this research are the following:
 What is the state of the art in research on CMI in general, and specifically in
communication issues? (Chapter 1)
 What does effective communication mean within a CMI context? (Chapter 2)
 What tool is appropriate for analysing communication within CMI? (Chapter 2)
 Which methods need to be used in order to acquire data about civil-military
communication? (Chapter 3)
 What is the context in which the communication between civil UN entities and the
Dutch military takes place in the Gao region? (Chapter 4)
 Who are the civil and military actors that are involved in this research? (Chapter 4)
 How did communication take place between civil UN entities and the Dutch military in
the Gao region? (Chapter 5)
 What are the problems in communication between civil UN entities and the Dutch
military in the Gao region? (Chapter 5)
 Which actions can address the identified communicational problems? (Chapter 6)
The author beforehand assumes the following two hypotheses. Firstly, communication between
civil UN entities and the Dutch military in the MINUSMA mission should be at least to some

13. 13
extent effective, since the actors are all part of the overarching UN organization. Secondly,
communication between the Dutch military and humanitarian UN entities will be more
problematic than the communication with MINUSMA civil entities. Because the civil
MINUSMA entities and the Dutch army are both part of the same MINUSMA mission, and
therefore communication will probably be easier.
Research structure
In order to answer the research question and its sub-questions several steps have been taken.
First of all a literature review has been conducted with regards to civil-military interaction in
general, and civil-military communication in specific. This chapter gives a broad introduction
on research conducted within the CMI spectrum so far and will also give the main gaps within
civil-military research. The second chapter consists of a more specific review focused on
theories regarding effective communication. In this chapter a theoretical framework fit for the
purpose of this research is developed. Although this thesis draws heavily upon the research of
Rietjens et al., who developed a five-stage information management framework for civil-
military communication (2009), additional theories concerning communication between
organizations have been looked upon. Within this theoretical framework effective
communication is defined as:
‘The process by which information is transmitted between civil and military organizations, in
which a minimum of communication barriers are present, so that an understanding response
of the information occurs.’
The theoretical framework is followed by the methodology that has been used for this research.
The methodology explains that the data-gathering for this thesis is mainly done through semi-
structured interviews with employees of civil UN entities and the Dutch military who are, or
who have been active in Gao, and gives justifications for the choices that where made with
regards to the methodology. Before turning towards the results a case description is given, in
which the context and structure of MINUSMA is explained. Furthermore a description is given
of the Dutch military and the several civilian entities. In this it is, for instance, concluded that
there are two main categories of civil UN entities. There are the civil UN entities who are part
of MINUSMA, and there are UN agencies who are to a great extent outside the MINUSMA
mission, and who are thus more independent. The gathered data in turn has informed the results
and discussion chapter, which will show the main identified problems, and subsequent

14. 14
recommendations, with regards to effective communication between the civil UN entities and
the Dutch military. The conclusion provides a short wrap-up of the discussed issues and gives
an answer to the different sub-questions and the main question. It is concluded that civil-
military communication has been to a great extent effective between the ISR-coy and civil UN
entities that are part of the mission, although some communicational barriers are still present.
The communication with the UN agencies is however rated as ineffective. Several reasons are
given for this, such as organizational closeness, the importance of personal relationships and
individual cultural similarities of the ones communicating. Lastly, the conclusion will provide
recommendations for further research within the field of CMI.
Limitations & utility
All research has limitations, as does this one. One of the main limitations that this research faces
is that communication between civil and military actors was not directly observable due to the
inability of the researcher to visit Gao. Interviews however form a perfect alternative, because
it clearly shows how the interviewees have perceived the communication with each another.
There is however the danger that interviewees give socially desirable answers, which could give
an inaccurate picture. It is however believed that this limitation can be tackled by comparing
the answers of the interviewees. Within the research one respondent from UNOCHA for
instance rated civil-military communication as very positive. By looking at answers from other
interviewees it could however be demonstrated that this was not the case. It does thus seems
like a socially desirable answer was given in this case, but the other interviews served as a cross-
check.
Although a great amount of people have been interviewed, another limitation that has
slightly hampered this research has been the limited availability of employees of civil actors for
interviews, especially within humanitarian UN agencies. Sufficient interviews have however
been conducted with civil UN entities, but it would have enriched the research if more people
could have been interviewed in depth. This has been caused because most prospective civil
interviewees where still active in the field, and thus too busy in doing their work.
Choosing a very specific case helps to study a certain phenomenon in depth it does not
necessarily mean that the findings hold true for other cases as well. The Dutch army is for
instance not representative for other military forces that are present in Mali. The Gao region
might also not be typical for the whole of Mali. In a much broader sense the international
peacekeeping mission in Mali might be entirely different from other missions. Therefore more
research on communicational issues within CMI like this and Rietjens et al. (2009) research

15. 15
need to be conducted for verification. The issues in communication that have been highlighted
in previous research indicate however that the Gao case is highly linkable to other cases as well,
(which is explained in the discussion chapter), and therefore this research is believed to be of
value, since it provides in-depth insight into the issues in civil-military communication.
Furthermore it is hoped that the provided recommendations will be useful for the entities
involved and the broader civil-military community.

16. 16
1. The research field of civil-military interaction
“Whether or not to co-operate, to what extent, under what conditions, and how, have become
controversial issues and are hotly debated.”
(Frerks et al., 2006, p. 32)
Civil-military interaction (CMI) is a relatively new field of research within the academic world.
Although interactions have occurred between civilians and soldiers throughout history (where
there is war there are civilians) it has only been since the early nineties that this topic has
become a real academic issue (James, 2003; Homan, 2010; Gjørv, 2014). This can be clearly
observed when looking at the interference of the international community within areas that are
affected by war. So-called peacekeeping missions have traditionally focused on upholding a
ceasefire between two conflicting parties (Rietjens et al., 2009). From the early nineties
onwards peacekeeping missions have however grown in complexity, with regards to their
mission and scope. This is a direct result of changes within armed conflicts, which currently
mainly occur within, instead of between states, and furthermore because of the failure of
previous approaches in peacekeeping (Egnell, 2013). As a consequence, several spheres of
action, such as military, developmental and humanitarian, have become integral to current
peacekeeping missions (Frerks et al., 2006; Metcalfe et al., 2012; Egnell, 2013). Due to these
developments, international military forces are more and more inclined to interact with civilian
actors, such as host nation agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and
International Organizations (IOs) (Egnell, 2013). The interaction that occurs between civil and
military actors during operations can be depicted on a scale ranging from co-existence to
cooperation (Metcalfe et al., 2012). Possible forms of interaction are, for instance, coordination
of actions, joint operations, armed escorts, and information sharing (Frerks et al., 2006).
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the research conducted within this field of
civil-military interaction so far. Furthermore it provides the main gaps of research, which are
of relevance for the topic of this research. In order to do so the main concepts that have been
used within CMI research are explained. After this the chapter will look into the issues within
CMI research from two different perspectives. Firstly the general issues that have been
discussed within the research of the last decennia will be treated. This is followed by a deeper
investigation of CMI-issues within UN peacekeeping missions. In the final paragraph a short
recapitulation of the identified research gaps from the two perspectives will be given, which
this research tries to tackle within the remaining chapters. It should however be acknowledged

