Interpretation & Understanding of
the Nigerian Transitional Electricity
Market Rules
www.transafricanenergy.com
Dr Stephen Labson
slabson@transafricanenergy.com
Trans African Energy Pty Ltd
Advisory and consulting services
Australia’s National Electricity Market
Electricity Market Rules
Abuja 15 September 2015
3
Industry unbundling
Generation
Transmission
System & Market
Operator
Distribution
Retail supply
Market reform
Competitive wholesale
market
Retail competition
Independent SMO
Decentralised
Planning*
RegulatedT&D
Shareholding
Mixed ownership
Generation and
retail largely
private
T&D private and
state-owned
 Australian Energy Market Operator
(AEMO)
 System & Market Operator *
 National Transmission Planner
 Energy Market Development
 Corporate entity under Australian
Corporations Law.
 Board comprised of government and
industry representatives
 Operating costs recovered from Market
Participants
* AndGas Markets Operator
Policy, Administration and Regulatory
 Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE)
 Legislation and policy development
 Australian Energy Market Commission
(AEMC)
 Rule change and policy advice to MCE
 Australian Energy Regulator (AER)
 Regulation of network tariffs
4
Market Generators
 ‘Gross pool’ – Generators sell all
electricity output through the spot
market.
 Dispatch categories
 Scheduled generation >30 MW
 Semi-scheduled generation > 30
MW intermittent supply.
 Non-scheduled generation < 30 MW
Market Customers
 Purchase electricity supplied to a
connection point on a NEM transmission
or distribution system at spot price.
 Electricity Retailers: buy electricity at
spot price and on-sell it to end-use
customers.
 End-use Customers: buy directly from
the market for own use.
5
Network service providers
• Transmission Network Service Provider
• Distribution Network Service Provider
 Regions and interconnectors
largely based on Australia’s legacy
state based industry structure
▪ Five regional reference
nodes
▪ Five regulated
interconnectors
 Queensland
 New South Wales
 Victoria
 South Australia
 Tasmania
NB We will come back to WesternAustralia later
6
slEconomics Pty Ltd 7
ISMO
Marketoperations*
Prudential requirements
Central dispatch and
price determination
Ancillary services
Network losses and
constraints
Generation and system
adequacy
Settlements
8
The NER (Version 77) is established
under legislation covering (among
other matters):
• Market participants’ rights and
obligations
• Market operations
• Regulatory investment test
• Economic regulation of network
tariffs
• Power system security
• Metering and IT
• Dispute resolution
* NB. Market Rules Chapter 3 NER.
 Spot market and pricing
 Spot market managed in real-time
through a centrally-coordinated
dispatch process.
 Generators offer supply bids with
specific amounts of electricity at
particular prices., ramp rates, etc
 Offers are submitted every five
minutes of every day.
 A dispatch price is determined
every five minutes.
 Six dispatch prices are averaged
every half-hour to determine the
spot price for each NEM region.
Price determination
 Source:AEMO
 Spot price capped at AUD $12 500/MWh
 Dispatch BIDS capped AUD $-1000/MWh
 NB to balance swap arrangements
 Inter-regional losses from the regional reference node in one region to the
regional reference node in an adjacent region.
 Inter-regional loss factors:
 Describe marginal losses from a regional reference node in one region to the
regional reference node in an adjacent region
▪ for a particular time period ; and
▪ a defined range of operating conditions (i.e. loads)
 Inter-regional loss factor equations per AEMO methodology.
 Used in the central dispatch process to reflect the cost of inter-regional
losses.
Units dispatched according to bid price / loss factors / system constraints
10
Ancillary Services
1. AEMO operates eight separate markets for the delivery of Frequency
Control Ancillary Services (FCAS)
1. FCAS providers bid their services into the FCAS markets in a similar way
to how generators bid into the energy market.
2. AEMO purchases Network Control Ancillary Services (NCAS) and System
Restart Ancillary Services (SRAS)
1. Procured under competitive tenders with service providers.
 Charges are allocated on a user pays principle.
11
slEconomics Pty Ltd 12
 Gross pool
 Market Participants deal with
AEMO- NOT with each other
when selling or buying wholesale
electricity.
 Limited recourse w.r.t.
AEMO
 Payments to Generators are
limited to the money available to
AEMO from receipts from
Market Participants
 AEMO has powers to draw
down on credit support if a
market participant is in
default of payments.
