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Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown
Security Research Lead, CX Technology & Transformation Group
March 2022
It’s not just for developers
Threat Modelling
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 2
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
ATT&CK is a game
changer and where
it works, it can
enable blue and red
to co-exist and
work effectively
together
• However, what happens
when it falls short and
the threat intelligence
and hypotheses doesn’t
exist?
• How do you build threat
intelligence, threat
models, threat
simulations and threat
hunt hypotheses from
first principles?
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 3
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Introduction
• TLDR
• # whoami
• # cat .plan
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 4
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
TLDR
• Not a data scientist
• Could play one in a
movie
• No particular brief to
think blue or red
• This is not a solved
problem
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 5
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
# whoami
• Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown
• Backgroundin telecoms and financial
services sectors
• 15+ years at Portcullis (and now Cisco)
• Security Research Lead, CX EMEAR
Technology & Transformation Group
• Ex-NCSC CHECK Team Leader (9 years)
• CREST Registered Threat Intelligence Analyst
• CREST Practitioner Intrusion Analyst
• ISO 27001 LA
• >150 CVEs to my name
• Covering Windows, Linux, AIX and
Solaris platforms
• Userland through to kernel
• Most recent research: Where 2 Worlds
Collide: Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX,
Black Hat Europe 2018
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 6
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
# cat .plan
• Background
• Protecting a typical
network
• Specific examples
• Knowing your
customer
• Preparing for Black Hat
• Managing (technical)
debt
• Conclusions
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 7
Protecting a typical network
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 8
MEF88 SD-
WAN threat
model
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 9
Examining the SD-WAN threat model
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 10
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
How would you
validate it?
• Validating an SD-WAN
implementation
• Test against specification
• Focus
• Implementation
• Operation
• Use case
• 94/113 threats in the current
draft MEF88 threat model are
deployment rather than
design specific
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 11
Let’s look at some more
specific examples
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 12
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Knowing your
customer
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 13
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
The incident
• Platform suffering from
credential stuffing
• T1078: Valid Accounts
• Credential stuffing wasn’t
in my vocabulary
• Not sure what this is
• Tools/configs identified
on a “hacking forum”
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 14
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
How did we defend
against it?
• Realised it’s using an old
OpenSSL release
• Engineer block based on
TLS ciphers
• Compare ciphers?
• Easier, look at size of
selected suites
• SSL::cipher clientlist
• Detection
• DS0028: Logon Session
• DS0002: User Account
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 15
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Preparing for Black
Hat
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 16
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
The research
• Where 2 worlds collide:
Bringing Mimikatz et al
to UNIX
• T1003: OS Credential
Dumping
• T1558: Steal or Forge
Kerberos Tickets
• I wrote Linikatz
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 17
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
How did would you
defend against it?
• Auditd
• Check the syscalls
• Check file access
• -a always,exit-F dir=/var/lib/sss/db-
F perm=rwx -k linikatz-sss
• Look for static numeric values to
match on
• Constants
• Size parameters
• -a always,exit-F arch=b64 -S
connect -F a2=0x2f-k linikatz-vas
• Detection
• DS0017: Command
• DS0022: File
• DS0009: Process
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 18
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Managing
(technical) debt
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 19
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
The vulnerability
• Insecure permissions on
a retail banking
application
• T1005: Data from
Local System
• T1083: File and
Directory Discovery
• Uncooperative vendor
• Legal moving slowly
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 20
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
How did I defend
against it?