17. 17
that this this chapter does not provide a complete overview of the research on CMI issues, only
the issues which are deemed to be most important for this specific research are treated.
1.1. The concepts of the civil-military spectrum
Within the civil-military research field there are several concepts to be found, such as civil-
military relations, Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Civil-Military Coordination
(CMCoord) and Civil-Military Interaction (CMI). Each of these concepts has a slightly different
meaning and background. ‘Civil-military relations’ mostly refers to the relationship between
militaries and national civilian organisations within the same state (Gjørv, 2014). To be clear,
this thesis does not reflect upon civil-military relations as interpreted above, but between
international military actors who are deployed to a certain area in which they interact with
civilian organizations.
‘CIMIC’ is a concept that has been framed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). The term basically refers to civil-military engagement, which is specifically for
military purposes (Metcalfe et al., 2012). It thus reflects on civil-military engagement from a
military perspective, which has for this reason been criticised by civilian actors (Frerks et al.,
2006). ‘CMCoord’, in turn, is a concept which has been defined by the United Nations Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), which means the “essential dialogue
and interaction between civilian and military actors in humanitarian emergencies that is
necessary to protect and promote humanitarian principles, avoid competition, minimize
inconsistency, and when appropriate, pursue common goals” (UNOCHA, 2015). ‘CMCoord’
is therefore a concept reflecting more on the humanitarian perspective (Frerks et al., 2006;
Metcalfe et al., 2012), and has thus imbedded a certain bias.
The term CMI is more neutral and does not look at the civil-military spectrum from a
specific perspective. The definition of CMI, as applied within this thesis, is as follows: “the
range and nature of contact from co-existence to coordination, and/or cooperation between
national (local) and international (foreign) civilian (ranging from government officials to NGOs
both humanitarian and development, to local populations) and military actors in crisis
situations” (Gjørv, 2014, p. 7). CMI is thus an umbrella term, incorporating both CMCoord and
CIMIC. Within this thesis, the civil actors are mainly sub-entities of the largest IO worldwide,
the UN. The ‘civil’ in CMI refers, within this thesis, to peacekeeping, humanitarian and
developmental UN entities, such as The Human Rights Division, UNHCR and UNDP. As a

18. 18
consequence, this thesis will not deal with other civil entities outside the UN, such as local
authorities and organizations.
It must be mentioned that NATO is currently also introducing the term CMI, but their
definition of CMI is more neutral than their CIMIC definition, since it refers to increased
“effectiveness and efficiency” for both actors (NATO, 2014). Furthermore the term CMI has
also been used by some other military elements, such as the first Civil-Military Interaction
Command (1. CMI Co) of the Netherlands (Defensie.nl, 2015). The term CMI will however be
maintained within this thesis, since it currently seems to be the most neutral term at hand.
1.2. Relevant Issues within CMI research
Within the research field of civil-military interaction, debates have focussed mainly on
conceptual issues (Metcalfe et al., 2012). The big differences that exist between military and
(mainly humanitarian) civil actors have been highlighted very often as having a negative effect
on effective coordination and communication. One of the main issues is the cultural difference
existing between both entities. The difference in cultural perceptions is one of the main hurdles
in effective CMI according to many scholars and practitioners (e.g. Barry and Jefferys, 2002;
James, 2003; Franke, 2006; Rietjens et al., 2009; Metcalfe et al., 2012). The word ‘culture’ in
this case must be seen as a container concept to which many of the specific problems refer.
Issues like differences in language, organizational structure, goals, values, mandates, principles,
etcetera, can all be brought back to this concept of ‘culture’. The concept of cultural
distinctiveness seems to have dominated the research field of CMI, although the specificity of
the cultural topic differs.
Although cultural differences between entities does not make interaction easier, mutual
understanding of each other’s cultures could help in bridging these differences. Sadly enough
there is, however, a lot of misunderstanding between military and civilian organizations (Barry
and Jefferys, 2002). Within the consulted CMI literature the described misunderstandings have
mainly been focused on the differences between the military and the humanitarian and, to a
lesser extent, development community. There is however a clear lack of research on the
interaction of other civil entities with military actors, such as civil entities that are part of UN
peacekeeping missions. This can probably be explained because humanitarian and military
actors are polar opposites and thus a more interesting topic. It would therefore be interesting to
see if the same problems that are found within the humanitarian-military nexus, also held true
for other civil entities that interact with the military. It is however first necessary to explore the

19. 19
main issues that can be found within the existing literature. The following paragraphs therefore
explore the main cultural differences and the topics related to communication that have been
mentioned within the humanitarian-focused literature.
1.2.1. Cultural differences
Within the consulted literature, many scholars have argued that cultural differences pose a
major problem for effective CMI (e.g.: James, 2003; Scheltinga et al., 2005; Franke, 2006;
Homan, 2010; Egnell, 2013). Prejudices and misunderstandings on each other form an
additional problem.
Generally, the military organizational culture can be described as hierarchical, with a
clear line of authority and discipline. Moreover the military are trained to use controlled
violence in order to achieve security, when ordered to do so by their respective national
governments. Their activities are thus politically legitimated. The humanitarian and
development communities on the other hand in general are less hierarchical, are internationalist,
and put more emphasis on nonviolence (Franke, 2006; Metcalfe et al., 2012; Egnell, 2013). In
essence, humanitarianism is motivated by the desire to reduce human suffering (Egnell, 2013).
This leads to differences in motivations, goals and approaches between civil and military actors
(Metcalfe et al., 2012).
Regarding organizational structure, the humanitarian and developmental organizations
are horizontal, meaning decisions are being made in a more or less informal setting through
consensus. The military organizational structure is the complete opposite. The structure is
vertically organized, with top-down decision-making. Furthermore both entities work with
different time perceptions. The military is often only deployed for a short period of time, whilst
humanitarian and especially development organizations are deployed for a longer period
(Franke, 2006; Frerks et al., 2006).
The differences in organizational cultures can lead to a lack of understanding, mistrust
and negative perceptions of one another (Barry and Jefferys, 2002). Examples of
misunderstanding are plentiful. It has for instance been argued by humanitarians that the
military often does not understand the differences between sorts of humanitarian organizations
with a specific specialization, like UNOCHA, the WFP and the ICRC. Militaries often see that
humanitarians dot not understand the military levels of command (James, 2003; Franke, 2006).
Examples of negative perceptions are also plentiful within the consulted literature. Some
humanitarians, although the following example is a bit overstated, perceive militaries as
‘violence-adoring’, ‘dominant’, ‘ill-informed’ and ‘arrogant’, whilst some military personnel