 Any shortfall in AEMO’s
recovery from any Market
Participant in relation to a
billing period is shared across
the generators of electricity by
reducing the amount paid to
them for electricity supplied
through the Market in that
billing period.
13
14
 Risks from price volatility (wholesale market capped at AUD$
12,500/MWh)
 Rapid payment obligations
 Largest retailer (20% of NEM) with spot price at $12,500/MWh will increase
exposure toAEMO at over $1Million per minute
 Risk of non payment covered by bank guarantees with AEMO
 AEMO typically holds $1.5Billion to $3.5Billion in bank guarantees
 Level of guarantee (Max Credit Limit) driven by energy traded, average price and
price volatility
 Daily review of participant exposures
 Rapid payment requirements when near limits
 Default then suspend if obligation not met
 Rapid retailer of last resort required
 AEMO must administer medium term and short term projected assessment of
system adequacy (PASA.)
 On a weekly basis AEMO must collect and analyse information from all
Scheduled Generators, Market Customers, Transmission Network Service Providers
and Market Network Service Providers about their intentions for:
 generation, transmission and market network service maintenance scheduling;
 intended plant availabilities;
 energy constraints;
 And plant conditions which could materially impact upon power system security
and reliability of supply; and significant changes to load forecasts previously
notified to AEMO; and
 for the following 24 months prepare the unconstrained intermittent generation
forecasts for the following 24 months,,,
15
Statement of Opportunities
 AEMO publishes a 10 year forecast
of Opportunities each year.
 This publication provides
information to assist market
participants assess the future need
for :
 electricity generating capacity,
 demand side capacity; and
 augmentation of the network
NationalTransmission Network
Development Plan
As the NationalTransmission Planner for
the electricity transmission grid. AEMO
 provide historical data and projections
of network utilisation and congestion;
 summarise emerging reliability issues
and potential network solutions; and
 present information on potential
network augmentations and non-
network alternatives to projected
congestion.
16
 The Australian market operator has identified the following issues as shaping
market operations going forward:
17
Will regulation impede
uptake of new tech
and services?
Will technology
overtake incumbent
firms?
Can markets and policy
preferences find a
balance?
Dr Stephen Labson
Trans African Energy Pty Ltd
slabson@transafricanenergy.com
www.transafricanenergy.com
18

Trans African Energy - Overview of Australian Wholesale Market Rules

  • 1.
    Interpretation & Understandingof the Nigerian Transitional Electricity Market Rules
  • 2.
    www.transafricanenergy.com Dr Stephen Labson slabson@transafricanenergy.com TransAfrican Energy Pty Ltd Advisory and consulting services Australia’s National Electricity Market Electricity Market Rules Abuja 15 September 2015
  • 3.
    3 Industry unbundling Generation Transmission System &Market Operator Distribution Retail supply Market reform Competitive wholesale market Retail competition Independent SMO Decentralised Planning* RegulatedT&D Shareholding Mixed ownership Generation and retail largely private T&D private and state-owned
  • 4.
     Australian EnergyMarket Operator (AEMO)  System & Market Operator *  National Transmission Planner  Energy Market Development  Corporate entity under Australian Corporations Law.  Board comprised of government and industry representatives  Operating costs recovered from Market Participants * AndGas Markets Operator Policy, Administration and Regulatory  Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE)  Legislation and policy development  Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC)  Rule change and policy advice to MCE  Australian Energy Regulator (AER)  Regulation of network tariffs 4
  • 5.
    Market Generators  ‘Grosspool’ – Generators sell all electricity output through the spot market.  Dispatch categories  Scheduled generation >30 MW  Semi-scheduled generation > 30 MW intermittent supply.  Non-scheduled generation < 30 MW Market Customers  Purchase electricity supplied to a connection point on a NEM transmission or distribution system at spot price.  Electricity Retailers: buy electricity at spot price and on-sell it to end-use customers.  End-use Customers: buy directly from the market for own use. 5 Network service providers • Transmission Network Service Provider • Distribution Network Service Provider
  • 6.
     Regions andinterconnectors largely based on Australia’s legacy state based industry structure ▪ Five regional reference nodes ▪ Five regulated interconnectors  Queensland  New South Wales  Victoria  South Australia  Tasmania NB We will come back to WesternAustralia later 6
  • 7.
  • 8.