• ACLs and auditing
• Scripting the generation
of an auditing policy and
bespoke ACLs based on
the output of `find’
• Detection
• DS0017: Command
• DS0009: Process
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 21
find /opt/component -name –perm -o+w | while read filename
do
printf -- "-w %s -p r -k flag-%s-rn" “${filename}” “$(printf ”%s” "${filename}" |
tr "/" "_")”>>/etc/audit/rules.d/honeypot-component-dynamic.rules
printf -- "-w %s -p w -k flag-%s-wn" “${filename}” “$(printf ”%s” "${filename}"
| tr "/" "_")”>>/etc/audit/rules.d/honeypot-component-dynamic.rules
printf -- "-w %s -p w -k flag-%s-xn" “${filename}” “$(printf ”%s” "${filename}"
| tr "/" "_")”>>/etc/audit/rules.d/honeypot-component-dynamic.rules
printf -- "-w %s -p a -k flag-%s-an" “${filename}” “$(printf "%s” "${filename}" |
tr "/" "_")”>>/etc/audit/rules.d/honeypot-component-dynamic.rules
done
A dirty script
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 22
Conclusions
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 23
Technique Detection Technique Detection Technique Detection
Initial Access Credentialed
Access
Discovery &
Collection
T1078: Valid
Accounts
DS0028:
Logon
Session
T1003: OS
Credential
Dumping
DS0017:
Command
T1083: File
and Directory
Discovery
DS0017:
Command
DS0002: User
Account
T1558: Steal
or Forge
Kerberos
Tickets
DS0022: File T1005: Data
from Local
System
DS0009:
Process
DS0009:
Process
Putting it all together…
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 24
• Security isn’t all hashes, hostnames and IPs, at least not to begin
with
• Be imaginative and encourage others to experiment
• Study your target
• Don’t be afraid to break out the white board
• Think application-layer, not just network and transport
• ATT&CK gives blue and red a shared language, make full use of it
• Have fun!
Final thoughts
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 25
Questions?
twadhwab@cisco.com
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 27
Bonus material
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 28
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Useful links
• All of the threats -
Intelligence, modelling,
simulation and hunting
through an ATT&CKers lens
• https://github.com/MEF-
GIT/MEF-SDWAN-
Application-Flow-Security-
Threat-Model
• Where 2 worlds collide:
Bringing Mimikatz et al to
UNIX
• https://github.com/timb-
machine/linux-malware
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 29
© 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
Useful links
• Microsoft Threat Modeling
Tool
• https://github.com/cisco/j
oy/
• https://man7.org/linux/ma
n-
pages/man1/strace.1.html
• https://man7.org/linux/ma
n-
pages/man8/auditctl.8.htm
l

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Threat Modelling - It's not just for developers

  • 1. Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown Security Research Lead, CX Technology & Transformation Group March 2022 It’s not just for developers Threat Modelling
  • 2. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 2 © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public ATT&CK is a game changer and where it works, it can enable blue and red to co-exist and work effectively together • However, what happens when it falls short and the threat intelligence and hypotheses doesn’t exist? • How do you build threat intelligence, threat models, threat simulations and threat hunt hypotheses from first principles?
  • 3. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 3 © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Introduction • TLDR • # whoami • # cat .plan
  • 4. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 4 © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public TLDR • Not a data scientist • Could play one in a movie • No particular brief to think blue or red • This is not a solved problem
  • 5. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 5 © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public # whoami • Tim (Wadhwa-)Brown • Backgroundin telecoms and financial services sectors • 15+ years at Portcullis (and now Cisco) • Security Research Lead, CX EMEAR Technology & Transformation Group • Ex-NCSC CHECK Team Leader (9 years) • CREST Registered Threat Intelligence Analyst • CREST Practitioner Intrusion Analyst • ISO 27001 LA • >150 CVEs to my name • Covering Windows, Linux, AIX and Solaris platforms • Userland through to kernel • Most recent research: Where 2 Worlds Collide: Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX, Black Hat Europe 2018
  • 6. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 6 © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public # cat .plan • Background • Protecting a typical network • Specific examples • Knowing your customer • Preparing for Black Hat • Managing (technical) debt • Conclusions
  • 7. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 7 Protecting a typical network
  • 8. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 8 MEF88 SD- WAN threat model
  • 9. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 9 Examining the SD-WAN threat model
  • 10. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 10 © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public How would you validate it? • Validating an SD-WAN implementation • Test against specification • Focus • Implementation • Operation • Use case • 94/113 threats in the current draft MEF88 threat model are deployment rather than design specific