20. 20
might see humanitarians as ‘uncoordinated’, ‘ill-disciplined’ ‘hippies’ (James, 2003; Scheltinga
et al., 2005; Frerks et al., 2006).
Many scholars have given recommendations in order to overcome the cultural
differences that lead to ineffective CMI. Increasing mutual awareness through training,
coordination and information-sharing are some of the recommendations that have been
proposed (Barry and Jefferys, 2002; Scheltinga et al., 2005; Rietjens et al., 2009). This kind of
training is increasingly implemented in practice, there are improvements in coordination and
there is also an increase in guiding documents on civil-military interaction. But mutual
awareness is still far of and the fact that guidelines are not always adhered to, proves that these
efforts are not yet sufficient to solve the issues that occur within CMI (Metcalfe et al., 2012).
1.2.2. Humanitarian principles, accessibility and security
The above-mentioned culture-related issues can be found repetitively within most of the
literature on CMI. One of the culturally-related issues within civil-military interaction deserves
specific attention however. There is, and always has been, a conceptual discussion within the
civil-military field concerning the so-called humanitarian principles (e.g. Barry and Jefferys,
2002; Frerks et al., 2006; Franke, 2006; Wortel, 2009; Rietjens et al., 2009; Metcalfe et al.,
2012; Egnell, 2013). This discussion becomes especially heated when looking at military
personnel who provide humanitarian aid themselves.
Humanitarian aid, as given by humanitarian organizations, is often based on the so-
called humanitarian principles, which are humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence1
(Wortel, 2009). These principles came forth out of the International Red Cross movement and
have since been widely recognised by many humanitarian actors. These principles might be at
stake when humanitarian actors interact or cooperate with military actors (idem). Furthermore
interacting with the military might hamper the access to beneficiaries and can also have an
effect on the security of aid workers (Barry and Jefferys, 2002; Frerks et al., 2006). For this
reason, many humanitarian organizations highly resent intensive cooperation with the military.
1
Humanity: the provision of humanitarian assistance where it is needed and in a manner which respects the
rights and dignity of the individual.
Impartiality: the provision of humanitarian assistance without discrimination among recipients and guided
solely by needs, with priority given to the most urgent cases of distress.
Neutrality: the provision of humanitarian assistance without engaging in hostilities or taking sides in
controversies of a political, religious or ideological nature.
Independence: the provision of humanitarian assistance in a manner that is autonomous from the political,
economic, military or other objectives of actors engaged in the areas where humanitarian action is being
undertaken.
Derived from: Metcalfe et al., 2012.

21. 21
Another issue that is highly resented by humanitarian actors, are military actors who are
providing humanitarian aid as part of their military objectives. This is often referred to as the
‘militarization of aid’ (Metcalfe et al., 2012). Humanitarians argue that the lines between
military and humanitarian are as a result being blurred, which might lead to aid workers being
deliberately attacked (idem.; Wortel, 2009). Again, the militarization of aid is seen as an
infringement on the humanitarian principles, which could lead to security and accessibility
issues. It has however been argued by Goodhand that that this is based on ideological
assumptions which are not underpinned by factual proof (2013). This can also be seen within
the research of Frerks et al. on civil-military interaction in Liberia and Afghanistan. They
concluded that: “Attacks on aid agencies are (…) primarily a result of the general context, rather
than of the blurring of lines between aid workers and the military” (2013, p. 10). Despite these
findings, the discussion concerning the possible harmfulness of CMI in relation to the
humanitarian principles remains. It seems necessary however, to depart from the conceptual
discussion and look more into ways in which civil-militaryinteraction and its issues are working
in practice, as has also been emphasized by Metcalfe et al. (2012).
1.2.3. Information-sharing and communication
Some practical issues in civil-military interaction that are regularly mentioned are
communication and information-sharing problems. Within the consulted literature, this issue
has been highlighted by many scholars (among others: Barry and Jefferys, 2002; James, 2003;
Maiers et al., 2005; Frerks et al., 2006; Metcalfe et al., 2012; Haysom, 2013). It has for instance
been mentioned that both military as well as humanitarian actors are not eager to share
information with one another (Maiers et al., 2005; Metcalfe et al., 2012). Furthermore, it has
been mentioned that both entities have different languages and incompatible databases.
Different meanings are attached to the same terms and a different jargon is being used (Barry
and Jefferys, 2002; James, 2003). Both issues are related to the aforementioned cultural
differences between both actors.
However, the question that still remains is: why is it of such importance that there is
good communication and information exchange between military and humanitarian actors? It
has been argued that communication and information exchange enhances efficiency and
security for both actors. More efficiency because there is less duplication in information
gathering (Rietjens et al., 2009). Increased security because both parties can inform one another
on security related issues, such as locations of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and
populations movements (Maynard, 2001). Moreover, both entities are increasingly informed

22. 22
about one another’s activities and will therefore be less in each other’s way (Rietjens et al,
2009). Aside from this, effective communication is believed to be one way of overcoming the
many problems, as portrayed previously in this chapter, that are being faced within civil-
military interaction (Bollen, 2002; Rietjens et al., 2009).
Although communicational and information management issues have been mentioned
by many, there have only been a few researchers who specifically focus on this topic (Maynard,
2001; Verlaan, 2006; Rietjens et al., 2009; Ooms and van den Heuvel, 2012; Zyck, 2013). Zyck
and, Ooms and van den Heuvel focused mainly on the issue of information exchange through
databases, whilst the others paid most attention to communicational issues within several case
studies. Rietjens et al., for example, provided a comprehensive study concerning information
management between several NGOs and the military in Afghanistan (2009). The scarce number
of studies done on information management and communication alone is enough reason to
increase the amount of research on this important topic. Verlaan also acknowledged this and
stated that more case studies are necessary within other peace support operations in order to
verify the result out of these studies (2006), which has also been argued by Rietjens and Bollen
(2008). Furthermore more research on this topic might enhance, as argued above, the efficiency
and security of both entities, and thus is a start for overcoming the issues that have been
identified within the CMI literature.
1.2.4. Side note: Internal differences and external similarities
It is however extremely important to notice that the distinction between military and
humanitarian actors is not as black and white as portrayed above. There are similarities between
both entities, but there also differences within each entity internally. You will for instance find
idealist and adrenaline junkies on both sides of the spectrum. Most importantly, it is necessary
to be aware that the ‘civil’ within CMI is not a homogenous group.
There are many sorts of civil organizations. There is for instance the distinction between
humanitarian and development organizations. There are organizations who do both, and
organizations who specifically focus on a certain topic, like children or refugees. There are
government-led organizations like the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID). NGOs, like Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), UN agencies, there are civil
peacekeeping entities, etcetera et cetera. In short, this means that there are organizations with
different goals, different forms of organizational structure and different ways of working
(Scheltinga et al., 2005; Egnell, 2013). There are for instance organizations that strictly adhere
to the humanitarian principles, like the ICRC, who are often called the Dunantist humanitarian

23. 23
actors (Wortel, 2009). But there are also organizations that uphold a more pragmatic view and
decide whether or not to cooperate with the military depending on the context (Frerks et al.,
2006).
Although many military organizations have a similar hierarchical organizational
structure there are also many differences to be found. There will for instance be differences in
ways in which operations are being conducted between armies of different nationalities
(Scheltinga et al., 2005). Within each army there are furthermore also differences between
individuals with regards to functions and tasks. An artillerist would probably have less affinity
in working with civil actors than somebody working for a CIMIC battalion.
It is important to keep in mind the internal differences and external commonalities of
both entities. In order to better understand the specific characteristics of the main entities that
are being dealt with in this research, it is now time to elaborate on CMI within peacekeeping
and within the Dutch army.
.
1.3. CMI within UN peacekeeping missions
When looking into the type of military missions that are usually being dealt with in CMI
research, it is striking that most publications have focused on the recent Iraq and Afghanistan
cases (Metcalfe et al., 2012). These operations, of which the former was led by a coalition of
the willing and the latter by NATO, have probably gained so much attention due to the intense
involvement of the military in the humanitarian domain (Donini, 2009). There are, however,
many other case studies focussing specifically on UN peacekeeping missions, such as the
United Nations Mission In the republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) and the United Nations
Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (Gregorian and Olson, 2007; Frerks et al., 2006; Fenton and
Loughna, 2013). Fenton and Loughna for instance found out that there was only sporadic
interaction between the peacekeeping mission and humanitarian actors in South Sudan, whilst
the situation was more positive in Liberia (2013).
Besides these case studies there have been some more generic articles that specifically
focus on CMI issues within UN peacekeeping (e.g. de Coning, 2007a; Rolfe, 2011). These
publications on CMI within UN peacekeeping have a lot in common with the general issues
that can be found within CMI research. Again the main focus is on humanitarian-military issues,
in which the cultural differences and communicational issues come to the fore (de Coning,
2007a; Frerks et al., 2006). There are, however, some specific issues that stand out within the
literature on UN peacekeeping. Many scholars have for instance focused on the UN integrated