    Marketoperations* Prudential requirements Central dispatchand price determination Ancillary services Network losses and constraints Generation and system adequacy Settlements 8 The NER (Version 77) is established under legislation covering (among other matters): • Market participants’ rights and obligations • Market operations • Regulatory investment test • Economic regulation of network tariffs • Power system security • Metering and IT • Dispute resolution * NB. Market Rules Chapter 3 NER.
  • 9.
     Spot marketand pricing  Spot market managed in real-time through a centrally-coordinated dispatch process.  Generators offer supply bids with specific amounts of electricity at particular prices., ramp rates, etc  Offers are submitted every five minutes of every day.  A dispatch price is determined every five minutes.  Six dispatch prices are averaged every half-hour to determine the spot price for each NEM region. Price determination  Source:AEMO  Spot price capped at AUD $12 500/MWh  Dispatch BIDS capped AUD $-1000/MWh  NB to balance swap arrangements
  • 10.
     Inter-regional lossesfrom the regional reference node in one region to the regional reference node in an adjacent region.  Inter-regional loss factors:  Describe marginal losses from a regional reference node in one region to the regional reference node in an adjacent region ▪ for a particular time period ; and ▪ a defined range of operating conditions (i.e. loads)  Inter-regional loss factor equations per AEMO methodology.  Used in the central dispatch process to reflect the cost of inter-regional losses. Units dispatched according to bid price / loss factors / system constraints 10
  • 11.
    Ancillary Services 1. AEMOoperates eight separate markets for the delivery of Frequency Control Ancillary Services (FCAS) 1. FCAS providers bid their services into the FCAS markets in a similar way to how generators bid into the energy market. 2. AEMO purchases Network Control Ancillary Services (NCAS) and System Restart Ancillary Services (SRAS) 1. Procured under competitive tenders with service providers.  Charges are allocated on a user pays principle. 11
  • 12.
  • 13.
     Gross pool Market Participants deal with AEMO- NOT with each other when selling or buying wholesale electricity.  Limited recourse w.r.t. AEMO  Payments to Generators are limited to the money available to AEMO from receipts from Market Participants  AEMO has powers to draw down on credit support if a market participant is in default of payments.  Any shortfall in AEMO’s recovery from any Market Participant in relation to a billing period is shared across the generators of electricity by reducing the amount paid to them for electricity supplied through the Market in that billing period. 13
  • 14.
    14  Risks fromprice volatility (wholesale market capped at AUD$ 12,500/MWh)  Rapid payment obligations  Largest retailer (20% of NEM) with spot price at $12,500/MWh will increase exposure toAEMO at over $1Million per minute  Risk of non payment covered by bank guarantees with AEMO  AEMO typically holds $1.5Billion to $3.5Billion in bank guarantees  Level of guarantee (Max Credit Limit) driven by energy traded, average price and price volatility  Daily review of participant exposures  Rapid payment requirements when near limits  Default then suspend if obligation not met  Rapid retailer of last resort required
  • 15.
     AEMO mustadminister medium term and short term projected assessment of system adequacy (PASA.)  On a weekly basis AEMO must collect and analyse information from all Scheduled Generators, Market Customers, Transmission Network Service Providers and Market Network Service Providers about their intentions for:  generation, transmission and market network service maintenance scheduling;  intended plant availabilities;  energy constraints;  And plant conditions which could materially impact upon power system security and reliability of supply; and significant changes to load forecasts previously notified to AEMO; and  for the following 24 months prepare the unconstrained intermittent generation forecasts for the following 24 months,,, 15
  • 16.
    Statement of Opportunities AEMO publishes a 10 year forecast of Opportunities each year.  This publication provides information to assist market participants assess the future need for :  electricity generating capacity,  demand side capacity; and  augmentation of the network NationalTransmission Network Development Plan As the NationalTransmission Planner for the electricity transmission grid. AEMO  provide historical data and projections of network utilisation and congestion;  summarise emerging reliability issues and potential network solutions; and  present information on potential network augmentations and non- network alternatives to projected congestion. 16
  • 17.
     The Australianmarket operator has identified the following issues as shaping market operations going forward: 17 Will regulation impede uptake of new tech and services? Will technology overtake incumbent firms? Can markets and policy preferences find a balance?
  • 18.
    Dr Stephen Labson TransAfrican Energy Pty Ltd slabson@transafricanenergy.com www.transafricanenergy.com 18