  • 11. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 11 Let’s look at some more specific examples
  • 12. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 12 © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Knowing your customer
  • 13. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 13 © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public The incident • Platform suffering from credential stuffing • T1078: Valid Accounts • Credential stuffing wasn’t in my vocabulary • Not sure what this is • Tools/configs identified on a “hacking forum”
  • 14. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 14 © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public How did we defend against it? • Realised it’s using an old OpenSSL release • Engineer block based on TLS ciphers • Compare ciphers? • Easier, look at size of selected suites • SSL::cipher clientlist • Detection • DS0028: Logon Session • DS0002: User Account
  • 15. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 15 © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Preparing for Black Hat
  • 16. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 16 © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public The research • Where 2 worlds collide: Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX • T1003: OS Credential Dumping • T1558: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets • I wrote Linikatz
  • 17. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 17 © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public How did would you defend against it? • Auditd • Check the syscalls • Check file access • -a always,exit-F dir=/var/lib/sss/db- F perm=rwx -k linikatz-sss • Look for static numeric values to match on • Constants • Size parameters • -a always,exit-F arch=b64 -S connect -F a2=0x2f-k linikatz-vas • Detection • DS0017: Command • DS0022: File • DS0009: Process
  • 18. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 18 © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Managing (technical) debt
  • 19. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 19 © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public The vulnerability • Insecure permissions on a retail banking application • T1005: Data from Local System • T1083: File and Directory Discovery • Uncooperative vendor • Legal moving slowly
  • 20. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 20 © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public How did I defend against it? • ACLs and auditing • Scripting the generation of an auditing policy and bespoke ACLs based on the output of `find’ • Detection • DS0017: Command • DS0009: Process
  • 21. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 21 find /opt/component -name –perm -o+w | while read filename do printf -- "-w %s -p r -k flag-%s-rn" “${filename}” “$(printf ”%s” "${filename}" | tr "/" "_")”>>/etc/audit/rules.d/honeypot-component-dynamic.rules printf -- "-w %s -p w -k flag-%s-wn" “${filename}” “$(printf ”%s” "${filename}" | tr "/" "_")”>>/etc/audit/rules.d/honeypot-component-dynamic.rules printf -- "-w %s -p w -k flag-%s-xn" “${filename}” “$(printf ”%s” "${filename}" | tr "/" "_")”>>/etc/audit/rules.d/honeypot-component-dynamic.rules printf -- "-w %s -p a -k flag-%s-an" “${filename}” “$(printf "%s” "${filename}" | tr "/" "_")”>>/etc/audit/rules.d/honeypot-component-dynamic.rules done A dirty script
  • 22. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 22 Conclusions
  • 23. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 23 Technique Detection Technique Detection Technique Detection Initial Access Credentialed Access Discovery & Collection T1078: Valid Accounts DS0028: Logon Session T1003: OS Credential Dumping DS0017: Command T1083: File and Directory Discovery DS0017: Command DS0002: User Account T1558: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets DS0022: File T1005: Data from Local System DS0009: Process DS0009: Process Putting it all together…
  • 24. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 24 • Security isn’t all hashes, hostnames and IPs, at least not to begin with • Be imaginative and encourage others to experiment • Study your target • Don’t be afraid to break out the white board • Think application-layer, not just network and transport • ATT&CK gives blue and red a shared language, make full use of it • Have fun! Final thoughts
  • 25. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 25 Questions? twadhwab@cisco.com
  • 26.
  • 27. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 27 Bonus material
  • 28. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 28 © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Useful links • All of the threats - Intelligence, modelling, simulation and hunting through an ATT&CKers lens • https://github.com/MEF- GIT/MEF-SDWAN- Application-Flow-Security- Threat-Model • Where 2 worlds collide: Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX • https://github.com/timb- machine/linux-malware
  • 29. © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 29 © 2022 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public Useful links • Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool • https://github.com/cisco/j oy/ • https://man7.org/linux/ma n- pages/man1/strace.1.html • https://man7.org/linux/ma n- pages/man8/auditctl.8.htm l