24. 24
approach. This integrated approach, which was introduced in 1979 by the Secretary-General
and has been further developed since, emphasises a ‘higher degree of coherence’ among UN
entities, which in short means that UN peacekeeping, political, developmental and humanitarian
actors are more integrated (Metcalfe et al., 2011, p. 9). This has been highly contested by the
humanitarian actors (UN agencies and NGOs), because they fear that integration will blur the
lines between humanitarian and the politically-motivated peacekeeping actors, and thus have
an effect on the humanitarians’ impartiality and neutrality, and in consequence, security
(Metcalfe et al., 2012; Jasper and Moreland, 2015). People in favour of the integrated approach
highlight that engagement of humanitarian actors is necessary and that there is no strong
evidence for the assumption that integration hampers effective humanitarian action (Metcalfe
et al., 2012). The integrated approach discussion can be seen as a more specific part of the
discussion concerning the humanitarian principles as outlined in ‘1.2. Issues within CMI
research’.
In relation to this De Coning has stated that the relationship between UN military and
humanitarian actors in UN peacekeeping is much more cooperative (2007a). There is however
not much evidence confirming this assertion. Within the consulted literature, the bulk of
literature focuses on humanitarian NGOs, and to a lesser extent on humanitarian UN agencies.
There have not been many articles that focus solely on the relationship between UN
peacekeeping actors and humanitarian UN agencies, and even less attention has been placed on
the interaction between UN military and other non-humanitarian civil UN entities. Thus, there
seems to be a need for more research on UN-internal CMI. De Coning has also highlighted this,
when saying that “the humanitarian-military interface is only one of the several civil-military
relationships” (De Coning, 2007a, p. 89). Within a peacekeeping mission for instance, there are
several civil sub-sections like a Human Rights Division and Civil Affairs. De Coning
furthermore wondered if a different set of guidelines is needed for non-humanitarian UN
entities. Rolfe has focused on other civil UN entities when looking at the issue of Protection of
Civilians (PoC) within UN peacekeeping (2011). PoC ideally is executed by military, police
and civil actors. Rolfe found out that there are still many problems in this regard. Ramjoué did
something similar, but focused on the Join Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) and its internal
civil-military interaction (2011). He found out that this interaction is strained in several
missions.
In general however, it seems that there is a lack of research within UN peacekeeping
missions internally, both between UN military and humanitarian UN agencies, as well as
between UN military and civil UN peacekeeping entities. It would specifically be interesting to

25. 25
see if the same issues occur between non-humanitarian civil UN and the military, as within the
humanitarian-military interaction.
1.4. Relevant gaps within CMI research
Within the previous paragraphs of this chapter several research gaps have been mentioned. This
paragraph will recapitulate these gaps and will furthermore explain that this research deals with
these gaps by focusing on civil-military communication issues within an UN peacekeeping
mission:
 Within the literature review of Metcalfe et al. on civil-military coordination it was
emphasised that the bulk of literature focused on conceptual issues, like the discussion on
humanitarian principles (2012). They acknowledged however that there has been a lack of
research on CMI in practice, specifically within the light of current developments towards
integrated approaches and international interventions and how this impacts humanitarian
outcomes.
 A topic that has been mentioned by many scholars in CMI research is communication and
information management. Effective communication might be the way to overcome the
many hurdles that are to be found within CMI. Although many have acknowledged that
communication is problematic, not much specific research has been done on this topic.
Therefore follow-up research on the article of Rietjens et al. (2009) seems necessary.
 Furthermore, it has been found that the main attention of CMI research has been on the
Iraq and Afghanistan cases. Although an increase on CMI within UN peacekeeping was
determined, the bulk of the research still focuses on the relationship between the military
and humanitarian NGOs. Therefore it is necessary to focus on the relationship between the
military and other civil UN entities within UN peacekeeping. To some extent, this has
already been investigated with regards to the relationship between humanitarian UN
agencies and UN military, but specific research on UN internal CMI has been rare. Even
less research has been done on the relationship between UN military and non-humanitarian
civil UN entities.
This research tries to make a contribution towards closing the identified research gaps by
focusing specifically on a case of civil-military communication within UN peacekeeping
between UN military and civil UN entities. These entities do not only consist of humanitarian
UN agencies, but also of other civil UN entities within peacekeeping. The research thus is on
the one hand very narrow, since it focuses on communication within UN-specific CMI only,

26. 26
but is also broader then previous research, since the civil sphere does not only consist of
humanitarian actors. In order to be able to deal with such a case it is however first needed to
discuss in more depth what civil-military communication specifically entails.

27. 27
2. A theory of civil-military communication
“Communication is fundamental to human existence. It is a continuous process and essential
to all human activities.”
(Agarwal, 2010, p.1)
After having identified that there is currently a need for research on communication between
military actors and civil actors within UN integrated missions, it is now time to elaborate on
what effective communication between civil and military actors specifically entails. This
chapter gives an overview of relevant theoretical literature on civil-military communication. It
will give an overview of theories of ‘communication’, which are of value for civil-military
communication, and will conclude with a theoretical cadre that defines effective
communication within civil-military interaction. This cadre is then used to investigate the Gao-
case.
2.1. Civil-military communication and information management
Although it has, as argued earlier, been mentioned by many researchers that communication,
and the act of information-sharing, is a problem within civil-military interaction, not much
research has been done with civil-military communication as its main topic (the ones found are:
Maynard, 2001; Rietjens et al., 2009; Ooms and van den Heuvel, 2012; Zyck, 2013). Of the
literature dealing with this topic, only Rietjens et al. came up with a useful theoretical
framework of information management, which was applied to a case study of ISAF and
humanitarian organizations in Afghanistan (2009). This theoretical framework will form the
basis for the framework that is being used within this thesis.
Rietjens et al. do not provide a specific definition of communication, but instead view
communication from an information management perspective. They used a definition from
Fitz-Gerald and Walthall, which states that information management occurs when “the right
information is delivered when and where it is needed, through clearly defined and understood
communication channels” (2001). The theoretical framework itself was formed by combining
two information management models of Choo (1995) and Weggeman (1997). This five-stage
model focused both on internal and external information management of each entity within
civil-military interaction (see figure 1). Rietjens et al. thus highlight that internal information
management, and thus internal communication, is important for inter-organizational

28. 28
communication (2009). This has also been argued by others, who state that internal
communication shapes external communication (Sutcliffe, 2001; Yang and Maxwell, 2011).
Figure 1 The information management framework
Source: Rietjens et al., 2009
The first three stages in the information management process have to do with internal
information management. As Sutcliffe put it, information is “essential” for the survival of an
organization, and thus every organization has a need for information (2001, p. 197). The
information needs of each actor are defined by its mission, tasks and goals. When the needs are
clear, information is collected internally and externally, after which the information is
organized, stored and developed into information products. In the fourth stage the actual
interaction takes place between the two entities with the sharing of information, followed by
the last stage in which the information is used and evaluated (Rietjens et al., 2009).
The sequence of the framework can however be criticized, since information sharing is
already taking place at the third stage with collecting needed information externally.
Furthermore, it now seems like information products are solely produced for the sake of sharing
information, whilst the goal of the information sharing is the fulfilment of the information needs
of each entity. The use and evaluation of information is now visualised as a common effort,
whilst this probably is done by each entity separately. At first glance it thus seems more logical
to put the fourth step before the third step, and to alter the last two steps. Lastly, communication
and thus information exchange, might also take place in other stages of information
management. Organizations can for instance communicate about each other’s information
needs. Therefore, some amendments to the information management framework of Rietjens et
al. have been made (see figure 2).
The sharing of information, which is now called ‘Communication: information
exchange’ is now connected to the whole information management process. Sharing of
information should furthermore been seen as a trade, in which organizations not only collect,

29. 29
but also send out information. This has also been emphasized by Yang and Maxwell who said
that information exchange requires a ‘compensation’ (2011).
Figure 2 Adapted information management framework
Source: Adaptation of framework used by Rietjens et al., 2009.
The question remains, however, if this altered framework, which solely focuses on information
management, is sufficiently tackling all aspects of civil-military communication. It clearly
depicts the usage of internal and external information, but it does for instance not portray when
information management is successful, or in other words, effective. Therefore the remainder of
this chapter will be devoted to other ‘theories of communication’ in order to see if certain things
are missing. This will be done by starting very generically with a definition, and with the
process of communication, after which theories concerning inter-organizational communication
will be covered.

30. 30
2.2. Communication in general
As with many other terms in the academic world, there are differences to be found for the
definition of communication (Rodriques, 2000). According to the Oxford dictionary for
instance, communication means the following: “The imparting or exchanging of information
by speaking, writing, or using some other medium” (Oxforddictionaries.com, 2015). A much
cited definition of communication, drafted by Peter Little, seems more suitable for the purpose
of this thesis. Little defined communication as: “(…) the process by which information is
transmitted between individuals and/or organizations so that an understanding response results”
(1977). The big advantage of Little’s definition is that it already takes communication as
something happening between organizations, which is in line with the subject of this thesis.
Furthermore, Little’s definition refers to information exchange, which coincides with the
altered information management framework (as has shown in figure 2). Lastly, Little’s
definition is of value because it speaks of a process of communication. This basic
communicational process, as can be found in any handbook on communication, consists of a
sender, who sends out a message through a certain channel (e.g. by speech, e-mail, etc.), and of
a receiver who receives the message (Cleary et al., 2008; Agarwal, 2010). The sender encodes
his/her message, which means that he or she puts the information that needs to be communicated
into a certain form. The receiver in turn decodes the message, which means that he/she interprets
the message of the sender. The receiver in the end provides feedback towards the sender (Cleary
et al., 2008; Agarwal, 2010), in which in fact the process starts all-over, with the receiver being
the new sender. Successfully completing the communication means that the receiver
understands the message of the sender. A simplified schematic overview of the communication
process can be found in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Communication process
Source: author
Communication occurs for many reasons, but the two main categories for communicating are
information and persuasion (Cleary et al., 2008; Agarwal, 2010). With the former is meant that
we want to give or gain certain information in order to make (informed) decisions. The latter

31. 31
reason for communication is used because we want to influence others in order to change their
behaviour or attitudes. Within persuasion, however, information is still transferred from one
person to the other. This thesis will however mainly focus on information within
communication.
2.3. Barriers to effective communication
It is crucial for communication to be effective. The receiver needs to understand the message
that is being sent by the sender, as is highlighted by other scholars and within Little’s definition
(Little, 1977; Gudykunst, 2014). Agarwal gives a useful addition by stating that effective
communication occurs when “the meaning generated by one person gets smoothly transferred
to the others with a minimum of interference or distortion” (2010). In order to describe effective
communication it is thus necessary to explain what ‘interference’ and ‘distortion’ means, or in
other words, what ineffective communication entails. Understanding, interference and
distortion within effective communication are however not clearly incorporated within the
adapted information management framework.
Within the communication process many things can go wrong. This is commonly
referred to as a ‘communication barrier’. A communication barrier can be present in any stage
of the communication process. The sender might for instance encode the information wrongly:
he or she might use language or jargon that is not understandable for the receiver. The channel
might also cause problems: a poor telephone connection can for instance hamper effective
communication. The receiver might also make a mistake in decoding, by for example
interpreting the message wrongly. Lastly, the situational context can also cause problems, for
instance when there is too much noise at the place where the communication takes place.
These examples of ineffective communication are just a few of the barriers that can
impede effective communication. In general there are three different categories for barriers in
communication that can be distinguished (Agarwal, 2010). Firstly, there are barriers in
language;, certain words can for instance mean different things to different people. Secondly
there are psycho-social barriers, due to its prejudices towards the sender, the receiver might
interpret the message wrongly. Thirdly there are physical/mechanical barriers, which can for
instance be a defect in the medium of communication. These categories will be incorporated in
the theoretical framework for this thesis, but before doing so the specific communicational
barriers that occur between organizations and within civil-militaryinteraction will be elaborated
upon.

32. 32
2.4. Inter-organizational and civil-military communication barriers
Communication does not only, as portrayed above, take place between two individuals but also
occurs between and within groups, organizations and countries (Rosengren, 2000). This adds
on to the complexity of the communication process. Since not much research has been done
within civil-military interaction specifically focussing on communication, it seems useful to
also look at related fields of research, such as inter-organizational, inter-group, inter-agency
and inter-cultural communication. Although the Dutch military and the civil UN entities all act
under the umbrella of the United Nations in Gao, they are fairly different and independent
entities, with their own organizational structure (Unsceb.org, 2015). The Dutch army and the
several civil UN entities are therefore seen as different organizations, which makes this thesis
in essence a case of inter-organizational communication. The research will however keep
referring to entities, in order not to confuse the reader.
Effective inter-organizational communication has been highlighted within the field of
organizational studies as key for an organization’s effectiveness, because it leads to informed
decision-making (Kreps, 1990; Sutcliffe, 2001; Kapacu, 2006). Several general barriers to inter-
organizational communication have been mentioned within the consulted literature, which
impede effective communication.2
Furthermore, literature on civil-military interaction has
provided a scattered and disorganized amount of more specific communication barriers. These
barriers will in this thesis be classified according to the aforementioned categories in ‘2.3.
Barriers to effective communication’ (i.e. linguistic, psycho-social and physical/mechanical
barriers). It must however been mentioned that all barriers are inter-related and sometimes
overlapping.
Concerning linguistic barriers, several authors have mentioned that the lack of
knowledge of each other’s languages, and more specifically the use of jargon, is hampering
effective inter-organizational communication (Gudykunst, 2004; Yang and Maxwell, 2011).
This has also come forth out of literature concerning civil-military interaction, in which
organizational jargon was mentioned as a specific issue. For instance regarding the many
acronyms that are used within military circles (Barry and Jefferys, 2002; James, 2003;
Scheltinga et al., 2005; Zyck, 2013).
The most important factor within psycho-social barriers that has often been highlighted
within the consulted inter-organizational literature is differences in culture (Granot, 1999;
2
Communicational barriers have also been taken from related literature concerning: inter-cultural, inter-group
and inter-agency communication.

33. 33
Gudykunst, 2004; Griffith and Harvey, 2011; Yang and Maxwell, 2013). Organizational culture
has a high impact upon the external communication of an organization. The more the cultures
of two organizations differ, the more difficult it is to establish effective communication (Griffith
and Harvey, 2001), since each culture provides different norms and rules of communication
(Gudykunst, 2004). Furthermore the perception of the other within the own (organizational)
culture can lead to mistrust, which can lead to, for instance, wrong attitudes and stereotyping
(idem.). Within civil-military literature, the great distinction between civil and military culture
and the subsequent distrust has also gained much attention (Scheltinga et al., 2005; Wheeler
and Harmer, 2006; Rietjens et al., 2009; Fenton and Loughna, 2013; Metcalfe et al, 2012; Ooms
and van den Heuvel, 2012). One specific part of the culture of civil organizations has also been
mentioned, the humanitarian principles of neutrality and impartiality, which leads to an
unwillingness to communication amongst humanitarian civil actors (Rietjens et al., 2009).
Additionally, it has been stated by Gregorian and Olson that effective interaction highly
depends on the personalities of people communicating (2007). In other words, if the people in
question like each other, communication is more likely to be effective.
Lastly, forms of physical and mechanical barriers have also been frequently mentioned.
Within inter-organizational literature mostly technical issues are mentioned (Gudykunst, 2004;
Allen et al., 2013; Yang and Maxwell, 2013). Added to this were issues concerning the
capabilities of each actor to communicate and the situational context which can hamper
communication (Yang and Maxwell, 2013). In civil-military communication, technical issues
have also been mentioned as an issue, such as using differing information disseminating
equipment (Aall et al., 2000; Rietjens et al., 2009; Ooms and van den Heuvel, 2012, Zyck,
2013). Additionally, issues concerning the confidentiality of information, mainly from military
side, have been acknowledged (Maynard, 2001; Studer, 2001; Rietjens et al., 2009; Ooms and
van den Heuvel, 2012; Zyck, 2013). There are also some other issues that can be qualified as
physical and mechanical barriers, such as security issues and organizational policies, hampering
communication (Maynard, 2001; Ooms and van den Heuvel, 2012; Metcalfe et al., 2012; Zyck,
2013). These issues are however very interlinked with psycho-social barriers, for example
because policy often comes forth out of the culture of an organization (e.g. the humanitarian
principles).

34. 34
2.5. A theoretical framework of civil-military communication
The above-mentioned barriers within civil-military inter-organization communication have
been included within the altered information management framework of Rietjens et al. (2009)
(see Figure 4). The information exchange part within that framework has been enlarged.
In short the theoretical framework shows both internal and external information
management, in which it highlights the possible barriers for effective communication per
category. Through this lens, the issue of effective communication within the MINUSMA
mission will be looked upon. Although it must be mentioned that the research will mainly focus
will be on the ‘civil-military communication’ part. Lastly, the definition of effective civil-
military communication (as composed out of the above; i.e. a combination of Little, Agarwal
and Gudykunst) is as follows: ‘The process by which internal information is transmitted
between civil and military organizations, in which a minimum of communication barriers are
present, so that an understanding response of the information occurs, so that information needs
are being fulfilled.’ This research upholds the assumption that effective communication ideally
leads to increased organizational effectiveness for both actors, because more informed decisions
can be made.

35. 35
Figure 4: Framework of civil-military communication
Source: Combination of theories of civil-military and inter-organizational communication

36. 36
3. Methodology
This chapter explains how the research concerning the communication between the Dutch
military and civil UN entities has been done. It explains the choices that have been made during
the research process regarding the research design, such as choosing the case and prospective
interviewees. Furthermore, it explains the ethical considerations that have been contemplated.
3.1. Research approach and design
The research approach for answering the main question will be qualitative in nature, since it is
often used for understanding a phenomenon like inter-organizational communication (Taylor
and Trujilo, 2001; Wellington and Szczerbiński, 2007). Although communication can also be
studied with a quantitative approach, understanding the reasons for ineffective or effective
communication is rather something that is best approached in a qualitative manner. Furthermore
the qualitative approach has been frequently used within the field of civil-military interaction
research (Rietjens, 2014) and in civil-military communication research (Rietjens et al., 2009).
The research design will be a case study of the interaction between civil UN entities and
the Dutch military in Gao. The case study design has been chosen because, as identified within
the first chapter, there is a lack of practical research on civil-military communication, and a
case study lends itself perfectly for practical research. Furthermore, the case study design is
often used to explore certain topics which have not been intensively researched before, as is the
case with the topic of this research (Eisenhardt, 1989). Of course, deciding on just a single case
has its limitations. The findings presented in this research are for instance not necessarily
applicable to other cases of civil-military communication. But as there is a scarcity of research
within this topic, it is necessary to acquire more case-specific findings before more general
findings on civil-military communication can be generalized.
The choice for this specific case has been informed by the research gaps that have been
identified within the first chapter. The MINUSMA case is a case of an international
peacekeeping mission with an integrated approach, in which it is highly likely that UN civil
entities and UN militaries communicate. The choice for focussing on the interaction of the
Dutch ISR-coy has been made for three reasons. Firstly, the ISR-coy is an unit which is assumed
to have a high information need from external sources, because they are tasked to provide
intelligence for the mission. Thus interaction with civil UN entities is more likely, which makes
this case ideally for investigating civil-military communication. Secondly, the ISR company is
a Dutch entity, which is advantageous, because of the researcher’s linguistic background and

37. 37
place of residence. Thirdly and lastly, the choice has been informed by the already existing
contacts with the Dutch army of the researcher and his supervisors. Although it was not exactly
clear at the start of the research how many civil UN entities were involved in interaction with
the Dutch ISR company, there were clear indications of a high level of interaction between
these entities during exploratory talks with Dutch military personnel. The choice of civil UN
entities was thus informed by the existing contacts of the Dutch ISR-coy with these entities.
The previous findings on civil-military communication that have been found in the consulted
literature are highly comparable on a generic level with the findings as presented in this
research, which gives indication that this case is not atypical, and thus the findings of this
research are probably also applicable for other instances of civil-military communication.
3.2. Methods & instruments
The answer to the main research question is mainly based on primary data that has been
obtained through semi-structured interviews with personnel of the Dutch military and civil UN
entities that have been active in civil-military communication in the Gao region. To a limited
extent, this research also made use of secondary data, such as documents and reports related to
CMI within MINUSMA. This data has been acquired through the interviewees, the thesis
supervisors and through the MINUSMA website.3
Furthermore already existing literature on
MINUSMA has been used to understand the context of civil-military communication in Gao.
The reasons for choosing the semi-structured interview method are the following:
Firstly, direct observation of civil-military communication was not possible, due to the
inaccessibility of the Gao region and limited financial means. Interviews are a perfect
alternative for observation, since they are highly illustrative in comparison with other research
methods (Gillham, 2000). Secondly, interviews are widely used, and therefore seem to be an
appropriate method within civil-military research (Rietjens, 2014). Because this research
depends on peoples’ perceptions on communication, open-ended questions are preferable,
rather than closed questions, which are used in questionnaires, as they allow more room for
explanation. The interviews are semi-structured because this form of interviews is assumed to
be the most valuable form interviewing (Wellington and Szczerbiński, 2007). A specific set of
questions is asked to every interviewee, but, depending on the answers, the interviewer has the
possibility to ask additional questions of interest.
3
See: http://minusma.unmissions.org/en (last visited 3-3-2016)

38. 38
Preferably the interviews were conducted face-to-face, as this often gives you a much
broader amount of information. This was however not always possible due to limits in mobility
of the researcher, and because of the time and availability of the interviewees. Therefore
interviews that were conducted with people residing outside The Netherlands have mostly been
conducted through telephone or Skype. Lastly, a few interviews have been conducted through
e-mail exchange. Acquiring data through these communication devices has its limitations,
because for instance facial expressions are not visible and because of Internet or phone
connection issues.
Two interview guides have been used when conducting the interviews, one tailored for
the military in Dutch and one in English with specific questions for civil UN entities. The
interviews had an average length of 50 minutes each.4
The questions within the interview guide
have been based on the theoretical framework as portrayed in chapter 2 (A theory of civil-
military communication), in order to acquire relevant data. After a few introductory questions
about the function and background of each interviewee, questions related to external
organizational information needs were asked, followed by questions related to the actual civil-
military communication. The interviewees were asked how they have perceived the
communication between the Dutch military and civil UN entities and if any problems have
occurred. The interviewer however had the opportunity to ask additional questions depending
on the answers of the respondents. It was tried not to ask steering questions, but neutral open-
ended questions. The two interview guides can be found in Annex A.
3.3. Sampling & analysis
As this research deals with a case study, the number of people that can be interviewed is limited.
Furthermore not everyone within the Dutch ISR company and in the civil UN entities has been
actively involved in the interaction. Therefore, the amount of prospective interviewees was
limited. Non-probability sampling has been used in order to interview as many persons as
possible who have been active in civil-military communication. In total 21 interviews were
conducted, of which 13 with military personnel and 8 with employees of civil UN entities. The
interviewees from the civil UN entities were personnel from civil MINUSMA entities and from
UN agencies. Most of these persons were active in the Gao-region. Furthermore one person
from ASIFU HQ and one person from UNOCHA in Bamako have been interviewed. The
contacts with these persons were established through the researcher’s personal network and
4
Not including the e-mail interviews.

39. 39
through the network of the supervisors. After the first few interviews, more contacts were
established with the help of the already interviewed persons. Furthermore the interviews with
the Dutch military have been conducted in Dutch, whilst the rest of the interviews were
conducted in English.
Concerning the military, there have been four rotations so far. It was assumed
beforehand that there are differences in civil-military communication between the different
rotations. Therefore at least two persons per rotation have been interviewed. It was more
difficult to speak with the fourth rotation, because these were still present in Mali. This problem
also occurred with the civil UN entities. Civilians within UN mission rotate less regularly, and
thus mainly people were interviewed who were still active in Mali. Employees have been
interviewed from different sections within Sector Headquarter East and also with the United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC).
When doing interviews, one is always depending on the availability and willingness of the
prospective interviewees. With humanitarian UN agencies this has been problematic, although
persistence has to a great extent solved this problem. Despite the fact that some people from
humanitarian agencies have been interviewed, the researcher would have liked to have more
input from these agencies, in order to get a more representative picture. Probably more persons
could have been interviewed if there was more time, but since the researcher had to adhere to a
strict deadline this was not possible. It is believed however that sufficient data has been acquired
and that the response rate was sufficient for the viability of the research. More information on
the statistics of the interviews can be found in Annex B.
In order to disseminate findings out of the interviews, qualitative data analysis has been
used. Most of the conducted interviews have been audio-recorded and subsequently transcribed
by using the F4 transcribing program.5
This had to be done to make them analysable. The
interviewees had the possibility to receive their transcribed interviews, on which they could
make amendments and additions through e-mail. This measure was implemented as a ‘double-
check’ for accurateness and as a way for the interviewees to add more information that they
might not have given during the actual interview itself. The transcribed interviews have in turn
been analysed by using the ATLAS.ti qualitative research computer program.6
For analysis of
the conducted interviews a coding scheme was used which was mainly based on the theoretical
framework (see annex C). After the coding was completed the findings as depicted within this
5
See: https://www.audiotranskription.de/english/f4.htm
6
See: http://atlasti.com/

40. 40
thesis could be disseminated. To give an example all the information of the ISR-coy’s
interaction with UNOCHA could be retrieved by looking at parts that have been coded with
‘Interaction with UNOCHA’. Differences could be found by also looking into the codes related
to the different rotations of the ISR-coy. Through this way a network analysis have been made
of the external civil UN contacts of the ISR-coy. Another example is the different forms of
communication barriers that occurred, which have been coded with ‘Communication barrier.’
Because the bulk of the questions have been asked to every interviewee a general line
concerning civil-military communication could be identified.
3.4. Ethical considerations
In order to make this research ethically justifiable, several measures were taken. When
contacting prospective interviewees, information was given about the goal and content of the
interview. Before asking questions during the actual interview, this information was repeated.
In the face-to-face interviews the interviewees were asked to sign a consent form in which the
privacy regulations and issues like audio-recording were treated. Within other interviews this
happened through oral agreement. In order to evaluate the interview itself it was possible for
the interviewee to ask questions concerning the research at the end of each interview.
Due to privacy reasons, it was decided that names of the interviewees were not to be
listed in the thesis and that only the organizations of the interviewees will be named. Some civil
interviewees, however, did not agree with naming their organization, therefore these
interviewees are referred to as ‘civil UN employees’. It is furthermore important to know that
the perspective of the interviewees does not necessarily represent the views of their respective
organizations. The transcribed interviews are not attached to this thesis, because they consist
too much information related to privacy. These transcriptions have been consulted by the thesis
supervisors for verification.
Lastly, the reliability of the answers that interviewees gave is something to think about.
Respondents may act differently because they are subject to a research, which might lead them
to be more positive or negative than in reality is true. Furthermore, answers also depend on the
memory of the interviewees. It is however the researcher’s conviction that most interviewees
did not purposefully gave false information. Lastly, many things could be cross-checked,
because the same questions were asked to several persons.

41. 41
4. The MINUSMA mission in Gao
This chapter provides the context that is needed for understanding civil-military communication
within the MINUSMA case. It starts broadly with describing civil-military interaction within
UN peacekeeping. This is followed by a short history and outline of the MINUSMA mission.
Furthermore, a short elaboration on the CMI within the MINUSMA mission on country-level
is given. The civil and military UN entities that are involved in the case are in the next
paragraphs described. With regards to the theoretical framework these descriptions thus deal
with the mission, tasks and goals of the different entities, which determine the information
needs. The information on the different entities has to a great extent been obtained through
relevant academic literature and the websites of each entity. Some information on the specific
outlines of these entities in Gao has also been obtained through the conducted interviews.
Lastly, a simplified organogram is depicted which clarifies the way in which the entities are
connected through the UN organization.
4.1. UN peacekeeping and CMI
UN peacekeeping has changed tremendously over time. Its outlook before the nineties mainly
consisted of military forces being the intermediate between two conflicting parties, in which
they monitored ceasefires and did not have a mandate to use force (Rehse, 2004). After this
period UN peacekeeping missions changed radically. Not only did UN military receive
allowance to use force, but the missions themselves also became multi-dimensional. This means
in practice that the traditional peacekeeping tasks are extended with political, economic,
developmental and humanitarian ones (Jasper and Moreland, 2015). These tasks within the
mission are to a great extent performed by civil UN entities, such as humanitarian UN agencies
and specifically tasked offices in the mission, like Political Affairs (Rehse, 2004; Jasper and
Moreland, 2015).
The organizational structure of a UN mission is headed by a civil ‘Special
Representative of the Secretary General’ (SRSG). Under his or her command several
dimensions of UN peacekeeping can be found (Jasper and Moreland, 2015). Often the mission
area is divided into different sectors, the so-called sector headquarters (HQs). These sector HQs
usually have the same sort of structure as the general peacekeeping HQ. The basic structure of
an UN mission is depicted in Figure 5.
It is important to mention that there are differences with regards to adhering to authority
within the civil sector of a mission. There are civil UN entities which are inside, and which are

42. 42
more or less outside of the mission. Examples of internal civil UN entities are JMAC and sub-
offices like the Human Rights Division and the Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration (DDR) unit. These entities are all under command of the SRSG. Several UN
agencies, like UNOCHA, UNHCR and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) are a
distinct group of actors (de Coning, 2007b). There have been huge discussions on how far the
integration of these entities should go (Metcalfe et al., 2012). Their impartiality and neutrality
is protected within the system, and thus the SRSG has less influence on these actors. Therefore,
the relation between a UN peacekeeping mission and UN agencies depend more on
coordination than on the authority of the SRSG.
The humanitarian agencies and other humanitarian actors are being coordinated by
UNOCHA. UNOCHA has a distinct function within UN peacekeeping, as it is some kind of
mediator between the military peacekeeping actors and the humanitarian sector (Hatzenbichler,
2001; United Nations, 2006). Most integrated UN peacekeeping mission have a Deputy SRSG
(DSRSG) who has the task of ‘Humanitarian Coordinator’ (HC). The OCHA office is there to
support the HC, although they have a considerable degree of autonomy. UNOCHA, depending
on the situational context can have three different forms in relation to the structure of a mission.
Option 1 is that the HC and UNOCHA are positioned inside the mission, option 2 is that the
HC and UNOCHA are both outside the mission, and option 3 is that the HC is inside the mission
and UNOCHA outside (UNOCHA, 2011). In all cases UNOCHA acts as a liaison between the
political/military and the humanitarian actors (United Nations, 2006; UNOCHA, 2010). This
does however not mean that there is no direct bilateral interaction between humanitarian
agencies and the military.
The same DSRSG who performs the function of HC, is often also tasked to be the
Resident Coordinator (RC). The RC has more or less the same function as the HC, but then for
the development sector, under the lead of the UNDP. It thus has a coordinating function for all
the development related actors (UNDESA, 2012). The link between humanitarian and
development actors with UN peacekeeping is clearly made visible in the organogram of
Figure 5.

43. 43
Figure 5: UN mission organizational structure
Source: Copied from (Jasper and Moreland, 2015, p. 199)
As a result of the integrated approach within the UN, the interaction between civil and
military entities within UN peacekeeping missions has increased dramatically. This however,
poses a dilemma for the humanitarian actors within the mission, who are less fond of
integration. Integration might have a negative effect on the humanitarian space of these actors,
and consequently also on the security of humanitarian actors (UNOCHA, 2010; Metcalfe et al.,
2011).
4.2. The path to MINUSMA
The Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has been
established in July 2013. Of course this mission did not come out of the blue, but was preceded
by a series of events both regionally as well as nationally. As root causes for the current issues
within Mali, Walter Lotze, named: a weak state, hostility of the north towards the south due to
social inequality, and a deteriorating economy (2015). The collapse of the Gadaffi regime in
Libya of 2011 also had an effect on Mali. Within Gadaffi’s army many Malinese people of the
Tuareg ethnicity had been active. Most of these Tuaregs returned to Northern Mali after the
regime fell. Unhappy with the current situation in Mali, the Tuaregs organized themselves under

44. 44
the name of the Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) (Cristiani and
Fabiani, 2013; Lotze, 2015). The MNLA strived for the independence of the Northern region
of Mali, also known as Azawad. Simultaneously there are also jihadist groups active within
northern Mali who are hostile to the Malinese government. An example is Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) (Cristiani and Fabiani, 2013). Other than these actors, there are
several more ethically and religiously grounded groups active within the region, like the Islamic
Movement of Azawad (MIA) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA).
Lastly, parts of the national Malian army were increasingly unsatisfied with the current situation
and the apparent apathetic attitude of its own government (idem.).
It was exactly this last group of dissident soldiers who ousted a coup d’état in March
2012 under the name of the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State
(CNRDR) (Boeke and Tisseron, 2014). This event was followed, one month later, with a
declaration of independence for Northern Mali by the MNLA. The MNLA took this
opportunity, because the CNRDC was mainly focused on upholding the coupe (Lotze, 2015).
The MNLA in turn was quickly overthrown by a coalition of radical Islamist groups (Boeke
and Tisseron, 2014). The complex situation that had emerged and the threat of a jihadist
stronghold within North-west Africa induced an international response. Several international
actors like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union
(AU) and the UN got involved in the process. Under high political and economic pressure, and
with help of ECOWAS, the international community succeeded in establishing a government
of National Unity in 2012. More importantly the African-led International Support Mission in
Mali (AFISMA), with support of the UN Security Council, was initiated in December 2012
(Lotze, 2015).
However, installing AFISMA did not produce the desired effect. Due to its slow
deployment, Islamist actors within the country were able to increase their territory southwards.
Fearing the advancing Islamists, the interim government requested a French military
intervention. France agreed with this request and deployed operation ‘Serval’ in January 2013
(Lotze, 2015). The French, together with international and regional allies, deployed quickly and
were able to expel the Islamists out of the main strategic locations. The government of National
Unity requested to change the AFISMA mission into a UN-led peacekeeping operation (Lotze,
2015). Despite some disagreements between the UN and the AU/ECOWAS the UN Security
Council adopted, under Chapter VII, resolution 2100 which mandated the United Nations
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (UN Security
Council, 2013; Boeke en Tisseron, 2014).

45. 45
4.3. The MINUSMA mission
In July 2013 MINUSMA came into action. The resolution stipulated that the mission should
have an initial strength of 11.200 military and 1.400 police personnel (UN Security Council,
2013). The key points in the mandate of the mission are the following (as copied from UN
Security Council, 2013, point 16):
 Stabilization of key population centres and support for the reestablishment State
authority throughout the country.
 Support for the implementation of the transitional road map, including the national
political dialogue and the electoral process.
 Protection of civilians and United Nations personnel.
 Promotion and protection of human rights.
 Support for humanitarian assistance.
 Support for cultural preservation.
 Support for national and international justice.
The resolution furthermore stated that the remaining French troops, from operation Serval,
would act as a parallel force in support of the mission, and that the present AFISMA troops
should be re-hatted into UN peacekeeping troops (idem.). In June 2014 the mandate was
renewed by the adoption of resolution 2164, in which, among other things, the presence of
MINUSMA in the North of Mali was enlarged (UN Security Council, 2014)
Since the publication date of this research, MINUSMA has been active for merely three
years. The mission is still not reaching the personnel strength which resolution 2100 had
envisaged (Vermeij, 2015). Despite the shortage in staff the mission succeeded in successfully
overseeing nationwide elections throughout the latter period of 2013 (Boeke and Tisseron,
2014; Lotze, 2015). However, several huge challenges remain. (Lotze, 2015; Vermeij, 2015).
Firstly, the dichotomy between the north and south of the country is still apparent. Secondly,
there is still a lack of state authority in the northern part of Mali. Thirdly, the security situation
in the north deteriorated, and several attacks from Islamist movements on UN personnel have
occurred. Lastly, the mission is criticized and mistrusted by parts of the Malian population,
because MINUSMA is actively supporting the Malian government. The mission is thus far
from reaching its goals and Mali remains in a fragile state (Boeke and Tisseron, 2014; Vermeij,
2015). The mission is currently even the deadliest UN peacekeeping mission (Vermeij, 2015).
Examples of incidents are plentiful. In December 2015 alone there have been reports of
terrorists shelling the MINUSMA base in Gao and the killing of UN personnel in Kidal (Mali: